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In doubt his Mind or Body to prefer, Born but to die, and reas’ning but to err; 
Alike in ignorance, his reason such, Whether he thinks to little, or too much: 
Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confus’d; Still by himself abus’d, or disabus’d; 
Created half to rise, and half to fall; Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all; 
Sole judge of Truth, in endless error hurl’d: The glory, jest, and riddle of the world! 
 
-Alexander Pope 
An Essay on Man 
 
 
 
 
It is a wonderful feeling to recognize the unity of a complex of phenomena that to direct 
observation appear to be quite separate things. 
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The mind is inherently embodied.  Thought is mostly unconscious.  Abstract concepts are 
largely metaphorical.  These are three major findings of cognitive science.  More than 
two millennia of a priori philosophical speculation about these aspects of reason are over.  
Because of these discoveries, philosophy can never be the same again… 
 
Philosophical sophistication is necessary if we are to keep science honest.  Science 
cannot maintain a self-critical stance without a serious familiarity with philosophy and 
alternative philosophies.  Scientists need to be aware of how hidden a priori philosophical 
assumptions can determine their scientific results.  This is an important lesson to be 
drawn from the history of first-generation cognitive science, where we saw how much 
analytic philosophy intruded into the initial conception of what cognitive science was to 
be.  On the other hand, philosophy, if it is to be responsible, cannot simply spin out 
theories of mind, language, and other aspects of human life without seriously 
encountering and understanding the massive body of relevant ongoing scientific research.  
Otherwise, philosophy is just storytelling, a fabrication of narratives ungrounded in the 
realities of human embodiment and cognition.  If we are to know ourselves, philosophy 
needs to maintain an ongoing dialogue with the sciences of mind. 
 
- George Lakoff and Mark Johnson 
Philosophy in the Flesh 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The Nature and Purpose of this Dissertation 
 Since its inception, medical ethics has concerned itself with balancing several key 
concepts – the patient’s best interest, both psychosocial and medical; the patient’s legal rights 
and autonomy; the authenticity of the patient’s decision, i.e., narrative concerns that the patient’s 
choice be reflective of her values, etc.  As is the case with any pluralistic system, these concepts 
are complementary at times and conflicting at times.  Significant efforts to determine just how to 
proceed in any given case result, both in academic circles, in which theories clash and value 
structures rise and fall, as well as in clinical cases, in which academic language gives way to 
clinical context and lives hang in the balance.   
These values have been stressed in different manners at different times – before the 
advent of medical ethics as a field in itself, the physician-patient relationship was defined in 
paternalistic terms.  The physician, being the source of medical knowledge and prognostic 
wisdom, had an air of authority which one dared not question.  Decisions were top-down, in the 
manner of a general commanding his soldiers, and were rarely questioned.  While the patient’s 
concerns were counted, what was in their medical best interest carried the day. 
This perspective evolved over time, and a different model of physician-patient interaction 
emerged.  Patient advocacy found legal and philosophical recourse in autonomy models which 
stressed the ability of a patient to choose the treatment she wanted, and patients’ rights became 
more than an ephemeral concept.  Decisions proceeded on egalitarian terms, in which the patient 
and the treatment team reached an accord – the patient’s medical best interest was now simply 
one factor of many to consider, along with religious principles, social consequences and 
contexts, and legal rights to refuse undesired treatment.  The general was stripped of his rank – 
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choice and responsibility were no longer top-down considerations.  A new era of patient 
autonomy was ushered in, changing the face of medical decision-making. 
This gave rise to ethics committees and consultations – a treatment team would find itself 
conflicted as to how to proceed, and brought in individuals with special knowledge of 
philosophy, theology, and law to facilitate a decision.  The case would be evaluated, the patient 
and/or her family would be interviewed, and non-binding recommendations were made which 
helped the treatment team progress.  Sometimes they clarified communication problems in 
prognosis, sometimes they led to palliative care, sometimes they resolved a family conflict.  The 
welfare of the patient was at the forefront, but was no longer understood as being solely a 
medical issue.  Instead, a shift occurred – the patient became an evolving story, and the choices 
made were meant to reflect the pattern of that patient’s life. 
These concepts of autonomy and authenticity have dominated ethical thought for several 
decades, and have been given significant, if not complete, weight in many theories.  Autonomy is 
seen by many as a deontological norm – an absolute right and duty in some models, a prima 
facie duty in others.  Its value and moral weight are understood as being a priori – it is not 
contingently valuable or worthy simply as a means to some other end. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore this concept of autonomy, and to see how it 
is modified by knowledge from multiple fields.  Philosophy certainly offers compelling accounts 
and definitions, but a fundamental question arises: what does the concept mean in light of what 
we have learned from fields like cognitive psychology and psychiatry?  Philosophy and ethics 
have debated ‘modifiers of the voluntary’ for a long time, but these concepts of coercion 
generally are predicated on conscious awareness and experience.  A more complete model of 
cognition notes that significant thought processes occur at levels which we are only beginning to 
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understand.  These influences are non-conscious: they stem from a collection of processes 
outside of our conscious awareness.  How, therefore, can we exercise control over or appreciate 
the influence of elements of which we aren’t aware?  Many models fiat the ability of the moral 
agent to choose amongst alternatives – these models seem to be less compelling in light of what 
we know and understand from other disciplines.  In fact, the more we learn about the brain, the 
more homuncular they seem – it is almost as if they argue for a little man sitting in our brains, 
selectively choosing what will influence us to act.  These models are untenable – any conception 
of autonomy must include an appreciation for cognitive elements outside cognition, which 
potentially bias us in ways that are inauthentic.  In essence, the concern of this dissertation is 
whether it is possible for depressive disorders – a spectrum of cognitive dysfunction which is 
chronically underdiagnosed in contemporary medicine – to so influence a person as to skew their 
decision-making process.  In upholding choices that may be skewed, we undercut any 
meaningful sense of autonomy.  We destroy that which we would protect in a decision which 
may be the last choice the patient ever makes.  If we claim to be concerned about the welfare of 
our patients, this cannot stand. 
Philosophical Arguments Against Homuncular Autonomy 
 The first avenue of approach to understanding autonomy concerns two related 
philosophical doctrines: reductionism and determinism.  Reductionism in this sense refers to the 
modeling of the structural basis of cognition.  It is almost a truism to argue that cognition needs a 
platform upon which to operate – there must be some physical stuff there that is employed in 
thought.  To the best of our available scientific findings, there is no disembodied thought.  
Whether cognition occurs in terms of neurons and neural pathways or in terms of silicon chips 
and copper wiring, there is something there which allows us to think, emote, rationalize, 
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contextualize, and perform myriad other processes which guide and influence our everyday 
experience.  As such, any cognitive model must include physical elements – the question is still 
open as to whether we radically reduce thought to neurochemistry and cell interactions, or 
whether we account for cognition in pluralistic terms – proposing that there are multiple levels of 
cognition that are mutually influential.  Several philosophical arguments are examined, and 
elements of them are championed or rejected, yielding a sense of reductionism which is 
pluralistic and materialistic.  But this has necessary consequences and raises further questions. 
 If we accept a materialistic account of thought and volition – introduced by the 
experiments of Benjamin Libet – we necessarily raise the question of determinism.  Physical 
systems have laws they must follow; laws of cause and effect are axiomatic in the sciences, and 
are requisite assumptions in accounting for the phenomena of will and volition.  We feel that we 
choose between options; we deliberate in making a choice; we explore the consequences of 
given alternatives prior to exercising our choice.  These experiences, however, have neurological 
bases and follow certain laws, governing possibilities and thought pathways.  Further, there are 
elements of volition that demonstrably are not within our control or conscious awareness.  In 
fact, choice occurs fractions of a second before we are even aware of having chosen.  As in the 
discussion of reductionism, several ideas are considered, critiqued, and upheld or rejected.  What 
emerges is a sense of underdetermination – the idea that there are several causal factors in choice 
that individually may not determine action, but are essentially additive.  When a threshold is 
reached, the individual causal factors force a decision – the process of which we are not 
necessarily aware.  These additive causal factors in cognition stem from automatic psychological 
processes, the essence of chapter two. 
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Psychological Automaticity, Backstage Cognition, and Cognitive Heuristics 
 The second prong of the argument against homuncular autonomy concerns the automatic 
elements of human cognition.  These processes by definition are outside of our awareness, and 
may only be made evident in discussion with others.  Information is taken in and processed in a 
variety of ways, employing a variety of heuristics – cognitive ‘rules of thumb’.  Deliberation and 
decision-making occur in light of these heuristics, which causes some concern.  Cognitive 
heuristics by definition are not algorithms – they are not detailed plans that necessarily yield 
correct decisions or interpretations of situations or data. 
 Further, these heuristics are very common – the phenomena of being on ‘autopilot’ is not 
limited to specific circumstances.  Automaticity is a generalized phenomena; it can occur in a 
variety of situations or contexts, influencing not only how we drive to work but how we 
understand information, how we act, how we behave towards strangers, friends, family, and 
loved ones.  Automaticity factors into the thought processes we have all the time – they are 
refined and strengthened over time unless challenged.  As such, our biases become deeply 
ingrained, and may prevent us from seeing situations objectively or accurately.  Autonomy is 
only meaningful if we can genuinely choose between options – as such, cognitive biases must be 
identified, addressed, and challenged if they are mistaken.  Preserving choice for the sake of 
choice is meaningless unless some effort is made to prevent error. 
 This discussion yields a deeper problem, however – at issue is whether there is even such 
thing as a ‘rational’ process, unless we simply define the term as acting out the determined 
pathways of normal cognition.  Normal, however, is just as problematic – what defines normal 
and abnormal?  Unless one is discussing clear cases of psychosis and dysfunction, the issue of 
normalcy is not so black and white.  If we cannot clearly define normal and abnormal – not 
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necessarily the point of this chapter, but an important ancillary issue – how are we to determine 
rational and irrational?  Further, we chronically underdiagnose psychiatric disorders like 
depression – these are causal factors of critical importance, as they can have biological bases 
which directly impact cognition at several reductive levels.  The prevalence of these disorders is 
the focus of chapter three. 
The Spectrum of Depressive Disorders and Comorbidity in Common Medical Conditions 
 Chapter three notes the diagnostic criteria for commonly occurring depressive disorders, 
exploring their biological basis.  We can understand psychiatric dysfunction in both psychosocial 
as well as biochemical terms.  We do not look for neurotransmitter dysfunctions when someone 
loses his job or spouse – these have principally environmental or exogenous etiologies, and while 
pharmacological interventions can help, in general we seek to offer talk therapy approaches and 
help the patient develop coping skills.  There can be, however, biological dysfunctions, leading 
to endogenous depressions – monoamine deficiencies, structural abnormalities in the frontal 
cortices, limbic system, hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical pathways, hippocampal 
degeneration, etc. 
 The chapter then shifts to discussions of five common medical conditions: Alzheimer’s 
disease, stroke, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, and cancer.  All of these have pathologies 
potentially affecting important structures in cognition and affective (emotional) regulation – they 
may produce significant rates of depression that go undiagnosed, due to unfamiliarity with the 
diagnostic criteria or symptom masking (the physical signs of depression are explained by the 
physical signs of the underlying medical illness).  These are not the only conditions that give rise 
to depression – rather they simply note the five conditions I experienced while on clinical rounds 
at St. Francis Health System and while working on the adult and geriatric behavioral health units 
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at Mercy Hospital North Shore Campus.  Other conditions are mentioned that have significant 
rates of depression.  The overall point of the chapter is that psychiatric comorbidities are much 
more common than is presently diagnosed, and that these can fundamentally affect cognitive 
processing, due to their effects at structural and psychosocial levels of cognitive reduction.  In 
fact, depressive disorders have produced their own heuristics, discussed in chapter four. 
Depressive Heuristics and Homuncular Autonomy Models 
 Chapter four crystallizes the argument thus far – autonomy and cognition are seen to be 
easily influenced if not determined outright by the physical condition of the cognizing agent.  
New cognitive pathways can be introduced by the depressive disorders – new heuristics that can 
automatically affect the agent’s cognition, outside of her awareness, rendering her decisions 
inauthentic and non-autonomous.  There is some debate concerning this, however.  Alloy and 
Abramson have championed a heuristic called ‘depressive realism’, in which the mild to 
moderately depressed person actually makes more realistic decisions than individuals at their 
baseline or severely depressed.  Ironically, a little depression may be a good thing, if we are 
looking at purely objective decision-making.  However, this view has been challenged by Beck’s 
argument for a depressive bias – an overly negative and pessimistic view of the world that is 
more unrealistic than everyday cognition and choice. 
 Autonomy models in the philosophical and ethical literature have a tendency to avoid 
these issues – not by answering them or accounting for them, but rather by dismissing or 
ignoring them.  They offer a homuncular sense of autonomy, and elect not to consider the 
significant arguments that our vaunted ‘rationality’ and ‘autonomy’ may not necessarily be what 
they are cracked up to be.  As in previous chapters, several popular arguments will be explored 
and critiqued.  What emerges is a model of autonomy not just informed by cognitive psychology, 
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but dependent upon it.  Ultimately, autonomy, it is argued, ought not be such an absolute 
principle – it seems that in an effort to move away from the paternalistic model so prevalent in 
historical medicine, we have overcorrected, and have improperly deified a nebulous sense of 
autonomy.  A proper sense of autonomy is much more deterministic and less ‘rational’ than 
modern models suggest.  As such, greater care is necessary in assessing competence to forgo 
treatment – quite simply, current models allow for more bad decisions with fatal consequences, a 
reality antithetical with the stated and implied purposes of ethics in medicine.  A means of 
addressing this reality is proposed in the final chapter. 
Ethical Casuistry in Decision-Making 
 The final chapter presents nine case studies, creating a metric by which patient 
presentation can be judged and assessed.  These cases are drawn from clinical experiences and 
narrative accounts of depression; they are designed to offer the clinician clear instances of 
compromised autonomy and authentic autonomy, along with a continuum of cases in between, so 
as to facilitate decision-making, both for the clinician and the patient. 
 Overall, it is hoped that this dissertation will serve not only academic and theoretical 
purposes, such as integrating germane elements across disciplines into a unified model of 
physician-patient decision-making, but also clinical purposes, such as helping clinicians in both 
recognizing the prevalence of depressive disorders outside of psychiatric floors as well as 
assisting treatment teams and ethics consult teams in assessing whether it is appropriate for a 
patient to forgo treatment.  The issue is quite complex, and given its severity, ideologically 
simplistic models must necessarily be rejected.  If we genuinely care for our patients, we ought 
to help them reach meaningful choices, instead of fiating an empty and ill-defined autonomy. 
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CHAPTER ONE: WE’RE NOT AS FREE AS WE THINK WE ARE – REDUCTIONIST 
AND DETERMINIST ONTOLOGIES IN HUMAN COGNITION 
 
The discussion of cognition and our experience of the phenomenon begins in philosophy.  
Epistemology and ontology have wrestled with these foundational issues since at least the time 
of the ancient Greeks and it remains a fertile area of discussion.  It is a truism to suggest that we 
all have unique perspectives on the world, and that we are the sum total of – and possibly more 
than – our collective experiences, memories, beliefs and desires.  But the fundamental question is 
where do these phenomena come from?  Is our sense of self based on anything substantial, or is 
it an accidental epiphenomenon of a complex neural network?  If it is something expressible in 
terms of simpler relationships, is the nature of our cognition fundamentally determined by the 
architecture of our individual neural network? 
 These are critical questions in epistemology, ontology, and ethics.  As the overall purpose 
of this dissertation is to explore the interaction of depressive disorders and our thought processes 
in the choice to forgo medical treatment, it is necessary to understand just how much of our 
conscious experience is genuinely up to us.  Autonomy becomes a very different concept if it is 
essentially an acting out of underlying deterministic forces, instead of the more radical agentic 
choice – an almost homuncular view of a little executive entity picking and choosing amongst 
causal forces.  The model that emerges from the literature suggests that both reductionism and 
determinism are more accurate foundations of our subjective experience than their alternatives, 
and each will be explored in turn.  Let me establish at the outset that this dissertation is not 
simply a defense of determinism – in the next two chapters, I will repeatedly argue that human 
cognition and choice are heavily influenced by deterministic elements which are mediated or 
modified by conscious processes.  I will reject outright models that propose a radical 
indeterminism as factually incorrect in light of what neuroscience and cognitive psychology 
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demonstrate; such models are frequently found in ‘folk models’, which will be explored as they 
become relevant.  The model of human agency that I will defend throughout suggests that 
cognition begins as a deterministic, non-conscious process, which, if not consciously challenged 
and explored, will simply act out the responses determined by environmental and cognitive 
stimuli.  This is an example of what the literature refers to as ‘underdeterminism’ – that a causal  
threshold can be reached, yielding determined action, if there is no voluntary break in the 
process.  As a further necessary caveat, and to avoid potential equivocation, I will use the terms 
‘non-conscious’ and ‘un-/sub-/preconscious’ interchangeably, as they both refer to processes 
outside our normal conscious experience.  Ultimately, the stage will be set for an exploration of 
cognition in chapter two – we will see that agency and autonomy are not necessarily as free as 
we make them out to be. 
REDUCTIONISM 
Before discussing reductionism, it is useful to place it in context.  The concept of mind 
and agency is influenced by the classic philosophical debate concerning the mind and body.  At 
its heart is the question of whether there is some non-physical element to human existence and 
cognition – whether our ‘mind’ is something fundamentally different from our body.1  John 
Searle sums up the crux of the issue: 
We think of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that 
science tells us consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, physical particles.  
Now, how can we square these two conceptions?  How, for example, can it be the 
case that the world contains nothing but unconscious physical particles, and yet 
that it also contains consciousness?  How can a mechanical universe contain 
intentionalistic human beings – that is, human beings that can represent the world 
to themselves?  How, in short, can an essentially meaningless world contain 
meanings?2 
                                                 
1 It is well beyond the purpose of this dissertation to properly address the mind/body debate.  Such an effort would 
require significantly more space than is available.  As such, I will limit the discussion to the comments of John 
Searle, C. Wade Savage, and Michael Rugg. 
2 John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 13. 
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Searle argues that all mental phenomena have underlying neural processes.3  However, he 
continues that the model we ought to have of the brain is not purely an element of 
‘microproperties’ (i.e., properties of individual particles or neurons); rather, we ought to 
understand that there are underlying microproperties and overarching ‘macroproperties’ (i.e., 
emergent properties or features that only apply to the larger structure).4  Macroproperties, for 
instance, would be the liquidity of water – we cannot “reach into this glass of water, pull out a 
molecule and say: ‘This one’s wet.’”5 Consciousness or self-concept are these kinds of 
macroproperties – they are not properties of an individual neuron, they can only be understood at 
a higher level of organization.  Thus, we can account for mental properties, but we recognize 
their contingency upon the underlying structure.  We cannot have ‘wet’ in isolation, just as we 
cannot have ‘consciousness’ in isolation.  Further, these mental properties can have causal force, 
but are so in light of their underlying structures (microproperties).6  Understanding of micro- and 
macroproperties should not be understood as dualism in the physical/nonphysical sense, however 
– mental states are still the result of physical states.7 
A recurrent challenge to materialism and reductionism concern dualist claims of the 
innate separation of the mind and body.  Stemming from Descartes, the arguments essentially 
claim that there is something non-physical which unites conscious experience into memory, self-
awareness, and identity.  Patricia Churchland argues that this dualistic claim rests upon quite 
precarious grounds, for several reasons.  First, the dualist has a significant burden to prove – how 
does the non-physical interact with the physical?  Unless there is some kind of physical medium 
                                                 
3 Searle, 19. 
4 Searle, p. 20-1 
5 Searle, 22. 
6 Searle, 26. 
7 Searle, p. 26-27 
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through which it operates, there is no real means by which a non-physical entity can influence a 
physical object.8  Descartes’ efforts to answer this question by the soul influencing animal spirits 
in the pineal gland come up wanting – after all, these animal spirits were physical objects, too, so 
the same conundrum occurs.  Second, personal phenomena like cognition, consciousness, moods, 
moral and religious feelings are suggested to be autonomous subjective properties.  The problem, 
however, is that each of these are affected by neuropharmacology, suggesting a physical basis for 
each.9  The phenomena of subjective experience is discussed below.  Third, any claim that a 
dualist makes regarding the unifying properties of the non-physical mind can also be made by 
the materialist or reductionist.  Both positions are faced with a conundrum, however, in that 
neither position is iron-clad.  To date, neither the materialist nor the dualist position can claim an 
absolute accounting of the unifying properties of mind – there is a standoff, which will only be 
resolved by research.10  Despite her noted objections, Churchland does stress that we ought not 
reject the dualist hypothesis outright; however, as she cautions that future research may provide a 
means of the non-physical influencing the physical.11  We will return to explicit challenges to 
reductionism following a few definitional and explanatory comments below. 
 C. Wade Savage takes this issue further, arguing that nonphysical causes ought not be a 
part of science – the argument against such non-physical causes illustrates the conceptual 
difficulties in physical/non-physical interaction: one can neither prove nor disprove the existence 
of non-physical causes or objects (e.g., the ‘mind’, a deity, etc.).12  Such arguments cannot 
provide empirical data – how do we prove that God caused a natural disaster, rather than plate 
                                                 
8 Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), 318. 
9 Churchland, Neurophilosophy, 319. 
10 Churchland, 322. 
11 Churchland, 320. 
12 C. Wade Savage, "An Old Ghost in a New Body," in Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical 
Inquiry, ed. Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell and Irwin Savodnik (New York: Plenum Press, 1976), 125-53, p. 
150-1. 
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tectonics?  How do we demonstrate that an immaterial ‘mind’ caused a specific neural pathway 
to activate?  Both questions are fundamentally unanswerable.  In light of this, this dissertation 
argues along materialist lines – we can see neurons firing and following pathways, we can trace 
patterns of electrical activity, in short, we can see the physical evidence supporting materialist 
theories.   Michael Rugg argues that materialist theories allow for functional explanations of 
cognition – accounting for cognition in terms of interactive structure is an empirically testable 
and verifiable model, and allows us to interpret and integrate future physiological findings.13 
These models are necessarily reductive, a concept to which we will now turn. 
Definitions 
 As the overall argument of this dissertation is that depressive disorders can potentially 
give rise to conscious and unconscious cognitive bias in decision-making, it is necessary to 
discuss the means by which a depressive illness can affect a patient.  At the heart of the matter is 
how mental events are to be understood.  ‘Choice’ ostensibly refers to our reflection  upon and 
selection between different options based upon our internal state, values, and beliefs.  All of 
these concepts are in some manner related to physical structure – while as of this writing we 
have only a general idea about the neural mechanisms underlying our higher cognitive functions, 
it remains an axiom of cognitive science that there must be some physical structure underlying 
them.  In essence, we have to have a suitably complex physical structure that actually does the 
thinking.  As such, it is necessary to explore the interaction of the mental and the physical – 
whether, in fact, there is actually a divide between them. 
 As was noted in the outset of this dissertation, the underlying assumption of cognition 
and autonomy is reductionistic, but this in itself is unclear – there are a variety of understandings 
                                                 
13 Michael D. Rugg, "Introduction," in Cognitive Neuroscience, ed. Michael D. Rugg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1996), 6. 
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of the term ‘reductionism’.  The first part of this chapter is a discussion of reductionism as a 
concept, as this phrase has come to mean many things over the course of intellectual history.  
Patricia Churchland notes that: 
The word ‘reduction’ has a bewildering range of applications in the literature.  
‘Reductionism’ has come in some quarters to be used as a general term of insult 
and abuse.  Sometimes it is used as a synonym for ‘behaviorism’ (which is a case 
of the vague hounding the vague), or as a synonym for such diverse sins as 
‘materialism,’ ‘bourgeois capitalism,’ ‘experimentalism,’ ‘vivisectionism,’ 
‘communism,’ ‘militarism,’ ‘sociobiology,’ and ‘atheism.’  With such diversity, 
equivocation is inevitable, and often as not opposing sides in a debate on 
reductionism go right by each other because they have not agreed upon what they 
disagree about.”14 
 
On the cognitive level, reductionism is meant to refer to the ability to represent a cognitive 
process with a correlating neurological process – for example, a given neuron or neural system 
firing which corresponds to a perceived mental phenomenon.  It seems beyond question that all 
mental processes must have some physical correlation, whether gross or fine in nature.  While 
the debate is still ongoing about whether consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon of neural 
activity, it seems unscientific and almost regressive to suggest that there is a non-physical basis 
for thought and reasoning processes.  Each heartbeat is triggered by unconscious neural activity 
– we do not have to think about every systolic and diastolic cycle.  In a like manner, we 
experience conscious, subconscious, and preconscious events through neural processing 
pathways – we think about things at a variety of levels, some accurate, some inaccurate (these 
types of heuristics and cognitive distortions and clarifications will be discussed in later chapters). 
 Reductionism ought not to be understood as explaining everything cognitive in pure terms 
of neuroanatomy and physiology; it seems unrealistic that there would be a cognitive structure 
for each and every event, emotion, and cognitive experience we have.  Rather, we should view 
cognitive function as the interplay between levels of explanation.  Our goal is to explain 
                                                 
14 Churchland, Neurophilosophy, p. 278. 
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cognitive mechanisms in terms of appropriate simplicity – some explanations will be more 
complex than others.  Wimsatt notes: 
The point of reduction is not to get an ‘infinite regress’ explanation for 
‘eventually everything’ in terms of ‘essentially nothing,’ but only to make sure 
that everything gets explained – at some level or other.  This in fact allows for the 
possibility that some things may require explanation at higher levels…Also, while 
we may explain away false theories, or explain why we believed them, we do not 
literally explain something false or something that did not happen.  So the full 
explanatory maxim which takes account of both of these factors is: Explain 
everything that occurs and nothing that doesn’t.15  
 
As such, we ought not limit ourselves solely to explanations in terms of anatomy, structure, and 
signaling; however, we ought not simply throw up our hands in despair and fiat non-physical 
causative elements (the ‘ghost in the machine’). 
 In his discussion of reductionistic arguments in molecular biology, Sarkar argues that 
contemporary reductionism is essentially a modern incarnation of traditional mechanism, in 
which living organisms are recast as complex machines.16  He argues that there are both 
epistemological and ontological issues present, noting that “the former include questions about 
what exists in a system, whether the laws and mechanisms at one level determine phenomena at 
another, etc.  The latter include the questions about whether reductionist explanations of 
phenomena can be offered and whether research programs should be based on reductionist 
strategies.”17  As such, our discussion of reductionism is not simply a manner of representing 
data and neural interactions, but also our understanding of what it means to be human and how 
we should study ourselves. 
                                                 
15 William C. Wimsatt, "Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem," in Consciousness and 
the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry, ed. Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell and Irwin Savodnik (New 
York: Plenum Press, 1976), 205-67, p. 225. 
16 Sahotra Sarkar, Molecular Models of Life: Philosophical Papers on Molecular Biology (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2005), p. 70-71. Hereafter, ‘Sarkar’. 
17 Sarkar, p. 106. 
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 Organisms exhibit remarkable biological complexity – processes that seem everyday or 
mundane are actually the culmination of myriad chemical and physical interactions with specific 
pathways, dependencies, and outcomes.  An explanation of cognitive function, perhaps the most 
intricate process in the human body, would seem to be irreducibly complex.  Surely the 
phenomena of consciousness, memory, will, identity, emotion, ambition, and desire could not be 
explained in simple terms.  This is, however, not necessarily the case.  Sarkar and Paul 
Churchland both caution that arguments of irreducibility ought not be daunting – we should view 
the study of cognitive processes not as impossible ventures, but simply as very complex 
problems.18  Even in the face of complexity, we must recognize that there is some dependence on 
physiology. 
The point being, every mental event has some physical correlate, and hence, should be 
explicable in neurological terms.  This is not to suggest that there is a strict one to one ratio 
between emotional and neurological state – it seems reasonable that a given emotional state may 
correspond to several different neuroanatomical states.  Just as there are myriad reasons why 
one’s car might not start, so too could there be multiple reasons why an agent is depressed, 
angry, agitated, etc.    Later chapters will note a variety of etiologies for depressive disorders – 
there are several competing theories, all of which can explain a depressive state to varying 
degrees.  The task at hand is to explore the most likely representation of the physical bases 
underlying cognition.  I will not claim that mental phenomena are only to be understood in terms 
of individual neurons or neural systems.  Paralleling Sarkar, for reasons which will become 
                                                 
18 Sarkar, p. 121; Paul M. Churchland, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1995), p. 189. 
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clearer in later sections, I will argue for less radical forms of reduction, such as arguments of 
neural networks and interplay between levels of organization.19 
Concepts/Types of Reduction 
Parallels in Molecular Biology 
 In framing his discussion of reductionism, Sarkar argues against simpler reduction of 
molecular biology to genetics.  While a detailed discussion of his views on this form of 
reductionism are interesting and fecund in a general sense, they are beyond the purview of this 
dissertation.  As such, this dissertation will offer a simplified treatment of his rejection of the 
‘hereditarian program’ as a parallel to the present discussion of mental phenomena.  To 
paraphrase Sarkar, mental phenomena may be reductionistic, but they are not simplistic.20  Even 
in a discussion of molecular biology, however, and despite his cautionary language, Sarkar does 
note that we must recognize the interplay between the biological constitution of the organism (at 
the genetic level) and its cognitive processes: 
Proponents of the Human Genome Project exploited that hope to initiate massive 
blind DNA-sequencing projects: the full sequencing of entire genomes without 
prior concern for the functions of the sequences.  The same hope led to numerous, 
often irresponsible, claims that complex human behaviors (including male sexual 
orientation, schizophrenia, alcoholism, autism, reading disability, bipolar affective 
disorder [or manic depression], neuroticism, adolescent vocational interests, 
spatial and verbal reasoning, alleged differences in intelligence, etc.) had genetic 
etiologies.  From this perspective, phenotypic traits are being explained from a 
genetic basis: the framework is one of genetic reductionism.  Not one of these 
claims of genetic etiology has survived further experimentation and 
scrutiny…though it would also be irresponsible to argue that inherited biological 
constitution has no role in the etiology of human behavior.21 
 
Having conceded some interplay between biology and cognition, Sarkar argues that suggestions 
of simple gene-to-phenotype expression (the idea that having the genes to code for a specific 
                                                 
19 Sarkar, p. 112. 
20 Sarkar, p. 3. 
21 Sarkar, p. 13. 
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characteristic automatically and with necessity leads to that characteristic’s actual expression) is 
overly facile.  There are myriad other influences on phenotype.  As he states,  “Molecular 
biology has done much to demonstrate that genetic reductionism itself is sterile by showing how 
complex the path is from DNA sequence to phenotype, even for ordinary morphological 
phenotypes, let alone complex behavioral ones.  From the molecular perspective, simple 
genotype-phenotype determinations are exceptional; phenotypic plasticity is ubiquitous.”22  As 
such, we see an implicit argument for a complex diasthesis-stress model of gene expression 
(diasthesis referring to genetic predispositions, stress referring to environmental stressors that 
lead to phenotypic expression of the gene, whether in physical or cognitive terms).  In fact, the 
argument being made is not simply one of individual genes – many traits are polygenetic, and as 
such, require more than simply the presence of a given amino acid sequence.  Rather, the 
complex whole of the genome and the proteins for which it codes (hence genomics and 
proteomics as fields of study, respectively) are more relevant to discussions of cellular and 
organism phenotype.  Proteomics offers a reductionistic, but not simplistic, account of cellular 
function and the behavior of the overall organism.23 
 All of this has been discussed in an effort to note that reductionism is not simply 
relationship between objects or theories.  Reductionism takes many forms, and can allow for 
different methodologies – that is to say, there are many ways in which we can understand how 
the reduction takes place.  Sarkar notes three elementary forms of reductionism: theory 
reduction, explanatory reduction, and constitutive reduction.24  In general terms, theory reduction 
refers to efforts to relate one theory to another – a theory is shown to be represented in the terms 
of a simpler or more fundamental theory (e.g., we can understand digestion [a higher level 
                                                 
22 Sarkar, p. 14. 
23 Sarkar, p. 34. 
24 Sarkar, p. 55. 
 11
process] in terms of biochemistry [a lower level process]).  Explanation is not always required 
with this form of reduction, but this frequently occurs.25 Because of this occasional rift between 
theory reduction and explanation, a second type of reduction is necessary, hence explanatory 
reduction.  In this type of reduction, an explanation of phenomena in one theory is understood in 
terms of another.  The third type of reduction is constitutive reduction, in which it is asserted that 
“that upper-level (intuitively larger) systems are composed of lower-level (intuitively smaller) 
systems and conform to the laws governing the latter.  Unlike the cases of the previous two 
categories, models from this category of reductionism necessarily involve the separation of their 
domains into levels of organization.”26  These categories are not mutually exclusive – reductions 
can be represented in any or all of the three categories, or may be shown not to be reducible at 
all.27 
Theory Reductionism 
At its heart, theory reduction is the claim that theories can be reduced to more 
fundamental theories, that is, a particular theory is derived from some other, more basic theory.  
Sarkar notes that the most plausible argument of theory reduction derives from the work of 
Nagel and Schaffner.  Nagel’s model makes an epistemological claim about context-dependent 
conditional or biconditional truth between two theories (i.e., that for a given context or situation, 
the overall truth of the reduction will be contingent upon the conditional (‘if…then…’) or 
biconditional (‘if and only if’) truth of the relation between theories).28  In essence, the 
relationship between the two theories makes an epistemological claim:  a reduction is true if both 
the theory being reduced and the reducing theory are true.  Schaffner modifies this claim by 
                                                 
25 Sarkar, p. 58. 
26 Sarkar, p. 58. 
27 Sarkar, p. 76. 
28 Sarkar, p. 60. 
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noting that the reduced theory is not directly derived from the reducing theory; instead, the 
reducing theory produces a modified version of the reduced theory.29  Hence, the final model of 
theory reduction from these two accounts is that a reducing theory both modifies and is corrected 
by the modified theory (hence biconditionality). 
 Wimsatt notes that there are objections to theory reductionism from logical and semantic 
perspectives.  Philosophers have charged that while there may be some similarity between the 
reduced and reducing theories, there are meaning changes present that prevent a reduction from 
one to the other.  Hence, they argue, reductionistic arguments commit fallacies of equivocation.30  
Wimsatt rejects this argument, and suggests that in the event of meaning change, we must simply 
understand it as another aspect of the reduction to explore and explain.  He notes that “the 
assumption of a reduction of this type is generally that the new theory is true, but that the old 
theory to be derived from it is literally false.  So if the argument form is valid, there had better be 
an equivocation somewhere!”31 
 Wimsatt suggests that there are fundamentally different types of theory reduction: 
interlevel and intralevel.  Interlevel reduction occurs between systems of organization.  For 
instance, there is a fundamentally different level of organization between an entire organism and 
the cells of which it is composed.  An interlevel reduction would attempt to explain social 
functioning (a higher level phenomenon) in terms of biochemistry and physics (lower level 
phenomena).  An intralevel reduction, by contrast, offers explanations of complex phenomena at 
                                                 
29 Sarkar, p. 60. 
30 A fallacy of equivocation is a logical error in which words take on different meanings, producing invalid 
arguments.  For example, in the syllogism “A 747 is a plane.  A plane is a carpenter’s tool.  Therefore, a 747 is a 
carpenter’s tool” the fallacy of equivocation stems from an inappropriate usage of the term ‘plane’.  Contextually, 
each of the premises contains a correct usage of the term ‘plane’ – however, the conclusion does not follow, as it 
attempts to use one meaning of the term entirely out of context (i.e., it attempts to use the context from premise 1, 
when the conclusion should properly use the context from premise 2). 
31 William C. Wimsatt, "Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem," in Consciousness and 
the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry, ed. Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell and Irwin Savodnik (New 
York: Plenum Press, 1976), 218. 
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a given level of organization in light of more basic theories of explanation at that level.  For 
example, “[r]elativistic mechanics may reduce to classic mechanics (etc.) but it clearly replaces 
(rather than reduces to) Aristotelian physics.”32  Interlevel reduction resists relation between 
theories, but intralevel reduction might not.33  The key concern in reduction is the question of 
translation – how easily one theory can translate into the terms of another.  The easier the 
translation, the more replaceable the reduced theory.  By contrast, the more difficult the 
translation, the more essential the reduced theory – in fact, with enough difficulty in translation, 
it follows that a theory might not be reducible at all!34 
 Wimsatt supports Schaffner’s revised biconditional model, but notes that changes and 
corrections take place in theories at all levels of organization, but tend to be visible only in the 
upper levels.  These changes affect the ‘fit’ of the model at that organization level, which then 
also has varying effects on models at other levels.  In intralevel reduction, there is some wiggle 
room; interlevel reductions, however, requires significantly more precision: 
Considering only two levels, in an idealized reduction, this means that the theories 
at these two levels undergo a coevolution – they are the major factors producing 
change in each other: A lower-level model is advanced to explain an upper-level 
phenomenon which it doesn’t fit exactly.  This leads to a closed look at the 
phenomenon, and perhaps results in some change in the way in or detail with 
which it is described.  This will also lead to changes in the lower level model and 
may suggest new phenomena to look for.  These changes usually produce an 
improvement in ‘fit’ in some respects, but may involve a poorer fit in others, or 
suggest new areas in which fit must be obtained.  But as argued above, interlevel 
explanation requires exact fit in all relevant dimensions, so the cycle will be 
repeated as many times as necessary to produce it.35 
 
As such, it is easier for us to argue for reductionistic theoretical models in intralevel terms, but 
interlevel claims requires a higher onus of proof. 
                                                 
32 Wimsatt, "Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem," 219. 
33 Wimsatt, p. 221. 
34 Wimsatt, p. 222-3 
35 Wimsatt, p. 231. 
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 A final note regarding Wimsatt’s treatment of theory reduction – there are multiple levels 
of organization, but it is not necessarily clear that there is any particular order.  Absent a clear 
order, it is not clear that we can definitively state what reduces to what – levels of organization 
are interrelated and defined in light of each other (i.e., the body is defined in terms of cells, organ 
systems, social existence, etc., and each of these levels can be explained in terms of other 
organizational levels).  This creates quite a conundrum: 
Is reduction impossible in such complicated situations?  If orderability of levels 
fails, this means that we can no longer say what is composed of what.  On a view 
of reduction that emphasized ontological simplicity, or regarding upper level 
things as ‘logical constructs’ or aggregates of lower level things, this would seem 
to be a crucial failure.  The fact that anatomical organs can be viewed as made up 
of physiological processes and physiological systems as made up of anatomical 
components suggests that neither view is complete and also that neither kind of 
entity is really totally made up of the other.36 
 
As a consequence, it is necessary to establish what constitutes higher and lower order processes 
(if such an ordering is possible).  This is especially difficult in light of the complex interaction of 
levels of organization involved in cognition.  Wimsatt notes that the reduction of mental 
phenomena to physical phenomena is not necessarily a quick and easy process.  In fact, when 
complete the reduction may not be perfect or crystal clear: 
If reduction of the mental to the physical is possible, it may be with this residual 
indeterminacy: It may be unclear exactly what psychology is being reduced to, 
and unclear exactly what is being reduced to neurophysiology, but the malaise 
may disappear, leaving only the conviction that the explanatory task is complete, 
and without ever having invoked forces which were inexplicable at lower levels.  
Probably that is the most a reductionist can ask, and probably also it is enough.37 
 
While some indeterminacy may remain, this dissertation will assume that there is at least some 
degree of order in levels of organization in cognition. 
Explanatory Reductionism 
                                                 
36 Wimsatt, p. 255. 
37 Wimsatt, p. 256. 
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 Explanatory reductionism is the easiest of the models of reduction to explain – it simply 
suggests that phenomena are explicable in simpler terms, theories, or rules.  There are, however, 
challenges implicit in this approach.  Sarkar argues that the issues of reduction and explanation 
ought to be considered separately, and he suggests that there are at least two compelling reasons 
to do so.38  First, there is no generally agreed upon explanation of explanation!  That is to say, in 
an effort to reduce one theory to another, we may inadvertently commit an error in translation 
that will prevent the reduction from being acceptable.  This error in translation may, in fact, have 
nothing implicitly to do with the theory being reduced – it may be a purely methodological error 
which prevents the reduction from occurring.  Hence, the model of the reduction may be in error.  
Second, explanation routinely involves approximation, and there is not presently a completely 
objective (i.e., context-independent) definition of a ‘good approximation.’  There are other 
considerations aside from definitional ones: for instance, how a question is posed, the rigor of the 
scientific field, etc.  This he argues, “further underscores the importance of keeping the issue of 
explanation separate from that of reduction even while construing reduction as a form of 
explanation.”39 
 Sarkar suggests that maintaining the distinction between reduction and explanation also 
allows for more fecund exploration of a given reduction, because these seem to capture the 
essence of real reductions: 
There are two intuitions that motivate this interest.  First, scientific explanation is 
often ‘messy’ and involves that use of semiempirical rules and the invocation of 
mechanisms that do not form part of any fully explicated theory.  At best, in such 
cases, explanation involves the use of a fragment of a theory.  Reduction, in such 
circumstances, can only be construed as a relation between such rules, 
mechanisms or fragments, not as a relation between theories.  However, even in 
such cases, certain kinds of explanation are regarded as being reductive, and a 
general account of types of reduction needs to be able to incorporate these.  
                                                 
38 Sarkar, p. 65-6. 
39 Sarkar, p. 65-6. 
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Second, the Nagel and Schaffner models, applied to interlevel reductions and 
explanations, do not explicitly incorporate the basic idea that a reductive 
explanation is the explanation of a whole in terms of its parts.40 
 
As with theory reduction, there seems to be an element of indeterminacy or ‘messiness’ in 
scientific reductions.  However, indeterminacy in reduction does not necessarily translate into an 
absence of cognitive modeling that is reductionistic in nature – it is still possible to note essential 
versus accidental elements of cognition.  Cognition, for instance, can involve many levels of 
organization with complex interactions, and yet it is still explicable, in Sarkar’s words, as a 
whole in terms of its parts. 
Constitutive Reductionism 
 Sarkar argues that constitutive reductionism necessarily requires that higher level 
phenomena be explicable in terms of lower order phenomena – this ‘research program’ 
constitutes an ontological claim about the organism.41  Further, he notes that it requires that “all 
biological processes occur in such a way that they are consistent with physical law.”42  In 
essence, these two conditions require that upper level phenomena (e.g., complex phenomena like 
consciousness, memory, cognition, etc.) cannot be changed without a corresponding change in 
lower level phenomena (e.g., neural network structure, neuromodulators, etc.), and vice versa.  
This relationship is called supervenience (i.e., higher order phenomena are supervenient on lower 
order phenomena).43  Sarkar argues that the ‘research program’ exploring the proposed reduction 
might fail, either because it was pursued improperly or prematurely, or because the research 
program might be in error – no such reduction might be possible.  Sarkar cites the reduction of 
mental phenomena to physical phenomena as a paradigmatic example: 
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41 Sarkar, p. 69. 
42 Sarkar, p. 119. 
43 Sarkar, p. 69. 
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[I]t could be the case that the research program is itself fundamentally mistaken.  
However, this would probably bring into question whether even any model of 
constitutive reduction is itself applicable.  The only plausible example where so 
fundamentally mistaken a research program might be being pursued is the case of 
the attempted reduction of the psychological realm to the physical and, here, it is 
easy to see that, should the program fail, the ontological assumption involved, that 
is, constitutive reductionism itself, is exactly what would have to be questioned.44 
 
The difficulty, however, is how we can account for changes in cognitive processing, indeed 
changes in personality, following neurological insult or injury.  However, it is likely that Sarkar 
is simply proposing a hypothetical, rather than explicitly rejecting the thesis that mental 
phenomena are contingent on and expressible in underlying physical terms. 
Computational Models 
A popular concept of cognitive processing involves comparisons with computation.  
Schweitzer notes that intentional states are the cornerstone of cognitive science, and that they are 
traditionally bound with other philosophies like functionalism (see below); but the essential 
feature of this approach is the characterization of cognitive events in terms of computational 
profiles: 
The computational paradigm is standardly welded to some brand of functionalism, 
according to which mental states derive their identity from the abstract causal 
roles they play in a complex economy of internal states mediating environmental 
inputs and behavioral outputs.  But whatever the details and fine-grained 
variation, functionalism and/or classical computationalism share the notion that 
decomposition in terms of input/output profiles and sequences of internal 
processing states is the salient model for understanding cognitive phenomena.  
Thus according to the classical view, the level of relevance to the science of mind 
is the program, the sequence of abstract state transitions that yields intelligent 
responses to external stimuli.  This mind/program analogy is one of the basic 
conceptual legacies of orthodox cognitive science and AI.45  
 
While some choose to identify cognitive science solely with the means by which information is 
processed, Schweitzer argues that there is necessarily a fundamentally materialist underpinning.  
                                                 
44 Sarkar, p 69-70. 
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Instead of adopting the traditional assumptions of cognitive science, which he neatly summarizes 
as “the abstract formal procedure, not the bowl of porridge in which it happens to be 
implemented,”46 he argues that “the primary reason for invoking computation should be 
precisely the goal of providing a reduction of the mental to the physical, and that without this 
aim, the move to computationalism becomes scientifically unmotivated.”47  In fact, he argues, 
“[o]ne of the fundamental components of the cognitive science paradigm is the idea that the 
brain as a physical system serves to realize a particular abstract computational structure.”48  
Hence, it is necessary to explore the physical underpinnings of a computational model of 
cognition, in an effort to explain our memory, cognition, sense of self, and other higher order 
processes. 
There is reason to believe that our self-concept has a neuroanatomical correlate.  Ira 
Black, for instance, suggests that part of our self-concept – the cognitive recognition of our 
physical selves in opposing areas of physical space, as well as our ability to recognize 
abnormalities in ourselves are “localized to specific regions of the brain. Although the precise 
neural subsystems have yet to be defined, a physical substratum for the most subjective of 
psychologic entities has been identified.”49  He notes that it is quite likely that further 
investigation will reveal increasingly complex levels of association in the non-dominant parietal 
lobe.  In a like manner, our critical “emotional-vegetative-social functions of the self” are 
localized in the frontal cortices.50  This localization will be important in later chapters, wherein 
the link between affective disorders and frontal lobe dysfunction will be explored more fully.  
For the moment, it will suffice to say that disruptions in neuroanatomy can alter personality and 
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47 Schweitzer, p. 385. 
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49 Ira Black, Information in the Brain: A Molecular Perspective (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 168-9. 
50 Black, Information in the Brain: A Molecular Perspective, 170. 
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cognition.  Self-concept, Black notes, is a concatenation of distributed processes; the self is, in 
essence, modular.51  Our sense of “self in space, the self in time, and the social self” can be 
localized to the parietal, temporal, and frontal lobes, respectively.52  As a final note, Black 
suggests that these modules interact, forming a plastic neural network (a neural architecture 
capable of change and adaptation) – our sense of self, our understanding of who and what we 
are, changes both physically and metaphysically.53  Phillips and Patricia Churchland also propose 
neural networks as reductionistic models of cognition. 
Returning to the idea from theory reduction of levels of organization, Phillips notes that 
there are a variety of capacities in which cognition can be interpreted.54  We can examine 
individual neurotransmitters, the microcircuits within dendritic trees, neurons, neural circuits, 
cortical pathways, and systems of cortical pathways.  He argues that it would be a mistake to 
analyze cognition only at higher levels – cognition is a process related at many levels of 
organization.  He notes that “[c]ognition and cortex may be comprehensibly related at all these 
levels.  Some cognitive phenomena, such as the effects of certain drugs, pathologies or altered 
states of consciousness, may be best understood by using knowledge of how specific substances, 
such as neurotransmitters or neuromodulators, affect processing at the subcellular level.”55  He 
notes that computational functions are carried out at many different levels of organization, and as 
such, “no theory that attempts to explain the whole of cognition on the basis of just a few cortical 
principles is likely to be successful…Different subsystems may well interact with and constrain 
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each other, but that doesn’t invalidate the view that different subsystems play different roles in 
the system as a whole, and solve essentially distinct problems.”56 
 Memory is a key area of exploration in the computational model.  Humans have different 
kinds of memory – e.g., long-term memory, working memory, episodic memory, procedural 
memory – that require the activation of different pathways, different cortical regions, and 
different neurological structures.  The hippocampus, for instance, is an essential element of 
episodic memory but not procedural memory, while other types of memory rely more on 
sensorimotor cortices.  Phillips argues that it is essential to keep these distinctions in mind.57  
Hence, there is no single reductive model of memory; the phenomena is explicable in physical 
terms, but not identical physical terms. 
 Phillips further argues that activity within the network is not linear, which is to say that it 
does not simply follow a given path.  Rather, the entirety of the network is involved, and activity 
“does not just flow through the network, but flows ‘around’ the network.”58  As a consequence, 
the activity of the network will depend on the connections between the individualized units.  A 
given input may not necessarily yield one single output – rather, the net effect of the neural 
system may be chaotic, allowing some indeterminacy in cognition.  Phillips suggests that these 
recurrent neural nets are engaged in this type of chaotic activity when they “store and recreate 
temporal sequences of activity.”59 This should not be understood as an argument for 
indeterminacy at the reductive level, or an argument against the deterministic qualities of 
cognition (see below), but rather that the product of a neural network is dependent upon its 
contemporaneous arrangement and strength. 
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 Memory, then, may be a given state of a recurrent neural net – it may be a pattern of 
activation and strength of connection between individual units.  Phillips asks us to envision a 
three-dimensional map to represent the energy surface of a cognitive system (much akin to maps 
of gravitation in physics).60  The deep points – the ‘attractors’ – on this map represent the low 
points of energy activation, and the system will act and react in such a manner as to reduce the 
overall level of activation (the level of activation is understood in terms of disagreement with 
external stimuli – the higher the degree of disagreement, the higher the system energy).  
Surrounding these deep points (perhaps best thought of as the downward change in slopes 
leading to these deep points) are the activation states of these low points of energy attraction, 
which Phillips describes as the ‘attractor basin.’  Memories are the attractors, and the activation 
pathways that lead to them are the attractor basins.  When a system is activated by an external 
event (triggers for a memory), the system will seek  out these attractors – the system will bring 
forth memories relevant to the external stimuli.  In practical terms, this may be why people with 
similar facial features or gaits may remind us of friends or relatives – they have activated a given 
pathway, and our cognitive system has settled into a specified energy arrangement.  Difficulty in 
retrieving specific words or memories may be a result of difficulty activating a given attractor 
basin.61  This cognitive mapping approach is similar to the tensor networks proposed by 
Churchland. 
Phillips argues further that it is not simply memory that is contingent upon the underlying 
neural mechanisms of cognition.  Rather, there are a variety of cognitive capacities that are 
predicated upon the computational capabilities of the cerebral cortex.62  There are significant 
elements of the human experience that we do not yet fully understand in reductionist terms, 
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either in neuroanatomy or in terms of recurrent neural networks.  Theories attempting to explain 
these complex phenomena are, however, bound to existent neuroanatomy – we cannot simply 
posit a ‘ghost in the shell’.  
 This has immediate relevance in the context of cognition and choice.  In discussing the 
meaning of cognitive science for psychology, Schweitzer argues for a model in which there are 
multiple methods by which mental phenomena may be represented.  Schweitzer is not entirely 
smitten with the term ‘reductionism’, his focus instead is “not the terminology, but rather the 
theoretical consequences and methodological practices it is used to justify.  And what I would 
strenuously object to is the move from the multiple realizability of abstract mental structure to 
the conclusion that the mind is somehow ‘autonomous’ in any interesting or significant sense.”63  
Simply because cognitive structures can be realized in a variety of different arrangements, it does 
not follow that the mind is irreducible to the body or that psychological states are not dependent 
on physical states.  Maintaining the computational motif, Schweitzer notes that “organisms with 
advanced cognitive capacities are still essentially hardware devices, not software 
implementations.  Naturally occurring systems do not have a pure ‘software’ level that can be 
nearly detached from the physical mechanism.”64  Operating within this allusion, I could not type 
this dissertation abstractly – there is no freely existing Microsoft Word – I have to have a 
medium on which to run it.  In a like manner, there is no freely existing thought – that activity is 
inextricably bound to and determined by the material doing the thinking.  As Schweitzer notes, 
“[f]rom a truly physicalist perspective, the mind simply is a state of the hardware.”65  We cannot 
study psychology in a vacuum – we require input from neuroscience, neurology, etc., and other 
fields examining the physical underpinnings of this abstraction.  When we change the physical 
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elements – the hardware in our computational model – we change how the higher processes 
function – the software.  If we adhere to a computational viewpoint, we commit ourselves to a 
rejection of cognitive autonomy: 
The staunch defender of intentional explanation who insists on mental autonomy 
must give up the computational paradigm.  On the other hand, the cognitive 
scientist, who is committed to computation as the cornerstone of the discipline, 
must eschew mental autonomy.  For the cognitive scientist, the mental level may 
be indispensable, but it is neither ontologically nor theoretically independent of 
the physical.  Psychological structures must be realized in the brain, and hence 
have empirical dependencies and ramifications for outside the field of 
psychology.  The rigorous testing, and thus ultimately the very articulation of 
psychological laws and regularities, requires systematic accord with the detailed 
workings of the central nervous system.”66 
 
The absence of cognitive autonomy is one of many competing definitions of deterministic 
philosophy, a theme which we will return to shortly. 
Functionalism 
 The functionalist school of thought defines the essential nature of a system by its 
underlying function – i.e., how it does what it does.  A functional description of cognition would 
focus on the neural structures that are activated when a given task is performed, i.e., the 
individual neurons, neural pathways, neuroanatomical structures, etc., just as a functional 
exploration of computation would focus on the interaction of circuitry and processors.  Higher 
cognitive functions are not non-physical phenomena – as Patricia Churchland notes, “the 
differences between functional descriptions and hardware descriptions turn out to be differences 
in what level of description is appropriate, not in whether what is described are physical states or 
nonphysical states.”67  Physical structures play a significant part in structures like memory, an 
important element in self-concept and decision-making.  Jonides and Smith argue that memory is 
a critical element of normal cognition – in fact, they argue that: 
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Every intelligent being has some form of memory play a critical role in its higher 
cognitive function.  This is true of any complex computing device, it is true of any 
animal that is respected for its cognitive skill, and it is true of humans.  In fact, the 
role played by memory in cognition is sufficiently complex that just a single 
memory will not do.  Rather, computers, humans and other animals have all 
developed (some by evolution, some by design) multiple memory systems that aid 
in higher level cognition.68 
 
Frith and Friston note that neurological experiments have noted specific components of working 
memory (a central executive and slave systems specific to the information being remembered), 
and that these components can be disrupted by very different forms of interference.69  This 
suggests that there are external elements that can disrupt normal cognitive functioning, and that 
our normal cognition is dependent upon factors outside of our volition – an argument that we 
will revisit at length later.  Our understanding of the structural elements of central executive 
processes is not as advanced as that of memory, but “the available evidence is beginning to 
reveal the complex architecture of executive processes and their representation in the brain.”70 
Challenges to Reductionism 
 As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, reductionism is not without its detractors.  
Before proceeding with this dissertation, it is necessary to explore some of the challenges raised, 
in an effort both to explain the issue as well as to clarify the reductionistic concept assumed in 
this dissertation.  Some of the objections are couched in abstraction – they are objections at the 
conceptual level about the irreducibility of theories, for instance.  Others are empirical, either in 
appeals to irreducible complexity or the limitations of contemporary research.  Still others 
suggest that mental phenomena are emergent qualities of neural structures – the idea that 
consciousness emerges as a result of the complexity found in neural structure.  Just as light 
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emerges from a light bulb due to the completed electrical pathway, so too do our ‘minds’ emerge 
from the myriad neuronal interactions.   
A recurrent theme is the questionability of the hypothesis that we are ‘merely’ physical 
beings – in essence, cogent and compelling arguments are offered suggesting that simple 
reduction may not account for the variety of mental phenomena we experience.  This dissertation 
does not assume simple reduction; rather, it will argue that mental phenomena are dependent 
upon the underlying neural structure, and that alterations in lower level phenomena produce 
changes in upper level phenomena.  Further, it will be argued that these levels fundamentally 
interact, which is capable of producing complex behavioral changes – there does not seem to be 
a single level of organization which is not influenced by other levels of organization.  Case 
studies and neurological research will clarify this position, and demonstrate that changes in 
neurochemistry due to a depressive disorder can alter the experience of ‘self’ in the same manner 
as neurological impairment or damage.  This will be more fully explicated in chapter four. 
General objections 
Mills suggests that there are many compelling reasons to reject, or at least be skeptical of, 
materialist and reductionist arguments.  He argues that there are significant bases for this 
rejection – at stake are fundamental elements of humanity: 
The claim that the mind is nothing but the brain is a dogmatic assertion that 
attributes ontological primacy to physical states over mental processes and 
properties.  In short, the materialist holds a fallacious and simplistic view of 
causality, denies free agency of the self, and increasingly portrays the human 
being as a clinical object.  The ethical implications of such approaches in medical 
and social-political practices may potentially threaten the integrity of individuality 
and collective identity, which may further lead to an invalidation and/or empathic 
impasse regarding human difference and understanding.71 
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Mills raises five general and essential critiques of materialist and reductionist arguments, each of 
which will be addressed and discussed in turn. 
First, there is a significant concern that the individual is reduced to pure mechanism.  
Mills is concerned that by stripping the psyche of its non-physical elements, we are essentially 
stripping the mind or self of its ontological status.  The self loses its transcendental nature – we 
reduce humans to mere ‘things’. 72 The meaning of being human is lost – our existential 
questions, our moral dilemmas, all that which would seem to define us and our subjective 
experience is reduced to biochemical equations and expressions. 73  We will discuss the problem 
of personal experience in greater detail below.   
A second critique concerns a bias towards simplicity.  Materialist arguments, Mills 
suggests, assume that the only phenomena of mental life are those which can be observed.  He 
suggests that we have abandoned complex accounts of personal phenomena due to an implicit 
parsimony – it is easier for us to explain the mental in terms of the physical, and as such, we 
have an unwarranted bias in favor of simplicity.  However, he notes, “the simplest explanation is 
not necessarily the most accurate.”74  In response to this claim, however, there is a burden of 
proof necessarily imposed on someone suggesting more complex models – I could, for instance, 
claim the same line of reasoning to justify my belief in an impossibly complex model of 
consciousness involving souls, ‘anti-souls’, quantum mechanics, and motivating immaterial 
beetles.  This response is obviously a reductio ad absurdum, but it seems warranted – an appeal 
to occasional complexity does not seem sufficient to warrant a conclusion of complexity in any 
one particular instance. 
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Third, Mills argues that materialists must necessarily endorse agnosticism regarding the 
ontology of consciousness.  The essential question is whether materialism is necessary and 
sufficient to explain consciousness.  Again, consciousness seems to be essentially immaterial – a 
psychical construct.  He argues that “[m]ind is embodied or instantiated physically, but by virtue 
of its transcendental and elusive functions and properties, it cannot be spatially localized or 
dissected.  Most materialists want to eliminate this stance as a viable possibility and hold 
allegiance to a simple economy – that which is real is something that is tangible.”75  At this 
point, one could easily accuse Mills of proposing essentially an argument from ignorance – after 
all, nonphysical entities are precisely what he feels do not require physical proof, and their 
absence does not thereby suggest their non-existence.  Essentially, this objection insists that just 
because we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the non-physical, we cannot rule it 
out.  This seems to be an untenable position – after all, as I tell my introductory philosophy 
students, they can neither prove nor disprove the existence of an invisible, immaterial magical elf 
on my left shoulder.76   
Fourth, there is an implicit danger of resurrecting behaviorist claims about personality 
and cognition.  Cognition in the materialist model boils down to an interaction between physical 
causation and environmental determinism.  In essence, all mental events are caused by physical 
processes and environmental stimuli, which reduces our agency to a reaction to external events.77  
This seems to be an overly simplistic assessment of the reductionist position – as it is presented 
and discussed in this chapter, for instance, reductionism does not require belief in a form of 
radical behaviorism.  All that is suggested is influence at multiple levels of cognitive processing.  
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Internal and external stimuli can certainly trigger mental events, but how they are ultimately 
realized in upper level phenomena, or whether they are acted upon at all is an entirely different 
question, which amounts to an explicit rejection of behaviorism. 
Fifth, there is a concern about the phenomenon of free will.  Mills argues that ultimately 
the materialist is committed to an overt rejection of free will: 
Reliance on material and efficient causal explanations, the over-valuation of 
simplicity à la Ockham’s razor, and consequently, physical reductionism, 
completely eliminate any possibility of free will.  From this standpoint, the human 
being is not free.  This position is summarized by the exclusion thesis, which 
posits that human beings have no properties or mental powers that no object or 
physical system can possess.  Thus, if free will is a mental process or property, 
and no physical system is free, then we do not possess free choice and are 
consequently not free.  This simplicity denies the possibility of final causal 
determinants and transcendental teleology characteristic of free agents.  Agent is 
defined here as a subject who is telic, purposeful, and self-directed via choices 
and deliberation in judgments constituting self-conscious activity.  Therefore, 
thoughts, volitional intentions, and behaviors are the activities of the will: 
Freedom is ultimately defined as the ability to choose to be otherwise.  Freedom, 
however, is not merely restricted to choice; it also encompasses the structural 
organization of the individual doing the choosing, namely the agent.  In short, 
agency, free will, intentionality, and final causality (e.g., choosing the grounds for 
the sake of which to behave) are problematic for the materialist, for physical 
matter is caused rather than freely causal.78 
 
While this does seem a bit of a sweeping generalization of all materialist positions, there is a 
significant concern here which I am inclined to support.  Fundamentally thought is dependent 
upon the physical structure of the cognizing entity – there are no free-floating consciousnesses of 
which I am aware.  As such, and as has been argued in this chapter, cognition is not entirely a 
voluntary process.  We are aware of some higher level phenomena and are capable of some 
introspection, but there are a great deal of cognitive processes of which we are unaware (see the 
next chapter).  Further, while we can exercise control over some elements of our physiognomy, 
we cannot directly influence the shape, structure, or connections of individual neurons or neural 
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pathways.  As such, it does seem compelling to note that cognition, and its derivative processes 
like choice, volition, and agency, are essentially deterministic (the extent of which we will 
explore in the second half of this chapter).  The question, however, is whether this is as 
dangerous as Mills suggests – perhaps it is indicative of an upcoming paradigm shift in how we 
view choice in the context of reductionist ontology and epistemology.  In later chapters, for 
instance, we will explore the tenability of several popular conceptions of personal autonomy in 
light of the neuroscience and neuropsychology discussed in this and later chapters. 
Reductionism and the qualia of personal experience 
Turning now from general objections to reductionism, the task at hand is to explain the 
complex phenomena of ‘the self’ and subjective awareness.  Objections have been raised to the 
idea that our subjective experience is explicable in reductive terms (e.g., Nagel’s “What is it like 
to be a bat?”), and it has been suggested that there is a significant split between what is knowable 
about the human experience in objective terms (e.g., pure mechanistic explanations of the 
automation of the human body systems, chemical analysis of cells, bone, and tissue, etc.) versus 
what is knowable about the human experience in subjective terms (e.g., personal cognitive 
experience, individuality and identity demarcation, etc.): 
Nevertheless, eliminating materialists, such as Churchland, must still account for 
the phenomenon of introspection and the ‘qualitative feel’ of our alleged mental 
states.  The eliminative materialist must account for the difference we claim to 
perceive between pain, for example, and our understanding of a mathematical 
problem or our believing of knowing a fact.  A strong case can be made that these 
latter phenomena are best explained under some dualist theory of mind/brain.79 
 
These objections rightly claim that there is much about the human experience that is ineffable in 
current scientific methodology.  
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The exploration of reductionism cannot overlook personal intuition of the self.  There is a 
certain amount of ‘folk psychology’ at work that does not depend upon models, nor is it 
beholden to any particular research methodology.  There is the intuitive claim that we are the 
masters of our cognitive fate, that we are not beholden to past experience or subconscious 
processes in making our choices.  Rather, we simply act as we see fit, with no overriding 
concerns for the determined aspects of our personalities.  This is, as Patricia Smith Churchland 
notes, a potentially self-defeating and incorrect model – once we start looking at our 
introspective process, we may have to revise or abandon our assumptions.80 
 There are a variety of phenomena which have been used to justify claims of the 
irreducibility and ineffability of subjective experience.  Further these claims are not joined by 
one single common argument – rather, there is a plethora of arguments which attempt to justify 
the idea of irreducibility.81  Churchland notes that there are two essential variations on the 
irreducibility argument, which she classifies as the ‘boggled skeptics’, who suggest that the brain 
is simply too complex to understand, and the ‘principled skeptics’ who argue from “the nature of 
subjective experience or from the fact that some mental states have meaning and significance.”82  
The boggled skeptic claim can be rejected, as it simply does not offer a defensible position.  
While current neuroscience has not provided complete answers concerning the essence of the 
self, it has provided significant inroads and afforded a greater understanding of how the brain 
works.   
The challenges of the principled skeptic, however, can prove to be more difficult.  
Churchland cites Thomas Nagel’s essay “What is it like to be a bat?” as an example of a 
principled skeptic.  Nagel argues that the fundamental qualities of subjective experience are only 
                                                 
80 Churchland, Neurophilosophy, 293. 
81 Churchland, 315. 
82 Churchland, Neurophilosophy, 316. 
 31
appreciable to that particular being; as an outsider, I can have limited objective knowledge of 
what it would be like to be someone or something else, but I cannot have complete knowledge 
without actually being the person or object in question.  But there is something specific about 
actually being the person in question that is not explainable in quantitative terms; Nagel argues 
that this qualitative aspect of being is irreducible to neuroscience.83  But this seems to be begging 
the question: 
The point is this: if in fact mental states are identical to brain states, then when I 
introspect a mental state, I do introspect the brain state with which it is identical.  
Needless to say, I may not describe my mental state as a brain state, but whether I 
do depends on what information I have about the brain, not upon whether the 
mental state really is identical to some brain state.  The identity can be a fact 
about the world independently of my knowledge that it is a fact about the 
world…In short, identities may obtain even when we have not discovered that 
they do.  The problem with the second premise is that the only justification for 
denying that introspective awareness of sensations could be introspective 
awareness of brain states derives from the assumption that mental states are not 
identical with brain states.  And that is precisely what the argument is supposed to 
prove.  Hence the charge of begging the question.84 
 
Nagel assumes a qualitative difference between an objective versus subjective appreciation of 
one’s existence, and in doing so, assumes the existence of the very concept he wishes to prove.  
But this posited qualitative difference between what we can know externally versus internally 
can not be dismissed so readily. 
 Hypothetically, if it were possible to translate subjective human experience into objective 
language and experience – that is, translate our individuality into quanta that could be understood 
by anyone – then we would cease to be who we are as individuals.  While there is a visceral 
appeal to the suggestion that I am unique and ineffable, there seems to be a practical and 
empirical objection to this.  First, there are definite elements of my personality that are not 
shaped by my subjective experience – as John Hospers notes, at the lower level of moral 
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discourse, my personality is shaped by genetics, my environment as a child, my family 
experience, my birth order, my race, gender, etc.  None of these things are chosen by me, and yet 
they are essential elements of who I am and how I see the world.  It also does not seem to be too 
far-fetched to note that men can appreciate the worldview of women in objective terms and vice 
versa (see, for example, Deborah Tannen or Robin Lakoff in sociolinguistics).  It further does not 
seem too far-fetched to appreciate how greater access to resources at an early age can shape 
appreciation of material goods and thereby attitudes towards economic materialism.  These are 
but two examples of subjective elements which may be understood objectively, without 
necessarily denigrating the individual’s experience of the world.  In fact, it has been suggested 
that appreciation of other sociolinguistic models help to bridge interpersonal gaps – suggesting 
that this type of understanding may not only be possible but also desirable. 
 Churchland argues that this irreducible qualia of experience does not necessarily require 
an immaterial basis. Rather, it may simply refer to a physical information pathway for a 
particular phenomenon that is not possessed by others.85  Further, there are empirical claims that 
can be raised against the argument of non-physical phenomena – there is no reason why a 
physical system should be affected by them: 
It is of course possible that mental states do have nonphysical features.  And it 
remains possible that one’s autoconnected epistemic pathways are precisely what 
detect them, which is essentially what Nagel is insisting.  These ideas are 
certainly not impossible.  Quite the contrary.  But their credentials as default 
assumptions have now evaporated.  The mere existence of autoconnected 
epistemic pathways, which almost every creature possesses, should no longer 
even suggest the existence of nonphysical features.  If they do exist, it is the 
burden of some other argument to spotlight them.  In fact, the situation for 
Nagel’s picture is slightly darker than this, because even if such nonphysical 
features were to exist, why should one’s autoconnected pathways pay any 
attention to them?  Those pathways are themselves entirely physical.  How could 
they interact with any nonphysical goings-on?  In any case, it is far more likely 
that those pathways arose, under the normal selective pressures of biological 
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evolution, so as to integrate all relevant aspects of our internal physiological 
activities, both sensory and motor.  Nonphysical properties are not a solution to 
anything, even where one’s self-knowledge is concerned.  The existence of one’s 
auto-connected epistemic pathways, their origins, and their current cognitive 
functions are all intelligible, without remainder, on purely physicalist 
assumptions.86  
 
The onus of proof is thereby upon those who would make the system more complex, as well as 
the burden of demonstrating how the physical would interact with the non-physical – a 
conundrum addressed earlier.  Churchland argues that the positing of mental phenomena like 
consciousness is frequently couched in terms meant to foment hostility between reductionist and 
anti-reductionist camps.  This is, however, entirely unnecessary and quite false: 
There is a general lesson to be drawn here beyond the deserved deflation of two 
anti-reductionist arguments.  It is crucial to bring it out.  An assumption common 
to many thinkers, not just to Nagel and Jackson, is that the neuroscientific, 
computational, physicalistic approach to human cognition is in some essential 
way hostile to the notion of consciousness, and to the unique first-person 
perspective that any creature has, onto itself and onto the world at large.  
Although the assumption is widespread, nothing could be farther from the truth.  
The explanation of consciousness, both animal and human, is one of the central 
hopes of current research in cognitive neurobiology…And reconstructing the 
intricacies of each creature’s unique cognitive perspective on the world is part of 
the lasting explanatory obligation that cognitive neurobiology is eager to accept.  
How realistic these hopes are is still a matter of dispute.  But there should be no 
disputing that they are now among the hopes that neuroscience holds dear.87 
 
Neuroscience is guided by the mysterious; however, as has been a recurring theme in this 
section, mystery neither requires nor suggests that a phenomenon is inexplicable.  Reductionism 
still faces many challenges, conceptual and practical. 
Dialectical Interplay 
 Wimsatt raises a significant challenge to reductionism by noting that the mental realm of 
our existence cannot simply be sloughed off in light of reductionism.  He notes that while 
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reductionism may be able to explain lower level phenomena, it does so in light of higher 
phenomena – in fact, the lower level explanations are a requisite part of that explanation: 
[N]europhysiology cannot make progress at the level of higher units of functional 
organization without appealing to the mental realm for guidance.  The task would 
be like asking a molecular biologist to give a molecular reconstruction of elephant 
physiology from what he knows, together with photographs of elephants taken in 
the wild at a conservatively safe distance.  Constant reference to minute details of 
the upper-level descriptions of elephant anatomy and physiology are at least 
necessary (though not yet sufficient) for the task.88 
 
The crux of his objection is that levels of organization are mutually dependent – while we can 
explain upper level phenomena in terms of lower level phenomena, we cannot suggest that this 
ontological support is unidirectional.  Rather, there is a constant dialogue between the two – an 
irreducible dialectic between the two.  We have a natural tendency to view ontological support as 
one-way; but this is, Wimsatt argues, fundamentally mistaken.89 
 This is a difficult challenge for reductionism – there is an empirical and intuitive basis for 
this claim.  After all, when we learn a concept, we are not physically adding new neurons into 
our existing neural network.  Rather, multiple higher level phenomena are interacting which 
affects our cognitive maps.  Wimsatt refers to this as a ‘panphenomenalism’ which he feels is a 
necessary understanding to make reductionism palatable to those traditionally opposed to it: 
On this account then we have a kind of ‘panphenomenalism’ (not to be confused 
with what is usually thought of as panpsychism) at which entities and things 
detected by them at different levels are equally real, and none is secondary, in its 
reality, to any other.  This is, I think, a necessary move in removing the feeling of 
austerity that many people appear to fear in reductionism – what, in other words, 
might be called the ‘nothing more than’ phobia.90 
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As an example of the panphenomenalism Wimsatt proposes, a thumbnail sketch of the 
experience of classroom learning would necessarily involve multiple levels of organization.  At a 
higher level of organization, we would expect to find the phenomena of consciousness, attention, 
and intention.91  At a lower level of organization, but above that of individual neurons or neuron 
pathways, the primary and secondary auditory and visual cortices, language association and 
comprehension pathways, memory centers (both working and long-term), etc., would be 
activated and modified by the higher level phenomena experienced, just as they activate and 
modify the higher level phenomena in turn.  At the level of individual neurons and neural 
pathways, learning creates connections between individual cells that were not present before, 
which then facilitates future recall.  Again, there is a mutual influence between higher and lower 
levels of organization.  One could conceivable discuss effects at the cellular level in the complex 
chemical interactions between neurons.  The classroom learning experience may stimulate 
addition production of glutamate (a primary excitatory neurotransmitter), which can affect the 
speed of recall, attention to one’s environment, etc., and a corresponding increase in demand for 
γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA – a primary inhibitory neurotransmitter).  What, therefore, reduces 
to what?  Which level is explainable only in terms of a lower level?  Does it even make sense to 
speak of ‘reduction’ in any traditional sense? 
 The reductive claims made in this dissertation do not require adherence to a strict 
definition of reductionism – rather, the plasticity and mutual influence underscore the 
fundamental claim being made.  Given this dialectical influence, a depressive disorder can have 
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cognitive effects on a variety of levels, each or all of which can affect cognitive processing and 
consciousness, and hence affect the final decision to forgo medical treatment. 
Emergentism 
 The emergentist objection to reductionism is not a complete rejection of the materialist 
account of cognition.  Rather, it is meant to connote the production of causative mental 
phenomena from physical structures.  Sperry argues that the emergent phenomena of cognition 
are not meant to invoke dualistic arguments – the emergent processes are products of the 
underlying physical structures, which then influence the physical structures in turn.  He argues 
that:   
On the positive side our present view can be classified broadly as an ‘emergent’ 
theory of mind that needs to be distinguished from other emergent theories 
advanced previously, mainly by the Gestalt school in psychology.  It differs from 
these in several respects: first, the phenomena of subjective experience are not 
thought to be derived from electrical field forces or volume-conduction effects, or 
any metaneuronal by-product of cerebral activity.  Our view relies on orthodox 
neural-circuit and related physiological properties.  Second, there is no 
assumption of the need for an isomorphic or topological correspondence between 
the events of perceptual experience and corresponding events in the brain.  I have 
conceived the mental properties to be functional derivatives that get their meaning 
from the way in which the brain circuits and related processes operate and 
interact, rather than in terms of isomorphic correlations.  Reference to 
‘spatiotemporal patterning’ of brain activity is sage as far as it goes, but this term 
fails to connote the operational derivation of the conscious properties that I have 
tried to emphasize.  Third, the conscious subjective properties in our present view 
are interpreted to have causal potency in regulating the course of brain events; 
that is, the mental forces or properties exert a regulative control influence in brain 
physiology.  The subjective conscious experience on these terms becomes an 
integral part of the brain process, rather than a correlated phenomenon as 
conceived by Koehler and others.  The mental events are causes rather than 
correlates.  In this respect our view can be said to involve a form of mental 
interactionism, except that there is no implication of dualism or other parallelism 
in the traditional sense.  The mental forces are direct causal emergents of the brain 
process.92 
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As such, there is a ‘mutual interdependence’ implicit in the model proposed.  Consciousness both 
shapes and is shaped by the underlying physical structures.  It emerges as a consequence of the 
complex interactions between neurons and neural structures.  Sperry argues that this position 
allows for a middle ground between purely materialist positions and dualist positions.93  He 
suggests that allowing for this kind of subjective experience to have causal force also influences 
the determinism debate – subjective causality as an emergent consequent would allow for some 
control over volition that seems to be absent from many materialist argument. 
 A key concept added to the debate regarding the explanation of consciousness is the idea 
of virtual governors.  A parallel can be drawn between complex electrical grids and our neural 
networks – consciousness and mind can be understood as a means of an emergent, automatic 
self-regulation of cognition, akin to the pattern of self-regulation that appears in interconnected 
generators.  Dewan describes the phenomenon of virtual governors as follows: 
A generator in isolation does not give a very steady 60-Hz output.  An electric 
clock attached to such a generator will become quite inaccurate after awhile.  But, 
in remarkable contrast, when a large number of such generators are 
interconnected, they behave much more stably; that is, they all lock into step with 
one another or mutually entrain in a manner which is basically the same 
phenomenon as the fireflies flashing together or the heart cells ‘beating as one.’  
In the case of the generators, the mechanism is easy to describe.  If one generator 
leads the others in phase, i.e., if it is slightly faster, then its energy will be 
absorbed, not only by the load, but also by all generators which lag behind it.  
This will increase the load on the generator, forcing it to slow down a bit so that it 
won’t ‘get out of step.’  If by chance it lags in phase, the other generators pump 
energy into it so that it catches up.  Thus, generators which go a bit too fast are 
slowed down while those that lag are speeded up.  They pull together in 
frequency.  The generalization of feedback to a sort of mutual and shared 
feedback system should now be easy to see.  The stability and accuracy of a 
system of generators is far greater than any single unit.  This mutual entrainment 
is a splendid example of self-organization, and it is obvious that such a system 
can be regarded as a single unit so far as its function is concerned.  Out of mutual 
entrainment has emerged what Wiener terms a ‘virtual governor’ which controls 
the entire system in a manner which uses feedback.  This virtual governor is not 
located in any one spot in the system, but rather it pervades the system as a whole, 
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so that it does not have a ‘physical existence’ in the usual sense.  It is an emergent 
property of the entire system which goes far beyond what any single unit can 
accomplish in accuracy and power.94 
 
It is plausible to imagine such a virtual governor in cognitive processes – in fact, there is a direct 
biological correlate.  Neuronal transmission is the result of a significant amount of mutual 
interaction.  In general, many other neurons attach to the dendrite of a given neuron, each 
provide chemical signals.  Some of these signals are excitatory, while other are inhibitory.  
Whether the influenced neuron fires is a matter of additive activation – each excitatory 
neurotransmitter received moves the charge of the receiving neuron towards its activation 
threshold (depolarization), while each inhibitory neurotransmitter moves the charge away from 
its activation threshold (hyperpolarization).  A neuron will only fire if it receives sufficient 
excitatory signaling to exceed its activation threshold, at which point the firing is unstoppable 
(the ‘all-or-none’ principle).  Sodium rushes into the neuron while potassium rushes out, further 
depolarizing the cell, which causes an electrical cascade down the axon (this causes sodium and 
potassium pump activation in sequence), culminating in the release of a neurotransmitter into the 
synaptic cleft of a receiving neuron, providing excitation or inhibition of the receiving neuron, 
and so on.  In essence, our brains are compact (but ridiculously complex) collections of 
interconnected chemical and electrical generators.  If such self-governance can emerge as a 
property of inanimate systems, what would prevent them from emerging as a property of animate 
systems?  Dewan suggests that “the ‘virtual governors’ of a power grid stand in relation to the 
individual governors in a way which is analogous to the way consciousness and mind stand in 
relation to the activity of the neuronal units of the brain.”95 
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Pluralism 
 The essence of the pluralistic objection to reductionism is that complexity ought to be 
welcomed – there are complex phenomena that cannot (presently) be expressed in terms of 
simpler theories.96  Sarkar draws a parallel with molecular biology in his support of a pluralistic 
approach to organization: 
The important methodological point that should be made is that complexity 
should be embraced, not avoided merely to save the reductionist cause.  This may 
well be the most important lesson to be learnt from the failure of genetic 
reductionism…Some robust organismic phenomena have stubbornly resisted all 
attempts at physical reduction.  Dominance is a common property of traits.  There 
is, as yet, no satisfactory molecular account, it relies on the topological properties 
of biochemical reaction networks.  Topological properties are not physical 
properties; consequently, the epistemological weight in such explanations is not 
borne by the physical interactions involved.  Topological accounts provide 
systemic explanations.  The future will show the extent to which they are 
necessary, even at the molecular level. There is thus no reason for a reductionist 
triumphalism.  Reductionism is an empirical issue and the evidence for or against 
it is not all in: only the future will show whether all biological phenomena at any 
higher level of organization will succumb to the lure of physical reduction.97 
 
It does not seem to be too much of a stretch to apply the same type of reasoning to mental 
phenomena and cognition.  The same caveats apply – whether mental phenomena are essentially 
reductive (and if so, to what extent) is ultimately an empirical issue that requires further research.  
Wimsatt suggests that understanding cognition need not draw significant lines between mental 
and physical phenomena – the explanation of cognitive phenomena requires input from several 
different systems at higher and lower levels of organization.98 
Dupre is a key proponent of pluralistic influences on cognition.  He first takes issue with 
the modular theory of the brain – the idea that our cognition is divided into coherent units that 
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are then linked together forming larger networks.99  His skepticism stems from the essentially 
integrative processes involved in cognition – while cognition may involve ‘modules’, this 
approach does not explain how their output is then integrated into a decision of the whole person.  
Further, even knowledge of these modules does not necessarily offer any insight into the 
behavior or behavioral tendencies of humans.  We are notoriously complex, and our decision-
making processes may or may not involve a given module.  Further, our behavior is not simply a 
product of any one given input (e.g., we are not simply the products of our genes).  Rather, who 
we are is contingent upon a variety of inputs.  He argues “there are many sources of information 
that are required in building a human body – genetic, cellular, physiological, and, especially at 
later stages, cultural.  All are necessary, none is sufficient.”100  How we think and behave is 
influenced by many different variables, and it would be mistaken to assume that one necessarily 
is reducible to another.  On Dupre’s argument, focusing on single causes, or on small groups of 
causes, fails to capture the full complexity and intriguing detail of human volition. 101 
 Dupre’s second objection echoes that of Mills earlier – the overreliance on the genetic or 
biological influences on behavior has unpleasant consequences on our sense of morality and 
responsibility.  Dupre specifically takes issue with evolutionary psychology and the general 
theory that behavior is evolutionary and adaptive.  This position, Dupre argues, has the necessary 
consequence of justifying behavior that would otherwise be condemned:  
[A]lthough evolutionary theorists almost universally deny any such goal, it is hard 
to see how theories in evolutionary psychology can avoid offering justifications of 
behavior.  If evolution has in fact shaped our behavior, it can only have done so 
by selecting physical structures, presumably in the brain, that cause the 
production of such behavior.  To say that a certain behavior, which some find 
morally objectionable, is caused by a physical structure in my brain, is in effect to 
remove at least part of my responsibility for it…By presenting behavior as in an 
                                                 
99 John Dupre, "Against Reductionist Explanations of Human Behavior," 153-71., p. 158-9 
100 Dupre, "Against Reductionist Explanations of Human Behavior.", p. 161-2 
101 Dupre,  p. 171 
 41
important sense biologically determined its ethical dimension is removed or 
attenuated.102 
 
As with the discussion of Mills argument, I am sympathetic to this concern about the abnegation 
of free will and moral responsibility.  However, as will be discussed in the second half of this 
chapter, it seems increasingly clear that there must be at least some element of determinism in 
any model of cognition.  As we will see, this elemental determinism ought to not to be confused 
with a completely deterministic model, but should be understood to include strongly 
deterministic elements which may require conscious challenge and exploration. 
Dupre suggests that pluralism has been critiqued historically for mistaken reasons.103  
First, some have criticized it in light of the influence of Cartesian dualism – many view the 
mind/body debate solely in terms of monism or dualism.  As dualism has become less influential, 
many assume that monism is the only viable remaining choice.  This is, he feels, fundamentally 
mistaken, as pluralism allows for the same explanations as monism (i.e., the characteristics that 
led to a rejection of dualism are explicable both in terms of monism as in terms of pluralism).  
The second critique stems from an over-reliance on the physical sciences.  Many feel that the 
realm of scientific inquiry requires a monistic vision of the world, and that while this view has 
had some success, it has not, in his opinion, had enough success to warrant automatic deference. 
 Extending his argument, Dupre suggests categorizing reductionism differently than 
Sarkar and Wimsatt, proposing instead to discuss synchronic and diachronic reductionism.  He 
uses diachronic reductionism to refer to reductions similar to Newtonian mechanics reducing to 
relativistic mechanics.  He uses synchronic reductionism to refer to relationships between 
“coexisting theories addressed to different levels of organization.”104  Within this categorization 
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model, he suggests that supervenience is not quite as tenable as previous theorists had held, and 
as a consequence, evidence for reductionism is equally tenuous: 
But supervenience is not self-evidently true.  It is surely imaginable, for instance, 
that people with identical physical states, including states of the brain, might be 
thinking different things.  This possibility is defended by those who believe that 
the content of a thought typically depends on facts external to the thinker.  
Evidence for supervenience, it seems, would have to be the kind of evidence 
necessary for reductionism.  It would be evidence that higher-level phenomena 
are indeed determined by lower-level phenomena, or that identical (or sufficiently 
similar) lower-level phenomena do indeed produce the same higher-level 
phenomena.  As is the case with evidence for reductionism generally, the problem 
is that where such evidence exists at all, it is in a narrow range of quite 
specialized cases, and the legitimacy of extrapolation to a general philosophical 
thesis is, to say the least, questionable.105 
 
If supervenience is questionable, we are by definition questioning the explicit reduction and 
explanation of one level of organization in terms of another, a theme that has been recurring 
throughout this chapter.  As a consequence, we cannot simply assign behavioral causation to one 
level over another – pluralism argues that every level of organization has some causative 
properties.106  While Dupre does point out that he is rejecting the dualistic notion of a separate 
mind and body substance, he does not necessarily seem to reject emergentist elements like 
virtual governors.  Concerning levels of organization, Dupre notes that higher order organisms 
possess a quiddity that lower organisms do not, and hence do not suggest themselves for 
reductive models.  As he notes, “[a] sponge, perhaps, is a multicellular organism that is nothing 
but an assembly of cells.  But an aardvark would more naturally be treated as an assembly of 
organs and other complex systems.”107  Complexity, therefore, lends itself to pluralistic models 
of behavior. 
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 The difficulty for this dissertation, however, comes from Dupre’s treatment of mental 
phenomena.  He argues, counterintuitively in this author’s opinion, that only the ‘how’ of 
behavior is explicable in reductionist terms.108  Specifically, he suggests that the ‘what’ of 
behavior can only be understood in terms of higher levels of organization (e.g., systemic or 
social), and that significant work remains to decide what actually ought to be explored in 
neuroscientific terms.  As a field of study, psychology is still concerned with the ‘how’ and 
‘what’ of behavior, but it ought not to look for answers in terms of biological reduction, as 
biology is only tangentially related to behavior.109  Causal explanations, he argues, are best 
explored in social and individual (i.e., higher) levels of organization: 
The contrary intuition is that whatever mental properties pertain to an individual, 
they must do on the basis of some structural features of that individual, even if 
this is so in no stronger sense than that of supervenience.  But I hope it is clear by 
now that there is no need to insist on even such a weak physicalism.  Beliefs, 
often at least, explain actions.  Actions, again often, take place in social contexts 
that have much to do with determining what kinds of actions they are…The 
reductionist will insist that the social is merely a product of the diverse behaviors 
of the many individual agents by which it is constituted.  But it is equally 
possible, and perhaps more natural, to think of the social and the individual as 
each constituting partially autonomous, causally efficacious, domains.  
Sometimes we can explain social phenomena in individual terms, and sometimes 
individual behavior should be explained by appeal to social factors.  And as with 
my claims in the previous chapter about phenotypic causes of genetic change, 
when I speak here of explanation, I do mean causal explanation.110 
 
As I indicated above, it is unclear why Dupre seems so committed to maintaining behavioral 
causation at higher levels of organization, especially if he maintains a model in which there are 
complex interactions between levels of organization.  It would seem more plausible to defend a 
model that allows for mutual influence across levels.  Phenotype influences behavior and 
behavior influences phenotype; one does not have to look too far for examples of this.  
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Overeating, for instance, is a behavior that influences the organism at many levels.  At the social 
level, it can lead to deterioration of relationships.  At the individual level, it can affect self-
esteem and body images.  At the organism level, it can lead to changes in physical shape, sleep 
discontinuity (e.g., sleep apnea), stress, hypertension, and elevated risk for other comorbidities.  
At the cellular level, it can lead to over- or under-production of hormones and other chemicals 
and chemical messengers.  Each of these will affect other levels of organization, and hence, in 
this author’s opinion, each should be seen as causative. 
The Shift Towards Determinism 
 What emerges from the discussion so far is a complex model of cognition with 
interaction at multiple levels.  It is reductive in the sense that there is a physical material upon 
which it is built, but there are obviously questions as to what is explicable in terms of what.  
However, what seems to be a fair conclusion is that if levels interact with each other, then 
disruptions or distortions in overall cognition can come from many different sources and 
different levels of organization.  This would allow for psychosocial stressors like job loss or the 
death of a spouse to cause depression and influence multiple levels of cognition, in just the same 
manner as dysregulation of dopamine or serotonin can cause depression and influence multiple 
levels of cognition.  This is germane because our access to the levels of our cognition is limited – 
while I may be able to control some thought processes (see the next chapter), I cannot 
necessarily pick what neuron or pathway is activated, let alone how much of a given 
neurotransmitter I produce.  As such, there are necessarily elements of my cognitive process that 
are out of my control.  These will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter.  For the 
moment, it is necessary to explore the philosophical consequences of this lack of control. 
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It would seem that some credence is given to deterministic models – cognition is 
dependent upon neuroanatomy, which is influenced by genes, gender, socioeconomics, and 
myriad other foundational influences (as noted in Hospers’ argument).  These shape and 
constrain the options considered by an agent during cognition – determining, as it were, the 
direction the cognitive process will go.  There is an ongoing debate as to how much influence 
these factors have on behavior; the most credence is given to models that are not fully 
deterministic, but maintain some semblance of indeterminacy.  Instead of a 1:1 cause-effect ratio, 
there are multiple possible effects.  This topic will be explored in later sections on the 
neuroscience of choice. 
DETERMINISM 
The Libet Experiments 
 In making the switch from discussions of reductionism to discussions of determinism, it 
is useful to consider the experiments of Benjamin Libet.  Seeking an understanding of the 
phenomena of conscious will, Libet constructed a means by which the time of neurological 
activity (measuring the readiness potential [RP]) versus perception of will to act could be traced.  
In previous experiments he had found that neural activity preceded movement by more than one 
second.  He concluded that: 
The brain was evidently beginning the volitional process in this voluntary act well 
before the activation of the muscle that produced the movement.  My question 
then became: when does the conscious wish or intention (to perform the act) 
appear?  In the traditional view of conscious will and free will, one would expect 
conscious will to appear before, or at the onset, of the RP, and thus command the 
brain to perform the intended act.  But an appearance of conscious will 550 msec, 
or more before the act seemed intuitively unlikely.  It was clearly important to 
establish the time of the conscious will relative to the onset of the brain process 
(RP); if conscious will were to follow the onset of RP, that would have a 
fundamental impact on how we could view free will.111 
                                                 
111 Benjamin Libet, "Do We Have A Free Will?" in The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, ed. 
Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman and Keith Sutherland (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 1999), p. 49. 
 46
 
Indeed, the common perception of cognition is that we consciously will an action before our 
body begins the necessary processes to bring it about.  After all, conscious will should be a 
catalyst, not an afterthought.  This was not, however, what his experiment found: 
For groups in which all the voluntary acts were freely spontaneous, with no 
reports of rough preplanning of when to act, the onset of RP averaged -550 msec 
(before the muscle was activated).  The W [Will to Act] times for first awareness 
of wish to act averaged about -200 msec for all groups.  This value was the same 
even when subjects reported having preplanned roughly when to act!  If we 
correct W for the -50 msec error in the subjects’ reports of timings of the skin 
stimuli, we have an average corrected W of about -150 msec.  Clearly, the brain 
process (RP) to prepare for this voluntary act began about 400 msec before the 
appearance of the conscious will to act (W).112 
 
Counterintuitively, Libet found that the decision to act appears before our perception of having 
willed to act.  Volition, then, is an unconscious process – the perception of having ‘chosen 
freely’ appears to be an illusion or afterthought.  Libet notes that the appearance of will does 
appear before the muscle contracts, and hence appears as an intermediate stage between the 
unconscious choice to act, the perception of choosing, and the actual action itself.  Because of 
this intermediate stage, Libet suggests that consciousness acts as a kind of ‘veto function’ on 
these unconsciously determined processes – the RP spike appeared when the subject chose to act, 
but no such similar spike occurred when the subject decided not to follow through on the action 
willed.113  This veto function is a form of conscious control, he continues, that does not stem 
from a corresponding unconscious source.114  This delay between unconscious processing and 
action is not affected by the amount of time before deciding – Libet noted that “one may, after 
all, deliberate all day about a choice but never act; there is no voluntary act in that case.”115  
Even in these cases, however, the delay between the unconscious initiation and the perception of 
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will was present; based on this evidence, Libet argues that this would apply to any sort of 
decision.  Free will, then, is not understood to be an initiator of action in Libet’s model – rather, 
it would necessarily be a control mechanism on an underlying impulse to act.  He argues for a 
model in which multiple urges ‘bubble up’ from the unconscious, and we then choose to inhibit 
or not inhibit those impulses.116 
 Gomes and Claxton offer comments on these findings.  Gomes notes that despite Libet’s 
suggestion that veto mechanisms are consciously controlled, they do not thereby return the 
actual impetus to act to the agent.  Thus free will does not allow for the creation of action, but 
simply for censoring them.117  In fact, Gomes argues that perhaps this veto mechanism is not an 
expression of choice – perhaps, instead, the agent simply lacked the final catalyst to action; 
everything was present, except for the final variable allowing the action to proceed: 
Retrospectively, one experiences that one ‘had almost started’ the act and then 
refrained from carrying it out.  Of course, ‘having almost started’ means not 
having started…As I have already said, experience of deciding to act is an integral 
part of the experience of the action itself.  And very often the prior experience of 
an intention is absent: we experience only the suddenly decided and performed 
action.  Indeed, even in the case in which the subject experiences that an 
impending action has been aborted, it is debatable whether the word ‘veto’ is a 
good description of his experience.  In some of the spontaneous cases, a more 
suitable description is perhaps that the final decision to move simply did not 
occur, although the subject has the experience that it almost occurred.  It seems it 
is more a case of not having decided than of positively vetoing an impending 
event.118 
 
Gomes agrees with Libet regarding the unconscious initiation of action, but suggests that we 
ought not view the readiness potential as the start of volition or will.  Rather, Gomes argues that 
the initial readiness potential is causal in intention and volition, and that following this trigger, a 
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sequence of events culminates in our conscious experience of the decision to act.  He does argue 
that we exert control over the final decision to act (the final variable mentioned above); after the 
final neural impulses “comes consciousness of the action as caused by a decision of one’s 
own.”119 
 Claxton notes that there are other examples paralleling Libet’s experiment.  He describes 
a series of demonstrations by Grey Walter that noted preconscious triggering of choice: 
Patients with electrodes implanted in the motor cortex were invited to look at a 
sequence of slides, advancing from one to the next, at their own speed, by pushing 
a button.  Unbeknownst to them, however, the button was a dummy.  What 
actually advanced the slides was a burst of activity in the motor cortex, 
transmitted directly to the projector via the implanted electrodes.  The patients 
reported the curious feeling that the projector was anticipating their decision, 
initiating a slide change just as they were ‘about to’ move on, but before they had 
‘decided’ to press the button.  In other studies, Grey Walter found that EEG 
readiness potentials taken from RAF bombardiers, as they were lining up to drop 
a simulated bomb, preceded the conscious decision to press the bomb release 
button.120 
 
Claxton suggests that the model that emerges from considering Walter’s and Libet’s experiments 
are comparable to a racing start: the preconscious brain prepares the body for action, a metaphor 
Claxton compares to stepping on the brake and accelerator at the same time.  Whether we act or 
not is then decided in our perception of choice.  In describing these veto models, he states “thus 
it is that Libet and others have come to associate volition more with the vetoing of action than its 
instigation: Richard Gregory’s ‘free won’t’ rather than ‘free will.’”121 
What emerges from these arguments is a generalized model of cognition in which our 
experience of will or volition is a secondary phenomenon – the decision to act is initiated 
preconsciously, that is, prior to our awareness of it.  Our popular conceptions of autonomy are 
                                                 
119 Gomes, "Volition and the Readiness Potential,", p. 72. 
120 Guy Claxton, "Whodunnit?  Unpicking the 'Seems' of Free Will," in The Volitional Brain: Towards a 
Neuroscience of Free Will, ed. Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman and Keith Sutherland (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 
1999), 105. 
121 Claxton, "Whodunnit?  Unpicking the 'Seems' of Free Will," 109. 
 49
predicated upon some sense of control – an idea that our actions are the result of our own 
agency, and not that we are simply responding to stimuli or that something is controlling us.  
Intuitively, being controlled is antithetical to theses of autonomy – expressed almost 
tautologically, if we are being controlled, by definition we are not in control of our actions.  The 
difficulty, however, is that this is the model that seems to be borne out by experimentation – 
there are compelling and causative elements of our volitional process that are not under our 
control.  Hence, as a bare minimum, we must assume at least some deterministic elements in our 
conception of agency and ‘autonomy’.  But like reductionism, determinism has multiple 
meanings, and it is necessary to understand what is meant by deterministic elements. 
Why is this meaningful? 
What is the essential conflict?  Why is the discussion of determinism meaningful?  At its 
heart, the discussion concerns essential questions of human volition, motivation, decision-
making capacity and responsibility.  We generally believe that human beings are praiseworthy or 
blameworthy.  This model of subjective experience is ubiquitous, and is reinforced every time 
we have to make a decision, regardless of whether it is a decision as inconsequential as what type 
of bread to buy or whether we want to undergo another round of chemotherapy.  This everyday 
accounting of subjective experience is a model of folk psychology – a plain-language accounting 
of phenomena we all experience. 
The Folk Model – Our Everyday Experience of Free Will 
 There is a common experience in cognition concerning the question of free will: we feel 
consciously aware of the process of choice and deliberation.  We persistently feel a sense of 
ownership and authorship of our actions, and hence corresponding feelings of pride and 
embarrassment when we excel or err.  McCrone summarizes the experience quite cogently: 
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Free will seems a straight-forward enough business.  I feel the mental effort of 
making a choice and anyone who tells me my choices are predetermined can 
quickly be proved wrong – I will simply do the opposite of what’s expected.  Of 
course there are a few mysteries.  When I crook a finger or raise a hand, it is hard 
to be sure how I really make these simple actions happen…So there are some 
complexities to the story.  But the ancient tripartite division of the mind into 
thought, feeling and will seems indisputable.  Nestled somewhere in the humid 
folds of our brains must be a moving soul-stuff or at least some clever neural 
machinery of volition.  Such is the folk psychology view of volition and already 
many of the standard suppositions about the nature of freewill are apparent.  It is 
seen as a unitary faculty – any differences are of degree rather than kind.  It is 
innate – all humans are born with the power, although its shoots may need 
nurturing to grow healthy.  It is dimensionless – the willing of an act is a point-
like event, clearly separate from deliberations that may have preceded it.  And 
free means free – don’t you dare call it an illusion.122 
 
This folk psychology view is deeply engrained in many people – it is very difficult to challenge 
and very resistant to change.  As Claxton notes, our perception of folk psychology explanations 
are that they do a good job of explaining our everyday experiences.  Unless we consciously look 
for breakdowns or errors in this process, it has a tendency to be self-perpetuating, and just seems 
right.  However, these common ‘seems’ can be unreliable and inaccurate.123  The extent of the 
inaccuracies will be explored shortly. 
 What, then, is at stake?  What could the basis of objecting to this folk psychology model 
be?  One might approach the issue from a purely philosophical question of the nature of 
causality.  If we accept that effects must have prior causes, then we can challenge the folk 
psychology model on the basis of adequate versus inadequate exploration of causation.  We may 
not necessarily be aware of all of the elements relevant to or explicitly causing the given action.  
From a psychological viewpoint, we may note that the cognitive biases of the agent, conscious 
and un-/sub-/preconscious elements shaped the decision, but that we only were aware of the 
surface level phenomena.  Elements outside of consciousness are avolitional, or at least not 
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controlled by us – therefore we do not exert the conscious control that we believe we do.  From 
an anatomical basis, we have Libet’s own experiments, which demonstrate causative and 
unconscious activation of specific cortices relevant to the feeling of having ‘willed’ something – 
therefore, our ownership of the subsequent action might not be as complete as we believe it to 
be.  From a scientific basis, one could argue that the universe has causal laws that are inherently 
deterministic (in the sense of being predictable, explanatory, and consistent), and that we ought 
not to conceive ourselves as being exempt from these laws.  These concerns will be addressed in 
a brief exploration of the arguments of Searle, Libet, and Sappington. 
Searle 
 Searle raises several issues at stake in the debate.  There is a concern about taking 
ownership and responsibility for actions – much in the same manner as we do not hold 
individuals responsible for actions done under hypnosis, if psychological determinism were true 
(that our actions are caused by underlying psychological processes), we ought to remove any 
discussion of morality from discusses of humanity.  If we are simply our psychological 
processes, we are not moral agents.  This will be a recurring theme in this chapter, and as such, it 
is not necessary to belabor this point at the present.  It is worth exploring the question of 
psychological determinism, however, as Searle’s question speaks to issues fundamental to this 
dissertation, and explored more fully in the next chapter.  In Searle’s argument, psychological 
models are not incompatible with free will: 
Is all behavior determined by such psychological compulsions?  If we try to treat 
psychological determinism as a factual claim about our behavior, then it seems to 
be just plain false.  The thesis of psychological determinism is that prior 
psychological causes determine all of our behavior in the way that they determine 
the behavior of the hypnosis subject or the heroin addict.  On this view, all 
behavior, in one way or another, is psychologically compulsive.  But the available 
evidence suggests that such a thesis is false.  We do indeed normally act on the 
basis of our intentional states – our beliefs, hopes, fears, desires, etc. – and in that 
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sense our mental states function causally.  But this form of cause and effect is not 
deterministic.  We might have had exactly those mental states and still not have 
done what we did.  As far as psychological causes are concerned, we could have 
done otherwise.  Instances of hypnosis and psychologically compulsive behavior 
on the other hand are usually pathological and easily distinguishable from normal 
free action.  So, psychologically speaking, there is scope for human freedom.124 
 
This seems to be counterintuitive, however.  Searle fiats the ability to act differently with 
identical causal psychological states, which seems to be an unfounded statement.  It seems likely 
that perhaps there was an incomplete accounting of causal factors – that while the situations may 
appear similar, there were other elements present which inhibited the initiation of action.  In light 
of myriad un-, sub-, and preconscious elements in cognition, it seems entirely plausible that we 
manifest different behavior simply because we are not aware of all of the germane factors 
affecting agency. 
 A further irony is that while Searle argues for ownership of action, there is a fundamental 
paradox:  How do we then account for ownership of an action if it doesn’t stem from our 
character (and hence psychological state)?  Character, as a recurrent pattern of belief and 
behavior, is not a consistently conscious and willed phenomenon.  Character stems from 
experiences and causal elements outside of our control (e.g., genes, early environment, parenting, 
gender, race, economic status, etc.) – determined elements – and is not something about which 
we consistently think.  The availability heuristic, a concept more fully explored in the next 
chapter, notes that our cognition tends to be shaped by events that are easily accessed in our 
memory, a deterministic model.  My choices are also shaped by previous events about which I 
have no working memory (i.e., I do not consciously think about them), and as such, I cannot 
control their influence on my present choice or volitional process.  One’s psychological state is 
much more causative and deterministic than Searle suggests. 
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 Searle ultimately argues that the psychological model is less worrisome to free will 
theorists than models stemming from physical models of microelements:  
This is an absolutely fundamental point in this chapter, so let me repeat it.  The 
form of determinism that is ultimately worrisome is not psychological 
determinism.  The idea that our states of mind are sufficient to determine 
everything we do is probably just false.  The worrisome form of determinism is 
more basic and fundamental.  Since all of the surface features of the world are 
entirely caused by and realized in systems of micro-elements, the behavior of 
micro-elements is sufficient to determine everything that happens.  Such a 
‘bottom up’ picture of the world allows for top-down causation (our minds, for 
example, can affect our bodies).  But top-down causation only works because the 
top level is already caused by and realized in the bottom levels.125 
 
This seems overly dismissive of psychological determinism – after all, as noted above, there are 
significant causal elements of cognition that are psychological in origin.  There is a potential out, 
however, in that it is likely Searle is referring to hard determinism (a very strict form of 
determinism discussed below) rather than underdeterminism – which refers to avolitional 
causative structures that strongly influence the agent, but do not remove all actual agency.  
Underdeterminism will be discussed more fully below. 
Libet 
 Libet notes that we face a fundamental problem – in the course of studying consciousness 
and our experiences we feel free, but we cannot reconcile this with our understanding of 
deterministic processes in the natural world.  We ‘know’ we have volitional control, but we also 
now that this isn’t in accord with natural laws.126  This conflict is significant; in fact, Libet notes 
that history has demonstrated it to be beyond the ken of some of the most influential thinkers in 
philosophy: 
                                                 
125 Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science, p. 94. 
126 Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland, "Editor's Introduction: The Volitional Brain," in The 
Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, ed. Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman and Keith 
Sutherland (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 1999), p. ix. 
 54
Our sense of free will (volitional control) depends upon a balance between 
reliability and flexibility in relation to cause-and-effect.  Without the former, all 
outcomes would be arbitrary; without the latter, all outcomes would be 
predetermined.  In neither case would there be any way of putting one’s will into 
effect.  So much is clear, yet establishing that precarious balance has proved so 
difficult that Kant himself declared ‘freedom of the will’ to be one of the only 
three metaphysical problems which lie beyond the powers of the human 
intellect.127 
 
Two models that recur in the debate are libertarianism and compatibilism – philosophies that 
attempt to preserve some volitional elements of cognition and choice from underlying 
deterministic causality (which will be discussed below).  Libertarianism generally argues that 
individuals are moral agents who can create their own goals and motives – actions originate with 
the moral agent, not with the agent’s surrounding environment or external stimuli.  
Compatibilism generally holds that freedom consists of “being free from outside constraints and 
abnormal internal compulsions.”128  Libet suggests that compatibilism tends to be a more 
commonly held opinion among philosophers and the general public.  The public, he suggests, 
would reject theories that argue for more deterministic models, as “ a common reaction, after all, 
to the suggestion that we are not ultimate self-originators – that we could not have willed 
otherwise in a given situation – is to suppose that morality, responsibility, justice, fairness, and 
the social order itself are deprived of a necessary foundation.”129  These same concerns were 
raised with regard to reductionism, and we will return to these concerns in discussing objections 
to determinism below. 
 Ultimately Libet suggests that perhaps it would be better to simply assume that free will 
and volition are not essentially deterministic, as they are the basis of many social and cultural 
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mores.  Absent hard data proving or disproving free will or determinism, he suggests that we err 
on the side of caution: 
Present-day physics does not provide for the possibility of free will, but neither 
does it rule it out – unless one subscribes to the view that presently known physics 
is final and complete.  Given the immense complexity of the brain, it probably is 
not feasible to demonstrate unequivocally the presence or absence of free will 
through analysis of neurophysiological processes.  But further experiments can 
give us insight as to the way it presumably works, if it exists…Seeing as our 
experience is one of agency and free will, and seeing as the entire religious, 
ethical, cultural and legal system of the western world is based on such an 
assumption, then it might be much better to assume that this is the position until 
science tells us, unequivocally, that this is not the case.  That way we should all 
be ‘innocent until proven guilty.’130 
 
But this raises a necessary question – do we simply adhere to models because they are 
fundamental to our current worldview?  This type of mentality justified a variety of questionable 
pseudoscientific practices, including belief in spontaneous generation, phlogiston, Lamarckian 
evolution, geocentrism, etc.   As Kuhn argues, scientific progress occurs as the result of 
paradigm conflicts and resolution – as evidence mounts against a currently dominant paradigm, 
as more questions are found that cannot be reconciled with the current theory (or can only be 
reconciled with tortured logic and loose inference), we have more reasons to reject the dominant 
paradigm and adopt the challenger.  Quite simply, there are too many unanswered questions to 
maintain current beliefs.  Libet’s experiments note an unconscious volitional precursor, 
indicating backstage cognitive processes that by their nature are avolitional and deterministic.  
Cognitive and social psychology note a variety of heuristics that act as automatic filters during 
decision-making and cognition.  These are all compelling arguments that our cognition is not 
quite as free as we would like to maintain – in short, these are all compelling arguments that the 
current ‘folk’ paradigm of psychology and subjective experience ought to be replaced with 
something that incorporates more deterministic elements. 
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Sappington 
Sappington notes that both libertarians and compatibilists can admit that choices 
influence behavior, and that there can be causative influences external to us that shape our 
behavior.131  Neither position is arguing for a radical freedom uninfluenced by external or past 
factors.  We have personalities, after all, and have previous experiences which can affect how we 
view situations and circumstances.  Sappington notes that the data on personal choice prove 
neither free will nor determinism, as they do not address the origin of choice or personal goals, 
or why one goal or value may be given priority over others, or whether genetic factors or past 
learning history are causative in choice.132  He suggests that some theorists have been able to 
demonstrate compatibility between free will and scientific tasks like control and prediction, but 
they have been unable to demonstrate that there is any reason to view humans as exceptions to 
the rules governing other natural phenomena.  The same types of argument justifying free will in 
humans can be used to justify free will in other chaotic systems that we do not traditionally view 
as being free (pendulums, weather systems, leaf distributions, and mathematical equations).133 
 He suggests that free will and determinism can act as meta-assumptions in guiding 
scientific research.  Experiments proceeding from different meta-assumptions will explore 
different constructs and thereby gather different data.  Theories adopting free will as a meta-
assumption might explore subjective “purpose or conscious choice”; theories adopting 
deterministic meta-assumptions would be less likely to explore these elements.134  Sappington 
concludes that scientific data will never allow us to answer the question of subjective free will 
versus determinism.  He makes a distinction between subjective consciousness and free will –we 
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are aware of and can test subjective consciousness and choice; free will is not testable.  
Fundamentally, he argues, proving either free will or determinism requires an impossibility – 
proving a negative claim: 
It has been argued previously that the data covered in this article are inadequate 
for demonstrating the existence of free will.  It is now argued that no empirical 
data can settle the free will versus determinism issue.  Logically, to prove that free 
will exists, it would be necessary to show that at least some choices cannot be 
explained in terms of factors outside the person.  To prove the determinism 
position would require a demonstration that no choices exist that cannot be 
explained in terms of factors outside the person.  To prove either position would 
thus require proving a negative, which cannot be done conclusively.  Thus, free 
will is not a scientific construct in the same sense as conscious choice, and the 
free will versus determinism issue cannot be settled scientifically.135 
 
It would seem, then, that we are left in the initial quandary of having a concept that can neither 
be proven nor tested; whether we actually exert control over the causes of our actions may not be 
answerable in scientific study – it may not be a question so much of physics as metaphysics. 
Key  Definitions in the Determinism Debate 
Before the conceptual discussion begins, it is useful to lay out a few key differences 
between the ideas at hand.  These differences are not purely semantic – they have strong 
consequences not only for accounting for human cognition and behavior, but also for issues on 
the periphery of epistemology and ontology – questions of morality and responsibility.  The two 
key concepts that must be addressed are fundamentally opposed: indeterminism and 
determinism. 
Defining Indeterminism 
The traditional alternative to determinist schools of thought is that of indeterminism.  
Where determinism sees strict causation, indeterminism sees probabilities.  Where determinism 
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sees necessity, indeterminism sees possibility.  In the experiment discussed above, Libet defined 
free will in accord with what he called the common view: 
First, there should be no external control or cues to affect the occurrence or 
emergence of the voluntary act under study; i.e., it should be endogenous.  
Secondly, the subject should feel that he/she wanted to do it, on her/his own 
initiative, and feel he could control what is being done, when to do it or not do it.  
Many actions lack this second attribute.136 
 
Despite the prevalence of actions lacking this second attribute, Libet suggests that actions are 
free, but perhaps not free in the usual sense.  After all, the common view of free will is not veto 
capacity, but actively willing one of many alternatives. 
Enç defines indeterminism as “the thesis that starts from the formation of the beliefs and 
desires of an agent, through a decision, an intention, to the execution of the action [and that 
thesis] must essentially contain an indeterministic element.”137 In essence, the process must 
originate with the plans of the agent and must have alternatives available to the agent.  These 
alternatives cannot be simply for show – they must be genuine options that the agent could make, 
and the choice finally made must stem from the agent instead of some determining element or 
elements.  This does raise a compelling question, however – how do we reconcile the two 
apparently disparate concepts of agent-based choice and character-based agency.  Ultimately 
who we are is a culmination of a lifetime of experience and subjective assessment; as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter, this experience and assessment is not always a conscious 
process.  In fact, compelling arguments have been made suggesting that these deeply formative 
un-, sub-, and preconscious elements are also causative – our character is shaped by elements 
outside conscious choice.  We cannot selectively filter our unconscious processes – certain things 
happen automatically and outside our perception which affect how we think and act.  Agency, 
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then, is not entirely a volitional process; it must contain determined elements if it is to accurately 
portray our actions.  Agency that does not admit this backstage cognition is homuncular – it’s as 
if there were a little man selectively deciding what will affect us and what will not, a theme that 
will be explored in chapter four in the discussion of popular autonomy models.  Cognitive and 
social psychology tell us that we cannot simply fiat these little men; our cognitive processes are 
not quite so choosy – a theme explored more fully in the next chapter.  For the moment, let it 
suffice to note that this type of agency does not gel well with Libet’s experiments; action has 
unconscious, non-agentic roots. 
Defining Determinism 
Determinism, however, is perfectly compatible with Libet’s experiment – deterministic 
systems do not fiat such homuncular thought.  Instead, un-, sub-, and preconscious processes 
(hereafter referred to as backstage cognition) are perfectly compatible with the volitional data 
suggesting our ‘choice’ to act is caused by elements outside our conscious awareness.  Dorato 
defines determinism as “a scientific-philosophical doctrine according to which the state of a 
physical system at one instant of time t (whatever that means) univocally fixes any other 
temporal states of that system, past or future.”138  In this model, there is a 1:1 relationship 
between a state of the universe and it’s following arrangement – there are no contingent events or 
other possibilities.  If, he argues, our actions conform to this definition, we cannot have acted any 
differently in the past, and by extension cannot act except as we are determined to do.  This does 
not equate to fatalism, however, which he distinguishes as arguing that certain events are fated to 
occur, although the paths we may take to reach them can be variable.  Fatalist arguments suggest 
that certain events must happen, but there are multiple causal pathways that can bring them 
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about; determinism, on the other hand, argues that there is only one causal pathway between 
events. 
 Sappington, among many others, notes that there is a logical consequence of upholding a 
deterministic model of human behavior.  Specifically, if our actions are constrained and no other 
outcomes are genuinely possible, it makes no sense to argue for concepts like morality.  Moral 
decisions are predicated on at least the capacity to choose between alternatives – choice, in the 
deterministic model proposed, is illusory, and as a consequence, so is the concept of morality.139  
This point is contentious, and will be revisited when challenges to deterministic models are 
discussed.  Sappington notes a distinction between “hard” and “soft” versions of determinism 
(the latter is frequently referred to as ‘compatibilism’ or ‘libertarianism’) – in soft deterministic 
models, certain elements of choice and volition are determined, but others are freely chosen: 
Libertarians agree with Alexander Pope that human beings are somehow a special 
case in that they must be understood differently than other natural phenomena.  
Human choices are not determined by external factors; the cause of a choice is 
held to be the person who makes it.  People must be viewed as active agents.  It is 
true that people are not free to implement all of their choices; they are faced with 
external constraints that serve as barriers and with personal constraints such as 
lack of ability.  Nevertheless, in any situation, people are always free to make 
choices and the choices themselves are not determined by any factor outside the 
individual140   
 
This position has been critiqued by many, and at present it is sufficient to note that there is not a 
clear distinction between soft and hard determinism – all thought is predicated on an underlying 
substrate or structure, which by definition has rules to follow.  We cannot have thoughts without 
simultaneously having some underlying neural activity, which is a determined action.  
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 Dowe suggests that there are at least four compelling variants of determinism.141 (all 
subsequent discussion in the next few paragraphs are drawn from Dowe’s work).  The first 
variant is causal theory, which suggests that every event has a prior and sufficient cause (i.e., for 
every event we can name, there is a corresponding cause that was sufficient to bring the event 
about).  In this model, behavior is explicable in terms of root causation; e.g., the desire to drink is 
brought about by genetic or social etiologies (upbringing, education, etc.).  Dowe notes that there 
are at least two subsequent challenges this account encounters: first, defining causation is 
problematic itself, therefore defining determinism in light of causation merely makes the 
question more opaque; second, causation is asymmetric with respect to time (causes precede 
effects), while determinism is does not necessarily have this asymmetry (effects can be 
contemporaneous with their causes).  A second variant of determinism stems from Popper’s 
predictability theory; that is, “a system is deterministic if and only if all its states are predicable 
by the right kind of being with knowledge of the present state and the laws of nature.”142  This 
being possesses finite knowledge, but it is enough to predict all of the possible and subsequent 
states of the system.  The objection raised by this definition is the concern that it conflates 
epistemology with ontology (predictability is epistemic while determinism is ontological).  
Dowe’s third variant stems from Bertrand Russell, who suggests that the universe is 
deterministic if there is a functional relationship between variables at one time with variables at 
all other times.  This, however, raises questions of possibility – Dowe notes that Russell admitted 
that the model he proposed was problematic.  It was equally possible that the world would be 
deterministic as indeterministic.  The fourth variant uses the idea of physical necessity in 
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infinitely possible worlds, such that “a physically possible world W is deterministic just if for 
any other physically possible world W’, if W and W’ agree at any time then they agree at all 
times.”143  Dowe suggests that this model faces the challenge of the difference between 
accidental and nomological regularities, but that it is the “front runner for the appropriate theory 
of determinism.” 
 Unlike Dowe, I suggest that the second model – the Popper model – is a more likely 
account of deterministic thought, at least as it pertains to human cognition.  Underlying cognitive 
processes are causative, in the sense that they individually or collectively can provide strong 
impetus to act, if not explicit action itself (these underlying cognitive processes will be explored 
in greater detail in chapter two).  Similarly, Bargh and Ferguson suggest that determinism 
underlies every element of human choice and volition – the causative elements of human 
behavior are both conscious and unconscious.144 
Concepts in the Determinism Debate 
In discussing the question of deterministic causation in cognition, what becomes evident 
is the strenuous nature of the debate and the tenacity with which the advocates hold to their 
positions.  The difficulty, however, is that to date no approach has been able to claim absolute 
victory – while significant elements of cognition can be assessed objectively (from a third-person 
perspective), we have not had many inroads into the subjective phenomena of cognition (from a 
first-person perspective).  As Libet argues, both determinism and non-determinism (a catch-all 
phrase for theories that are not innately deterministic) are “non-proven speculative beliefs.”145  
Both Gomes and Spence and Frith note that subjectively we experience our cognition as 
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undetermined – i.e., our phenomena of cognition is one of conscious deliberation, volition, and 
decision.146  However, Spence and Frith note that while our subjective experience may be one of 
volitional control and decision, from an objective perspective, our behavior may be causally 
explained and predicted.  They note that “in this example the subject experiences one reality 
(their freedom ‘to choose’), while another, material reality, coincides with (and indeed pre-
empts) their experience.”147 As such, we find ourselves experiencing the original quandary – 
how can we reconcile an essential element of our subjective experience with objective 
knowledge of deterministic causation?  Dorato argues that there are multiple methodologies by 
which one can approach the relationship between determinism and subjective indeterminism.  
These methodologies generally agree as to what constitutes determinism, but differ significantly 
when exploring and explaining the phenomena of free will.148  These positions will be elucidated 
and explored below. 
Indeterminism 
Several theorists have endeavored to demonstrate the innate indeterministic cognitive and 
volitional capacities of human moral agents.  The justifications for belief include such disparate 
approaches as discussions of quantum mechanics, voluntary decisional mechanisms, folk 
psychology, questions of ultimate responsibility, probabilistic causality, etc.  The degree to 
which they can plausibly justify indeterministic human agency varies accordingly, and each 
leads to questions challenging the stability of their foundation.  Indeterministic theories must 
account for the success of mechanistic accounts of the natural world, as well as the general 
reliability of prediction by third-person observation of human behavior.  The above bases for 
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justification will be discussed through discussion of the arguments of Kane, McCrone, Enç, 
Libet, Eccles, and Gomes.  Each will be addressed in turn. 
 Kane bases his defense of probabilistic causation on two principles: AP, the principle of 
alternative possibilities, and UR, the principle of ultimate responsibility.149  Alternative 
possibilities has a long history in the indeterminism debate, and generally refers to the necessity 
that an agent possess alternative choices for a decision to be considered free.  Kane argues that 
ultimate responsibility is fundamentally more important than alternative possibilities – we need 
the agent to take ownership of her actions in order to genuinely say that her choice was free.  
Ultimate responsibility is similar to existential notions in Sartre, in that it suggests that past 
choices are character-forming, and that therefore we take responsibility for who we were, are, 
and are becoming by the choices we make.  Kane calls these ‘self-forming actions’.   
 In circumstances of deliberation and choice, Kane proposes that disparate desires, 
motivations, and goals conflict at a cognitive level, yielding an ‘indeterministic noise’ – a barrier 
to decision-making that must be overcome.150  The ‘noise’ stems from one desire’s effort to 
inhibit the other – each is attempting to defeat the opposing impulse so that the desire may be 
fulfilled.  Eventually one desire reaches in activation threshold, which initiates action and choice.  
Kane suggests that we see the agent as attempting to solve two cognitive problems at the same 
time – the agent wants both choices, but action is thwarted until one or the other wins out.  In this 
manner, agents can be held responsible for actions that may have gone awry – for instance, the 
assassin who misses his target is still responsible for his action, because part of him intended to 
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succeed.151  Kane distances his analysis from the influence of chance or luck, which he argues 
are terms from ordinary language and indicate a lack of control.  Instead he argues that the 
language of indeterminism ought not be construed as implying luck, and instead understand it as 
necessarily ruling out deterministic causation.  In its stead, we ought to adopt a paradigm of 
probabilistic causation, in which outcomes are not inevitable.152 
 The ownership of a given action stems from its basis in the character of the moral agent.  
He argues that: 
A choice is the agent’s when it is produced intentionally by efforts, deliberation 
and reasons that are part of this self-defining motivational system and when, in 
addition the agent endorses the new intention or purpose created by the choice so 
that it becomes an additional part of that motivational system and thereafter 
functions as a further purpose guiding future practical reasoning and action.”153  
 
In essence, each choice the agent makes and endorses becomes integrated into her causal 
decisional mechanism and motivational scheme.  Kane refers to this in literary terms, as he states 
that “agents exercising free will are both authors of and characters in their own stories all at 
once.”154  This story is unfinished – the agents have no determined path or character arc; instead 
they define and refine the story and character as they are written.  The fundamental criteria for 
agentic control in Kane’s model is: 
Embodied in the idea of plural voluntary control over a set of options at a time 
when they have the (i) ability or capacity to (ii) bring about (iii) at that time (iv) 
whichever of the options they will or want, (v) for the reasons they will to do so, 
(vi) on purpose or intentionally rather than accidentally, by mistake or merely by 
chance, hence (vii) voluntarily (in accordance with their wills rather than against 
them), (viii) as a result of their efforts, if effort should be required, (ix) without 
being coerced or compelled or (x) otherwise controlled or forced to choose one 
way or the other by some other agent or mechanism.  Agents exercise such 
control directly when they voluntarily and intentionally produce one of the 
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options (a particular self-forming choice or SFA) then and there (at the time in 
question) under these conditions.155 
 
For the moment, I am willing to simply grant these criteria.  There are fundamental problems 
therein, however, that we will return to and discuss shortly.  In light of these criteria, we 
understand indeterminacy to be fundamentally an obstacle to be overcome by the agent, and 
when this occurs, the agent has succeeded in bringing one of her conflicting desires to fruition.156  
These drives and desires stem from her character and background, ensuring that the resultant 
choice serves to further define and develop their character. 
There are two responses to Kane’s proposed model: first, exactly why should this be 
construed as being something other than a deterministic model; and second, how much of the 
agent’s intentionality counts towards agency?  Do we have to be consciously aware of every 
motivational factor?  Each of these questions will be addressed in turn. 
First, at this point, it is necessary to throw in an observation: The model Kane proposes 
bears more than a passing resemblance to the model proposed by Paul Henri Thiry, Baron 
d’Holbach, which is explicitly and inherently deterministic.  In Thiry’s model: 
Man is said to deliberate when the action of the will is suspended; this happens 
when two opposite motives act alternately upon him.  To deliberate is to hate and 
to love in succession; it is to be alternately attracted and repelled; it is to be 
moved sometimes by one motive, sometimes by another.  Man only deliberates 
when he does not distinctly understand the quality of the objects from which he 
receives impulse, or when experience has not sufficiently apprised him of the 
effects, more or less remote, which his actions will produce…He deliberates in 
consequence; he weighs the various motives that urge his will to go out or to stay 
at home.  He is at length determined by that motive which is most probable.  This 
removes his indecision, which necessarily settles his will, either to remain within 
or to go out.  This motive is always either the immediate or ultimate advantage he 
finds, or thinks he finds, in the action to which he is persuaded…Choice by no 
means proves the free agency of man: He only deliberates when he does not yet 
know which to choose of the many objects that move him…Action always being 
the effect of his will once determined, and as his will being determined by a 
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motive which is not in his own power, it follows that he is never the master of the 
determination of his own peculiar will – that consequently he never acts as a free 
agent.  It has been believed that man was a free agent because he had a will with 
the power of choosing, but attention has not been paid to the fact that even his 
will is moved by causes independent of himself…157  
 
What is the difference between Kane’s argument and saying that our unconscious drives and 
desires are in conflict until one wins out and causes us to act, as in Thiry’s model?  Thiry’s 
model seems to meet the criteria for control that Kane suggests, and yet Thiry draws radically 
different conclusions.  If the same line of reasoning can justify both deterministic and 
indeterministic conclusions, it seems suspect to conclude that it is therefore an argument for 
probabilistic causality and hence indeterminism. 
 Second, Kane makes repeated reference to a reflective process in choice and volition, in 
an effort to have the moral agent take ownership of her actions.  In this dissertation, a recurrent 
critique of indeterministic models stressing character and motives is non-conscious causation – 
the process that gives rise to character and reflection upon action are essentially deterministic, in 
that they are influential, but not consciously willed.  Hence, we have non-conscious causative 
factors, which implicitly seem to undercut models of volition predicated on conscious awareness 
and reflection. 
McCrone suggests that a more accurate attempt to understand cognition should shy away 
from the reductionist methodologies suggested earlier in this chapter.  Instead, we ought to ‘look 
to the big picture’ of the human mind in all of its contexts and see it as a ‘bifold’ model of 
socially constructed software using the resources of the underlying biological hardware.158  The 
faculty of free will thus is a social idea in addition to a neurological process.  Viewing free will 
as an interaction of biological processes and cultural input allows us to resist the “bogy of 
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Newtonian determinism” – the social and cultural context in which we operate demands our 
feelings of autonomy at the same time as it inculcates cultural mores and expectations in our 
sense of agency.159  Knowing what we should be doing also necessarily implies what we should 
not be doing, giving us alternative courses of action, if we were to so choose them.  This greater 
degree of socialization translates into a greater awareness of actively choosing between options. 
 While McCrone does suggest a unique perspective on indeterminism, it is questionable as 
to whether the model he proposes actually demonstrates human free will.  After all, what would 
distinguish his model from a deterministic model in which both biology and culture are the 
determinants?  McCrone argues that human action is, in fact, determined in this regard,160 but he 
suggests that as part of this cultural determinism we foster our sense of individual autonomy.  
This seems to be begging the question – if a sense of autonomy is culturally determined, is it 
actually there (a position we will return to again in the discussion of determinism below)?  After 
all, if part of the inculcation of cultural mores is a developing personal impression of telepathic 
ability, does it actually mean I can read minds?  This suggestion appears dubious, and seems to 
argue instead that a feeling of autonomy is culturally determined, and therefore not genuine 
autonomy at all. 
Enç argues that there is a fundamental indeterminacy in mental activity,161 but that this 
indeterminacy does not itself explain the nature of the feeling that the choice is up to me.162  He 
argues that we must distinguish voluntary from involuntary actions, and he suggests that we 
ought to consider the underlying deliberative mechanism as the basis for this distinction.163  So 
long as the underlying mechanism is functioning properly (i.e., absent artificial constraints like 
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addictions, compulsions, etc.), we have reason to call the action voluntary (so acting on bad or 
absent information is still a voluntary act, as the underlying decisional mechanism was 
functioning properly).  Our sensation of having willed an action stems from this decisional 
mechanism: “The reasons for the original intention won over the reasons for satisfying the more 
immediate desires.  But these frustrated desires leave a mark.  It is conceivable that the mark is 
what gives the feel of having exerted one’s will.”164  Will, in this sense, is “a power to make 
rational decisions in varying circumstances.”165  As such, it is possible for the will not to be free 
– some circumstances may prevent this decisional mechanism from operating properly, and as 
such, the agent is not free in the choices made. The model Enç ultimately adopts is similar to that 
of Locke, who discussed conditional restraints on individual agency.  Enç argues that: 
What I am suggesting, instead, is a reading of Locke in which freedom is an 
attribute of persons in their capacity as agents in specific contexts.  And I propose 
to add to Locke the proviso that an agent’s freedom, in so far as she is 
contemplating a type of activity in a specific context, comes in degrees.  If upon 
deliberation, I choose a course of action on the merits of the case, and act in 
accordance with my choice, my act is voluntary.  It would be voluntary in spite of 
the fact that I could not have acted otherwise if I were to choose to act otherwise.  
But if the alternative courses of action available to me were severely restricted 
(say by the counterfactual contravener poised to interfere if I made the ‘wrong’ 
decision), then the degree of freedom I normally enjoy in that context would 
accordingly be diminished.”166  
 
But this necessarily begs the question – if I deliberate upon an action (conscious and non-
conscious processes), then I choose how to act based upon the merits of the case (non-
consciously modified both by my backstage cognition and cognitive heuristics discussed in the 
next chapter), then act in accordance with my choice (the ultimate effect of myriad backstage 
causal elements), my act is voluntary – but the question remains as to whether it is free.  While 
Enç argues for degrees of freedom, it is not entirely clear what the scale is – voluntary and 
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involuntary actions might not necessary be distinguishable absent a much clearer presentation of 
what constitutes a properly functioning decisional mechanism.  As has been suggested, properly 
functioning decisional mechanisms do not necessarily mean fully, or even partially, conscious 
processes.  
Libet argues that his experiments suggest some methodology by which free will may 
operate – a restriction on an urge to act that begins outside of conscious awareness.167  We can 
freely choose to follow through on this impulse or to suppress it.  However, these experiments do 
not address the fundamental question as to whether conscious actions are completely determined 
by natural laws, or whether conscious processes can proceed without them. He notes that if 
conscious actions are indeed determined, our personal experience of free will is illusory, and 
exerting one’s will is a mere epiphenomenon.168 
 This is a practical concern, and research does seem to indicate that conscious processes 
are indeed determined by some causal laws.  Thought itself tends to fall into patterns of 
activation, whether one adopts one of the models discussed in the reductionism section or adopts 
a new model.  The phenomenon of being on “auto-pilot” is just as common as the phenomenon 
of exercising conscious volition.  Further, psychological models demonstrate that how we take in 
and process information tends to be predictable; if cognition necessarily has an underlying 
substrate, as argued earlier, it would stand to reason that we develop neural activation patterns, 
which are in fact governed by natural laws (e.g., the all-or-nothing rule of synaptic firing, 
irreversible and cascading opening and closing of sodium and potassium ion channels as a 
causing the relay of the signal down the nodes of Ranvier, neurotransmitter release into the 
synaptic cleft as a result, leading to the inhibition or stimulation of the next neuron, etc.).  As we 
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will see later, Libet will suggest that we default to an assumption of free will to preserve our 
beliefs in the everyday phenomena of free will – this seems to be an unjustified claim, as 
mounting evidence suggests that this is in fact a willful fiction.   
Eccles argues quite forcefully that free will is factual – in fact, he argues that to deny it is 
irrational and illogical, and one ought not to even engage in discussion with someone who claims 
to be merely responding to complex stimuli with complex conditioning.169  Discussion with such 
a “Skinnerian”, he argues, devolves into a game of “conditioning and counter-conditioning.”  
Like Libet, Eccles suggests that if “in willing an action one does not effectively influence the 
patterns of neuronal activity in the cerebral cortex and so bring about the desired discharge of 
motor pyramidal cells, then free will is an illusion, however subtle the philosophical 
arguments.”170  Eccles is arguing for a series of individual worlds of neural phenomena in which 
we understand consciousness to be the product of the individual’s dominant hemisphere.  This 
dominant hemisphere gives rise to a non-physical phenomenon that can causally interact with the 
physical material of the brain, affecting behavior and cognition.  Despite a spirited rejection of 
Savage’s response that the model is glorified dualism, Eccles does fundamentally face the same 
problem as Descartes – explaining how the non-physical interacts with the physical. 
Even granting that consciousness is the product of the dominant hemisphere – 
experiments with split-brain patients demonstrate that non-conscious physical actions can 
originate with the non-dominant hemisphere171 – there is still a fundamental problem: we have 
no proof that this phenomena of consciousness is causal.  If the non-dominant hemisphere can 
move the individual’s arm or leg without the agent being aware of it or despite consciously 
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willing it to stop, it suggests that epiphenomenal volition is insufficient to counter material 
causation (similar to the Penfield experiments).  If we can have this kind of causation without 
volition, why should we assume that the sense of will and volition is anything more than a 
secondary by-product of nonconscious processes – the very thing that Libet’s experiments 
demonstrate?  The model of consciousness emerging from the dominant hemisphere does not 
seem to account for apparently purposeful and willed non-conscious action – a split-brain patient 
will consciously pick up a pencil with the hand controlled by the dominant hemisphere, and the 
hand from the non-dominant hemisphere will attempt to put it back down.  Appeals to a non-
dominant consciousness are question-begging; if it exists, there is no reason to assume it is any 
more causative than the dominant consciousness. 
Like Enç, Gomes notes that modern conceptions of physics have introduced a 
fundamental indeterminacy at the particle level, which can result in causative chains and effects 
at higher levels of organization.172  He argues that while this might allow for indeterminacy in 
actions and events, it does not bolster the claim of free will – as has been repeatedly argued, part 
of the conscious experience of free will is the sense of having consciously willed something to 
occur.  If the ultimate cause of a behavior is quantum fluctuation, then I am no more the cause of 
the action than I am in a deterministic system.  As such, Gomes concludes that “Reasons and 
choice seem as different from chance as from causes.  It is difficult, then, to reconcile our 
naturalistic view of the physical world with the idea that we ourselves, as voluntary agents, are 
part of this physical world.”173 
 Free actions in his model must fundamentally take into account that the mind is subject to 
causality – a common perception of which we normally are not aware.  We often do not perceive 
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in first-person terms (agent as agent) the causal factors that can be evident in third-person terms 
(agent as observer).174  A necessary part of this perception, however, is that I do not perceive my 
actions to be caused by factors external to me – I still take ownership of the action and claim 
responsibility for bringing it about.  A further necessary condition for a free action is the genuine 
possibility of “doing otherwise in the same circumstances.’175  In this list of circumstances 
Gomes includes all of the external factors germane to the choice, potentially all of the ‘somatic 
states’ of the agent (body conditions external to the nervous system), as well as potentially all of 
the mental states, such as desires, beliefs and emotions.  One would not, however, include the 
actual deciding system within these causal constraints – that would inherently lead to a 
contradictory claim that “even if the subject had decided to do the same thing, he could have 
decided to do otherwise, which is self-contradictory.”176  As such, we should understand free and 
voluntary acts to implicitly mean that if every other causal factor except those internal to the self 
were the same, the agent could choose differently.  A final key element of free will is choice, not 
simple agentic determination.  The agent must perceive a genuine choice between alternatives, 
and must willfully choose to pursue one of the alternatives.  As such, the action must be 
deliberate: 
Another important concept for the characterization of free will is the concept of 
choice.  Free actions are actions that are not only determined but chosen by the 
subject.  For an action to be considered free, the subject must have chosen to do it, 
and this implies having chosen not to do otherwise.  This means that the 
possibility of doing otherwise should not be just an abstract possibility, it should 
not be just a possibility that exists from the point of view of someone who 
considers the case from the outside.  Rather, it should be a possibility for the 
subject himself or herself.  The subject must be able to consider this possibility 
before the final decision to act.  This means that the subject must be conscious of 
the intention to act now before acting.  We conclude that only what we have 
called deliberate acts should be considered as really free.  Acts that are voluntary 
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but non-deliberate would then manifest an intermediate degree of free will.  They 
are determined by the subject, we consider that the subject could have done 
otherwise in the same circumstances, they derive from a conscious experience of 
the situation in which the subject is, but they were not consciously chosen, in the 
sense that they and the possibility of doing otherwise were not consciously 
considered by the subject before starting their performance.177 
 
This model seems to have an implicit assumption that there is actually something fundamentally 
different between experiencing choice and volition as causative factors instead of effects of non-
conscious processes.  The model Gomes proposes implicitly assumes a deterministic model – 
hence his caveat that everything could be the same except for one essential causal factor.  If 
indeterminism were genuinely possible, we should not require such caveats in its defense.  
Further, as Libet’s experiments demonstrate, the experience of volitional and deliberation are not 
necessarily proof that they sprang, sui generis, from the agent’s conscious processes – the 
experience of volition occurs after the non-conscious brain has ‘decided’ to act.   
While not explicitly aimed at Gomes’ argument, a second question can be raised 
concerning quantum indeterminacy, as some theorists have suggested that fundamental 
indeterminacy leads to higher indeterminacy.178 While physics demonstrates the essential 
unpredictability of atomic and subatomic particles (in our current understanding of particle 
physics), there is a necessary question as to whether this is necessarily applicable at higher levels 
of organization.  As some have suggested, deterministic philosophies make no sense at the 
quantum level;179 the converse question is whether quantum indeterminacy makes any sense at 
the cellular or social level. 
Challenges to Indeterminism 
                                                 
177 Gomes, "Volition and the Readiness Potential." p. 74-5 
178 Enç, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. 
179 Jim Al-Khalili, Quantum: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003). 
 75
 Significant challenges have been raised to indeterminist theories.  Recurring themes in 
the challenges include the questionability of whether the agent authored the action, the role of 
character and values in the decision-making process, the consequences of divorcing cause from 
effect, the question of false causation, and questions about the construction of subjective 
phenomena.  These challenges will be explored in the arguments of Dorato, Kane, Claxton, and 
Bargh and Ferguson. 
 Dorato’s challenge to indeterminism involves two essential issues.  First, it is an implicit 
assumption on the part of indeterminism that strict 1:1 causality is rejected in favor of 
probabilistic arguments – a given cause could have multiple effects, though the probabilities of 
each may vary.180  Second, this probability refers not only to causes external to the agent, but to 
internal causes as well, including the agent’s beliefs and values.  These, Dorato argues, are 
influential prior to the decision-making process, and as such, only influence the decision 
probabilistically.181  This leads the indeterminist into a bit of a dilemma – we can imagine a 
context in which the effects of a given choice are completely unrelated to the agent’s background 
and values: 
By analogy, now consider a great number of identical replicas of the person 
deciding whether to lie or not in front of the jury.  Recall that probabilities are 
ontic, so that the past of each individual is identical to any other replica up to the 
moment of decision, and the rest of the world is identical, too.  Only in a certain 
percentage of the worlds we are considering does the person lie, while in the 
others she tells the truth according to the probability we may have.  It then follows 
that the set of single individual events and circumstances preceding the decision 
not to lie – in which we include all the desires, the beliefs, and the moral values of 
the person in question, and therefore, anything that matters for her – literally 
cannot fully explain the decision not to lie, given that they are compatible also 
with the opposite choice.”182 
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This example does stretch plausibility – it is extremely unlikely that we will ever face a situation 
of having to account for such choice – but it does have a legitimate basis.  Given probabilistic 
causality, we cannot definitively argue that the actions the individual initiates will have any 
connection to that individual’s character, identity, morals, values, etc.  By requiring probabilistic 
reasoning, the indeterminist opens decision-making to genuinely inauthentic choices, anathema 
to many conceptions of autonomy (discussed in chapter four). 
 Kane attacks indeterminism on the grounds of the logical consequences of divorcing 
cause from effect.  He argues that indeterminism does not, in fact, help the cause of free will.  
Indeterministic systems translate essentially to chance – some events occur only because of 
change, and not because I necessarily willed them.  As such, “Indeterminism in nature, if it did 
play a role in human affairs, would not enhance our freedom and control over events, but 
diminish freedom and control; and so it is considered to be irrelevant to free will at best, and an 
obstacle at worst.”183  It is reasonable to question whether an indeterminist understands the 
debate in terms of causation or in terms of some other concept (e.g.,  Stace and Holmstrom 
understand the issue in terms of degrees of control and coercion).184  However, if one does adopt 
a definition of indeterminism explicitly separating cause from effect, then there appears to be no 
way around this criticism – we can agree that an event occurred, but we have no reason to 
assume that we authored or controlled it. 
 Claxton suggests that in light of the dominant folk psychology model of consciousness 
and volition, we ought to approach the question of agency and indeterminism with a skeptical 
view: 
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A fortiori, we have to approach the phenomena of ‘free will’ distrustful of 
observations that seem immediate and unequivocal, and construals that appear 
self-evident.  It certainly seems as if each of us is a center of volition, and that 
conscious deliberation plays a causal role in determining our plans and actions – 
albeit an intermittent one.  And sophisticated theoretical superstructures can be 
built which seem to buttress, but which actually presuppose, this ‘common 
sense’.185 
 
Working within the folk psychology model, we only distinguish between sources of action that 
are either from ‘me’ or from ‘not me’ – actions stemming from ‘me’ are evidence of free will, 
while actions stemming from ‘not me’ are determined.  If we find the idea of ‘not me’ causation 
repellent (but not necessarily untrue), then we then have a motive for arguing for the idea of 
conscious intention as the source of action.186   This motive and assumption can give rise to 
models that appear to make fundamental errors – intentional states lead to conclusions that the 
conscious self is the cause of action.187 
 Claxton’s rejection of intentional states includes a challenge of false causation – 
intentional states and actions may not necessarily be causally related.  The intentional state and 
the action may both be consequences of a prior cause, and the intentional state may simply occur 
before the action – which seems to be exactly what Libet’s experiments demonstrate.  He notes: 
If A and B covary, and A usually preceded B, that doesn’t necessarily mean that 
A causes B.  it could equally be that both A and B are manifestations of a third set 
of processes, C, the time characteristics of which just happen, every so often, to 
make A pop up shortly before B.  On this picture, the facts that intentions are 
sometimes followed by the intended action and sometimes not, that voluntary 
actions sometimes occur without concomitant intentions, and that intentions 
sometimes impede the execution of actions, invite speculation about the 
relationship between and nature of A, B and C.  If we admit that ‘C’, whatever it 
is, comprises preconscious processes, then the loose-coupling of A and B no 
longer has to be construed as aberrant or anathema.  Revising the sense of self to 
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include such pre- or unconscious processes would then render the perceptual 
squint unnecessary.188 
 
The extent of pre- and unconscious processes in cognition comprises the bulk of chapter two, and 
as such will not be addressed in detail here.  It will suffice to say that indeterminist theories may 
be quite mistaken in arguing that intentionality preceding action is demonstrative proof of free 
will. 
Bargh and Ferguson argue that the phenomena of will and subjective experience are 
misleading.  Citing the Penfield experiments in neuroanatomy, they note that subjects were 
unable to prevent movements of their hand even when told of them in advance (Penfield would 
stimulate areas of the patients motor cortex to induce the movement, and the patient would try to 
resist).  Their ‘will’ apparently, was insufficient to prevent external control.189  They further note 
that belief in free will may be a cultural construct, rather than a universal phenomenon: 
There is also recent evidence that belief in a substantial role for free will or 
conscious choice in one’s life varies by culture.  Iyengar and Lepper reported a 
study comparing the beliefs of Japanese versus American students regarding how 
many choices they had made during the course of a given day – the American 
students reported themselves as having made 50% more such choices than did the 
Japanese students and also reported these choices as being significantly more 
important to them…Approximately 30% of the Americans, but none of the 
Japanese, reported wanting to have choices all of the time, and more than half of 
the American students said they could not imagine a time when they would prefer 
not to have a choice.  Belief in the role and extent of free will as a causal factor in 
one’s life is therefore not a universal and may be at least somewhat a function of 
the values (e.g., for individualism) of one’s culture – the implication being that 
the feeling of volition is not necessarily based on its true causal status.  From all 
of this evidence, as well as research on the ‘illusion of control’, one can conclude 
that people normally and naturally experience their own behavior as intentional 
and volitional even when that is not the case.  It is clear from this that one’s 
subjective experience of volition is a poor and inaccurate guide to its true causal 
status.190 
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Two questions immediately stem from these arguments.  First, to what extent can we infer the 
falsity of free will from the Penfield experiments, and second, does a lack of belief in free will 
necessarily translate into an actual absence of free will?  There is some reason to suspect that the 
objections raised by Bargh and Ferguson may not necessarily demonstrate their point.  
However, at this point, it is necessary to include a necessary caveat: Bargh and Ferguson 
have provided a wealth of literature on the automaticity of many cognitive structures – they have 
demonstrated that specific heuristics are ubiquitous and causal in our everyday experience.  As 
such, there is reason to believe that their challenges to the concept of free will are legitimate.  
These will be explored more fully in chapter two.  For the moment, one can raise a legitimate 
concern that they are accurate in their assessment of free will – perhaps it is a cultural construct, 
an automatic heuristic we employ to account for our experience of ‘willing’ an action. 
Determinism 
 Determinism as an ontological assumption does not require significant detail to explain – 
it is essentially a system in which probabilities are replaced by necessity; chance is an illusion, as 
there is only one possible effect from any given cause.  Dorato defines determinism as a singular 
relationship in causality, “in which each event is necessarily caused by a preceding event and in 
which, as James put it, ‘the future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb: the part 
that we call present is compatible with just one fixed totality.’”191  For any given cause, there is 
only one corresponding event possible – there is no indeterminacy or accidental effects.  
Causation extends backward and forward, ostensibly ad infinitum or to some initial uncaused 
cause.  As a consequence, any experience we have of choice is essentially illusory – we are 
simply unaware of the causes which determine how we will act.192   
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What might constitute causative elements in a deterministic model?  What are the 
necessary assumptions?  Determinism, Dowe argues, necessarily requires the contingency of the 
present and future upon past causes – while it is conceptually possible for effects to be 
contemporaneous with or precede their causes.193  A second necessary feature is the link between 
cause and effect – in deterministic models, this link is fundamental and necessary, in 
indeterministic models, on the other hand, this link is possible, but not necessary.  Dowe notes 
that there are several ways in which the link between cause and effect can be made – i.e., there 
are several ways in which we can understand deterministic causality.194  First, it is possible that 
causation is strict in determined events (every event has a cause) and loose in indeterminate 
events (some events have no prior cause).  A second possibility deals with sufficient versus 
insufficient causation.  Determined actions are those whose prior causes are necessary and 
sufficient to bring about the effect, while indeterminate events have no or insufficient causation.  
The task of science would then become to discern whether the events in the world have sufficient 
causes.  The third possibility is that where the distinction between determinism and 
indeterminism is expressed as threshold point (e.g., 70%) that may or may not be context 
dependent, an alternative labelled ‘underdeterminism’.  Underdetermined actions are those that 
have prior causes which collectively sum to or past the threshold point, while the causes in 
indeterminate actions fail to reach this threshold.  Dowe argues that the first two options of 
deterministic thought ultimately must be rejected, leaving the third option as a workable 
explanation of determinism: 
Now the first option – that indeterminism is where there is no cause at all – if it 
allows causation by degrees, will understand this as a case of causation but not 
determinism.  Or if it does not allow causation by degrees, it will understand this 
as a case neither of causation nor determinism.  Either way it gets the wrong result 
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– since the case does raise the appropriate folk worry in connection to free will.  
The second option – the most common amongst contemporary philosophers – also 
gets the wrong result, since it takes the 95% case to be a case of indeterministic 
causation.  I conclude that the third option is the appropriate way to secure the 
contingency of determinism.  This means that to get a satisfactory causal theory of 
determinism, we need a notion of causation which admits causation by degree.  
Further, we would require the relation between deterministic and indeterministic 
causation to be transparent.195 
 
It is this third relation of causation to determinism that is adopted in this dissertation – this 
underdetermination is quite compatible with a model of causal influence that is both reductive 
and additive.  It is reductive in the sense that it is explicable in terms of causation at lower levels, 
much akin to a readiness potential for neural activation.  It is additive in the sense that it is a 
concatenation of causal forces; as has been argued earlier, we can see causation occurring at 
multiple interactive levels of organization.  Causation can be experienced at the level of 
intracellular communication, intercellular communication, neural pathways, overarching 
structures and cortices, epiphenomena, past experience, and sociocultural interaction – all of 
which can interact causally resulting in an action we experience as our own.  When left on their 
own, i.e., when they are not consciously challenged, these strongly causal factors are sufficient to 
generate action, resulting in purely deterministic agency.  When they are consciously challenged 
and explored, indeterminism is added to the cognitive mix, allowing the agent to exercise 
conscious control over their actions.  This model will be explored more fully in the next chapter. 
This ought not to be understood as a behaviorist argument, as it is explicitly delving into 
the un-/sub-/preconscious processes behind the outward manifestation of behavior.  Bargh and 
Ferguson note that many have suggested that the rejection of behaviorist models constitutes a 
subsequent rejection of mechanistic accounts; this, they suggest, is fundamentally mistaken, and 
is only exacerbated by claims that controlled processes (those cognitive faculties that we 
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experience as being controlled by us, like cognition and volition) are undetermined.196  Rather, 
they suggest that we make a distinction between automatic processes and controlled processes 
only because researchers have been able to find the causal factors for one but not the other – they 
expect the causal factors for controlled processes to be discovered in time.  They argue that it is 
false to suggest that automatic processes are determined and controlled processes are 
undetermined simply for the reason that both processes will ultimately be shown to be 
determined.  I disagree with Bargh and Fergusson on this, as it seems overly determined.  
Conscious processes certainly are contingent upon deterministic elements, but when conscious 
challenges are raised, the agent has the ability to choose between two options – the original 
predisposition stemming from avolitional non-conscious elements or the one or more new 
options generated by challenging the assumptions of the original predisposition.  Following this 
challenge, we have removed the emphasis of our cognition from the backstage processes to the 
foreground, and are much more likely to spot errors in cognition when we are consciously 
searching for them, or have others assisting us in discerning them.  This would seem to undercut 
claims of pure determinism in cognition and volition. 
Determinism ought not be understood as applying solely to behavior of which the agent is 
unaware or unwilled – instead, they argue, we ought to concern ourselves with understanding 
complex behaviors as well: 
Although some may conflate the notion of automaticity with determinism, it is 
our position that a deterministic interpretation of human behavior should not be 
confined to behavior that proceeds without consciously aware choice and 
guidance.  Whereas automatic behavior can be easily understood as exemplifying 
a deterministic account of behavior (it is commonly defined as unwilled, 
unintentional, aware), the existence of a role played by consciousness or 
controlled processes in a phenomenon does not preclude a deterministic account 
of it.  After all, the very point of research and theory on judgment and decision 
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making is the discovery of the causal mechanisms (i.e., determinants) of 
conscious choice and reasoning processes themselves.197 
 
As has been noted, social and cognitive psychologists have found models that can account for 
upwards of 60% of complex behavior like health decision making, suggesting that the field is 
moving towards the fruition of Bargh and Ferguson’s suggestion.  Further, Bargh and Ferguson’s 
own research demonstrates that our perception of volition may not even necessarily require us 
actually possessing volitional capacity.198 
Challenges to Determinism 
Many challenges have been raised to deterministic philosophies.  These range from 
questions of empirical validation and underlying physical theory to questions of whether it is 
essentially meaningful to our everyday experience of the world (i.e., does it pass the “So What?” 
test).  These questions are necessary and relevant – after all, why assume that the universe is 
inherently deterministic?  What difference will it make to me, not as a moral agent, but as an 
everyday person who buys food, goes to movies, works, and attempts to have a social life?  Even 
if behavior ends up being deterministic, why should it matter?  I still have the subjective 
experience of being in control.  In the course of addressing these issues, we will explore 
challenges raised by Dupre, Libet, and Kane. 
Dupre argues that determinism fundamentally lacks support for two reasons: first, it has 
not been empirically validated; and second, the most successful scientific theories propose 
probabilistic instead of deterministic models.199  He further argues that to date – in this case, 
1993 – there are many fields of scientific study that are essentially probabilistic, and reject pure 
deterministic claims, e.g. “population and behavioral ecology, economics, meteorology, 
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evolutionary biology, geology, and almost all of the diverse aspects of human psychology.”200  
He notes that it is possible that deterministic models may eventually be found, but the available 
evidence does not suggest that it should be expected.  Dupre ties his rejection of determinism to 
his prior rejection of reductionism.  Specifically, he doubts the ability for science to account for 
complex phenomena in terms of strict causation at the structural level: 
To provide an adequate grounding for a deterministic universe we need to be sure 
that every causal connection is underwritten by a completely sufficient condition.  
That this can be done in terms of the concepts at the structural level in question is 
incredible, so that the retreat to reductionistic accounts of determinism is easy to 
understand.  But reductionism is false.  So, therefore, is determinism.201 
 
This is problematic, however.  As was indicated in the first half of this chapter, reductionistic 
models are not beholden to an explanation solely in terms of microproperties or cellular 
phenomena – models can be reductionistic simply by noting that cognition does not occur in 
entities absent an underlying physical structure, and that changes in that structure at a variety of 
levels can produce changes at higher levels of organization.  Second, it is not clear that 
psychology should be considered in a list of ‘non-deterministic’ or ‘probabilistic’ sciences.  
Social psychology has been able to offer increasingly accurate predictive models of human 
behavior.  While it is true that as of this writing there are no models that account for 100% of 
human behavior, the models that are available have accounted for significant portions thereof 
(e.g., some models report being able to account for 60% of health decision behavior), and are 
constantly being refined and modified.  As this percentage climbs higher, the argument for 
probability and indeterminism dwindles.  This ought not be construed as a complete rejection of 
indeterminist schools of thought, but rather should be understood as strengthening the basis for 
believing that human action is more deterministic than is frequently admitted.  As I argued 
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earlier – I do not rule out indeterministic elements of volition and choice; however, I do argue 
that unless the cognitive processing we adopt is challenged, the likelihood of indeterministic, 
conscious mediation occurring is unlikely. 
 Libet takes a different line of approach regarding natural laws and determinism than 
Dupre.  While Dupre suggests that probabilistic theories have had more success than 
deterministic theories, Libet embraces determinism in the natural sciences, but suggests that 
there is a mistake in kind to make the leap from natural laws to subjective experiences.  He notes 
that: 
Determinism has on the whole, worked well for the physical observable world.  
That has led many scientists and philosophers to regard any deviation from 
determinism as absurd and witless, and unworthy of consideration.  But there has 
been no evidence, or even a proposed experimental test design, that definitively or 
convincingly demonstrates the validity of natural law determinism as the mediator 
or instrument of free will.  There is an unexplained gap between the category of 
physical phenomena and the category of subjective phenomena.  As far back as 
Leibniz it was pointed out that if one looked into the brain with a full knowledge 
of its physical makeup and nerve cell activities, one would see nothing that 
describes subjective experience.202 
 
This is a quite compelling concern, and the danger of making a category mistake is legitimate.  
The question for Libet, however, is whether a rejection of determinism in the physical sense 
necessarily translates into rejection of philosophical determinism (e.g., ontological questions of 
causality).  Further, must we automatically reject the idea that subjective experience itself can be 
causative, and causative in a manner that is not conscious?  Must I be consciously aware of all of 
my past memories and experiences that are germane to the present situation for them to be 
causative?  How can we reconcile this with cognitive and social psychology research on priming 
effects and conditioning?  How can we reconcile this with data from biological psychology 
suggesting environmental influences affect biochemistry, which then produce distinct thought 
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patterns and facilitate specific behavioral responses (e.g., situations unconsciously perceived as 
hostile which activate the sympathetic nervous system, making a fight or flight reflex easier to 
initiate)?  While Libet is correct to note the dangers of misattributing deterministic causality 
from one field of study into another, there seems to be a significant body of evidence arguing for 
philosophical and psychological determinism (or underdeterminism). 
 Kane suggests that even if determinism were true, we would still note a difference 
between coercive elements and non-coercive elements, and would prefer to be free from the 
former (e.g., threats of force, addictions, etc.).  As such, “esoteric questions about whether 
determinism is true or not – in the physical or psychological sciences – are considered to be 
irrelevant to the freedoms we really care about in everyday life.”203  The only freedom that 
fundamentally matters in these instances are those that we would still feel would have undue 
influence on our moral agency.  This analysis might be true from the perspective of everyday 
living, but I would suggest that this is not the case in medical decision-making.  The choice to 
forgo medical treatment, for instance, is potentially the last meaningful choice a person might 
make.  Would we as clinicians be acting responsibly if we did not make sure that this choice was 
as free from unconscious compulsion or coercion as possible?  This topic will be addressed in 
chapter four in discussions of autonomy. 
Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Challenges to Both 
 There are two models that can be discussed jointly – compatibilism and libertarianism.  
Dorato notes that compatibilists argue for determined action insofar as we are physical objects 
and must obey the same rules as other natural events when they are caused.  However, we also 
fundamentally possess the ability to do what we want to do.204  In essence, we can be the authors 
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and originators of action, but we are necessarily constrained by the same causal laws as other 
natural events and objects.  He sets up the distinction between compatibilists and libertarians by 
noting that they are defending very different conceptions of freedom: 
It is very important to stress that there are at least three different intuitive notions 
of freedom discussed in the literature, and deciding which among these really 
captures the essential character of ‘what we mean or should mean by freedom’ 
(what we could term freedom with a capital f) is very difficult if not impossible, 
considering the vagueness of our conceptual and linguistic intuitions.  The three 
notions in question are (1) freedom meant as an absence of obstacles to the 
realization of our desire; (2) freedom meant as a power or capacity to bring about 
a new causal chain; and (3) freedom meant as the power to doing otherwise in the 
very same circumstances.  The philosophical debate between hard determinists 
and libertarians on one side and compatibilists on the other, can, therefore, be 
explained with the following hypothesis.  While the latter claim that freedom 
essentially coincides with the unconstrained power to do what we want – let us 
call it, with a somewhat inelegant but useful notation, freedom1 – and that such a 
notion is sufficient to guarantee whatever is important to us from a moral point of 
view, the former deny this very thesis.  Libertarians, in particular, defend the idea 
that it is only the possibility of originating a new causal chain in an unconditioned 
way (freedom2), or the power to do otherwise in the same circumstance 
(freedom3), that would guarantee our moral responsibility.  Consequently, 
libertarians are bound to believe that human beings are effectively and actually 
endowed with one or both of these capacities, a belief attacked by 
compatibilists.205 
 
The question remains, however, in how much control we can genuinely possess – is it honest to 
say that we can originate new causal chains?  Are freedom2 or freedom3 actually possible?  For 
the moment, let us confine the discussion to the sense of freedom2 (the libertarian model), and 
see whether it holds up to critique; freedom3 will be discussed below. 
 The fundamental assumption of the libertarian model is that we can originate new causal 
chains – we are the authors of action.  There is an intuitive truth to this claim – by virtue of the 
fact that I am sitting in a café writing this, I ensure certain causal chains are possible and others 
are impossible by the simple fact that I cannot be in two places at once.  However, in light of my 
subjective consciousness, I cannot say definitively that there are not other germane elements to 
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any future chain of causation.  While I may influence what happens, I cannot be aware of all of 
the elements that have gone into my choice to be one place and not another.  I am aware of many 
important causal factors – the desire to finish this chapter, the desire to stretch my legs, cabin 
fever, etc. – but I cannot be sure that this list is anywhere near complete, or even indicative of a 
majority of my underlying causal conditions.  My being in this café may have been influenced by 
the amount of gas in my car, by the availability of distractions in other milieus, by its proximity 
to a movie theater if I choose to reward myself for a job well done, etc.  There are other 
apparently ‘accidental’ elements in the overall causal chain (i.e., elements that do not appear to 
be initially related to any subsequent decisions I may make) that are in fact germane and 
necessary antecedents to the causal chain that ‘I’ originate.  In short, while the causal chain may 
be dependent upon me for origination in some sense, it is unclear whether I am necessary or 
sufficient for this chain to come about, and it is unclear whether this sense of autonomy and 
‘self-direction’ is meaningful.  I may simply be acting as a result of prior causes in bringing 
about other ends, not determined by me.  Freedom2 – the libertarian model – seems to be 
excessively optimistic about the agent’s actual role in causation. 
 Challenges to freedom3 are found in Searle’s critique of the compatibilist argument.  
Ignoring questions of psychological determinism, the compatibilist must address the question of 
whether a human agent could genuinely have acted differently if all of the contextual variables 
were the same.  The compatibilist school of thought considers internal and external variables in 
causation – that is, it argues that outcomes are determined partially by factors external to the 
agent and determined partially by internal variables (psychological state, etc.).  The challenge 
thus becomes whether an agent could act differently if the same causal inputs were given – if the 
agent could genuinely act otherwise, free will is not an illusory concept, if the agent could not, 
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then free will is illusory, despite the compatibilists supposed arguments to the contrary.206  Searle 
argues that there is no reason consistent with compatibilist philosophy that would allow the agent 
to have done anything other than what was done before – in essence, because of the causative 
model suggested, compatibilists essentially argue for deterministic causation, the antithesis of 
free will. 
 As has been noted previously, there are some concerns about the dismissive stance taken 
by Searle to psychological determinism – these causal factors are significant and can be very 
determinative of behavior.  However, he is correct to note that there are concerns about the 
ability to do otherwise in a compatibilist system.  If the agent could not genuinely have chosen 
otherwise, then there is no reason to call the compatibilist argument supportive of free will; as 
Searle suggests, it becomes a shell of the concept – an intrinsically hollow idea.  A very similar 
objection is raised by Savage, who notes that we can directly manipulate internal causes: 
How does the compatibilist distinguish between free and unfree actions where 
both are internally caused?  The actions of a normal person are caused by 
neuronal discharges in his cerebral cortex; but so are the actions of an epileptic 
during a seizure.  What justifies our calling the one type of action free, and the 
other type unfree?  The compatibilists have never answered this objection.  And 
their failure to do so is the most important argument in favor of indeterminism.  
But the indeterminist view is no less objectionable.  In contrast to compatibilism, 
it provides a clear definition of a free action; namely, a free action is one caused 
by uncaused volition.  But it forces us to hold that if any action is free, then some 
events are uncaused.  And it is an article of scientific faith that every event has a 
cause.  To believe otherwise is to open the door to superstition and magic.207 
 
Some philosophers have argued that causation ought not to be identified as a necessary condition 
for free will,208 but rather that free will be viewed in terms of coercion.  So long as an action is 
not coerced, either from external sources (e.g., threats of physical violence or economic 
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gain/loss) or from internal sources (e.g., genetic predispositions or education), then the action is 
free (i.e., it stems from the psychological state of the individual).  But this is problematic – 
psychological states can be deterministic.  Identical situations and information can be perceived 
quite differently dependent on the person’s psychological state, and this interpretive bias is not 
necessarily self-evident.  Others have suggested that what is important in deciding between free 
will and determinism is the degree of control that the moral agent exercises over the situation – 
the more control the individual has, the greater their free will.209  Subjective control consists of 
examining orders of desire (i.e., first order: “I want this”; second order: “I want to want this”; 
third order: “I want to want to want this”; etc.).  Some concern can be raised concerning these 
definitions as well – how much control is enough?  Are there any orders of desire that cannot be 
manipulated, leading to a loss of control? 
 In light of these concerns, it should be evident that there are significant concerns about 
both libertarianism and compatibilism.  If there are fundamental questions about how much 
control or independent agency we genuinely possess, then there are also legitimate questions 
about the acceptability of models arguing for independent agentic control (libertarianism) or 
internally causative conditions (compatibilism). 
Alternative Theories in the Determinism Debate 
There are two alternative theories that will be considered: dissolutionism and 
hermeneutics.  Both seek to do away with the determinism debate by changing the frame of 
reference.  Dissolutionism changes the frame of reference used in considering the action, while 
the hermeneutic argument suggests changing the nature of how we view the individual.  Each of 
these will be explored briefly. 
Dissolutionism 
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Dissolutionism argues that while deterministic causation necessarily is applicable and 
unavoidable in the larger natural world, but there are other issues to be considered at the level of 
individual autonomy and volition.  Dorato suggests that the dissolutionist argues that a 
distinction must be made between the evaluative attitude towards the agent and the descriptive 
attitude towards the action performed.  By shifting the type of language used, it is possible to 
remove talk of causation from the discussion:  
Once the talk of causes is eliminated, the threat of determinism to our freedom is 
thereby eliminated, too, since it would be meaningless to claim that our actions 
are determined by antecedent causes…To put it simply, the dissolution of the 
problem of the relationship between determinism and free will calls into play a 
linguistic analysis of the respective conceptual domains, from which the 
conclusion emerges that they are incommensurable.210 
 
The problem is thus dissolved – we no longer have to speak of determinism because the concept 
makes no sense in the evaluative framework being used.  Dorato offers a quick refutation of this 
linguistic approach – discussion of causes of actions is not meaningless.  Rather, it is a necessary 
foundational element in discussions of the psychological development of the moral agent whom 
we are evaluating, and hence is germane to the discussion at hand.211  A second problem alluded 
to in Dorato’s argument is the extent to which this is a linguistic dodge.  It is troublesome that 
language would be seen as a barrier to a discussion of a fundamental problem, and this has more 
than a passing resemblance to the linguistic modeling of 1984, wherein agents attempt to refine 
and sculpt the language so as to prevent meaningful evaluation of Big Brother.  After all, if we 
can’t express it in the language we have, then by definition it cannot be a problem.  The 
fallacious nature of this argumentation is evident – the problem does, in fact, exist; the fault lies 
with the language adopted. 
Hermeneutics 
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  The second alternative model stems from hermeneutic phenomenology – it seeks to 
understand the world not in the terms science has dictated, but rather in an undistorted vision 
consistent with everyday, pretheoretical thinking.  Guignon suggests that returning to a 
phenomenological perspective will allow us to better appreciate the fundamental experience of 
free will, and thereby transform the entire debate.212  He suggests that a full understanding of free 
will necessarily implies two things: ultimate responsibility for one’s actions, in the sense that the 
action originates with the agent, as well as the presence of genuine alternatives to the action 
chosen.213  In short, an action lacking either in ultimate responsibility or a lack of alternatives 
implies a lack of free will.  If one analyzes our everyday experience, he continues, one realizes 
how artificial and implausible the determinism dilemma seems to be.  Guignon argues that the 
worldview that leads to the dilemma of determinism stemmed from revolutions in scientific 
thought: 
The new Galilean and Newtonian conception of science brought with it a set of 
ontological assumptions that have dominated our thought ever since.  Reality is 
no longer regarded as a meaningful cosmic order; rather, it is seen as a ‘universe’, 
that is, as a vast aggregate of causally interacting material substances in a space-
time coordinate system.  The result is an objectifying ontology that treats as real 
only the objectively specifiable properties of things, where ‘objectively 
specifiable’ means ‘in a way not subject to interpretive dispute,’ ideally, those 
properties that are quantifiable.  Humans occupy an oddly ambiguous position in 
this conception of the natural order.  On the one hand, they are regarded as 
organisms in a natural environment, products of evolutionary forces, constantly 
affected by causal factors in the surrounding world.  On the other hand, they are 
seen as knowing subjects who are capable of grasping the external world and 
transforming it for their own purposes.  Given either account, a human is regarded 
as an object that is distinct from, yet in constant causal interchange with, the array 
of non-human and human objects surrounding it in the world.214 
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As a consequence of this scientific viewpoint, we assume that all elements of nature, including 
ourselves, must be understood as adhering to the same causal laws, and that the same rules of 
explanation must necessarily apply to all events.  Phenomenologists, Guignon argues, suggest 
that we not be so hasty in assuming that the rules which apply to some aspects of our lives 
(physical interactions, in which such assumptions can prove to be quite useful) apply equally to 
others (cognition and volition). The aim of phenomenology, he argues, is an effort to dissolve the 
problem by “challenging the very framework in terms of which the problem is formulated.”215  
He notes that our everyday experiences do not have a static character – they shift and are 
redefined as the situation changes.  Our initial fear and apprehension may dissolve into 
amusement and relaxation, with corresponding shifts in attention and attitudes.216 
 How, then, should we see the world and our experience in it?  Guignon argues that we 
should understand it not in the mechanistic terms of the scientific view, but as a complex 
interweaving that is holistic and dynamic.  In fact, phenomenology would argue that the 
scientific viewpoint prevalent in modernity is itself derived from and contingent upon a far richer 
tapestry of experience than can be expressed in the language of science.217  The 
phenomenological viewpoint argues that we understand actions in terms of the wider context in 
which they are embedded: the unfolding life-story of the agent.  This shift in viewpoint and 
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holistic understanding cannot be expressed in terms of causal connections.218  The difficulty, and 
the challenge I would raise to Guignon’s argument, is whether the process of engaging in a life-
story is conscious, subconscious, unconscious, or a combination thereof.  Any sub- or 
unconscious elements would seemingly take away ‘control’ of an action from the agent and 
relegate it to something outside of conscious control, and hence, opens the door to non-agentic 
causality.  This seems to lead to determinism or underdeterminism.  Further, we are not 
perceptually aware of every germane element in the decision-making process, but priming 
effects and other studies in cognitive psychology have demonstrated that they do change how we 
behave.  If Guignon requires conscious interaction for his phenomenological model, his 
argument gets derailed by studies of non-conscious elements of cognition. 
 Guignon refers to the Heideggerian concept of Dasein and its requisite ‘facticity’ by 
which is meant the “meaningful prior commitments and involvements in terms of which an agent 
grasps what is at stake in a situation.”219  This is an open-ended concept, constantly informed, 
changed, and redefined as events unfold.  In essence, what happens to us in the past takes on new 
meanings in light of present experiences.  While this certainly has intuitive appeal and is both 
easy to account for in and is commensurate with our everyday cognition, again, there is the 
problem of non-conscious cognition.  On Guignon’s analysis of Heidegger, the agent constantly 
engages and redefines the influential elements of his life-story.  This cannot be done at a non-
conscious level; meanings change upon reflection, but we cannot reflect upon all causative 
elements at once, nor can we even know every specific element of our life-story that is directly 
or indirectly germane.  This model seems to be impossible to reconcile with what we know of 
human cognition.  When Guignon insists that seeing our actions as part of an overarching life 
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story makes explanation in terms of causative neural phenomena less plausible,220 there is an 
immediate question begged.  As was noted earlier in this chapter, we cannot have a mental 
process without a corresponding physical process; further, understanding our ‘life-story’ requires 
reflection or intuition – both of which require conscious/subconscious/unconscious causal 
processes.  Our memory is realized in a physical structure, which can break down or be 
physically influenced, altering our perception of self and others.  The question then becomes how 
a phenomenological model can account for this level of reductive interaction. 
 Guignon argues that Heidegger’s conception of agency makes determinism untenable for 
two reasons: 
First, humans have the ability to reflect on what has come before, redefining the 
past by endowing it with a different meaning.  Since there are no facts about the 
past independent of these meanings, there is no way to specify the causal 
antecedent of an action in a way that satisfies the requirement of generality of 
causal statements.  And, second, humans are beings who can envision a range of 
possibilities as defined by the cultural context in which they act, and so always 
make choices against a backdrop of alternative ways of acting.  This ‘standing out 
into a range of possibilities’ is not something that can be grasped by physicalist 
causal statements.221 
 
The difficulty with this suggestion is two-fold.  The first objection again concerns the 
assumption of a fully conscious process.  The second concern is that there is an unreasonable 
assumption being made – Guignon suggests humans can envision “a range of possibilities as 
defined by the cultural context in which they act”; but this seems counterintuitive.  Can I simply 
choose to see the world as another human being in an identical cultural context, and then simply 
ignore variables like race, gender, intelligence, education, etc.?  Can I simply imagine how a 
neurosurgeon would address a given case, not having had the requisite training?  As of this 
writing, I am a young man; is it within my power to simply choose to see the world or choice 
                                                 
220 Guignon, p. 332. 
221 Guignon, p. 333. 
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from the perspective of a middle-aged menopausal housewife, and experience I by definition 
cannot have?  There is the possibility that I am interpreting this argument too literally; perhaps 
Guignon is not arguing for such a radical perspective shift.  Perhaps, instead, he is suggesting 
that given my cultural context, I can imagine a variety of different possibilities or alternatives.  
This, too, seems to be a rather contingent function, dependent as it is upon background, 
education, neurological structure, intelligence, race, gender, etc.  Each of these can contribute to 
the possibilities I see available, as well as how I approach the problem.  While Guignon may see 
this in terms of an unfolding life-world, it is equally plausible and less complicated to view the 
situation as a culmination of underdetermining causal factors. 
The Resulting Philosophical Model and the Consequences for Cognition  
In concluding this chapter, we return to Libet, who suggests that we ought to adopt a 
model of cognition that does not describe free will as illusory.  He appeals to the ubiquitous 
phenomenon of free and independent choice as prima facie evidence of free will.  These intuitive 
feelings ought not be dismissed, and should be represented in any model we ultimately choose to 
adopt.222  He concludes that a model of free-will is:  
[A]t least as good, if not a better, scientific option than is its denial by determinist 
theory.  Given the speculative nature of both determinist and non-determinist 
theories, why not adopt the view that we do have free will (until some real 
contradictory evidence may appear, if it ever does).  Such a view would at least 
allow us to proceed in a way that accepts and accommodates our own deep feeling 
that we do have free will.  We would not need to view ourselves as machines that 
act in a manner completely controlled by the known physical laws.223 
 
As such, by adopting this model, we can account for both the scientific data and the perceptions 
from folk psychology, the best of both worlds. 
                                                 
222 Libet, "Do We Have A Free Will?" p. 56. 
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This does not, however, seem to be supported by the available evidence.  While one can 
see why Libet’s suggestion is attractive – we would be able to continue to believe what we 
believe – there do seem to be some significant cracks in the foundation of non-deterministic 
philosophies.  Libet’s own experiments remove the basis of volition from conscious control, and 
whether we see the results in terms of determinism or “free won’ts” there is reason to believe 
that at a deeper cognitive level we will find genuine causal determinants.  In the next chapter, we 
will explore the common cognitive structures germane to decision-making from cognitive and 
social psychology.  These structures allow for response prediction, bias in information 
processing, and patterns of thought and evaluation that occur without our conscious control.  On 
the whole, the evidence supports a model in which we are perceptually aware of only the tip of 
the cognitive and volitional iceberg.  What emerges is not a model of pure determinism, but a 
model in which backstage elements exert significant causal force – an underdeterministic model.  
We are motivated, strongly, by elements of which we might not be aware, and only through 
exploration of the thought processes involved can we become aware of these motivation factors.  
It might not be possible to ever be fully aware of such causative elements, but one ought, as a 
bare minimum, attempt to unearth and identify those which may distort the individuals ‘normal’ 
thought pattern – i.e., those cognitive patterns which may result in inauthentic decision-making.  
In the context of forgoing medical treatment, a decision that can and frequently does have lethal 
consequences, it seems negligent not to ensure that the decision made is genuinely the patient’s, 
and not merely that of a particular cognitive distortion (a theme we will return to in chapter four).  
Patient autonomy, if it is to be meaningful, must necessarily understand what we can and what 
we cannot control. 
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CHAPTER 2 – “RATIONALITY” ISN’T SO RATIONAL – AUTOMATICITY,  
BACKSTAGE COGNITION, AND COGNITIVE HEURISTICS IN “RATIONAL” THOUGHT 
 
 The focus of the dissertation now turns to cognition and influences upon it at various 
stages.  Cognition is not a single-stage process, as noted in the last chapter – there are many 
levels of organization in the brain, and they interact with each other in many ways which are 
open to influence.  Conscious thought – the result of these myriad physical and social 
interactions, is also a construct; a concatenation of many different types of cognition, operating 
in conscious and backstage capacities.  The focus of this chapter will be on the backstage 
elements of cognition – conscious choice models (i.e., autonomy models) will be addressed in 
chapter four.  Backstage cognition involves a variety of related concepts, e.g., reflex thought 
patterns with affective and behavior components, generation of novel meanings for situations 
and objects from the mental assembly of other situations and objects, distinctions between 
algorithmic and heuristic thought, etc.  A full treatment of cognition is well beyond the purview 
of this work – what follows is an overview of a much larger body of literature, and it is certain 
that some elements and arguments have been omitted.  A complete accounting of cognition from 
a psychological perspective would occupy several volumes, and complementing it with 
philosophical analysis would require several more.  As a consequence, the treatments given to 
certain concepts are by necessity quite brief, but I believe that the most salient elements are 
covered. 
 A related concept, a meta-question perhaps, that results from the current discussion 
concerns the definition of ‘rational thought’.  That ‘rational thought’ exists is generally accepted 
as a given, but, as should be evident at the end of this chapter, what it necessarily is isn’t clear.  
Much like the problem facing Socrates’ interlocutors, defining ‘rational’ becomes exceptionally 
difficult.  How do we understand ‘rational thought’?  Do we consider thought processes that 
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result in cognitive errors as rational?  What if the error does not reflect a processing problem, but 
rather a perceptual one?  If the same cognitive process can lead us to accurate decision-making in 
one context but inaccurate in another, is the process ‘rational’?  A recurring theme in the 
literature notes that there are distinct qualities of cognition that are purely individual 
interpretation, but are generally perceived as ‘rational’. We draw on the information available to 
us, consciously and unconsciously, but tend to do so in a self-serving fashion: 
A general thread that runs through much of the decision-making and reasoning 
research is that we are often overly influenced by the general world knowledge 
that is stored in our memories.  The influence of stored information is quite 
pervasive; it affects how we perform in the classic forms of reasoning as well as 
in less well-defined judgment and decision-making situations.  A second thread is 
just as pervasive, and just as important in decision making; far more than is 
logical, we tend to search for evidence that confirms our decisions, beliefs, and 
hypotheses, and as such are considerably less skeptical that we ought to be.1 
 
Is this process rational?  As we will see in discussion of cognitive heuristics, our typical mix of 
algorithmic and heuristic cognition has been evolutionarily advantageous (after all, we are still 
around to discuss the matter), but can also be a source of systematic error.  The question remains, 
“What does ‘rational’ even mean in light of heuristic thinking processes?”  By definition, they 
can be inaccurate. 
 The overall conclusion of this chapter will parallel that of the previous chapter – there are 
elements of our cognition that are strongly deterministic, but they can be overridden by 
indeterministic conscious elements.  The challenge, however, will be in recognizing the 
automatic and backstage elements of our cognition – errors cannot be addressed or corrected if 
we are not aware of them.  The discussion of automaticity and backstage cognition will cover 
reflex processes that can result in automatic cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses.  In 
the process of this, we will explore conceptual blending and mental spaces as means of 
                                                 
1 Mark H. Ashcraft, Human Memory and Cognition (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), 520. 
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information processing at a nonconscious level – complex processes can occur outside of our 
perceptual awareness.  We will then discuss heuristic thought processes – mental ‘rules of 
thumb’ regulating cognition at a nonconscious level.  We will explore commonly occurring 
heuristics, challenges to them, as well as complementary and supplementary cognitive models.  
We will close with a discussion of affect – emotional responses to and valences of situations and 
events that can affect cognition and behavior.  Our discussion of affect will draw this chapter to a 
close and segue to our discussion of the family of depressive disorders and their rate of 
comorbidity in five common medical illnesses.  All of this will demonstrate the potential 
complexity of the cognitive processes of the patient contemplating forgoing medical treatment – 
faced with a difficult decision, our patients can be influenced by a variety of causal determinants 
for action of which they may not be aware.  In light of the severity of the choice they face, we 
would be remiss were we not to ensure that the decision-making process to forgo medical 
treatment is as unaffected by sources of error as possible.  This may be a chance our patients can 
make only once – it should not be made lightly, nor should it be made for the wrong reasons. 
BACKSTAGE COGNITION, MENTAL SPACES, AND AUTOMATICITY 
 As the last chapter indicated, there are a variety of deterministic elements that necessarily 
must be accounted for in cognition.  Much research has indicated that contrary to folk models of 
psychology, we are both perceptually aware of only a fraction of our brain’s activity and naïve in 
our assumptions that the full extent of cognition in decision-making is accounted for by those 
few conscious elements.  Rather, a more accurate presentation of cognition is a quite apt culinary 
comparison: 
In an analogous way [to a bubbling pot of soup], as information is activated in 
memory (by whatever influences produce activation, including spreading 
activation from other active nodes, residual activation from primes that directly 
activated the information earlier), that information drifts higher in the soup pot of 
 101
the mind, like a noodle or a vegetable.  Whatever bits are at the top of the soup 
correspond to the bits of information in the person’s current conscious experience.  
The metaphor suggests at least one further implication.  It derives from the fact 
that the pieces in the heating soup are all continuously active to some degree, 
even if they are nowhere near the top of the pot.  They are still absorbing 
activation, still bumping against each other; parts underneath are still supporting 
the parts of the soup that are at the surface.  The analogy suggests that the parts of 
the mind that are out of awareness similarly remain engaged in work, spreading 
activation amongst themselves, and in some cases serving to support the edifice 
that’s made it to consciousness at the top of the pot.  In such a model, many 
different areas of partial activation compete continuously for access to 
consciousness, but of necessity only some small fragment of these competing 
elements can be in consciousness at any given moment.2 
 
As such, we are aware of only a fraction of our cognitive activity, and these various layers 
interact and inform each other.  This chapter will concern itself with both processes, conscious 
and backstage, and how influences can creep in at a variety of levels.  Our first concern, 
however, is not with the conscious elements of cognition – conscious phenomena are predicated 
on deeper phenomena.  We cannot have surface cognitive phenomena without deeper structures, 
much as we cannot build a castle before constructing its foundation.  All of the myriad sense data 
we take in initiate complex activation pathways, associating current stimuli with previous 
experiences, affective data, and other valence structures.  These deeper cognitive phenomena are 
not simplistic processes – they are layered, quite complex, exceptionally fast, and quite 
independent of our volition: 
We’ve encountered two important lessons of cognitive psychology already.  First, 
mental processes can occur with hardly any conscious awareness at all.  This is 
especially (or maybe only) true of processes that have received a great deal of 
practice, as in reading skills.  Second, even though these processes can operate 
very quickly, they are nonetheless quite complex, involving difficult motor, 
perceptual, and mental acts.  Their complexity makes it even more amazing how 
efficient, rapid, and seemingly automatic they are.3 
 
                                                 
2 Charles S. Carver, "Associations to Automaticity," in The Automaticity of Everyday Life, ed. Robert S. Wyer 
(Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 97. 
3 Ashcraft, Human Memory and Cognition, 7. 
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Their automaticity belies their complexity – just as complex physical responses can be initiated 
without volition, so too we should recognize that our cognitive processes can be induced to 
action.  An environmental trigger can give rise to the activation of many complex systems – a 
particular memento can trigger complex memory and affective components with corresponding 
behavioral components.4  For instance, I may pass a photograph of my grandfather, which 
triggers a series of memories (living with my grandparents, visits, holidays, advice given to me, 
etc.), eliciting specific affective responses (sorrow at his passing and resolution to fulfill 
promises made to him), and culminating in behavioral changes (renewed vigor in completing this 
chapter).  None of these responses were necessarily chosen by me – they are all direct results of 
the environmental stimulus; further, this same stimulus can affect me well after I actually 
encounter it – my memory of the stimulus can provoke identical psychological and behavioral 
responses. 
 What is more, these backstage processes are also able to introduce errors into cognition – 
the way we perceive the world is dependent upon a variety of factors, some within our control, 
some well outside control.  We will see that a requisite part of accurate cognition is appreciating 
and understanding when we are making choices based upon the indeterministic elements within 
our control and the deterministic elements lying outside our volition or awareness.    
None of this is meant to deny that consciousness has no causal role in choice.  Though 
authors will disagree about the deterministic versus indeterministic nature of consciousness, they 
do agree that consciousness acts as a mediator of backstage and automatic elements – after all, 
there has to be some manner of restoring systematic functioning to and making sense of the 
myriad processes active beneath our conscious awareness.  Bargh suggests that by shifting away 
                                                 
4 Eliot R. Smith, "Preconscious Automaticity in a Modular Connectionist System," in The Automaticity of Everyday 
Life, ed. Robert S. Wyer (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 199. 
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from the folk model of consciousness being the sole causal determinant of action we may 
actually understand its purpose more clearly: 
In removing consciousness from its privileged place at the mediational center of 
everything, by moving from a serial stage to a parallel process metatheory, one is 
not claiming that there is no role or function for conscious 
processing…Consciousness still exists as we move from a serial to a parallel 
model of mind.  In fact, by getting rid of its overstated position in the middle of 
serial models, we may end with a clearer sense of its role and purpose.5 
 
We will explore the meanings of parallel processing models of the mind shortly in our discussion 
of automaticity.  For the moment, let it suffice to say that consciousness can help us to make 
sense of the backstage, reflex processes that characterize human cognition.  As was stated above, 
however, our present concern is not with our conscious experience of choice and autonomy – we 
will return to this in greater detail in later chapters.  Let us return our attention to the processes of 
which we are unaware, for as Turner notes, “Reason and choice depend upon ‘backstage 
cognition.’”6  The discussion of backstage cognition necessarily concerns two key concepts: 
automaticity and conceptual blending.  Both will be addressed in turn. 
Automaticity 
 Automaticity is a significant element of cognition – a variety of processes simply occur 
without volitional cueing.7  Bargh understands automatic cognitive processes to occur 
“reflexively whenever certain triggering conditions are in place; when those conditions are 
present, the process runs autonomously, independently of conscious guidance.”8  This can refer 
                                                 
5 John A. Bargh, "The Automaticity of Everyday Life," in The Automaticity of Everyday Life, ed. Robert S. Wyer 
(Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 52. 
6 Mark Turner, "Backstage Cognition in Reason and Choice," in Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the 
Bounds of Rationality, ed. Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins and Samuel L. Popkin (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 271. 
7 The simplest means of demonstrating this is by asking the question “What is the first thing you think of when I say 
the words ‘white bear’?”  The normal reaction is to call to mind immediately an image of a polar bear – this was not 
a voluntary process, however, in that had the words pointed to some other cognitive target, you would be free to 
think of myriad other things instead of white bears. 
8 Bargh, "The Automaticity of Everyday Life," 3. 
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both to physical processes – such as navigating an automobile while thinking of something 
entirely different – as well as cognitive processes – such as references to white bears cueing the 
imagination of polar bears.  Bargh argues that these are deterministic processes – they satisfy 
‘if…then’ conditionals, in that, if a particular stimulus is present we cannot but help fulfill the 
‘then’ criterion, but offers a few key distinctions: 
The nature of these necessary preconditions (the if side of the equation) can vary.  
Some require only the presence of the triggering environmental event; it does not 
matter where the current focus of conscious attention is, what the individual was 
recently thinking, or what the individual’s current intentions or goals are.  In other 
words, this form of automaticity is completely unconditional in terms of a 
prepared or receptively tuned cognitive state.  These are preconscious automatic 
processes…They can be contrasted with postconscious and goal-dependent forms 
of automaticity, which depend on more than the mere presence of environmental 
objects or events.  Postconscious automaticity is commonly studied through the 
experimental technique of priming.  Priming prepares a mental process so that it 
then occurs given the triggering environmental information – thus, in addition to 
the presence of those relevant environmental features, postconsciously automatic 
processes do require recent use or activation and do not occur without it.  Goal-
dependent automaticity has the precondition of the individual intending to 
perform the mental function, but given this intention, the processing occurs 
immediately and autonomously, without any further conscious guidance or 
deliberation (e.g., as in a well-practiced cognitive procedure or perceptual-motor 
skill).  What it means for a psychological process to be automatic, therefore, is 
that it happens when its set of preconditions are in place without needing any 
conscious choice to occur, or guidance from that point on.9 
 
Once the eliciting stimulus occurs, the agent has no recourse but to manifest the targeted 
behavior – a psychological knee-jerk response with cognitive, affective, and motivational 
elements.  Bargh notes that this response can also influence later cognition; as such, preconscious 
automaticity can affect postconscious function.  He understands preconscious processing to refer 
to the “initial state of cognition in which the world makes contact with our minds” – in essence, 
we cannot have a conscious experience of the world without having a preconscious experience of 
                                                 
9 Bargh, "The Automaticity of Everyday Life," 3. 
 105
it first.10 Isen and Diamond clarify Bargh’s model, noting that automatic processes are best 
understood as ‘parallel process’ – they do not take up cognitive processing resources (attention 
or effort), so they can occur parallel to other cognitive processes which do require these 
resources.11  Because it does not tax cognitive resources, automatic processing can be performed 
much more rapidly and earlier than other types of processing.  This may explain our ‘gut 
instincts’ in certain situations – our full processing has not yet finished, leaving us with only a 
general impression of necessary action.  Berkowitz  notes that the deterministic model suggested 
by automaticity is frequently undervalued by many people – there is a frequent visceral objection 
to the idea that our cognitive processes are heavily influenced by environmental determinants.  
These can be manifested as objections to experimental results or methodologies or as  appeals to 
the indeterministic claims of folk psychology.  Berkowitz suggests that, if nothing else, “Persons 
interested in gaining a truly adequate understanding of the complexities of human conduct 
should at least adopt a healthy skepticism toward the assumption that conscious processes are 
necessarily involved in all human behavior.12 
 Preconscious processes develop as the result of conditioning – we develop patterns of 
psychological responses to stimuli.  As is claimed by behaviorist thought, we make associations 
between stimuli and psychological responses, facilitating future responses along those same 
psychobehavioral lines.  It becomes easier for stimuli to elicit behavioral, emotional, and 
motivational responses in us, producing automatic cognitive processing.  Initially these responses 
                                                 
10 Bargh, "The Automaticity of Everyday Life," 8. 
11 Alice M. Isen and Gregory Andrade Diamond, "Affect and Automaticity," in Unintended Thought, ed. James S. 
Uleman and John A. Bargh (New York: Guilford Press, 1989), 126. 
12 Leonard Berkowitz, "Some Thoughts Extending Bargh's Argument," in The Automaticity of Everyday Life, ed. 
Robert S. Wyer (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 85. 
 106
require work, but like other recurring responses, the amount of conscious effort they require 
consistently decreases to the point where they require no conscious processing at all.13 
 This type of processing can extend to the goals we set for ourselves as well as the means 
of attaining them.  Once we encounter a particular cognitive trigger, we can manifest complex 
behaviors and plans automatically, which Bargh refers to as the ‘Auto-Motive Model’.  These 
goals operate on all available information that is applicable to the situation, outside of our 
volitional control and regardless of whether that is the information upon which we want to 
fixate.14  Bargh notes that there are significant implications for automatically activated goals: 
First, behavioral and cognitive goals can be directly activated by the environment 
without conscious choice or awareness of the activation.  Second, the goals, once 
activated, direct information-processing and social behavior.  Third, the states 
activated by the priming manipulations in these studies have motivational 
qualities.  Fourth, these states also exist in chronic form and there are individual 
differences in these chronic motivations.  Finally, the activated goals operate 
autonomously, bypassing the need for any conscious selection or choice, but 
producing outcomes different from those that would occur if the individual would 
choose if the goal were not primed.  In short, every postulate of the auto-
motivation model was supported by these studies, demonstrating that the entire 
sequence from environmental information to goal and motivation to judgment and 
action can and does occur automatically and unconsciously.15 
 
This has serious ramifications – it means that if we encounter a particular cognitive trigger, we 
can initiate goals, motivations, and resultant behaviors automatically.  Absent volitional control, 
we may not necessarily be able to control the kinds of thoughts and actions that result.  In a 
clinical setting, for instance, a particular diagnosis may be an emotional trigger for a variety of 
subsequent thought processes and associations.  The mere word ‘cancer’ may elicit a slew of 
memories and experiences involuntarily and instigate thought processes culminating in a 
comorbid depression, which may radically affect how our patient perceives his or her current 
                                                 
13 Bargh, "The Automaticity of Everyday Life," 10. 
14 Interested readers should also see Carver, "Associations to Automaticity." for treatments of automaticity in goal 
activation. 
15 Bargh, "The Automaticity of Everyday Life," 47-8. 
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health and prognosis.  When asked about treatment preferences, and whether the patient desires a 
particular course of treatment, we may have unknowingly set into action an automatic process 
that results in an outcome our patient might not otherwise desire.  We will return to these kinds 
of concerns throughout the chapter. 
 Reaffirming the deterministic model Bargh noted, Bargh and Ferguson note that the 
phenomena of consciousness and willfulness are not necessarily objections to deterministic 
systems – they feel that it is inappropriate to believe that a deterministic model necessarily 
equates to a lack of choice or influence on the process.16  They explore a key element of Bargh’s 
previous research into automaticity – the role of awareness on control of automatic processes: 
Is this to say that one is usually not in control of one’s own judgments and 
behavior?  If by control over responses is meant the ability to override 
preconsciously suggested choices, then the answer is that one can exert such 
control in most cases.  The occurrence of preconscious influences on 
interpretation of input and generation of evaluations is probably not controllable 
in the immediate, on-line sense (but is perhaps alterable through extensive and 
controlled rechanneling of unwanted interpretative biases, as through cognitive 
therapy).  However, one can reduce or perhaps eliminate such preconscious 
influences on judgments by an intentional search for and examination of relevant 
evidence… But if by ‘control’ is meant the actual exercise of that ability, then the 
question remains open.  The assertion of control over preconscious, 
postconscious, and context-dependent automatic influences…can only occur if 
one is aware of those influences.  My own hunch is that control over automatic 
processes is not usually exercised, not so much because of a lack of motivation as 
because people tend not to accept the idea that there are many ways in which 
awareness, judgment, and behavior may be influenced without one’s knowledge.  
As long as most people believe that they are aware of all such influences, that 
subjective awareness is an objective reflection of reality, and that their 
introspective ability is fully capable of sorting out the true causes of one’s 
emotions and evaluations, then they will not take care to counteract the hidden 
preconscious biases and other unintended influences upon thought and behavior 
that are discussed in this chapter.17 
                                                 
16 John A. Bargh and Melissa J. Ferguson, "Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes," 
Psychological Bulletin 126, no. 6 (2000): 925-45, p. 925-6; see also Gordon D. Logan, "Automaticity and Cognitive 
Control," in Unintended Thought, ed. James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh (New York: Guilford Press, 1989), 52-
74. 
17 John Bargh, "Conditional Automaticity: Varities of Automatic Influence in Social Perception and Cognition," in 
Unintended Thought, ed. James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh (New York: Guilford Press, 1989), 3-51, p. 39-40. 
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Bargh and Ferguson reiterate Bargh’s assessment (which we will also return to in chapter four).  
They suggest that awareness of one’s automatic reactions can assist in guiding and informing 
one’s resulting behavior – there is a direct parallel to this in both rational-emotive and cognitive-
behavioral therapies.  In both of these interventions, the patient is asked to think about the 
automatic thoughts that resulted from a particular stimulus or situation, explore its meaning and 
source, and examine whether it is an appropriate or inappropriate response.  By willfully 
breaking the stimulus Æ thought Æ emotion Æ behavior chain, a patient is empowered and able 
to exercise more control over subsequent emotional responses and his or her subsequent 
behaviors.18  Bargh and Ferguson place a necessary caveat on this process, however – they feel 
that the higher processes which become aware of this automaticity are themselves subject to 
automatic and deterministic control mechanisms.19 
In contrast to the highly deterministic model proposed, Baumeister and Sommer suggest 
that consciousness introduces explicitly indeterministic elements.20  As Bargh noted, 
consciousness allows us to recognize when automatic processes are occurring, and to exercise 
control in the behavioral process.  In contrast to Bargh’s suggestion that conscious processes 
may be determined, I tend to follow Baumeister and Sommer.  Introducing some indeterminacy 
into decisional models does not contradict underdetermined decisional models, and it allows for 
ownership of action with accompanying ethical valence (moral 
praiseworthiness/blameworthiness).  It does, however, reinforce the necessity of exploring the 
decisions we make to ensure that they are, in fact, the result of conscious mediation, and not 
                                                 
18 Some individuals have suggested that there is a significant automaticity in certain psychopathologies (see, for 
instance E. Tory Higgins, "Knowledge Accessibility and Activation: Subjectivity and Suffering from Unconscious 
Sources," in Unintended Thought, ed. James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh [New York: Guilford Press, 1989], 75-
123.). 
19 Bargh and Ferguson, "Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes," 928. 
20 Roy E. Baumeister and Kristin L. Sommer, "Consciousness, Free Choice, and Automaticity," in The Automaticity 
of Everyday Life, ed. Robert S. Wyer (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 75. 
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simply the result of underlying automatic processing.  I wish to stress that there are strongly 
deterministic causal factors in cognition, and that we must be aware of the myriad influences 
upon our choices, especially in critical situations such as forgoing treatment. 
 As noted above, automatic processing can have significant ‘downstream’ effects (i.e., 
conscious effects).  The clearest example of this occurs in priming studies – Bargh and Ferguson 
cite prior research demonstrating how affect and affective responses can be influenced by 
priming objects.  Participants reported their moods following exposure to priming objects.  
Participants exposed to positively valenced priming objects reported significantly better moods 
than individuals exposed to negatively valenced priming objects.  In short, they demonstrated 
that downstream mood can be determined by automatic emotional processing of earlier situations 
and experiences.21 Clore and Ketelaar concur with Bargh’s conclusion of (deterministic) 
conscious mediation of automatic processes.  They note that it would be false to model behavior 
solely on controlled versus automatic processes.  Rather, they suggest that our normal cognition 
is a mixture of automatic and controlled processes, and that the other phenomena of our 
cognitive processes (e.g., affect) do not fall into neat categories like ‘controlled’ or ‘automatic’.  
They argue that affect and cognition are involved in both the conscious/unconscious and 
automatic/controlled domains.22 
 Automaticity, therefore, can be a powerful motivator for action, resulting in affective 
changes, goal activation, and deterministic mediators of conscious processes.  These resultant 
changes are necessarily interactive and modifying causal elements of further cognition: 
It seems undeniable that conscious processes are themselves causal agents within 
the same deterministic framework as nonconscious processes.  Conscious and 
nonconscious processes presumably act in concert with one another, and with 
                                                 
21 Bargh and Ferguson, "Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes," 932. 
22 Gerald Clore and Timothy Ketelaar, "Minding Our Emotions: On the Role of Automatic, Unconscious Affect," in 
The Automaticity of Everyday Life, ed. Robert S. Wyer (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 118. 
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stimuli outside of our bodies, according to physical laws.  Any mental circuit or 
system that guides behavior extended over time (as opposed to single, one-off 
reflex responses) must have access to information in the environment to do so.  
That an individual is currently consciously aware of this information at the same 
time does not mean that the process is any less determined.  If one takes any of 
the perception-behavior studies described above, one finds that the effect required 
information of which the person was consciously aware and could report on – 
such as walking down the hallway more slowly after priming with elderly-related 
stimuli or helping to pick up pens in the elevator.  Yet the automatic goal 
operation experiments provide more telling and, in hindsight, rather obvious 
evidence that even controlled mental processes are themselves controlled and 
determined.  Goals – such as to form an impression of someone, or memorize 
information, or achieve the best score possible on a task, or treat others fairly – 
are executive processes that operate on information held in working memory and 
‘do things with it’.  This is the functional essence of a goal structure.  Therefore, 
if these goals are nonconsciously activated and operating without the person’s 
knowledge but still producing the same outcomes and using the same brain 
structures as when the goal is being consciously pursued, this means that the 
executive processes and working memory operations are themselves being 
controlled by the automatically operating goal.23 
 
As a result, we see that cognition has strongly deterministic elements at all levels of pre- and 
post-conscious processing.  These elements necessarily conflict with our folk model of cognition, 
in which our cognition is essentially free.  As we will see, automatic processes add a further 
layer of complexity into cognition – there is nothing that guarantees that these automatic 
processes will be accurate or unbiased, a theme we will return to in our discussion of heuristics. 
 Cohen extends the model, noting that there are strong sociocultural determinants of 
perception and behavior.  Our automatic perceptions, cognitions, and behaviors occur within a 
particular cultural context – we cannot simply ignore the specific cultural bases of cognition, or 
the behavior cues it initiates.  He suggests that “The ‘self-evident’ truth of what we must do in a 
situation can be the product of a preconscious that is highly accultured.  Things that seem like a 
natural stimulus-response connection differ markedly across cultures.”24  This does not seem to 
                                                 
23 Bargh and Ferguson, "Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes," 939. 
24 Dov Cohen, "Ifs and Thens in Cultural Psychology," in The Automaticity of Everyday Life, ed. Robert S. Wyer 
(Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 123. 
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require significant leaps of logic – as we will see elsewhere (e.g., in conceptual blending), the 
particular culture in which we learn how to react to and process stimuli has instilled in us 
particular values and normative standards to which our actions conform.  This is not to suggest 
that cultures produce homogeneous agents, but it is certainly much more likely that members of 
the same culture will react more akin to each other than to members of a radically different 
culture.  Within this cultural context, Mischel adds an additional layer of complexity by noting 
that there are significant and unique causal and modifying conditions in every reasoning agent 
which affect how we react to external stimuli: 
But in a comprehensive analysis of social cognition, feeling, and action, the if-
then relationships that have to be considered include internal events and 
conditions – the situations inside the head – such as the person’s chronic affective 
states, styles of encoding information, self-representations and expectations (e.g., 
about one’s own efficacy), goals, values, self-regulatory strategies, and action 
scripts, all of which are likely to interact with and change the impact of the 
external stimulus.25 
 
Mischel chafes, however, at suggestions that cognition ought to be understood as a necessarily 
deterministic model – he notes that human goals often mediate automatic reactions, preventing 
us from acting on our impulses or reactions.  He suggests that the conclusion Bargh reaches – 
i.e., that these mediating processes themselves are determined – may restrict fields of inquiry 
(e.g., social psychology) to the discovery of stimuli.26  He does stress that environmental stimuli 
can have a strong influence over behavior, however, and does not fully divorce stimulus from 
response.  In light of Mischel’s concerns, Bargh clarifies his remarks, noting that it is not simply 
environmental triggers that can produce automatic responses – his analysis applies to 
psychological situations:   
                                                 
25 Walter Mischel, "Was the Cognitive Revolution Just a Detour on the Road to Behaviorism?  On the Need to 
Reconcile Situational Control and Personal Control," in The Automaticity of Everyday Life, ed. Robert S. Wyer 
(Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 181-86, p. 182-3. 
26 Mischel, "Was the Cognitive Revolution Just a Detour on the Road to Behaviorism?  On the Need to Reconcile 
Situational Control and Personal Control," 185-6. 
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In hindsight, my use of the terms situation and environment, combined with my 
invocation of precognitive (Skinner) and preinteractionist (e.g., Milgram) ghosts, 
was unintentionally (consciously, at least) misleading.  By situation, I meant the 
psychological situation, and this certainly includes the immediate internal 
reactions of the individual…the objective external situation is not a cause as much 
as the taken meaning and internal experience of that situation – and this can 
certainly vary from individual to individual.  Environmental events can directly 
trigger these internal reactions without the intervention or need of conscious 
choice…and as these internal reactions can vary from individual to individual, 
these automatic effects, can and do, vary as well.  In fact, when these individual 
differences in the meanings of external situations are taken into account, 
substantial cross-situational consistency is shown in emotional and behavioral 
reactions, as Mischel’s own research shows.27 
 
As such, the model that emerges from this discussion is that of a consciously mediated but often 
deterministic, reflex processing in response to both external and internal stimuli which can have 
long term effects on affect, perception, and cognition.  In short, the choices that we make can be 
heavily influenced, but not necessarily determined, by factors outside of our control.  As 
clinicians, we should be very aware of the role that context and psychological stimuli have upon 
the decision-making process.  If a patient chooses to forgo medical treatment, we would be 
remiss if we were not to ensure that it is done for the right reasons, and not as an automatically 
processed reaction to the situation in which the patient finds him or herself. 
Conceptual Blending and Mental Spaces 
 The discussion of cognition must contain a discussion of ‘mental spaces’ – a theory of 
cognition positing the assemblage of novel ideas and constructs from earlier ideas and constructs, 
occurring outside of our conscious awareness.28  Fauconnier argues that language cues give rise 
to cognition outside of our awareness, building complex cognitive structures that can exceed the 
extent of the information presented: 
                                                 
27 John A. Bargh, "Reply to the Commentaries," in The Automaticity of Everyday Life, ed. Robert S. Wyer (Mahwah: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 232. 
28 Turner, "Backstage Cognition in Reason and Choice," 266. 
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In order for thinking and communicating to take place, elaborate constructions 
must occur that draw on conceptual knowledge, schema-induction, and mapping 
capabilities.  Expressions of language do not in themselves represent or code such 
constructions – the complexity of the constructions is such that the coding, even if 
it were at all possible, would take very large amounts of time and be extremely 
inefficient.  Instead, languages are designed, very elegantly it would seem, to 
prompt us into making the constructions appropriate for a given context with a 
minimum of grammatical structure.  Language does not itself do the cognitive 
building – it ‘just’ gives us minimal, but sufficient, clues for finding the domains 
and principles appropriate for building in a given situation.  Once these clues are 
combined with already existing configurations, available cognitive principles, and 
background framing, the appropriate construction can take place, and the results 
far exceeds any overt explicit information…We notice only the tip of the iceberg 
– the words – and we attribute all the rest to common sense.29 
 
This seems to be a principal of spoken language, but there seems to be grounds to extend these 
principles.  Thought must occur in some form of language of self-presentation30 – after all, there 
must be some manner in which we can consciously and unconsciously consider information.  In 
light of this, it would follow that there would be a mental space construction (which may be 
unique to each individual).  Fauconnier suggests that any form of thought or cognition produces 
such mental spaces.31  He stresses that these ought not to be considered simulations of reality of 
‘possible worlds’ – as such, we ought not to envision them as such, or compare them to types of 
heuristics setting up simulations of possible outcomes (e.g., as in some heuristics later in this 
chapter).32  These elements, however, are not necessarily accessible to us consciously – we are 
engaging in a phenomenon called ‘backstage cognition’. 
                                                 
29 Gilles Fauconnier, Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), xviii. 
30 This may or may not necessarily parallel our representations of spoken language.  My argument does not require 
that our language of self-presentation necessarily have an ordered grammar or syntax; all that is being posited is 
some manner in which information is brought up for cognition, and by which it is compared to, adapted by and 
fused with other information in the same manner in which it occurs when we create mental spaces.  In light of what 
cognitive psychology has learned (a small sampling of which is contained in this chapter), it seems unlikely that we 
do not engage in some similar process for the processing of internally elicited cognitive stimuli as we do for 
externally elicited stimuli. 
31 Fauconnier, Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language, xxxvii. 
32 Fauconnier, Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language, 152. 
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 In developing the presentation of backstage cognition, Turner notes that it potentially 
conflicts with the ‘truths’ of common experience – just as we witnessed folk theories in the last 
chapter, we encounter them again here regarding cognition, and they are just as mistaken.  Folk 
theory would suggest that we are perceptually aware of the elements of our own cognition – we 
know both what and how we think.  This idea, however, is undercut by the available evidence of 
cognitive science: 
The central insight cognitive science offers to social science is that reason and 
choice operate, indispensably and inescapably, through what Gilles Fauconnier 
calls ‘backstage cognition.’  Backstage cognition is the integrated activity of 
intricate, systematic, powerful, and complex mental operations of interpretation 
and inference.  Crucially, the backstage cognition that constitutes most of reason 
and choice takes place outside of consciousness, and so we do not even recognize 
that it is happening.33 
 
Any appreciation of reason and cognition, therefore, must be in light of what we now know – the 
cognitive processes of which we are aware are surface phenomena, and merely a subset of all the 
phenomena occurring when we consider choices and options.  Thought and judgment are much 
more complex processes than our everyday folk accounting would suggest, and any model of 
‘rational autonomy’ must account for a profound empirical criticism – ‘rationality’ isn’t so 
rational after all.  The implications of this for several popular ethical theories will be addressed 
in chapter four. 
 As indicated above, cognition in mental spaces involves a series of interactions between 
inputs (internal and external stimuli).  Some inputs are projected into the mental space, where 
they can combine to produce new meaning (‘emergent structure’) that is not directly available to 
either of the inputs (i.e., the meaning is something novel, rather than an intrinsic property of the 
input).  This interaction and production of novel meanings and interactions is a process Turner 
                                                 
33 Turner, "Backstage Cognition in Reason and Choice," 265. 
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and Fauconnier refer to as ‘conceptual blending’.34  This novel meaning can then be projected 
back to the input in question, giving them new properties and meanings.35  These three basic 
interactions lead to greater claims about the nature of conceptual blends: 
Fleshing out the claim that reason and choice depend on backstage cognition 
yields the following more specific claims: basic cognitive operations like 
conceptual blending are the basis of reasoning and choice; basic cognitive 
operations like conceptual blending are systematic and highly intricate; we rarely 
notice these basic cognitive operations or the details of their operation.  
Operations of backstage cognition, like conceptual blending, typically operate 
below the horizon of observation, too intricately for consciousness to handle, 
interactively with each other, on-line, quickly, [and] with powers of access and 
recognition not otherwise available.  This combination of features is partly 
responsible for the power of backstage cognition.  It is also partly responsible for 
the difficulty – notorious in cognitive science – of recognizing the existence of 
these cognitive operations, or the greater difficulty of noticing them as they 
operate, or the yet greater difficulty of analyzing what it is they do when they 
operate.36 
 
This is a very different model than what we encounter in classical models of cognition, which 
posit an agent as rationally mapping out the consequences of particular actions and assigning 
objective probabilities to each (this will be addressed further later in the chapter).  Cognition 
appears generally to be more ad hoc – judgments and meaning seem to be constructed by 
conceptual blending in mental spaces, rather than the results of conscious deliberation.  Turner 
notes that evolution favors rapid processing and blending of the sort discussed above – slower 
processes like the classical model do not appear to have evolutionary consequences.  Instead 
“What does have consequence for evolution is whether, in total, over decades, you manage, 
sometime, to make certain things happen.  On that requirement, human reasoning needs to be 
                                                 
34 Turner, "Backstage Cognition in Reason and Choice," 266. 
35 Turner,  268. 
36 Turner,  272. 
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inventive, creative, reliable, strategic, opportunistic, social, natural, effective, and nonfatal, but it 
does not need to be especially good at cascading implication.”37 
 What, then, would characterize cognition in this model?  We have already seen that it is a 
backstage process – it is a fast process by which we can rapidly respond to environmental and 
discursive stimuli.  These blends can accommodate information from a wide variety of sources, 
and we associate them with frames of meaning (e.g., contextualizing meaning).38  Fauconnier 
and Turner offer pattern completion as an example of conceptual blends drawing information 
from a variety of sources to give meaning to an incomplete series or pattern: “We see some parts 
of a familiar frame of meaning, and much more of the frame is recruited silently but effectively 
to the blend.”39  Further, the blends that result from mental spaces are not necessarily 
deterministic – they stress that it is nonsensical and counter to actual human thought to require 
that a specific blend must result from any particular two inputs.  How we interpret inputs can 
vary, and therefore the effect it has on us can vary as a result – we will return to the means by 
which involuntary or nonconscious processing can affect cognition in our discussion of heuristics 
later in the chapter. 
Continuing the description of what characterizes the proposed cognitive model, we are 
aware of the end products of this blending, but not the processing that brings it about: 
The perception available to consciousness is the effect of complicated interactions 
between the brain and its environment.  But we integrate that effect with its 
causes to create emergent meaning: the existence of a cause – namely, the cup – 
that directly presents its effects – namely, its unity, color, shape, weight, and so 
on.  As a consequence, the effect is now in its cause: the color, shape, and weight 
are now intrinsically, primitively, and objectively in ‘the cup.’  In perception, at 
                                                 
37 Turner, "Backstage Cognition in Reason and Choice," 285. 
38 By way of clarification, this discussion of framing ought not to be understood in terms of how questions are 
framed, or other equivocable meanings.  Frame of meaning here refers to a general frame like “sitting at a table” or 
to specific frames like “sitting at a table in the Barnes and Noble café at 6:47 PM on May 14th.”  These frames can 
affect how we recall information and how we associate it with other meanings. 
39 Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden 
Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 48. 
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the level of consciousness, we usually apprehend only the blend of cause and 
effect.  We cannot fail to perform this blend, and we cannot see beyond it…Brain 
damage, psychoactive drugs, and certain neurobiological syndromes can cause 
breakdown of these integrations and consequent bizarre perceptions.  But for the 
most part, when we are functioning normally, consciousness cannot see the rest of 
the blending network.40 
 
The material that is drawn into the blend does not have to be part of the current stimulus – it is 
entirely possible for one to draw upon old experiences and memories as inputs into a conceptual 
blend.  This will be an important part of the heuristic model as well – experience and memory 
provide the information accessed most readily, in addition to emotional valences.  We are not 
necessarily aware of all of the blends that our minds produce – as it is a backstage process, it is 
entirely possible for meanings and associations to be blended, but to be preconsciously rejected 
in favor of other interpretations.41  They may be rejected for a variety of preconscious reasons; 
while we do not presently have a full accounting of preconscious processes or reasoning (and, in 
light of our complexity, one might reasonably ask whether we will ever have such an account), 
we have several candidate theories in heuristics-and-biases, ecological rationality, bounded 
rationality, and ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics.  These will all be addressed later in this chapter. 
 A further characteristic of the blends we form is their dependence on our cultural setting; 
it does not seem to be contentious to suggest that how we interpret environmental and cognitive 
stimuli will be informed by our cultural context.  Ignoring temporal differences between cultures 
and societies, we can see that individuals from contemporaneous and sympatric communities can 
form vastly different associations based on biological and sociocultural cues.42  They provide us 
with different experiences with concomitant differences in frames of reference; as such, we blend 
                                                 
40 Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities, 78-9. 
41 Fauconnier and Turner, 321. 
42 I test this perception every semester in my Introduction to Philosophy class when we discuss determinism.  It is 
interesting to see how many ardent supporters of indeterminism readily admit that our perspective, method of 
cognitive processing, and interpretations of external and internal stimuli are affected by such determinants as genes, 
age, gender, race, social class, upbringing, degree of education, and exposure to other cultures. 
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different elements with common stimuli.  Fauconnier and Turner suggest that there is “no other 
way for us to apprehend the world” – forming conceptual blends is an automatic and essential 
part of our cognitive lives.  It is a requisite part of our consciousness and memory.43 
COGNITIVE HEURISTICS 
 How do we approach the world cognitively?  How do we make sense of the myriad sense 
phenomena that greet us every waking moment of every day of our lives?  How do we make 
associations between past, present, and future?  Are we homuncular theorists, picking and 
choosing the information we will use in formulating a judgment?  Are we purely rational, coolly 
and calmly weighing evidence and choosing a utility-maximizing solution?  Are we intuitive, 
relying on elements of cognition and impressions that we cannot fully explain, but seem 
compelling?  Any of these?  None?  A mixture thereof?  These questions are both fascinating and 
fecund, but regrettably outside the purview of this work.  What will have to suffice is a treatment 
of several fundamental ideas, building to a model that notes individual differences in cognition, 
the inapplicability of a purely rational utility calculus, and the necessity of a conception of 
bounded rationality – we cannot exceed our innate limitations as human cognizers. 
Nisbett et al. note that the dominant theory “poses a view of man as lay scientist, 
attempting to infer causes for the effects he observes.  The causes he attributes determine his 
view of his social world, and this view may determine his behavior.”44  Making generalizations 
about the world as he understands it leads to patterns in interpretation and perception.  These 
patterns then influence and modify future events and experiences, and are in turn modified by 
these experiences.  These schema are selective, however, in what information they take in and 
                                                 
43 Fauconnier and Turner, 390-1. 
44 Richard E. Nisbett, et al., "Popular Induction: Information is not Necessarily Informative," in Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 101. 
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how they process it.  Specifically, the data that are subjectively most influential are not 
necessarily the strongest information: 
We believe that the present research and examples drawn from everyday life show 
that some kinds of information that the scientist regards as highly pertinent and 
logically compelling are habitually ignored by people.  Other kinds of 
information, logically much weaker, trigger strong inferences and action 
tendencies.  We can think of no more useful activity for psychologists who study 
information processing than to discover what their subjects regard as information 
worthy of processing.45 
 
In essence, the way we think about many things is not necessarily based on the strongest 
information or the most accurate understanding of what information we do choose to focus on.  
Further, we are often called upon to evaluate novel situations, or at least situations that are novel 
to us.  In this context, we find that there are several typical constraints upon what we view as 
likely versus unlikely, based upon any germane or potentially relevant information we possess.  
We construct scenarios to evaluate how we can reach the targeted outcome; the more plausible 
the scenarios we discern, the more likely the target event.  We have innate limitations, however, 
on how much information we can manage in constructing these scenarios; as a consequence, we 
tend to only alter simple elements or factors, which may not conform to reality or may be 
counterintuitive.46  Further, once we construct a particular scenario, we tend to find it difficult to 
imagine other possibilities – we become tied or ‘anchored’ to one given possible explanation or 
course of action (see below), which limits our ability to generate further scenarios or to see other 
potential outcomes.47  Kahneman and Tversky further note that in judging probabilities and 
unknowns, our decisions are only adequate if the judgment is in accord with the entire collection 
of beliefs held by the thinking agent.  This poses a problem in assessing rationality: there is no 
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simple way to check whether any particular set of probability judgments are compatible with the 
individual’s collective whole.  Instead, the individual simply strives for compatibility with his 
knowledge, assessments of probability, and his own heuristics and biases.48  In other terms, the 
individual strives to make his decision as authentic as possible. 
 We also respond differently when we begin to add information into our cognitive schema.  
Our mind occasionally has difficulty filtering useful information from worthless information – 
studies demonstrate that “people respond differently when given no evidence and when given 
worthless evidence.  When no specific evidence is given, prior probabilities are properly utilized; 
when worthless evidence is given, prior probabilities are ignored.”49  When information is 
present, we assign it decisional weight and importance, but may potentially give it undue weight, 
leading us to become either overly reliant upon that particular piece of information (anchoring), 
or overly confident in our assessment of its worth, a failure rampant across lay and professional 
decision makers: 
The weighing of evidence and the formation of belief are basic elements of 
human thought.  The question of how to evaluate evidence and assess confidence 
has been addressed from a normative perspective by philosophers and 
statisticians; it has also been investigated experimentally by psychologists and 
decision researchers.  One of the major findings that has emerged from this 
research is that people are often more confident in their judgments than is 
warranted by the facts.  Overconfidence is not limited to lay judgment or 
laboratory experiments.  The well-publicized observation that more than two-
thirds of small businesses fail within four years suggests that many entrepreneurs 
overestimate their probability of success.  With some notable exceptions, such as 
weather forecasters, who receive immediate frequentistic feedback and produce 
realistic forecasts of precipitation, overconfidence has been observed in 
judgments of physicians, clinical psychologists, lawyers, negotiators, engineers, 
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and security analysts.  As one critic described expert prediction, ‘often wrong, but 
rarely in doubt.’50 
 
But this seems to conflict with our traditional understanding of humans as rational agents – 
surely a rational agent employs a more systematic means of assessing probabilities and novel 
situations.  Simon notes that traditional cognition has been modeled around subjective utility 
theory (SEU) – a model in which the cognizer follows certain procedures and rules in 
constructing probability estimates and judgments based on a utility-maximizing calculus.  There 
are four key assumptions of such models: 
First, the theory assumes that a decision maker has a well-defined utility function, 
and hence that he can assign a cardinal number as a measure of his liking of any 
particular scenario of events over the future.  Second, it assumes that the decision 
maker is confronted with a well-defined set of alternatives to choose from.  These 
alternatives need not be one-time choices, but may involve sequences of choices 
or strategies in which each subchoice will be made only at a specified time using 
the information available at that time.  Third, it assumes that the decision maker 
can assign a consistent joint probability distribution to all future sets of events.  
Finally, it assumes that the decision maker will (or should) choose the alternative, 
or the strategy, that will maximize the expected value, in terms of his utility 
function, of the set of event consequent on the strategy.51 
 
After all, these would all seem to be logical and necessary assumptions in any decisional 
algorithm – a common standard to decide between distinct alternatives, appreciation of the 
consequences of these choices, and the process culminating in the choice that maximizes the 
return the agent receives as measured by the common standard.  In a clinical setting, this is a 
description of our idealized patient and our ideal of informed consent – authentic choices 
predicated on an understanding of the procedures and risks involved and knowledge of the 
reasonably predictable outcomes.  There is a problem, however – this standard is impossible. 
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 Human cognition does not follow this pattern of utility maximization; our cognition is 
characterized by values, emotions, prior knowledge, raw intelligence, and many other factors that 
do not fit nicely into this idealized model.  Simon’s first objection to the SEU model is that it 
assumes that we are capable of viewing everything at once, and seeing the influences between 
these disparate elements.  This is an unrealistically optimistic assessment of what we can do – we 
are far more likely to hone in on a few key instances and base our cognition upon them (e.g., 
availability and anchoring).  Second, the SEU model assumes that we have enough prescience to 
appreciate the full range of alternatives and consequences of each for our lives; again, this is an 
unrealistic expectation.  While we can certainly conceive of a handful of alternatives and some of 
their consequences, we cannot do this in a lump-sum manner or easily decide between competing 
factors.  Third, he notes that the SEU assumes that we have somehow managed to reconcile all of 
our fully and partially-formed values and have been able to synthesize them into a single scale.  
This is extraordinarily unrealistic – conceptually one would have to find common denominators 
for issues of morality, philosophy, theology, health, lifestyle, and psychosocial function.  Each of 
these factors presents unique challenges and definitional debates and controversy – it seems to be 
a stretch of logic that they can be contained on a single scale.  For all of these reasons, Simon 
proposes that the SEU model has never actually been applied, and in fact can never be applied, 
especially in questions of human cognition.52  
 As alternatives to this Olympian model (so named due to the superhuman requirements it 
necessitates), Simon proposes two models that interact and together characterize human 
cognition.  The first model, which he characterizes as ‘bounded rationality’, is essentially 
behavioral, has several characteristic elements.  Posing a challenge to his reader, Simon suggests 
that the following are characteristic of most of the judgments we make: 
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First, your decisions are not comprehensive choices over large areas of your life, 
but are generally concerned with rather specific matters, assumed, whether 
correctly or not, to be relatively independent of other, perhaps equally important, 
dimensions of life…Second, when you make any particular decision, even an 
important one, you probably do not work out detailed scenarios of the future, 
complete with probability distributions, conditional on the alternative you 
choose…Third, the very fact that you are thinking about buying a car, and not a 
hose, will probably focus you attention on some aspects of your life and some of 
your values to the relative neglect of others…Hence, it is unlikely that a single 
comprehensive utility function will watch over the whole range of decisions you 
make.  On the contrary, particular decision domains will evoke particular values, 
and great inconsistencies in choice may result from fluctuating attention.53 
 
These characteristics are defining elements of bounded rationality (Simon includes a fourth, 
noting that we also routinely seek out information for some of our judgments).  As a 
philosophical/psychological approach, it implicitly denies that humans generally are capable of 
the same kinds of algorithmic processes we program into computers – our cognition is dynamic, 
predicated on fast and efficient thought. From an evolutionary perspective, we have neither the 
time nor the energy to commit to an algorithmic thought process for all of our decisions.54   We 
will return to bounded rationality later in this chapter. 
Fast and efficient processing does not mean that we will necessarily always make the 
same choices – the same backstage elements can produce different motives depending on the 
context and what we (preconsciously) judge to be relevant, a point first mentioned in chapter 
one.  Simon notes that: 
Rationality of the sort described by the behavioral model doesn’t optimize, of 
course.  Nor does it even guarantee that our decisions will be consistent.  As a 
matter of fact, it is very easy to show that choices made by an organism having 
these characteristics will often depend on the order in which alternatives are 
presented.  If A is presented before B, A may seem desirable or at least 
satisfactory; but if B is presented before A, B will seem desirable and will be 
chosen before A is even considered.55 
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This may come as a surprise, but this concept should become less controversial as the present 
argument progresses – a recurring theme in this chapter is that how we perceive information, its 
relevance, and its application are dependent upon a variety of issues that may not necessarily be 
important to, or even connected with, the information in question (e.g., the order in which 
information is presented should not make a difference to us, in that it’s objective truth value is 
not contingent upon the order in which we see it).  Just like judging the probability of an 
outcome based upon what we expect to see represents a source of bias and error, so too could the 
order of information exert undue influence on our perception of its weight and merit. 
 The second model Simon proposes stems from intuitive knowledge – some individuals 
have demonstrably greater knowledge than others (i.e., specializations, whether it be medicine, 
botany, or chess), and can come to conclusions based upon that greater knowledge intuitively, 
while others with less experience require much more conscious effort (e.g., a physical chemist 
who has memorized a reactivity series intuitively will be able to predict the probability and 
spontaneity of a given reaction much more readily than a general chemistry student, who will 
have to examine charts to determine which materials are more reactive than others, perform the 
relevant stoichiometry, and calculate the relevant enthalpy, entropy, and free energy.).56 
 These two models, intuitive and behavioral, do not contradict each other, nor are they 
specialized to specific hemispheres.  Simon notes that “All serious thinking calls on both modes, 
both search-like processes and the sudden recognition of familiar patterns.  Without recognition 
based on previous experience, search through complex spaces would proceed in a snail-like 
fashion.  Intuition exploits the knowledge we have gained through our past searches.57 
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 Stanovich and West note that throughout the literature, the models of cognition that 
emerge indicate two discrete processes – the first is generally an automatic, heuristic based 
system (referred to as System 1), while the second is a much more controlled process that 
decontextualizes and depersonalizes information (two-process models will be explored more 
thoroughly in the discussion of alternative theories below).  These two processes operate in 
parallel, allowing them to potentially override some System 1 cognition.58  As part of this 
parallel processing model, we find that there are unique issues that arise as a result of 
contextualizing information – what Stanovich and West refer to as a ‘computational bias’: 
The fundamental computational bias is meant to be a global term that captures the 
pervasive bias towards the contextualization of all informational encounters.  It 
conjoins the following processing tendencies: (a) the tendency to adhere to 
Gricean conversational principles even in situations that lack many conversational 
features; (b) the tendency to contextualize a problem with as much prior 
knowledge as is easily accessible, even then the problem is formal and the only 
solution is a content-free rule; (c) the tendency to see design and pattern in 
situations that are either undersigned, unpatterned, or random; (d) the tendency to 
reason enthymematically – to make assumptions not stated in a problem and then 
reason from those assumptions; (e) the tendency toward a narrative mode of 
thought.  All of these properties conjoined together represent a cognitive tendency 
toward radical contextualization.  The bias is termed fundamental because it is 
thought to stem largely from System 1 and that system is assumed to be primary 
in that it permeates virtually all of our thinking.  If the properties of this system 
are not to be the dominant factors in our thinking, then they must be overridden 
by System 2 processes so that the particulars of a given problem are abstracted 
into canonical representations that are stripped of context.59 
 
This type of error does not occur in isolation – we have a tendency to find patterns in the 
information around us, regardless of whether there is actually a pattern to be found, due to the 
information we include as germane to the current situation and how we choose to perceive it. 
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In light of all of this, the image that emerges demonstrates that we have a tendency to 
process information in a manner which may seem rational, but which produces apparently 
irrational results (i.e., basing decisions on irrelevant or worthless data is irrational [e.g., basing a 
choice to forgo medical treatment based on the price of coffee in Barbados]).  As Ashcraft notes, 
this is an interesting characteristic of much of our ‘everyday reasoning’.60  This apparently 
paradoxical cognitive processing and the many subtypes found within are collectively are 
referred to as ‘heuristics’ – a term we turn to now. 
Definitions 
In general, heuristics refer to the rules we employ during cognition that are optimized for 
quick interpretations of data and situations, based on probabilities or frequencies.  Schwartz 
traces the etymology of the term back to ancient Greek (heuriskein – to discover), in that these 
heuristics are discovered ‘rules’ we apply to specific situations and contexts to make sense of 
them.  However, Schwartz notes, experientially-based heuristics are not necessarily good guides 
– we can have experiences that skew our perceptions in unrealistic or biased ways.61  The 
probabilistic interpretation has been linked to Kahneman and Tversky’s research (see below), 
and will be the default assumptions for the purposes of this work.  Alternatives to the heuristics 
proposed and discussed will be covered below. 
 Ashcraft cogently summarizes the traditional contrast between algorithmic cognitive 
processes and heuristic processes, noting that they employ very different methodologies: 
In many reasoning and problem-solving settings there are two general approaches 
that can be taken in order to achieve a problem solution or reason out an 
appropriate answer.  One approach is termed an algorithmic approach, and the 
other is a heuristic approach.  An algorithm is a specific rule or solution 
procedure, often quite detailed and complex, that is guaranteed to furnish a 
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correct answer if it is followed correctly…A heuristic is a ‘rule of thumb,’ as 
opposed to a formal specified rule.  It’s an informal, ‘seat of the pants’ strategy or 
approach that works under some circumstances, for some of the time, but is not 
guaranteed to yield the correct answer.62 
 
This is an area of potential concern: by relying on heuristics – a characteristic of much of our 
everyday cognitive operation – we open ourselves to systematic errors in information processing 
and decision-making.  We rarely have the time or opportunity to engage in algorithmic 
processing, and as a consequence, we have adapted and adopted a method of handling 
information in a manner that is generally fast, helpful and useful, if potentially mistaken.  
Gilovich and Griffin raise three concerns that are necessary caveats to the discussion that 
follow.63  First, although heuristics have reasoning patterns distinct from algorithmic processes 
and open the door to potential error, they should not be understood as irrational.  Second, despite 
the characterization of heuristics as ‘quick and dirty’ tools, they are based on highly 
sophisticated cognitive processes.  Third, these heuristics are normal responses to all types of 
questions asked – they are not simply invoked in atypical or unlikely situations.  In fact, these 
cognitive processes are very similar to the concepts involved in automaticity, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter.  They further note that research in heuristics “stresses the fact that much of 
mental life is not the product of deliberate processing, but of quicker, more reflexive processes 
that are less available to conscious intervention.”64 
 What emerges from these observations is a cognitive model that is constantly invoked 
across instances that allows for fast interpretation of data and circumstances, that generally is 
adaptive and beneficial, and is potentially open to error.  In a clinical setting, this translates into 
                                                 
62 Ashcraft, Human Memory and Cognition, 541. 
63 Thomas Gilovich and Dale Griffin, "Introduction - Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now," in Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin and Daniel Kahneman (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3. 
64 Gilovich and Griffin, "Introduction - Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now," 16. 
 128
issues applicable to both the patient and to the members of his treatment team.65  As will be 
addressed later, these cognitive issues are not limited to particular people; they are characteristic 
of the way all of us think.  We will further refine this definition and our cognitive model when 
we address dual system theories of cognition below.  Finally, there is some controversy about 
these heuristics – in some paradigms they are seen as principally sources of bias and error, while 
others see them as evolutionary adaptations designed to benefit the species. 
Specific Heuristics 
There are many heuristics that have been proposed and researched, but in this work we 
will focus on only a handful that seem particularly germane.  Specifically, we will focus on 
availability, representativeness, anchoring, simulation, durability, automated choice, and 
proposed metaheuristics.  Each of these presents salient aspects of cognition that generally assist 
individuals in making decisions, but may also introduce sources of methodological error, and 
each will be addressed in turn. 
Availability 
The availability heuristic refers to the ease with which information is recalled.  In 
essence, events or situations that are very vivid or that frequently occur are called to mind more 
readily than other events or situations.66  Kahneman and Tversky offer the following example: 
For example, one may assess the divorce rate in a given community by recalling 
divorces among one’s acquaintances; one may evaluate the probability that a 
politician will lose an election by considering various way in which he may lose 
support; and one may estimate the probability that a violent person will ‘see’ 
beasts of prey in a Rorschach card by assessing the strength of association 
between violence and beasts of prey.  In all these cases, the estimation of the 
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frequency of a class or the probability of an event is mediated by an assessment of 
availability.  A person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he 
estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or 
associations could be brought to mind.67 
 
As a consequence, we tend to base our judgments and perceptions based upon what scenarios are 
called to mind, regardless of whether these may be the most accurate source of information.  
While it is almost a truism to note that, in general, the more frequent an event is the more 
probable it is that it will occur, we can unintentionally introduce a source of error into our 
cognition when we introduce outside factors unrelated to frequency into our probability 
estimates.68  A common phenomenon, for instance, is when a celebrity is diagnosed with a 
particular disease or disorder.  Public health centers note a spike in individuals seeking testing 
following the publication of the diagnosis, indicating that people are more likely to believe that 
they may have the disease or disorder, regardless of the actual base rate of the condition – an 
example of bias or error in cognition.  Further, the more someone is preoccupied with a given 
outcome, the more available that outcome is to future cognition, and as a consequence, the more 
likely it is perceived to be.69  Ashcraft extends Kahneman and Tversky, noting that any salient 
factor which causes us to remember a piece of information may potentially be a source of 
cognitive error: 
Basically, any factor that leads to storage of information or events in memory can 
influence our reasoning here, since our judgments are based on what can be 
remembered easily.  If reasonably accurate and undistorted information is in 
memory, then the availability heuristic probably does a reasonable job.  But to the 
extent that our memory contains information that is inaccurate, incomplete, or 
influenced by factors other than objective frequency, there may be biases and 
distortions in our reasoning.  In particular, any factor besides frequency that calls 
attention to the event may make the event more memorable, make it stand out 
more in memory…such events may be more accessible for retrieval.  This will 
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bias our estimates, since the ease of retrieval would be influenced not simply by 
frequency but also by those other memorability factors.70 
 
This is a key concern, as it speaks to a variety of potential reasons we may choose to remember 
an event – emotional valence, salience, impact on then contemporaneous activity or judgment, 
etc.  This feature of availability will become especially relevant in chapter four, when we discuss 
the debate between depressive realism and depressive bias.   
There are a few issues to be addressed with availability, however.  Dawson and Arkes, 
for instance, caution that employing availability does not necessarily lead to error – there is no 
inherent bias in recalling frequent events more readily than infrequent events.71  There is a reason 
why frequent events come to mind so readily – in general they do occur more frequently, and 
therefore we are justified in believing them to be more probable.  In fact, rather than viewing 
such frequency-based recall as a source of cognitive error, some have suggested that this is an 
evolutionary advantageous cognitive schema (e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer [see below]).  Schwartz 
notes that there is reason to avoid embracing availability too readily – there have been relatively 
few experiments which demonstrate explicitly that subjective probability estimates are based on 
ease of information recall.72 He argues that most of the data have demonstrated correlation, not 
necessarily causation.  As such, it may simply be happenstance that when we make probability 
judgments we are recalling germane events contemporaneously.   
Schwarz and Vaughn extend this concern, noting that there is an implicit confound in 
experiments designed to test availability – efforts to facilitate the ease of recall may also affect 
the amount of information recalled.  They note that “In most real-world situations, these two 
factors are naturally confounded.  Unfortunately, this confound renders it difficult to determine if 
                                                 
70 Ashcraft, Human Memory and Cognition, 553. 
71 Dawson and Arkes, "Systematic Errors in Medical Decision Making: Judgment Limitations," 184. 
72 Schwartz, "Heuristics and Biases in Medical Judgment and Decision Making," 51-2. 
 131
the obtained estimates of frequency, likelihood, or typicality are based on participants’ 
phenomenal experiences or on a biased sample of recalled information.”73  This is a real concern, 
they note, as agents tend not to recall every piece of information that is salient, but rather tend to 
cut the process short.  It is possible, however, to disentangle the two factors and thereby 
eliminate the confound, restoring confidence to the original data on availability.  They note that: 
[T]he reviewed research highlights that recall tasks render two distinct sources of 
information available: the recalled content and the ease or difficulty with which it 
could be brought to mind.  In most situations, these two sources of information 
are naturally confounded and the experience of ease of recall goes along with a 
greater amount of recall.  This confound rendered many of the classic tests of the 
availability heuristic nondiagnostic.  When this confound is disentangled, 
however, the available evidence supports the original formulation of the 
availability heuristic: Individuals estimate the frequency of an event, the 
likelihood of its occurrence, and its typicality ‘by the ease with which instances or 
associations come to mind.’74 
 
As such, we can have confidence in the cognitive model that influences our judgments based on 
the ease of recall of specific pieces of information.  We must, however, remain cognizant that 
this necessarily introduces a source of error into the process – the information that we recall may 
not be the most accurate or directly germane to the judgment at hand. 
Representativeness 
 Representativeness refers to our predisposition to evaluate questions of probability based 
on whether or not we feel the outcome proposed resembles the outcome we expect to see, i.e., is 
the outcome or probability representative of our impression of the situation.  Tversky and 
Kahneman propose this as an explanation of the phenomenon observed when individuals are 
asked to select the likely profession of a person based upon their characteristics; if someone is 
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educated and professionally dressed, we are more likely to view this person as a lawyer or doctor 
instead of a farmer, even if base-rate probabilities of professions are provided and run contrary to 
our expectations.75  We look for patterns in data and situations, in defiance of actually 
probabilities; for instance, when asked which result of six coin tosses is more probable – 
HHHHHH or HTHTTH – most people will pick the latter, because it looks more like a random 
distribution, which is what we would expect.  Many people feel that HTHTTH is more 
representative of six coin tosses, despite the fact that both options are equally probable.  In light 
of this, Ashcraft characterizes representativeness as “a judgment rule in which your estimate of 
the probability of an event is determined by one of two features: (1) how similar the event is to 
the population of events it came from, or (2) whether the event seems similar to the process that 
produced it.”76 This can have clinical impacts as well, in the sense that we may feel that certain 
states are more indicative or representative of a given diagnosis or intervention.  For instance, it 
is possible that a patient may associate limited medical intervention (e.g., mechanical ventilation) 
with full intervention (mechanical ventilation, artificial nutrition and hydration, dialysis, etc.).  
When asked to visualize their life with mechanical ventilation or artificial nutrition and 
hydration, a patient may pick a more extreme vision than warranted, simply because he feels it is 
more representative of medical interventions, a potential source of bias and error. 
Anchoring 
 Anchoring refers to a variety of phenomena.  Chapman and Johnson note at least three 
different understandings of the term: 
Because it has been used in many different areas, the term anchoring has been 
used to mean somewhat different things.  We group these definitions into three 
types: One refers to an anchoring procedure in which a salient but uninformative 
number is presented to subjects. A second meaning is an experimental result, in 
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which the uninformative number influences the judgments.  Finally anchoring and 
adjustment is sometimes used to refer to the psychological process by which the 
uninformative number has its effect.77 
 
In the context of this work, I will use anchoring to refer to a tendency to attach one’s cognition to 
one or a small group of characteristics subjectively viewed to be salient to the decision in 
question.  The deciding agent assigns significant weight, consciously or unconsciously, to this 
factor or these factors, which may potentially result in skewed interpretation or perception.  
Parallels abound in a variety of contexts78 – conscious anchoring in politics, when a voter hinges 
her vote on a single issue, diagnosis, when a physician places undue weight on a particular lab 
result (e.g., insisting a tendon tear is impossible because he/she didn’t see it on an MRI) or 
diagnosis (e.g., insisting on the presence of bipolar disorder or schizophrenia without the patient 
having met sufficient diagnostic criteria or with the patient having met the criteria for a less 
common disorder).  We have a tendency to subjectively weigh information and thereby assign it 
precedence in cognition.  The potential for error occurs when the weight assigned is 
inappropriate, or leads to pathological states (e.g., rumination).  Certain terms have this effect 
when they are included as part of a differential; for instance, if a patient were presented with a 
list of possible causes for hemo-positive stool – hemorrhoids, gastric ulcer, colorectal cancer, 
tear in the intestinal vasculature, etc. – the likely result is that they will anchor on ‘cancer’, 
despite an absence of other risk factors and the higher probability of another cause.  As a 
consequence, it is likely that cognition about his current medical condition will revolve around 
this one element of the differential (cognitive weight greater than is warranted by the 
presentation) – the patient has ‘anchored’ on the diagnosis of cancer. 
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 The reason for concern in the context of this work is the weight patients may assign to 
elements in their lives that may or may not be affected by the treatment being offered – if 
patients anchor on a particular element of their life, they may potentially skew their cognition, 
resulting in a choice that, in retrospect, they may regret.  Our clinical concern should be to ensure 
that the choices made by our patients are as accurate as they can be, and to challenge undue 
weights and other sources of error – after all, it is quite possible that the patient will be making a 
terminal choice.  We ought to make sure that that choice is made for the right reasons. 
Simulation 
The simulation heuristic refers to situations in which we are asked to imagine either a 
future outcome or what things would be like were an event to turn out differently.  Ashcraft notes 
that the heuristic derives its name from its parallel to computer simulation, in that we are asked 
to simulate a future, alternate reality or hypothetical situation.79  This simulation is aided or 
hindered by the availability of information (in the sense of the availability heuristic) which 
allows us to construct plausible scenarios – this ‘ease of construction’ is the key factor in the 
function of the simulation heuristic.  Citing Kahneman and Tversky, Ashcraft notes that 
individuals tend to make ‘downhill changes’ – that is, people change the circumstances in 
simulations to make them seem more ‘normal’.  This is to say that we have a tendency to replace 
those elements which seem unusual with seemingly more usual events (replacing usual with 
unusual events is making an ‘uphill change’).  This represents a cognitive error in that it fiats 
probabilities on events which may be unwarranted – sometimes the unusual is usual.  We 
discount the unusual in our simulations simply because they may be “difficult to imagine or 
construct.”80  This leads to a potential problem – we can create a positive bias based on the ease 
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of the construction of our simulation, leading us to expect positive outcomes more than is 
realistically warranted.81  We will return to unrealistic optimism in chapter four, in the discussion 
of depressive realism versus depressive bias.  For the moment, it will suffice to note that errors in 
simulation heuristics are related to the phenomenon of bias in affective forecasting and the 
durability bias. 
Durability Bias 
 Durability bias and affective forecasting refer to common sources of error in predicting 
how we will feel about a particular events in the future.  Research has indicated that people 
frequently make mistakes in how they will feel about a particular life event or quality of life in 
the future.  This has immediate clinical impact – patients frequently state that there are states of 
living that they would not want to experience or persist in.  Paralyzation, amputation, and 
persistent or terminal illness frequently are referenced as states to which many people are averse.  
The literature, however, notes that when these individuals find themselves in such states, many 
have found their lives still have personal value and meaning.  
Gilbert et al. explored this phenomenon, and found several potential triggers for the 
common (mis)perception that people have regarding how they will feel about future events, and 
how long those feelings endure.  Citing eleven previous studies, they note a demonstrable 
overestimation of the extent to which people anticipate negative life events will affect them.82  
They note that most people are reasonably happy and emotionally stable most of the time, 
despite experiencing profoundly positive or negative life events.  Why, then, would people 
continue to overestimate the duration of affective responses?  Gilbert et al. suggest that there a 
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variety of potential causes: misconstrual, inaccurate theories, motivated distortions, focalism, and 
immune neglect.  Each of these will be addressed in turn. 
 Misconstrual refers to a tendency to ignore other possible interpretations and 
conceptualizations of the future event or emotional state.  People have a tendency to imagine 
events as being more powerful than they actually are, and as a consequence, they imagine that 
the emotional response it provokes will also be more powerful and of longer duration than 
warranted.83  In a clinical context, individuals may overestimate how profoundly an illness will 
impact their lives, and as a consequence, may overestimate how long they will feel burdened or 
depressed about the illness. 
 Discussion of inaccurate theories refers to misunderstanding a situation, whether due to 
understanding too little, too much, or by having the situation modified by culture or experience.84  
Some of the knowledge that results from our perception and understanding is likely to be wrong 
– aside from potentially misremembering our experiences and/or their context-specific details, 
we tend to give our experiences emotional valences, but we also tend not to properly remember 
these valences or why we assigned them as we did.  When we attempt to make rules based on 
these early experiences and emotional valences, we tend to make errors when predicting how we 
will respond emotionally to future situations.  We will return to the topic of emotional valence at 
the end of this chapter. 
 Motivated distortions stem from the fact that affective forecasts inspire emotion at the 
time the forecast is made.  For instance, if someone feels good about getting married, he may 
extend that emotional reaction to cover how he will feel throughout the marriage.85  In a like 
manner, people may engage in ‘defensive pessimism’ – they will overestimate their negative 
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experience so that when things turn out better than expected, they are pleasantly surprised.  This 
has significant clinical correlates – people brace for bad diagnoses, and can overestimate how 
profoundly the diagnosis will affect them as a result.  Many people feel very averse to 
contracting cancer, and this negative valence can set up an expectation of misery and suffering, 
which can then lead to an overestimation of how they will feel throughout the course of their 
illness, should they ever be diagnosed. 
 Focalism refers to the tendency to focus solely on the event in question, and in the 
process, ignore the larger social context of the future event.86  Personal events do not occur in 
isolation – our lives are not static, and we can easily ignore mitigating factors or events about 
which we will feel good.  In a clinical context, of someone focuses solely on her diagnosis of 
cancer, she may focus on that to the extent that she ignores the possibility of other personal and 
familial triumphs and opportunities.  She may ignore the very real chance that other events will 
assist in her emotional coping and recovery. 
 The prime focus of Gilbert et al.’s article is on the phenomenon of immune neglect – 
drawing a parallel to physical health, they note the presence of a psychological immune system 
that enables people to maintain a relatively stable state of mental health: 
In science, literature, and folklore, people are famous for making the best of bad 
situations, remembering their successes and overlooking their excesses, 
trumpeting their triumphs and excusing their mistakes, milking their glories and 
rationalizing their failures – all of which allow them to remain relatively pleased 
with themselves despite all good evidence to the contrary.  Psychologists from 
Freud to Festinger have described the artful methods by which the human mind 
ignores, augments, transforms, and rearranges information in its unending battle 
against the affective consequences of negative events…Some of these methods 
are quite simple (e.g., dismissing as a rule all remarks that begin with ‘You 
drooling imbecile’) and some are more complicated (e.g., finding four good 
reasons why we did not really want to win the lottery in the first place), but taken 
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in sum, they seem to constitute a psychological immune system whose job it is to 
protect the individual from an overdose of gloom.87 
 
Immune neglect, therefore, is when we fail to take into consideration our existent reserves and 
innate ability to manage bad situations.  When asked to predict how we will feel about a 
particular future situation, we don’t factor in our inherent tools for managing bad situations.  The 
direct clinical correlate is the statement that “I won’t be able to live this way,” – because of our 
inability to predict how we will actually feel and respond, statements like this become suspect.88 
Automated Choice 
 Taking a different tack (i.e., switching from heuristics governing information processing 
and perception to how we make choices), Frederick raises the question of whether choice can 
actually be predicted via the theoretical cognitive models based on rationalistic optimal choice – 
i.e. models suggesting that human choice is predicated on some utility calculus divorced from 
affective content.  He suggests that one must attend to the actual phenomena of choice in all its 
cognitive and emotional complexity to address the issue adequately.89  This is, however, not as 
easy as it seems.  When we face novel situations (Frederick considers the example of someone 
given a list of statistical information and asked to make a choice), we don’t simply have an 
epiphany and make a choice.  Instead, the decision maker must consciously choose what 
methodology to employ to process the information and to reach a decision.  The decision maker 
is aware of the strategy employed, and can make adjustments to it should the need arise, as any 
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deficiency in the outcome of the methodology chosen is likely to become apparent to the 
decision-maker.  Frederick suggests that this type of cognition employs ‘deliberate choice 
heuristics’ – which he characterizes as fundamentally of a different kind than the processes 
typically considered in the heuristics-and-biases program of Kahneman and Tversky.90 
 Frederick suggests that the fundamental difference between ‘deliberate choice heuristics’ 
and ‘automatic judgmental heuristics’ is a function of the different types of stimuli employed in 
choice versus judgment tasks.  He argues that the choice heuristics are the products of analytic 
and abstract situations which do not evoke any intuitive elements of cognition, while the 
judgment heuristics implicitly appeal to intuition: “traditional judgment heuristics are System 1 
heuristics – they result from cognitive processes that are rapid and not entirely controllable – 
whereas traditional choice heuristics are System 2 heuristics – they result from slower and more 
deliberate mental processes.”91  Frederick then proposes two types of choice heuristics to 
demonstrate his model – choosing by liking (in which a choice is made based on the option that 
generates the most favorable response) and choosing by default (in which choice is made based 
on the option that first comes to mind).  Initially it is not entirely clear why Frederick refers to 
his model choice methodologies as ‘heuristics’; in light of how we are defining heuristic (fast 
and frugal, rules of thumb), it seems more likely that these are algorithmic approaches (slow and 
deliberate).  However, he does stress that while these model methodologies may require more 
processing time, “they are governed by rapid and intuitive processes, they are relatively immune 
to introspection, and their associated biases may not be recognized by the people who use 
them.”92   
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The first of the choice heuristics concerns decisions informed by affective responses – he 
argues that ignoring germane emotional responses and attempting an overly cognitive analysis 
can undercut the validity of the evaluation.  In spite of these benefits, affect is not a perfect tool 
for evaluation, and at times may be severely detrimental in choice, because “(1) it is 
insufficiently sensitive to quantitative detail; (2) it is unduly influenced by transient contextual 
cues; (3) it is excessively affected by familiarity.”93  We will return to the issue of affect in 
judgment at the end of this chapter. 
 The second of the choice heuristics concerns default settings that may influence our 
choices – we frequently have general preferences to which we defer in choices, and research has 
also demonstrated that absent new information, humans in general have a tendency to select 
defaults (i.e., we tend not to consciously veer from the default unless we have a compelling 
reason to do so).  These defaults tend to have some personal salience, whether through precedent, 
conspicuous differences with the other options, or some other feature that makes it stand out.94 
 As such, it appears that in addition to the judgment heuristics already discussed, there 
may also be automatic processes by which we make choices – elements outside our conscious 
awareness that shape our selection between options.  In line with the theme of this chapter, both 
how we process information and how we make decisions are less homuncular and purely 
volitional than we initially assumed.  Both cognitive functions appear to be heavily influenced by 
backstage cognition and ‘fast and frugal’ heuristic processes. 
Metaheuristics 
 Einhorn has proposed that a further distinction can be made between heuristics, the ‘rules 
of thumb’ or ‘fast and frugal’ cognitive structures, and metaheuristics, the rules which create the 
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heuristics in the first place.  He argues that when we are faced with novel situations, we are 
initially unsure how to proceed and what actions to undertake – we have no rules of thumb 
already generated, so we must rely on more fundamental structures – metaheuristics – in order to 
generate the rules to govern the novel situation.  Learning, he argues, is inductive, in the sense 
that “one experiences specific instances or cases and heuristics are developed to provide some 
general way to deal with them.”95  We initially make blind guesses and observe the 
consequences, and formulate explanations based upon our observations.  This is almost Humean 
in its empirical basis – the rules governing novel situations, and the associations that we make 
based upon them, are all self-generated.  He suggests that heuristics like availability, anchoring, 
representativeness, etc. may in fact be metaheuristics, in that they generate the rules which 
govern other heuristical approaches to cognition.96  This allows us to maintain plasticity in 
cognition and perception – we can adapt to each new piece of information and novel situation. 
 There is, however, an implicit difficulty in this – because experience both informs us and 
gives rise to our understanding of the world around us (judgments of the probability of future 
events based on past experience), we can receive positive feedback for bad heuristics.97  We can 
create rules that are irrelevant or fundamentally wrong; the easiest parallel is spontaneous 
generation – the theory fits the evidence and is reinforced by repeated validation, despite being 
fundamentally flawed and ultimately false.  In essence, the reinforcement we receive through 
repeated experience is not just a force that works for accurate heuristics and rules; more often 
than not, our inaccurate judgments of probability get reinforced and correction of our mistakes is 
infrequent: 
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I do not mean to imply that it is impossible to learn to make well-calibrated 
probability judgments.  If one makes many probability judgments in the same 
situation, such as weather forecasters and horse-racing handicappers do, and 
outcome feedback is quickly received, such conditions may not be outcome 
irrelevant, and feedback can be self-correcting.  However, such conditions would 
seem to be the exception rather than the rule for most of us.98 
 
In short, we frequently are unaware of the inaccuracy of the probabilistic assessments and 
decisions we make.  Much has been said affirming the truth of the heuristics-and-biases model of 
intuitive judgment, but this is not to say that it is iron-clad or infallible.  Significant critiques and 
alternative theories have been raised, and we will explore the challenges to the heuristics-and-
biases approach first.  
Challenges 
As indicated earlier, there are some critiques of the concept of heuristics – as it 
represented a new paradigm when it was first introduced, the concept of cognitive heuristics has 
come under fire from a variety of positions.  Several categories of critique have emerged in the 
literature, and are represented here by the critiques from Schwartz and Gigerenzer.  They raise 
significant conceptual and practical concerns, which are responded to by Gilovich and Griffin. 
Schwartz 
 Schwartz expresses several concerns with the heuristics-and-biases program.  He notes 
questions of the generalizability of the research, questions concerning the actual existence of 
heuristics, questions about what normative behavior actually entails, and the applicability of 
probability to individual events.  Each of these will be addressed in turn.  In addition, Gilovich 
and Griffin raise responses to each challenge (see below). 
 The first concern Schwartz raises concerns the widespread criticism in the literature 
concerning the ability to extend the findings from the laboratory to the real world: 
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Many well-known writers have questioned the generalizability of the research on 
judgment heuristics and biases.  Some have gone so far as to suggest that the 
research itself is biased.  These critics claim that the problems used by 
psychologists are specially chosen to produce confusion and that judgment biases 
are difficult to demonstrate except in contrived laboratory experiments.  It is 
difficult to refute this criticism. Most of the judgment bias research has used 
highly artificial tasks.  Few studies have been conducted in the clinic.99 
 
As such, there is a genuine concern about the generalizability of the research – it may be 
applicable to the artificial environment of the research laboratory, but it may not necessarily be 
an accurate presentation of how we function in the real world.  This is not to say that we don’t 
make mistakes; rather, it is meant to note that the environment that produces the mistakes in 
research settings is very artificial and confusing for subjects, and as such, we shouldn’t be 
surprised that errors occur as often as they do. 
 The second concern is whether heuristics and biases actually exist.  Schwartz notes that 
thinkers like Gigerenzer have argued that what are being described as biases are, in actuality, 
merely “artifacts of an arbitrarily chosen normative theory.”100  We have arbitrarily chosen how 
people are supposed to act, and therefore when people deviate from this expectation, it is claimed 
that they have committed some kind of error.  If the normative basis is inaccurate, the claim of 
error or bias is likewise inaccurate. 
 Questions of normative theory tie into the third objection raised, which addresses the 
question of what probabilities are and how they ought to be implemented in decision-making.  
Schwartz notes that even among statisticians there is considerable disagreement on both of these 
questions.101  Schwartz notes that there are two competing conceptions of the term probability – 
pure frequency estimates and Bayesian analysis, which understands probabilities to refer to both 
degrees of belief as well as frequency.  Two distinct concepts of probability leads to the 
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possibility of equivocation, logical inconsistency, and consequent confusion when attempting to 
model human cognition. 
 Schwartz does note, however, that even if “the theoretical value of the heuristics and 
biases research program proves to be unclear, its practical value is hard to deny.”102  After all, 
mistakes in cognition occur – missed or botched diagnoses or surgical procedures, systematic 
errors in judging the likelihood of outcomes or predicting courses of action, etc.  By virtue of the 
fact that the heuristics-and-biases research program has opened up these systematic errors to 
exploration and experimentation, the work and effort that has gone into it is justified, so long as 
we recognize it as a beginning of explanation, and not necessarily its conclusion.103 
Gigerenzer 
 Gerd Gigerenzer provides a sustained critique of the heuristics-and-biases program, 
arguing that they explain both “too little and too much.”104  He argues that they explain too little 
because we do not know when they work or their mechanism, and too much because one can 
apply a given heuristic to nearly every experimental result. 
 The first conceptual critique he offers addresses the normative model Kahneman and 
Tversky propose, suggesting that their selection of Bayesian models and conjunction, for 
example, are arbitrary and assumptive.  By narrowing attention to a handful of models, they are 
not looking at cognition as problem-analysis (i.e., how people approach the problem and 
understand it).105  In essence, he argues that by asserting that any particular probability model is 
normative, we are systematically accusing people who conceptualize the problem differently of 
committing gross cognitive errors. 
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 By choosing a normative model absent context and content analysis, Gigerenzer 
continues, they are explicitly creating conditions that will make people make mistakes, and then 
claiming that these errors are fundamentally part of cognition.  He stresses that people interpret 
context and problem content in different ways, and therefore, we ought to recognize these 
differences in cognition as salient and legitimate means of problem solving – for instance, 
‘probable’ means different things to different people.106  To demonstrate this, Gigerenzer 
considers a famous example of probability assessment referred to as the ‘Linda Problem’, in 
which participants are given a description of a woman which highlights her intellectualism, 
academic success, and concern for women’s issues and social justice.  In light of this description, 
the participant’s are asked which is more probable: “Linda is a bank teller” or “Linda is a bank 
teller and active in the feminist movement”.  Many participants select the latter option, in light of 
her intellectual talents and pursuits.  However, if one considers conjunction as a normative 
probability assessment tool, the former option is more likely – to arbitrarily assign numbers and 
say that the likelihood of either condition individually is 0.5 (from 0 to 1), then the probability of 
fulfilling the first option (bank teller) is 50%, but the probability of meeting both options (bank 
teller and feminist) is 0.25 (0.5 x 0.5).  Gigerenzer argues that the people selecting option two 
ought not to be considered as having committed an error – after all, they may have interpreted 
the context/content differently: 
The phrase T&F can be understood as the conditional ‘If Linda is a bank teller, 
then she is active in the feminist movement.’  Note that this interpretation would 
not concern and therefore could not violate the conjunction rule.  Recent studies 
using paraphrasing and protocols suggest that participants draw a variety of 
semantic inferences to make sense of the Linda problem: Some 10 to 20% seem to 
infer that and should be read as a conditional, and some 20 to 50% seem to infer 
that the alternative ‘Linda is a bank teller’ implies that she is not active in the 
feminist movement.  These semantic inferences can lead to choosing T rather than 
T&F.  Semantic inferences – how one infers the meaning of polysemous terms 
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such as probable from the content of a sentence (or the broader context of 
communication) in practically no time – are extraordinarily intelligent processes.  
They are not reasoning fallacies.  No computer program, to say nothing of the 
conjunction rule, has yet mastered this form of intelligence.  Significant cognitive 
processes such as these will be overlooked and even misclassified as ‘cognitive 
illusions’ by content-blind norms.107 
 
This illustrates the implicit shortcomings of arbitrarily selecting one method of determining the 
probability of events – there are compelling reasons to suspect that what we understand to be 
‘errors’ may simply be different, but equally rational, methodologies. 
 The second conceptual concern Gigerenzer raises concerns the vague nature of cognitive 
heuristics – he compares them to inkblots in which researchers can read into them what they will.  
He argues that there is an implicit absence of falsifiability in the heuristics-and-biases model – 
there is no way to demonstrate that they were incorrect or that the research does not support 
them.  Falsifiability is a hallmark of the modern scientific method – the only way to progress in 
scientific knowledge is to test and retest a hypothesis that is capable of being proven wrong.  
Gigerenzer argues that neither of these is applicable to the heuristics-and-biases program because 
“The two major surrogates for modeling cognitive processes have been (a) one-word-labels such 
as representativeness that seem to be traded as explanations and (b) explanation by 
redescription.”108 
 Like Schwartz, Gigerenzer does note the significant effect of the heuristics-and-biases 
program on stimulating further research, but he suggests that we recognize that what has 
emerged has been more discordant results than consistent support.  As such, he argues that we 
need clearer models and more consistent results before adopting a new research and modeling 
paradigm.109 
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Response to the critiques: Gilovich and Griffin 
Gilovich and Griffin note several recurring objections to heuristics.  First and foremost, 
they note frequent objections falling into a category of responses arguing that ‘we’re not that 
dumb’: 
The most common critique of the research on heuristics and biases is that it offers 
and overly pessimistic assessment of the average person’s ability to make sound 
and effective judgments.  People by and large manage their lives satisfactorily, 
something they would be unlikely to accomplish, the argument goes, if their 
judgments were so prone to bias…This critique owes much of its persuasiveness 
and appeal to the fanfare that the negative message of heuristics and biases 
program has generated at the expense of its positive counterpart.  There is, of 
course, some inevitability to this: Negative information typically dominates the 
positive.  Just as there is a ‘bad news bias’ in media reporting (‘if it bleeds, it 
leads’), it is hardly surprising that the negative message of the heuristics and 
biases program would capture more attention, inspire more like-minded research, 
and serve as the focal point of disagreement and controversy.110  
 
One ought not to assume that simply because most of the coverage of the heuristics and biases 
research has reflected the negative aspects of our cognition that the total content of our cognition 
is biased or prone to error.  The research has drawn attention to this facet of our cognition simply 
because while we generally are not error prone, we do make mistakes, and we seek the source of 
those mistakes.  By noting these heuristics, we can account for some of the systematic errors we 
do generate. 
 There are legitimate questions remaining within this train of thought – one can question 
the ecological validity of the heuristic in question, that is, how well does it translate from abstract 
concept to actual outcome in the world.  Has the research found a genuine cognitive bias, or have 
we simply found a lab condition in which we make mistakes?  Gilovich and Griffin note that 
research in the heuristics and biases tradition have not necessarily demonstrated ecological 
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validity, but that it is probably high, despite there likely being exceptions.111  It is clear that we 
make cognitive mistakes, and if we can demonstrate plausible instances in which cognitive errors 
occur in the laboratory, it seems likely that we can infer a relationship between the test 
conditions and manipulations and their ecological correlates.  We get along quite well more often 
than not, but we clearly demonstrate questionable judgment at times, and there must be a source. 
 Within this category of objections one can find arguments that the mind is innately 
modular, with specific tools adapted for varying situations.  Even within this ‘mental toolbox’ 
motif, we still find room for error – we may encounter a novel situation, which requires us to 
attempt to adapt an existing tool for a new use, which may have varying degrees of success: 
At some times, and in some contexts, tasks are performed by just the right module 
and sound judgments are made.  At other times and in other contexts, however, 
specific tasks are co-opted by the wrong module and systematically biases 
judgments are the result.  On still other occasions, of course, the mind might not 
have the right module to handle the problem (no Swiss Army knife does 
everything an outdoorsman needs done) and so the task is assigned to the ‘next 
best’ module, and imperfections in judgment should once again be the result.  A 
modular mind should also produce a pattern of judgments whereby a problem 
described or structured in one way yields one type of response, whereas the same 
problem described or structured another way yields a vastly different response – 
exactly the pattern of results reported countless times in the heuristics and biases 
literature.112 
 
In short, while there is an admitted gap between abstract concept and ecological validity, there is 
good reason to suspect that heuristics are a good means for accounting for the very real errors we 
make in cognition. 
 A second category of objection argues that the results generated by research in heuristics-
and-biases are simply curiosities of the laboratory, and indicative of the ‘tricky’ nature of the 
testing conditions.  These objections assume that cognition outside the laboratory is greatly 
superior to that within the lab.  Gilovich and Griffin note that this type of objection seems to 
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ignore that the motivation for the heuristics-and-biases program was the errors typically made 
outside of the laboratory.113  There is some validity to the objection, however, in that there is 
always a concern in experimentation that the research participant will misconstrue what is being 
tested or the questions asked.  Errors can easily result from poor testing conditions, bad 
questions, etc. – it makes no sense to then interpret the results of experimenter error as a 
cognitive bias on the part of the research participant.  However, this type of critique may be 
appropriate for a small percentage of the experiments conducted in the heuristics-and-biases 
program – the great majority have demonstrated the heuristics in question repeatedly in a variety 
of contexts and with a variety of participants and operating paradigms.  While some experiments 
can be doubted and their results questioned, this objection ought not be raised to the majority of 
the research conducted. 
 The third category of objection stems from a belief that those conducting research into 
heuristics and biases are holding their participants to a standard that is inappropriately high or 
unreasonable. Gilovich and Griffin note: 
Perhaps people – especially people participating in unfamiliar or otherwise 
misleading experimental games – make performance mistakes that mask their 
underlying rational competence, but by definition, human intuition must be 
rational.  This critique usefully points out two aspects of the ‘rationality problem.’  
First, it has a distinct ‘Alice in Wonderland’ flavor: People can and do define 
rationality in many contradictory ways.  Second, it brings to the fore the crucial 
role of axioms in justifying a normative theory.114 
 
Clearly there is a difference of opinion concerning an appropriate definition of rationality – if our 
cognition by definition is rational, then clearly there cannot be cognitive distortions or biases.  
This is problematic, however, in that in addition to doing away with any conception of bias, it 
potentially does away with our conception of mental illness – after all, the process by which 
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auditory and visual hallucinations are generated are also explicitly ‘rational’ in this definition, in 
that they result from distinct cognitive processes, just like the heuristics and biases currently 
being discussed.  It would seem that the resulting definition of rational is therefore unacceptable 
–  unless we define so broadly as to include its own negation (i.e., the irrational becomes rational 
so long as it is the result of discrete cognitive processes).  Further, if we simply reject the axioms 
of normative theory (those which describe the way individuals ought to behave), we reject 
notions that have a lot of empirical support and subjective appeal, which is difficult for us to do.  
As Gilovich and Griffin note, “it is the tension between the general agreement with the abstract 
rules of probability and the violation of those rules in richer contexts that give the heuristics and 
biases demonstrations their power.115 
 A fourth category of objection to heuristics and biases suggests that one ought to 
understand cognition in terms of frequentistic thinking, not probabilistic thinking.  That is to say, 
when we attempt to understand the likelihood of a given event occurring, we examine the 
frequency of the likely outcomes in order to establish which is more likely to occur.  Gilovich 
and Griffin suggest that this class of objections includes those proposing theories like ‘ecological 
rationality’ (a position stemming from evolutionary psychology, see below), in addition to 
classically frequentist approaches.  They note that frequency-based cognitive approaches face 
numerous concerns, which undercut fundamentally undercut their argument: 
Given the controversy surrounding the normative status of frequencies and 
subjective probabilities, it is not surprising that those who favor an evolutionary 
defense of rationality (‘ecological rationality’) should through in their lot with the 
frequentists.  Evolutionary psychologists maintain that success in our ancestral 
environment required only a talent for working with frequencies, not probabilities.  
This argument, precisely because it cannot be tested empirically, remains a matter 
of faith and ideology.  However, the frequentist argument for evolutionary 
rationality contains a component that can be tested empirically: The evidence for 
heuristics and biases, it is claimed, ‘disappears’ when stimuli are presented and 
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questions are asked in terms of frequencies.  This was a bold argument when first 
introduced and it is even bolder to maintain now when a score of studies have 
indicated that it simply does not hold up empirically.  In fact, presenting 
frequencies rather than probabilities sometimes makes judgment distinctly worse, 
sometimes makes judgments distinctly better and quite often leaves the quality of 
judgment largely unchanged.  Even more troublesome for the evolution/frequency 
argument, Kahneman and Tversky’s original explanation of the probability-
frequency discrepancy provides a unified account of when frequency formats 
improve judgments and when they do not.116 
 
As such, there is reason to believe that frequency-based assessments of probability are not 
fundamentally different (superior or inferior) to non-frequency-based assessments of probability. 
 In light of Gilovich and Griffin’s responses, despite the need to connect concept with 
ecological validity, there is significant conceptual support for a heuristic approach to human 
cognition.  Some controversy remains, and alternatives to this approach have been proposed, to 
which we will turn shortly.  For them moment, it is sufficient to note that a recurring theme in 
human cognition is a series of avolitional cognitive processes used to take in, analyze, and adapt 
information quickly and efficiently, which may as a consequence occasionally produce errors in 
cognition. 
Complementary/Supplementary Theories 
There are several additional areas of research and theory that are useful for the discussion 
of heuristics – some speak to the overall structure of cognition (i.e., heuristics as an element of 
another, larger process) or that offer alternative explanations and valuations of heuristics (i.e., 
heuristics as evolutionarily advantageous alternatives to algorithmic processes).  Each will be 
addressed in turn. 
Dual Processing Models 
 Dual-process models of cognition suggest the contemporaneous operation of both 
algorithmic and heuristic modes of cognition.  Smith notes that these models are supported by 
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empirical testing, noting specifically “the predictable effects of manipulations that drain 
cognitive capacity (such as distraction) or increase or diminish motivation to process carefully; 
these manipulations seem to knock out conscious processing and leave automatic processing 
relatively unaffected.”117 
 There are multiple versions of dual-process theories, positing different interactions and 
classifications.  Gilovich and Griffin, for instance, describe a two system model based on both 
quick and holistic judgments as well as deliberate and rule-based system: 
An associationist, parallel-processing system (‘System 1’) that renders quick, 
holistic judgments is always in operation – not just when motivation is low and 
judgments are made on the cheap.  The assessments made by the associationist 
system are then supplemented – and sometimes overridden – by the output of a 
more deliberative, serial, and rule-based system.  These models fit the cognitive 
miser perspective less well because they do not postulate two different ‘routes’ of 
information processing that operate in either-or fashion according to the 
motivation of the information processor (although they too can account for 
motivational influences through variation in the effort applied to the rule-based 
system).  As we alluded to earlier, the heuristics and biases program has most 
often been seen through the cognitive miser lens.  People are thought to employ 
various heuristics to save effort.  But the idea that heuristics are ‘natural 
assessments’ is clearly much more consistent with the two-systems 
perspective[.]118 
 
Echoing Gilovich and Griffin’s model, Sloman suggests that a two systems model based on 
associative and rule-based elements accounts for an essential tension we feel when 
conceptualizing human cognition.  It’s a general feature of human experience that we encounter 
an apparent divide between our intuitions and our ‘rational’ beliefs: 
The tension is revealing because it reflects a gap within our own heads between, 
on one hand, our intuitions and, on the other hand, those of our beliefs that we 
consider rational.  The classic demonstrations often suggest two minds at work: 
one following the ‘natural assessment methods’ like representativeness and 
availability; and the other working to form coherent, justifiable sets of beliefs and 
plans of action.  As Tversky and Kahneman have repeatedly shown, the two 
minds do not always agree.  The distinction between these two minds can be 
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construed in terms of one of the central puzzles in experimental psychology – 
whether people are best conceived as parallel processors of information who 
operate along diffuse associative links, or as analysts who operate by deliberate 
and sequential manipulation of internal representations.119  
 
These two systems interact and can occasionally counter each other.  They do not have specific 
purviews or problem domains – they are both applied to the same situation, and can generate 
fundamentally different results.  Sloman notes that examples of disagreeing responses from the 
two systems can be found “in every domain of reasoning that has been studied in detail.”120  In 
short, we always receive feedback from our associative system – after all, it is the first to respond 
and we cannot simply turn off the process by which we make associations between stimuli – 
which may be influenced or overruled by our rule-based system.121 
 Why would we need a dual process system of thought?  Sloman notes that there are 
distinct advantages to both: 
Why should human beings need two systems of thought?  One answer is that the 
systems serve complementary functions.  The associative system is able to draw 
on statistical structure, whereas a system that specializes in analysis and 
abstraction is able to focus on relevant features.  A different sort of 
complementarity is that associative paths that are followed without prejudice can 
be a source of creativity, whereas more careful and deliberative analyses can 
provide a logical filter guiding thought to productive ends.  Mathematics, law, and 
(probably) all disciplines demand this combination of creativity and rigorous rule 
application.122 
 
Thus, perhaps having both systems has allowed us to overcome inherent limitations found in 
only one system cognition. 
Dual process theories of cognition have intuitive appeal – we do find ourselves conflicted 
at times between our hearts and our heads, between our gut instincts and our reasoned logic.  
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Available evidence suggests that we are not simply experiencing disorganized cognition or 
simply ambivalence – perhaps we are using two different cognitive approaches representing two 
different yet necessarily interacting and influential systems.  At present, two system models of 
cognition are conjecture, but they certainly have both an intuitive as well as rational appeal.  
Fundamentally, “The fact that people are pulled in two directions at once suggests two forces 
pulling.”123 
Bounded Rationality 
 We initially discussed Simon’s work concerning bounded rationality at the outset of the 
discussion of heuristics.  Bounded rationality refers to an approach to cognitive modeling that is 
predicated on an understanding of the resources of human cognition as finite and limited in 
scope.  Chase et al. note that the classical model of human cognition viewed it as innately 
rational, a product of probability assessments and logical reasoning – this assumption has been 
significantly challenged by the heuristics-and-biases program, as noted earlier.124  Noting that 
current models still incorporate probability estimates into their assessment of normative human 
cognition, Chase et al. argue that there are at least three major conceptual problems to be 
addressed: first, there is no single conception of probability shared by all statisticians and 
philosophers; second, the normative model adopted by heuristics-and-biases ignores the content 
and context of the objects of inference; third, the kind of rationality suggested by models 
paralleling classical rationality place unreasonable expectations upon human cognition.125  These 
objections are quite serious, and deserve further explanation. 
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 The first concern – paralleling earlier challenges – concerns whether probability is a 
principle applicable to individual events or to classes of events.  If one adopts a frequentist 
approach, the probability rules proposed by heuristics-and-biases researchers do not make sense, 
as they are an arbitrary assignment of probability, instead of a genuine normative standard.126  
The second concern notes the failure of many research experiments to understand that the 
content and context of the questions they ask can be interpreted in ways that differ from the 
arbitrarily chosen norms and yet are perfectly reasonable (i.e., content and context can mediate 
reasonable versus unreasonable approaches).  It is entirely possible for an agent to assign 
different weights to information, and to judge some information to be irrelevant, despite what the 
rules of Bayesian inference may require (for instance, judging some information as irrelevant 
may be inappropriately interpreted as base-rate neglect).127  The third challenge notes that some 
problems are much more complicated than in experimental conditions, and as a consequence, the 
kind of modeling proposed (e.g., Bayesian assessments, SEU maximization, etc.) would require 
more cognitive resources than we actually possess.  Quite simply, the kinds of normative models 
generated by laboratory experiments may not necessarily be tenable in the real world, which 
clearly parallels earlier discussions of ecological validity.  Quite simply, these models require us 
to be able to do too much – the typical reasoning agent isn’t “a supercalculator with unlimited 
time, knowledge, and computational power.”128  Chase et al. put particular emphasis on this third 
challenge, and notes that ‘rationality’ is best understood as a tool for organisms to attain goals, 
not as conforming to a particular normative model.  As a consequence, for a cognitive model to 
be valid, it must demonstrate ecological validity – it must be attainable by an organism in its 
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environment within its existing cognitive capacity; hence, rationality must be understood as 
being bound by the innate capacities of the organism in question. 
 Chase et al. explore two approaches within bounded rationality.  The first is rational 
analysis, which “entails specifying the goals of the cognitive system, developing a formal model 
of the environment, and deriving the optimal behavioral function based on the goals, formal 
model, and minimal cognitive constraints.  This function is then compared to human 
performance, and the model duly refined to bring the two into closer correspondence.”129  While 
this model has proven to be useful, they note that there are some limitations: it can only be 
performed when an optimal solution can be discovered, and a tractable model requires significant 
simplifications of the assumptions of the real-world environment.  The second model considered 
are ‘fast and frugal heuristics’, which are proposed as specific cognitive tools which have 
evolved to minimize processing and reaction time to novel stimuli – a feature they refer to as 
‘ecological rationality’, the subject of our next alternative approach to human cognition.130  We 
will return to ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics below. 
Ecological Rationality 
 Organisms develop advantageous cognitive mechanisms in response to environmental 
stimuli, allowing them to thrive, in contrast to organisms that did not develop these mechanisms: 
These organisms that had a rather difficult time reaching decisions would have 
been left behind, genetically speaking, by their more fleet-witted conspecifics.  As 
a result, we can expect to see evidence of simple decision-making mechanisms at 
work in the behavior of modern organisms, including humans.  These 
mechanisms should help individuals make decisions quickly, both by limiting the 
amount of information they use to select a course of action or choose an available 
options, and by focusing attention on just that information that will be most useful 
in making the choice.  Thus, these simple evolved inference mechanisms can help 
organisms overcome one form of the classic frame problem plaguing any 
information-processing decision maker: how to avoid having to consider the 
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infinite number of possible real-world options and their unlimited future 
consequences when choosing a course of action.131 
 
If we went through each individual possibility and evaluated each and every potential outcome of 
every environmental stressor or challenge we face, we would quickly find ourselves stuck – 
disadvantageous in the event of a hostile organism or immediate crisis.  As a consequence, we 
needed faster responses, physical and mental.  But this in itself isn’t sufficient – what good is an 
ability to make quick decisions if they are not accurate?  If I am asked to quickly perform a 
problem of arithmetic and immediately declare that the answer is “Belgium”, I have provided a 
response to a stimulus, but not one that is reasonable in light of the information provided.  As 
such, the decision-making processes we would have to evolve would need to be accurate.   
This is a classic dilemma: should we adopt an algorithmic process, which is slow but very 
accurate, or a heuristic process, which is fast but more inaccurate?  Todd suggests that we need 
not compromise – we adapt our fast processes to the demands of the immediate environmental 
cues: 
Some complexity and structure in decision-making mechanisms can certainly be 
beneficial in terms of increasing the inferential accuracy of those mechanisms.  
However, that structure need not lie entirely within the decision maker.  Instead, 
organisms can take advantage of the structure inherent in the decision 
environment itself.  By matching the internal structure of simple decision-making 
mechanisms to the external structure of information in the environment, 
inferential accuracy can be achieved without computational complexity.  
Evolution need not compromise – speed and simplicity can be had at the same 
time as accuracy.  We call this view of adaptive, accurate decisions made with 
simply, fast, information-frugal and environment-exploiting mechanisms 
ecological rationality.132 
 
Fundamentally, ecological rationality explores the cognition of an organism within the specific 
environmental conditions it faces.  The way we approach problems in adverse conditions (e.g., 
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scarcity) tends to be different than how we approach problems in beneficial conditions (e.g., 
abundance).  We employ different “tools” depending on the different situations that we face.133  
Todd notes an implicit link between ecological rationality and fast and frugal heuristics, the next 
approach to cognition to be explored. 
Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
 In contrast to the pessimistic attitude towards cognitive heuristics in the heuristics-and-
biases program, some researchers view them as beneficial adaptive tools.  As has been 
demonstrated in this chapter, it is easy to portray heuristics as a means of introducing distortions 
and errors into cognition.  However, if one views these cognitive phenomena from an 
evolutionary psychology perspective, they demonstrate a significant and beneficial source of 
knowledge acquisition and interpretation.  We have survived to this point because of these 
heuristics – as such, we should see them as evolutionarily advantageous, rather than as nuisances 
and sources of error. 
 The term ‘fast and frugal’ is easily explained.  Gigerenzer et al. note that “We call these 
heuristics ‘fast’ because they process information in a relatively simple way, and we call them 
‘frugal’ because they use little information.”134  Demonstrating why ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics 
are preferable to the classical rationality model, Todd notes that an agent employing fast and 
frugal heuristics would be able to make a choice much more readily and with less irrelevant or 
peripheral information: 
When multiple cues are available for guiding decisions, how can a fast and frugal 
reasoner proceed?  A decision maker following the dictums of traditional 
rationality would collect all of the available information, weight it appropriately, 
and combine it optimally before making a choice.  A more frugal approach is to 
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use a stopping rule that terminates the search for information as soon as enough 
has been gathered to make a decision.135 
 
The fast and frugal model employs a battery of ‘one-reason’ decision heuristics – decisional 
patterns that allow an agent to reach a conclusion based on only one particular criterion.  He 
references three of these criteria as indicative of these ‘one-reason’ heuristics: Take the Best, 
which looks for the decision which most resembles the targeted outcome, Take the Last, which 
uses the most recent successful decisional cue, and Minimalist, which selects cues in random 
order.  Each of these one-reason decision heuristics stops the cue search as soon as one is found 
allowing a choice to be made.136  These three are not a complete list of the heuristics available to 
the typical agent – Todd suggests that many more are likely, as we encounter a wide variety of 
problem domains with corresponding heuristics. 
 Gigerenzer et al. laud the simplifying nature of heuristics and reject more classical 
models of rationality (including algorithmic processing and regression models) as overly 
complex and possessing little ecological validity.  Further, they describe several advantages of 
fast and frugal heuristics over multiple regression analysis (a higher-order decision tool): 
In summary, our fast and frugal heuristics learn with less information, perform 
fewer computations while learning, look up less information in the test phase, and 
perform fewer computations when predicting.  Nevertheless, fast and frugal 
heuristics can be almost as accurate as multiple regression when fitting data.  
Even more counterintuitively, one of these fast and frugal heuristics, Take the 
Best, was, on average, more accurate than Regression in the more realistic 
situation in which the training set and test set were not the same (cross-
validation).137 
 
This finding is quite compelling – we have a quick method of discerning between environmental 
cues which may prove to be more accurate than an algorithmic process.  Gigerenzer et al. find 
this to be significant insofar as it could allow for two completely different approaches to 
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cognition – someone who must make quick decisions may be better off using a heuristic 
approach, while someone with significant more time and resources may be able to employ a 
more Bayesian (classical probability) methodology (which Gigerenzer does suggest may be more 
accurate in these situations).138 
 The debate between Tversky and Kahneman’s heuristics-and-biases program and 
Gigerenzer’s fast and frugal heuristics is much more complex than is alluded to in this chapter, 
and were one to review the literature in greater depth, the great acrimony between the authors 
would be more evident.  It is not the purpose of this chapter to argue which one of these 
approaches is correct; the ‘take home’ message is instead that our cognition does not resemble 
the classical model previously championed.  Rather, our cognition is principally accounted for by 
a variety of spur of the moment decisions, predicated on elements of backstage cognition and 
automatic processes.  Both the heuristics-and-biases research program and the ‘fast and frugal’ 
program note that errors can creep into reasoning using these methodologies.  For our purposes, 
the main difference between the two is how we choose to valence these errors – are they 
systematic or aberrations of an otherwise rational process.  Regardless of whether one takes an 
optimistic or pessimistic view of heuristics, it is important to note that they do not generate 100% 
accurate decisions, and when used in conjunction with each other, the possibility of error in a 
particular judgment can be compounded.  In a clinical setting, this can have profound 
consequences, especially in choices of life and death.  What we have addressed to this point has 
been essentially a purely cognitive account of judgment and decision-making.  The final section 
of this chapter addressing the affective component of cognition, noting how emotional valence 
affects recall, categorization of information, and cognition. 
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AFFECT AND RATIONALITY 
 The last necessary element of discussion is the effect of affect on cognition.  In the 
chapter that follows, we will be exploring the family of depressive disorders, as well as their 
biological and psychosocial causes.  Depression can affect individuals at each of the levels of 
reductionism discussed in the last chapter.  There are physiological correlates to depressive 
disorders that affect biochemistry (cell-cell interactions, chemical pathway reactions, and other 
lower-order levels of cognition) as well as psychosocial function (interpersonal relationships, 
self-image, cognitive processing, and other higher-order levels of cognition).  Our focus for the 
moment, however, is to explore the degree to which affect is comparable to automaticity and 
heuristic thinking.  We will see that affective responses can be developed into automatic 
reactions, these affective valences can affect current and future cognition, and that when a 
disease process produces a subjective sense of loss, these affective/cognitive effects can persist 
for significant periods of time. 
Isen & Diamond 
We begin with Isen and Diamond, who suggest a bridge between automaticity and affect 
by noting how affective valences can arise without conscious volition.  They suggest that 
affective responses may function ‘automatically’ in the sense that they become reflex and 
avolitional responses: 
One point we wish to explore is the idea that affect, in most instances in which it 
operates seemingly automatically, like cognitions found to operate automatically, 
may also involve overlearning and very familiar material…Thus, the same kind of 
processes that makes cognitive material appear to operate automatically, or 
without effort and irresistibly, may be responsible for the sense that we sometimes 
have that feelings take no effort to be felt and are irresistible: Perhaps this occurs 
when they involve very common, well-learned basic complexes of stimuli, 
anticipated effects, responses, and outcomes…This analysis would suggest that 
more frequent, familiar feelings, especially in familiar situations or contexts, 
would tend to seem more spontaneous and in fact might show characteristics of 
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automaticity, but that less familiar feelings, or feelings in unfamiliar situations or 
contexts, might take more effort or require conscious attention in order to occur 
and exert influence.139 
 
These reflex feelings result in automatic emotional valences for specific situations; as such, we 
may assign emotional value to situations without necessarily being aware that we have done so.  
As we will see shortly, these emotional valences are complex, both in their retrieval and how 
they can influence cognition.  Much like cognitive processes, reflexive affect valence processing 
is the result of overlearning – we associate the same stimuli with the same emotion repeatedly, to 
the point where we no longer have to consciously make the link between the stimulus and our 
emotional response.  Much in the way that we can drive to work without consciously thinking 
about every turn, braking or acceleration, so too can we assign emotional valence without 
consciously thinking about how we feel.  As such, Isen and Diamond note that “automaticization 
may be seen as a gradual process, and automaticity itself as continuous with other kinds of 
processing, rather than discrete”.140  
 There is one final argument Isen and Diamond propose which is necessary to note – 
automatic affective valence processing is not an inflexible or uncorrectable phenomenon.  They 
suggest that affective processing can be modified and subject to intervention.141  As such, if the 
emotional valence assigned to the current situation were to be challenged or corrected, any 
resulting cognition may be affectively debiased – the agent will be able to overcome implicit 
distortions of cognition.  We will return to this in discussing Schwarz below, and in chapter four 
with the work of Aaron Beck’s Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy. 
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Slovic et al. and the Affect Heuristic 
 Slovic et al. define affect as “the specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ (1) 
experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and (2) demarcating a positive or 
negative quality of a stimulus.”142  This term will take on greater and more explicit meaning in 
the next chapter, but for the present discussion it will suffice.  In essence, affect is the emotional 
feeling and valence we give to a particular event or situation.  Affect encompasses universally 
recognized emotions like anger, sadness, disgust, anxiety, etc., and, as will be seen, can 
fundamentally change the way we approach cognition.  Slovic continues to note that affect is an 
automatic feeling – we cannot simply turn on and off the elements of backstage cognition which 
give rise to an event’s or situation’s perception and valence, as Isen and Diamond noted above.  
Because of this automaticity of perception and evaluation, Slovic argues that the experience is 
indicative of an affect heuristic.143  This is in direct contrast with a great majority of the 
heuristics presented and studied, as these are essentially purely cognitive, and ignore emotive 
elements.  Emotion, he notes, is relatively rarely studied as a causal factor in choice and 
decision-making models.  The ironic aspect of this, however, is that emotion is a necessary part 
of cognition – studies have demonstrated that individuals lacking the ability to give situations 
emotional valence make worse decisions than individuals combining rational and emotive 
elements.  Citing Antonio Damasio, Slovic notes that individuals with damage to the 
ventromedial frontal cortices – damage which would not affect their intelligence, memory or 
ability to think logically but would their ability to valence these cognitive processes with 
emotional content – exhibit “a form of sociopathy that destroys the individual’s ability to make 
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rational decisions; that is, decisions that are in his or her best interests.”144  In short, the kind of 
abstract and absolute rationality championed by some philosophers ends up being detrimental 
when divorced from emotive elements.  Using this conceptual basis, Slovic suggests that affect 
may offer the very same type of judgment cue as the cognitively-based heuristics previously 
discussed.  In fact, these emotional cues may be much more readily accessible than the resource-
utilization-heavy cognitive heuristics.145  Because of their comparative ease of access, recalled 
emotional valence can affect future cognition and evaluation.   
 Previous work in the development of affective heuristics recognize two precursors – 
Pratkanis’s argument that an ‘attitude heuristic’ causes the agent to favor or disfavor classes of 
objects, resulting in approach or avoidance strategies, and Loewenstein et al.’s review of 
research supporting a ‘risks-as-feelings’ hypothesis, which suggests that agents’ emotional 
valences differ from their cognitive valences, and that these emotional valences can lead to very 
different risk-taking behaviors.146  Both of these models note the significant role emotion can 
play in decision-making; at times, they can produce behaviors completely at odds with purely 
cognitive models.  This parallels earlier discussions about dual-process systems, which also 
produce complementary/oppositional behavioral impulses. 
 Just as with cognitive heuristics, however, there is the potentiality for this recalled 
valence leading one to error.147  No cognitive model to date is without critique or potential of 
compromise; emotional models are subject to the same concerns, and cannot be considered to be 
the sole basis of cognition or experience: 
However, like other heuristics that provide efficient and generally adaptive 
responses but occasionally leads us astray, reliance on affect can also deceive us.  
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Indeed, if it was always optimal to follow our affective and experiential instincts, 
there would have been no need for the rational/analytic system of thinking to have 
evolved and become so prominent in human affairs.  There are two important 
ways that experiential thinking misguides us.  One results from the deliberate 
manipulation of our affective reactions by those who wish to control our 
behaviors.  The other results from the natural limitations of the experiential 
system and the existence of stimuli in our environment that are simply not 
amenable to valid affective representation.148 
 
The possibility of decisional error is compounded when heuristics are compounded.  For 
instance, it is plausible that an agent will face a choice that will trigger cognitive heuristics like 
availability and/or anchoring, relate that choice to earlier situations which gave rise to emotional 
valences, and believe that the choice will have emotional effects extending into the future, which 
requires affective forecasting.  Each of these influences is potentially advantageous or 
deleterious (i.e., potentially accurate or inaccurate).  If we are optimistic in estimating 
advantageous instances and argue that our heuristics are arbitrarily right 90% of the time, the 
likelihood of all four of the heuristics referenced being error-free is only 65% (0.9 x 0.9 x 0.9 x 
0.9).  If we were to add more heuristical elements, or we decrease their accuracy, we open up an 
even greater possibility of judging a situation incorrectly (e.g., a 5% reduction (85%) in the 
accuracy of the referenced heuristics reduces the likelihood of error-free judgment to 52%; a 
10% decrease (80%) reduces the probability of error-free judgment to 41%, and so on).  If the 
decision in question is to forgo medical treatment, we are opening up the decision-making 
process to potentially lethal errors. 
Schwarz 
Schwarz argues that the type of cognition we engage in may be heavily influenced by our 
current affective state.  He notes that “a growing body of research indicates that happy moods 
foster reliance on a top-down, heuristic processing strategy, whereas sad moods foster reliance 
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on a detail-oriented, bottom-up processing strategy.”149  The algorithmic nature of cognition 
when sad is an important and controversial concept which we will return to in chapter four, when 
we discuss the question of depressive bias versus depressive realism.  For the moment, it will 
suffice to note that emotion does not simply result in the potential application of new heuristics, 
but that it can lead to an entirely different cognitive model.  Schwarz notes that this shift has 
been linked to mood-congruent recall of valenced material and feelings as a source of 
information.150   
Mood-congruence implicitly suggests two things.  First, our memory is enhanced when 
our affective states at the time of memory-encoding and memory recall match (state-dependent 
learning) – we form happy memories more readily when we are happy and sad memories more 
readily when sad.  Second, any particular piece of information will be more easily recalled when 
in a mood-congruent state (mood-congruent memory).151  Schwarz notes that these two 
phenomena are more likely to occur for the self-referencing memories; we recall our own states 
much more readily than those of others.  As such, mood-congruent recall affects us selectively; 
there are times when it does not influence us at all.  Instead, we derive emotional valences from 
our feelings themselves. Schwarz’s discussion of mood-congruence differs significantly from 
Isen and Diamond, who found asynchronous mood congruence (positive affect served as a much 
more effective recall device than negative affect).152 
Feelings-as-information is the result of our limited appreciation of our immediate 
experience – we lack the ability to simultaneously reflect on our current affective state and our 
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previously valenced experiences.  In short, we lack an ability to distinguish affective responses 
brought on by earlier experiences from affective responses brought on by the current situation: 
Because we have only one window on our immediate experiences, however, we 
may mistake feelings due to a preexisting mood state as a reaction to the target, 
resulting in more positive evaluations under happy than under sad moods.  This 
feelings-as-information assumption generates a number of predictions that cannot 
be derived from the assumption that mood effects on evaluative judgments are 
mediated by mood-congruent recall or encoding, of which I address only two.153 
 
As such, individuals may simply rely on the feelings they have at that moment as a source of 
information about their overall attitudes toward the present situation.  Feelings-as-information, 
however, is a correctable phenomenon – by challenging the impressions an agent has about his 
immediate circumstances, it is possible to discount his reliance upon his emotions as a source of 
information.  This type of discounting, however, does not occur with historically valenced 
material – we cannot argue that previously negative valenced situations are simply the result of 
current triggers.154  In essence, if we feel bad now, we can feel better by blaming our mood on 
the weather – but we can’t do this for depressing memories. 
 The theoretical model Schwarz proposes suggests that “reliance on one’s feelings is 
particularly likely (1) under conditions in which one’s feelings are a highly relevant source of 
information, and (2) under conditions in which one’s feelings allow for the simplification of an 
otherwise demanding task.”155  It does not seem that much of a stretch to imagine instances when 
one is considering refusal of life-sustaining treatment to be heavily emotionally valenced (e.g., 
patients frequently fear dying attached to a machine) and/or potentially simplified by resorting to 
‘gut reactions’ to simplify the decision (e.g., “I don’t want this”).  Schwarz also notes that more 
algorithmic processes may incorporate mood effects in judgment.  When individuals have 
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sufficient time and energy to engage in more thorough decision-making processes, their present 
mood state will aid them in recalling mood-congruent memories, which can then influence or 
alter their perception of their current situation.156  Further, he argues that emotions do not 
necessarily exert influence only on the immediate situation – strong emotions may result in 
residual mood states, which may generalize to other events, related or unrelated.  In short, 
strongly valenced emotions can exert short-term and long-term effects, both of which can affect 
cognition and perception.  If the reasons for these valences are challenged, they may abate, 
which may prevent some skew or bias from affecting the agent’s perception and cognition.  In a 
clinical context, this would necessitate exposing underlying disorders potentially affecting 
cognition (e.g., depression), its source (e.g., reaction to the diagnosis), and challenging the 
thought process leading to the emotional valence (e.g., addressing possible heuristical thought or 
bias): 
As this selective review indicates, our feelings can have a pronounced impact on 
judgment and decision making.  Depending on conditions, they may influence 
which information comes to mind and is considered in forming a judgment, or 
serve as a source of information in their own right.  The use of one’s feeling as a 
source of information is particularly likely when the feelings are relevant to the 
judgment at hand or allow the judge to simplify the task by relying on a “How-do-
I-feel-about-it?” heuristic.  When our feelings do, in fact, reflect our actual 
affective reaction to the target, this heuristic does not result in undue biases.  Yet, 
it is often difficult to distinguish between one’s reactions to the target and one’s 
preexisting mood state.  In this case, reliance on the “How-do-I-feel-about-it?” 
heuristic results in systematic biases, as reviewed previously.  However, 
individuals do not rely on this heuristic when the informational value of their 
feelings is called into question.157 
 
Obviously, our goal as clinicians is to make sure that our patients make decisions that are as 
accurate in both their cognitive content and personal authenticity as possible; the prevention of 
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heuristic biases or errors in cognition is especially critical in the kinds of life and death decision-
making considered in this dissertation. 
 A final area of concern for Schwarz is how the effect of understanding emotional valence 
affects conceptions of rationality.  Like Slovic et al., he notes that there are serious questions 
raised if one attempts to divorce cognition from emotion – a growing body of research 
demonstrates what Damasio noted: ignoring affective information undermines judgment.158  
However, the solution is not simply to attend to the emotional valences – the issue becomes 
complex precisely because we have difficulty disentangling the emotions we feel from a 
particular environment or stressor from the long-term effects of past strongly emotionally-
valenced experiences.  As such, we must be aware of our emotions, we must understand how 
they can both help and hurt our decision-making capacity, and we must challenge emotional 
content when it seems to exert undue influence.  In chapter four, we will return to this concept, 
as there is literature suggesting that not all forms of depression result in unrealistic or skewed 
perception and interpretation. 
Tait and Silver 
What kinds of events can provide the kind of emotional keystones referenced in affect 
heuristics and emotional influences on cognition?  Tait and Silver have argued that major life 
events can have significant repercussive influence; this almost appears to be a truism, but their 
research further argues that how the event is experienced shapes its emotional valence159 – a key 
element when discussing emotional influences on cognition.  In fact, negative life events can 
frequently intrude on normal cognitive experience – we are forced to think about them repeatedly 
and involuntarily, a pathological form of memory referred to as rumination.  They note that this 
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rumination is a stress response, and “the experience of these ruminations tends to be correlated 
positively with the degree of reported stress and with levels of negative affect, and inversely 
related to indices of positive emotion.”160 
 Coping with these emotional responses and ruminations is a critical part of recovery from 
the event or stressor.  Negative life events can impact our lives in a variety of ways, short-term 
and long-term.  The means by which we cope with them initially and work through them as part 
of the healing process have profound effects on our ability to function later in life.  Tait and 
Silver note that so long as the agent has not found a way to work through negative life events, 
these events will remain salient to his experience and result in counterfactual rumination.  Until 
we can work through the negative life event, we run the risk of being mired in “What if…?” 
thinking, instead of being able to move on with our lives.  They further suggest that finding 
meaning in the negative event plays a key, and potentially pathological, role in recovery from the 
event – if the agent has on-going difficulty finding meaning for a given event, “the search may 
persist for extended time periods, contributing to ongoing cognitive and emotional involvement 
in the event.  A persistent search for meaning has been found to be inversely related to 
psychological recovery and positively related to the occurrence of involuntary, intrusive, and 
distressing event-related ruminations.”161  In short, we seek meaning, even at the expense of our 
emotional and cognitive well-being.  In the context of medical decision-making, it is quite likely 
that an pessimistic diagnosis and prognosis represent instances of these kind of rumination-
producing events, in the sense as they can be experienced as a form of loss: 
The experience of loss may represent a significant common denominator among 
the major negative events described by respondents in our research.  This loss 
may be literal (e.g., the loss of a particular person, environment, role, or 
relationship) and/or symbolic (e.g., the loss of future possibilities, cherished 
                                                 
160 Tait and Silver, "Coming to Terms with Major Negative Life Events," 352. 
161 Tait and Silver, 355. 
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hopes, goals, or plans).  Our basic emphasis is on the meaning of events, 
situations, or responses, and represents a symbolic interactionist approach.  From 
this perspective, any event that threatens or violates important models or theories 
of self, others, or the world may represent a loss.  Moreover, dissonance between 
the meaning of experience and central models or theories of reality may pose a 
significant threat or loss, insofar as they undermine the predictability of one’s 
situational and/or social experience.162 
 
If the patient experiences this subjective experience of the loss of one’s hopes or abilities, it is 
quite likely that they will engage in the kind of rumination currently discussed, with all of its 
concomitant influence on cognition and perception. 
 As a final note on Tait and Silver, it is necessary to contrast their findings with our earlier 
discussion of affective forecasting and the durability bias.  It is clear that elements of Tait and 
Silver conflict with what we have already established concerning our ability to predict how we 
will feel in the future, in light of our present predicament.  We may address this by noting that 
affective forecasting requires us to predict our emotional state in the future, which may be 
inappropriately negatively biased by present circumstances and ignorant of many types of 
common coping skills we naturally employ as part of our psychological immune system.  Tait 
and Silver’s argument, on the other hand, opens up the possibility that present circumstances 
may influence our present choices, and possibly may extend into future cognition. 
 What emerges from the literature is a sense that rationality is not a purely cognitive 
process – affect is a critical part of our thought process, and our rationality may be limited or 
undercut by removing affective valence.  However, this emotional valence heuristic is subject to 
the same kinds of error that cognitive heuristics encounter – our emotions can aide or hamper the 
choices we make.  As such, we must be cognizant of the impact emotional responses and coping 
skills have on our ability to weigh information and choose to undergo or forgo medical 
interventions.  In the next chapter, we will explore the family of depressive disorders and five 
                                                 
162 Tait and Silver, "Coming to Terms with Major Negative Life Events," 373. 
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common medical conditions that can give rise to comorbid depression.  This comorbidity is 
frequently undiagnosed, meaning that patients have made choices that may have been unduly 
influenced by a depressive disorder. 
 173
CHAPTER THREE: HIDDEN COMORBIDITIES: DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA OF DEPRESSIVE 
DISORDERS AND THEIR PREVALENCE IN FIVE COMMON MEDICAL CONDITIONS 
 
 The previous chapters have laid out arguments that cognition is a deterministic process 
mediated by conscious challenges. They have concerned themselves with compelling 
philosophical and psychological theories and experimentation, and have set the stage for 
discussions of clinical influences on cognition, the basis of this chapter.  What will be explored 
now are a family of disorders that are characterized by their affective components, as well as 
potential influences on cognition and behavior.  They influence our cognition at all levels of 
organization from biochemical to psychosocial.  They will provide the basis for the chapter to 
follow, which explores the proposed effects on judgment that result from the disorders contained 
herein.  In framing this discussion, we will see that depressive disorders are quite prevalent and 
frequently underdiagnosed.  In light of their potential to influence cognition, especially in 
emotionally taxing situations like diagnosis with a profoundly life-changing condition, we will 
see the danger they pose to patient's making accurate and authentic treatment decisions. 
There are a variety of causes of depressive disorders; factors causing depression are not 
limited to matters of psychiatric illness, but can be the result of sociological, medical, hormonal, 
or pharmacological factors.1  This chapter will offer a summary of seven types of depressive 
disorders, and their etiologies.  The descriptions of the disorders will follow the models listed in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR)2 and the 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th Edition 
                                                 
1  American Medical Association, Essential Guide to Depression (New York: Pocket Books, 1998); Harold I. 
Kaplan and Benjamin J. Sadock, Synopsis of Psychiatry, Eighth Edition (Baltimore: Lippincott, Williams, & 
Wilkins, 1998); Maurice Victor and Allan H. Ropper, Principles of Neurology, Seventh Edition (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001). 
2  American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text 
Revision, edited by Michael B. First, Fourth (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
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(ICD-10).3  Case studies will be presented for each, in order to clarify the unique nature of the 
depressive disorder and offer examples of how it may manifest clinically.  Further, common 
therapies for each will be discussed, including psychopharmacology, talk therapies, and 
alternative therapies. 
Medical versus psychiatric diagnosis 
 Before discussing the disorders themselves, it is useful briefly to consider the differences 
in diagnosis in psychiatry versus diagnosis in house medicine.  The multi-axial system of 
psychiatric diagnosis offers a significantly different means of assessment than traditional 
medicine.  Medical etiologies and diagnoses tend to be linear – while systemic dysfunctions may 
occur concomitantly, they are essentially grouped under one heading in the medical history – 
type of diagnosis is not germane or distinctive.4  Essential hypertension will be grouped with 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, decubitus, and peripheral neuropathy.  Psychiatric 
diagnosis is much more structured – disorders are placed into a multi-axial system which clearly 
delineates what can be treated on an inpatient basis versus what requires alternative modalities of 
therapy, as well as overall assessments of the patient’s psychosocial functioning. 
 There are five axes in psychiatric diagnosis.  Axis I encompasses the patient’s clinically 
treatable psychiatric disorders, such as chronic paranoid schizophrenia, major depressive 
disorder, bipolar disorder, and other disorders which normally respond readily to psychiatric 
medication.  For example, Sarah presents to the psychiatric emergency room; her behavior is 
hyperverbal and her mood and affect are labile.  She relates a personal history which 
                                                 
3  World Health Organization, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 
Tenth Edition (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1992). 
4 This statement will no doubt elicit some confusion – the author is not arguing that there is no real distinction made 
in medical diagnosis, but that the means of presentation of the medical history will group all medical dysfunctions 
together.  Psychiatric diagnosis will make explicit differences in the types of disorder present, as they refer to 
conditions that are clinically treatable, those which are not clinically treatable, conditions falling within the two, etc. 
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demonstrates a cycling history of periods of extreme energy, reckless behavior, sexual 
promiscuity, impulsive spending, and euphoria with periods of lethargy, despair, disinterest in 
the affairs of her daily life, and isolation.  She has no history of self-injurious behavior.  The 
pattern that emerges is not related to any apparent social cause, but just seems to happen 
naturally.  The psychiatrist makes a provisional diagnosis on Axis I of bipolar disorder.  Sarah 
admits herself voluntarily for several days, and the attending psychiatrist puts her on a lithium 
regimen (a mood stabilizer).  After several days, Sarah’s behavior is more in control as a result 
of a structured environment and stabilized lithium levels.  She is discharged with a prescription 
for lithium and outpatient therapy for medication management.  Future medical histories will 
note an Axis I diagnosis of bipolar disorder. 
 There are, however, psychiatric conditions which do not respond readily to medication or 
inpatient treatment; some are not treatable at all, or require extended “talk therapy” to affect 
behavior change.  These disorders are listed on Axis II, which encompasses personality disorders 
and mental retardation.  There is no medication at present which can treat mental retardation or 
the primary effects of a personality disorder.  At present, we cannot treat personality disorders 
with a pill – there is no anti-narcissism capsule or anti-histrionic drip to administer.  While 
medication can be used to address secondary symptoms (for example, an anti-depressant could 
be used to treat the depressive symptoms of a borderline patient or an anti-anxiety medication 
could be used to calm an obsessive-compulsive), it cannot correct the deeper issues, which deal 
with either the patient’s mental handicap or outlook on interpersonal interaction, self-image, or 
ability to assess the consequences of actions.5  These deeper issues can lead to overt behavioral 
                                                 
5 For example, the issues underlying borderline personality disorder tend to be a lack of object constancy, poor self-
image, an undefined or absent sense of self, a desire for punishment, a need to constantly test and retest 
relationships, a concomitant desire for intimacy/dependence with a conflicting desire for independence, etc.  The 
issues underlying histrionic personality disorder tend to be a persistent belief that relationships are much more 
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problems – suicidal gestures, attention seeking behavior, violence, etc., which are causes for 
hospitalization. 
 A very brief example would be Steven, who was admitted to a psychiatric inpatient unit 
for treatment of suicidal ideation with a plan – he had cut checkerboard patterns into his forearms 
after a fight with his girlfriend.  The wounds were superficial, but they looked ugly.  Steven 
stated that he had done it in front of her to punish her (he believed that she was planning to break 
up with him in favor of someone else).  Steven stated that he wanted her to feel guilty for making 
him hurt himself, and by making her feel guilty he would also force her to stay in the 
relationship.  Steven reported that he had had a difficult childhood with no real parental figures – 
his father had left and his mother had been involved in a series of codependent and abusive 
relationships afterwards.  Steven disclosed that he had a history of admissions to psychiatric 
facilities in other states – he had been admitted a total of thirteen times over the course of the 
past five years, all for similar self-injurious behavior.  Steven disclosed that all of his “suicide 
attempts” were done in public places or where friends could find him quickly.  He stated that 
when he suffered, he wanted other people to suffer, too.  This pattern of behavior and history of 
hospitalization led the psychiatrist to make a provisional diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder.  Steven suffered from an unstable self-image; he felt the need to continuously attract 
attention to himself and to test and retest the stability of his existent relationships.  His “suicidal” 
gestures were simply efforts to see if his friends were still his friends.  This lack of object 
constancy was the underlying pathology for his past and present admissions.6  After prescribing 
                                                                                                                                                             
intimate than they actually are, an abnormal desire to attract attention to oneself, a tendency to define oneself 
through the eyes of others, etc.  These symptoms are not neurochemical in origin – they are cognitive processes by 
which the person judges relationships, their own self-worth, etc.  There is no pill that can correct pathology with this 
etiology (unlike the anti-psychotic medications used to treat delusional behavior in a schizophrenic, for example). 
6 Jerold J. Kreisman and Hal Straus, I Hate You, Don't Leave Me: Understanding the Borderline Personality (New 
York: Avon, 1991). 
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antidepressants, the psychiatrist arranged for long-term cognitive-behavioral therapy to address 
Steven’s psychosocial attitudes – by correcting his lack of object constancy and the belief 
structures with which he approached relationships, it was hoped that future hospitalizations could 
be avoided.  Steven would gain greater insight into healthy relationships and a better self-image, 
which would prevent future suicidality. 
 Axis III contains all of the concomitant medical disorders a patient may be experiencing 
– many articles have underscored the link between physical and psychological dysfunction.7  As 
the crux of psychiatric diagnosis is psychosocial stressors, clearly any current medical illness 
would affect the cognitive process or mood of the patient at some level.  Indeed, insight into 
concomitant medical illness (and education and treatment thereof) can affect secondary 
psychiatric conditions.  The link between physiological dysfunction and affective disorders will 
be explored in greater depth below. 
                                                 
7 T. Chow and J.L. Cummings, "Depression in Parkinson's Disease: Pharmacological Characteristics and 
Treatment," in Depression Associated with Medical Illness, ed. Katherine Palmer (Hong Kong: Adis International, 
2000), 31-52; Lydia Chwastiak, et al., "Depressive Symptoms and Severity of Illness in Multiple Sclerosis: 
Epidemiologic Study of a Large Community Sample," The American Journal of Psychiatry 159, no. 11 (November 
2002): 1862-68; C.A. Class, L. Schneider, and M.R. Farlow, "Optimal Management of Behavioural Disorders 
Associated with Dementia," in Depression Associated with Medical Illness, ed. Katherine Palmer (Hong Kong: Adis 
International, 2000), 17-29; T.J.M. Cleophas, "Depression and Myocardial Infarction: Implications for Medical 
Prognosis and Options for Treatment," in Depression Associated with Medical Illness, ed. Katherine Palmer (Hong 
Kong: Adis International, 2000), 77-85; G.A. Fava and N. Sonino, "Diagnostic and Therapeutic Aspects of 
Depression Associated with Medical Illness," in Depression Associated with Medical Illness, ed. Katherine Palmer 
(Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000), 1-16; Y. Gustafson, et al., "Post-Stroke Depression," in Depression 
Associated with Medical Illness, ed. Katherine Palmer (Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000), 63-75; P.J. McGrath, 
E.V. Nunes, and F.M. Quitkin, "Treatment of Depression in Alcohol-Dependent Patients: Current Concepts," in 
Depression Associated with Medical Illness, ed. Katherine Palmer (Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000), 93-104; 
A. Ronson and D. Razavi, "Affective and Anxiety Disorders in Patients with Cancer: Optimal Management," in 
Depression Associated with Medical Illness, ed. Katherine Palmer (Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000), 113-28; 
S.P. Roose and E. Spatz, "Treating Depression in Patients with Ischaemic Heart Disease: Which Agents Are Best to 
Use and to Avoid?" in Depression Associated with Medical Illness, ed. Katherine Palmer (Hong Kong: Adis 
International, 2000), 87-92; T.F. Scott and C. Chieffe, "Treatment of Affective Disorders in Patients with Multiple 
Sclerosis," in Depression Associated with Medical Illness, ed. Katherine Palmer (Hong Kong: Adis International, 
2000), 105-11; Victor and Ropper, Principles of Neurology; Rebecca Elliott, "The Neuropsychological Profile in 
Primary Depression," in Cognitive Deficits in Brain Disorders, ed. John E. Harrison and Adrian M. Owen (London: 
Martin Dunitz, 2002), 273-94; John B. Murray, "Depression in Parkinson's Disease," The Journal of Psychology 
130, no. 6 (November 1996): 659-67. 
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 Axis IV concerns a listing and overall assessment of psychosocial stressors, rating them 
at none, mild, moderate, or severe.  This rating contains and considers financial problems, 
familial stressors, psychosocial difficulties, and any intercurrent medical problems.  For 
example, if a patient presents to the psychiatric emergency room with depression following the 
loss of a job and the break-up of a marriage, the psychiatric dysfunction would be categorized 
under Axis I, and the job loss and broken marriage would be contained in a  “moderate” or 
“severe” note on Axis IV. 
 Axis V represents the patient’s global assessment of function – a rating from 0 to 100 
which encompasses a total assessment of the patient’s ability to function, ability to handle 
psychosocial stressors, ability to care for him- or herself, etc.  Many hospitals have admissions 
criteria that require a specific GAF score before psychiatric inpatient admission is considered 
(e.g., patients with GAF scores over 35 presenting with a psychiatric emergency would be 
referred to an outpatient clinic or private practice psychotherapist). 
 To piece this all together, we can look at the case of Jeffrey, who presents to the 
psychiatric emergency room stating that he’s giving serious thought to jumping off a bridge.  
During the course of his intake interview, he is rude and condescending towards the staff, states 
that he’s the most important patient they have, states that he’s feeling depressed due to a death in 
the family, has a depressed mood with a labile affect, has no previous self-injurious behavior, 
and cannot contract for safety.8  A lot of information has been presented, but it can fit quite 
readily into the above diagnostic schema.  Axis I would carry a differential diagnosis of major 
depressive disorder, with bipolar disorder and dysthymic disorder to be considered.  This stems 
from the Jeffrey’s expressed suicidality and statements of feeling depressed.  Axis II would carry 
                                                 
8 When a patient ‘contracts for safety’, he or she states that they will not engage in self-harming behavior (e.g., 
attempt suicide). 
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a diagnosis of Personality Disorder, NOS (Not otherwise specified), with notes to consider 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder and Borderline Personality Disorder.  This is based on the 
grandiose statement “I’m the most important patient you have” as well as Jeffrey’s attitude 
towards the staff.  Axis III would be left empty or marked “Deferred” as there is no previous 
medical history.  Axis IV would carry a note of Moderate or Severe, due to the death in the 
family.  While there is a certain subjectivity to the assessment of Jeffrey’s Global Assessment of 
Function, it is safe to say that it would fall into the range set by the care facility for inpatient 
treatment (35 or lower), especially in light of his inability to contract for his own safety were he 
to be discharged. 
This is not to suggest that there is always precision in psychiatric diagnosis.  Quite 
frequently an Axis II disorder manifests itself as an Axis I disorder.  Borderline personality 
disorder, for example, can and has frequently been mistaken for bipolar disorder or episodic 
depression.  Further, unless a patient is floridly psychotic or neurotic, diagnosis tends to be 
blurry until behavior can be observed for extended periods.  Additional complications arise in 
that the ease with which a patient can manufacture illness is much greater in psychiatry than in 
house medicine.  While it is possible to mimic the signs and symptoms of a heart or kidney 
dysfunction, tests can disprove claims of inadequate function or damage.  My claims of a heart 
condition can be verified or disproved by a transesophageal echocardiogram, magnetic resonance 
imaging, etc.  Psychiatric dysfunction, however, is more difficult to prove or disprove. 
To a certain extent, psychiatric illness is a matter of neurochemistry and physiology – 
specific neurotransmitters in excess or in absence can cause corresponding changes in mood and 
perception, and can be measured by laboratory tests and other diagnostics.  If a patient is 
expressing depressive symptomology, the body can be checked for physical causes and 
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verification.  If I feel down because of hypothyroidism, I can receive pharmacotherapy for a 
physical problem (a more complete listing of physical and pharmacological causes of depression 
can be found later in this chapter).  However, there is no real lab test for psychosocial causes of 
mood disorders.  There is no enzyme for marital difficulties, no hormone for unemployment, and 
no neurotransmitter for the death of a loved one.  Consequently, there is no means to test whether 
a patient is malingering9 or is presenting with a factitious disorder.10  When these types of 
activities are suspected, other metrics must be employed to discern how much of the patient’s 
presentation is genuine psychopathology and how much is a manufactured “illness”.  The 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, for example, is the most common resource used in 
clinical and correctional settings for the detection of malingering.11 
DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS 
The DSM-IV-TR notes a four-way split in the division of the depressive disorders.  It 
makes a distinction between the unipolar depressive disorders (e.g., Major Depressive Disorder, 
Dysthymic Disorder, etc.), the bipolar disorders (e.g., Bipolar I Disorder, Bipolar II Disorder, 
Cyclothymia, etc.), depressive disorders secondary to medical illnesses (e.g., depression 
                                                 
9 The DSM describes malingering as “the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or 
psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining 
financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution or obtaining drugs.”  American Psychiatric Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, p. 739. 
10 The DSM describes factitious disorder as being “characterized by physical or psychological symptoms that are 
intentionally produced or feigned in order to assume the sick role.  The judgment that a particular symptom is 
intentionally produced is made both by direct evidence and by excluding other causes of the symptom.”  American 
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, p. 513. 
11 See, for example, R.M. Bagby, R. Rogers, and T. Buis, "Detecting Malingered and Defensive Responding on the 
MMPI-2 in a Forensic Inpatient Sample," Journal of Personality Assessment 62, no. 2 (April 1994): 191-203, C.B. 
Gacano, et al., "A Clinical Investigation of Malingering and Psychopathy in Hospitalized Insanity Acquittees," 
Bulleting of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 23, no. 3 (1995): 387-97, G.L. Iverson and L.M. 
Binder, "Detecting Exaggertion and Malingering in Neuropsychological Assessment," Journal of Head Trauma 
Rehabilitation 15, no. 2 (April 2000): 829-58, J.L. Lewis, A.M. Simcox, and D.T. Berry, "Screening for Feigned 
Psychiatric Symptoms in a Forensic Sample by Using the MMPI-2 and the Structured Inventory of Malingered 
Symptomatology," Psychological Assessment 14, no. 2 (June 2002): 170-76, and E.A. Wise, "Relationships of 
Personality Disorders with MMPI-2 Malingering, Defensiveness, and Inconsistent Response Scales Among Forensic 
Examinees," Psychological Report 90, no. 3 pt 1 (June 2002): 760-66. 
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secondary to neurological disorders like stroke or Huntington’s chorea or medical disorders like 
hypothyroidism), and substance-induced mood disorders (e.g., depressive reactions to alcohol, 
prescription medications, etc.).12  This dissertation concerns itself with the cognitive aspects of 
three of these four categories – unipolar, bipolar, and secondary to medical illness.  Substance-
induced mood disorders, while prevalent,  are significantly more transient than the first three 
categories, and tend, in this author’s experience, to resolve themselves much more frequently 
than other forms of endogenous/exogenous depressions. 
 This four-way split is necessary due to the wide differential diagnosis for depressive 
disorders – depressions can be caused by exogenous factors (e.g., loss of a job, divorce, death of 
a loved one, etc.), endogenous factors (e.g., monoamine dysregulation, chronically elevated 
cortisol levels, etc.), medical factors (e.g., hypothyroidism, myasthenia gravis, cerebral vascular 
accident, etc.), and legal/illegal substances (e.g., alcohol, illicit drugs, abuse of prescription 
medication, etc.).   
Epidemiology of affective disorders 
The World Health Organization in their landmark study The Global Burden of Disease 
noted that unipolar depression (ICD-10 classification; “Major Depressive Disorder” in the DSM-
IV-TR) is the second most prevalent cause of disability in industrialized nations – behind only 
ischemic heart disease.13  The National Institute of Mental Health notes concurs, noting that 
“Major depression is the leading cause of disability in the U.S. and worldwide.”14  In fact, it is 
estimated that 18+% of the population will experience a mood disorder in their lifetimes. Given 
                                                 
12 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, p. 345 
13  World Health Organization, The Global Burden of Disease: A Comprehensive Assessment of Mortality and 
Disability from Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors in 1990 and Projected to 2020., edited by Christopher J.L. 
Murray and Alan D. Lopez, Global Burden of Disease and Injury, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1996). 
14  National Institute of Mental Health, The Invisible Disease: Depression (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of 
Mental Health, 2001), p. 1 
 182
the rapid change and extreme psychosocial stressors faced by most members of society, this 
number is not surprising.  It is tied to a variety of stressors; economic concerns, psychosocial 
conflicts, health problems, and family crises all contribute to the depressive epidemic. 
The prevalence of depressive disorders in society varies dependent upon what is being 
examined.  The disease rate is dependent upon whether we are examining the general population, 
endogenous depressions, or depressions secondary to other conditions.  Murray and Lopez 
estimated that in the year 1990, established market economies saw approximately 18,499,000 
new cases of depression, or approximately 2,319 people affected per 100,000.15  Globally, these 
numbers are significantly higher, with 109,486,000 new cases in 1990, despite a lower overall 
incidence of 2,079 per 100,000 people.16  In addition to the 18% lifetime prevalence noted by the 
World Health Organization, the National Institute of Mental Health indicates that in any given 
year, about 9.5% of the American adult population is affected by a depressive disorder.17  The 
statistics are telling, and there is a genuine concern that the number of depressive disorders is 
actually being underestimated.  Pliska notes that depressive disorders are not necessarily limited 
to the adult population – while not as common as anxiety disorders, depressive disorders can be 
found in childhood.  He offers a more conservative estimate than the World Health Organization, 
noting that while the risk of developing a depressive or anxiety disorder increases significantly 
by adulthood, the lifetime rate of depressive and anxiety disorders is approximately 10% of the 
                                                 
15 John B. Murray and Alan D. Lopez, Global Health Statistics: A Compendium of Incidence, Prevalence and 
Mortality Estimates for Over 200 Conditions, Global Burden of Disease and Injury Series, vol. 2 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 601. 
16 Murray and Lopez, Global Health Statistics: A Compendium of Incidence, Prevalence and Mortality Estimates for 
Over 200 Conditions, p. 603. 
17 National Institute of Mental Health, The Invisible Disease: Depression, p. 1 
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adult population. 18  This risk varies with gender; he notes that “10-25% of women and 5-12% of 
men will suffer an episode of major depressive disorder (MDD) at some point in their lives.”19 
Peruzzi, et al., have noted that primary physicians frequently have difficulty recognizing 
the symptomology of depressive disorders, and Plovin, et al., have noted that “difficulties in 
diagnosing affective disorders create ambiguity in ascertaining base rates in the population.”20,21  
As such, we are reliant upon predictive studies and correlational studies to estimate the actual 
numbers of depressed patients.  Green suggests that the primary symptoms of a depressive 
disorder may even be mistaken as an underlying medical illness, which can complicate diagnosis 
and treatment.22  Victor and Ropper note that it is much more likely that primary care physicians 
will be the first to encounter a depressed patient, and that they are more likely to misdiagnose the 
depressive disorder as one of myriad somatic and psychosocial difficulties: 
Depressive states are so often associated with obscure physical symptoms that 
they are more likely to come to the attention of general physicians and internists 
than are other psychiatric entities.  Moreover, they are frequently misdiagnosed, 
the symptoms being mistakenly attributed to anemia, low blood pressure, 
hypothyroidism, migraine, tension headaches, a chronic pain syndrome, chronic 
infection, emotional problems, worry, and stress.23 
 
As noted above, there are a variety of physical conditions that can give rise to clinical depression 
– it is chilling to consider the vast numbers of patients experiencing depression who are being 
treated for physical complaints while their emotional issues remain unresolved.   
                                                 
18 Steven R. Pliszka, Neuroscience for the Mental Health Clinician (New York: Guilford Press, 2003), p. 130 
19 Pliszka, Neuroscience for the Mental Health Clinician, p. 200 
20 Nico Peruzzi, Andrew Canapary, and Bruce Bongar, "Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Role of Mental Health 
Professionals," Ethics & Behavior 6, no. 4 (1996): 353-66. 
21 Robert Plomin, J.C. DeFries, and G.E. McClearn, Behavioral Genetics (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 
1990), p. 378 
22 Stephen A. Green, "Supportive Psychological Care of the Medically Ill: A Synthesis of the Biopsychosocial 
Approach in Medical Care," in Human Behavior: An Introduction for Medical Students, ed. Alan Stoudemire (New 
York: Lippincott-Raven Publishers, 1998), 495-514, p. 506 
23 Victor and Ropper, Principles of Neurology, p. 1608 
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 There are a variety of depressive disorders to consider, and each presents different 
epidemiological rates and health concerns.  The DSM-IV-TR notes the following depressive 
disorders:  Major Depressive Disorder (single episode and recurrent, with several modifying 
features [e.g., psychotic, melancholic, etc.]), Dysthymic Disorder, Depressive Disorder NOS, 
Bipolar I/II Disorders, Cyclothymic Disorder, Bipolar Disorder NOS, Mood Disorder Due to a 
General Medical Condition, Substance-Induced Mood Disorder, Adjustment Disorder, and Mood 
Disorder NOS; Minor Depression is listed in an appendix under research conditions (i.e., there 
was insufficient evidence to warrant inclusion as a definitive diagnosis, but criteria are proposed 
that would enable future study and possible inclusion in future editions of the DSM). 
Severity of the Symptoms 
Both the DSM-IV-TR and the ICD-10 note that there is a clinically relevant difference in 
the possible presentations of the family of depressive disorders.  As such, they both divide the 
major disorders into categories of mild, moderate, and severe symptoms.  The DSM notes that a 
classification of ‘mild’ involves those conditions in which more than half of the criteria for a 
given diagnosis are met, as well as requiring that the presenting symptoms cause either a mild 
disability or require more effort to achieve normal function.24  The ICD-10, which lists similar 
symptomology for the relevant conditions but groups them differently, notes that a mild 
condition would present with two or three of the diagnostic criteria, but should be able to 
continue to function relatively normally with most activities.25  In contrast to this, a classification 
of a ‘severe’ condition would require most of the diagnostic criteria and “clear-cut, observable 
disability (e.g., inability to work or care for children).”26  The ICD-10 again parallels this 
                                                 
24 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, p. 412 
25 World Health Organization, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, p. 
336 
26 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, p. 412 
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distinction, noting that most of the diagnostic symptoms are present and distressing to the 
patient, an in the case of depression, may be accompanied by feelings of worthlessness and guilt, 
as well as possible somatic complaints and suicidal ideation.27  ‘Moderate’ cases of these 
conditions fit in between these two extremes. 
Major Depressive Disorder 
There are explicit diagnostic features of a major depressive disorder.  Both the DSM-IV-
TR and the ICD-10 note that the depressive illnesses are syndromal – the patient can exhibit a 
range of behaviors that fit into the spectrum of depressive illness.  The ICD-10 categorizes 
depressive episodes as containing worsened mood, decreased energy, and decreased activity.  
The patient has a decreased capacity for enjoyment, exhibits general disinterest, and inability to 
concentrate.  The patient typically experiences decreased sleep and appetite, and frequently has 
excessive feelings of guilt or worthlessness.  These periods extend for several days, and tend to 
remain at the same level throughout the episode.28  Major depressive disorder is syndromal – 
patients can present with a variety of symptoms.  In general, patients must present with at least 
five out of nine symptoms, including a depressed mood, loss of interest or pleasure, significant 
weight loss or gain not explained by diet, insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day, 
psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by others), fatigue or anergia 
nearly every day, feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilt nearly every day, diminished 
cognitive abilities, or recurrent thoughts of death.  Either the depressed mood or the loss of 
interest or pleasure must occur, and the overall symptoms must occur more often than not for at 
least two weeks.  These symptoms must not be better accounted for by a mixed episode (see 
below), must cause a significant impairment in functioning, must not be the result of a medical 
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336 
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condition (see below) or substance use, and the symptoms must not be better accounted for by 
bereavement.29 
The DSM notes that major depression is associated with a high mortality rate – the 
suicide rate has been estimated at up to 15%; the death rate in MDD appears to be linked to age 
as well, with a “fourfold increase in death rates in individuals with Major Depressive Disorder 
who are over age 55 years.”30  In general medical settings, MDD is also associated with 
increased pain and physical illness, as well as diminished physical and social functioning.31  Age 
appears to affect the course of the illness and its presentation; the DSM notes that atypical 
depression tends to be more prevalent in younger patients, while depression with melancholic 
features is more common in elderly patients (see below); advanced age is also associated with 
worse response to treatment.32  The epidemiological rates for MDD are about a 15% lifetime risk 
in the general population, with approximately 6%-8% of patients in care settings experiencing 
depression.33  As will be noted later, this rate of comorbid depression will vary significantly 
depending upon the medical illness in question, and the initial cause of depression appears to be 
multifactorial, taking in genetic risks, family history, biochemical dysfunction, physical and 
psychological stress, and other psychosocial factors.  Depression tends to have an onset around 
age 28, and is characterized by repeated episodes of depression (there is a significant risk of 
future episodes following an initial depressive illness).34  There seems to be a genetic 
predisposition to the development of depressive disorders; the literature suggests that the 
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ed. Eric R. Kandel, James H. Schwartz and Thomas M. Jessell (New York: McGraw-Hill Health Professions 
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condition can run in families, with first-degree relatives of individuals experiencing depression at 
1.5 to 3 times the rate of the general population.35  Pliska notes that first-degree relatives of 
individuals experiencing major depression have an 8-17% chance of developing depression as 
well.36  Without active treatment for depression, the illness tends to last 4-12 months.37 
Minor depression 
The DSM-IV-TR offers some diagnostic criteria for minor depression, but suggests that it 
needs more research before being included in the canon of psychiatric diagnosis, while the ICD-
10 includes it.  The DSM suggests that the requisite features of minor depression is one or more 
periods of depressive symptomology of the same duration as major depression, but without all of 
the same features (i.e., the same diagnostic criteria are used, but an episode of minor depression 
does not have as many presenting symptoms as an episode of major depression).38  These 
symptoms may or may nor impair social and occupational functioning, but they will require the 
person to exert more effort to remain at normal levels of function.39  The specific epidemiology 
is unknown, but the suspicion is that it is a relatively common phenomenon, especially in 
primary medical care and behavioral health settings; there is some suggestion that it is associated 
with several primary medical conditions.40 It appears that there are age correlates in the 
epidemiology of minor depression.  Lavretsky and Kumar note that there is some consensus that 
the prevalence of minor depression changes with age, peaking when the individual is in her 30s, 
falling off, then peaking again in her 80s.41  They also suggest that minor depression is especially 
prevalent in acute and long-term care facilities, in greater numbers than major depression (up to 
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50% in long-term care, up to 25% in primary care, and up to 70% in the institutionalized 
elderly).42 
Dysthymia 
The ICD-10 defines dysthymia as a persistent depressive mood of several years duration 
which is not severe enough to warrant diagnosis as a mild, moderate, or severe depressive 
disorder.43  The DSM-IV-TR suggests more explicit criteria, stating that the depressed state must 
last at least for at least two years (one year for children), have no symptom-free periods lasting 
more than two months, and include at least two of the following symptoms: “poor appetite or 
overeating, insomnia or hypersomnia, low energy or fatigue, low self-esteem, poor concentration 
or difficulty making decisions, and feelings of hopelessness.”44  Individuals with dysthymia tend 
to simply become used to their symptoms, and tend to state that this is “normal for them” – in 
fact, they tend not to report these symptoms unless they are directly asked.45  After carrying a 
diagnosis of dysthymia for at least two years, the individual can also experience episodes of 
major depression, periods which are described as “double depression.”46  The lifetime prevalence 
of dysthymia has been estimated at 6%, with a point prevalence of 3%.47  Dysthymia frequently 
begins at an early age, with an insidious onset and chronic duration.  Most individuals will seek 
help for a depressive episode superimposed on a dysthymic state, rather than seeking treatment 
for primary dysthymia.  Spontaneous remission occurs, but the DSM notes that “evidence 
suggests the outcome is significantly better with active treatment.”48  Dysthymia tends to be 
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more frequent in close biological relatives of individuals with a major depressive disorder than in 
the general population.49 
Seasonal Affective Disorder 
As the name suggests, seasonal affective disorder is linked with seasonal patterns.  In 
addition to the diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode, the DSM-IV-TR notes that it’s 
“essential feature is the onset and remission of Major Depressive Episodes at characteristic times 
of the year.  In most cases, the episodes begin in fall or winter and remit in spring.”50  Many have 
suggested that the cause of this disorder is levels of sunlight – in the winter, the sun rises later 
and sets earlier – and credence has been given to this theory by the efficacy of light therapy (the 
individual with seasonal affective disorder is exposed to bright light for an extended period, and 
generally reports an elevation in mood thereafter).  While an individual may possess a 
predisposition towards depressive episodes, to carry a diagnosis of seasonal affective disorder, 
the seasonal episodes of depression must significantly outnumber the off-season episodes.51  The 
DSM further notes that women tend to comprise the SAD patient base (60-90%), but it is unclear 
whether gender is a specific risk factor.52  The type of depression manifested is also in question – 
some research has suggested that less severe forms of depression are also seasonal (i.e., there 
may be a seasonal pattern for depressions other than a major depressive episode). 53 
Atypical Depression 
Atypical depression denotes a period of depression with signs less commonly associated 
with depression.  In a typical major depressive disorder, the patient may present with an inability 
to sleep, loss of appetite with weight loss, general dysthymic disposition, feelings of guilt, apathy 
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51 DSM, p. 425-6 
52 DSM, p. 426 
53 DSM, p. 426 
 190
etc.  Some of these symptoms may also present in a case of atypical depression, but the patient 
may present with hypersomnia, a leaden paralysis, or increased appetite with weight gain.  The 
individual also tends to exhibit some uncommon psychosocial symptomology, including mood 
reactivity and extreme sensitivity to perceived interpersonal rejection.54  The DSM defines mood 
reactivity as the “capacity to be cheered up when presented with positive events,”55 which can 
mean feeling less sad to feeling happy (euthymic), even for extended periods of time (so long as 
the outside stimuli remain positive).  “Leaden paralysis” refers to feeling like one’s body 
(generally one’s arms or legs) is heavy or weighted down for at least an hour.56  Perceived 
rejection sensitivity is not tied specifically to any one period in the depressive episode, but tends 
to be manifested more often during depressive periods.  The individual tends to respond to 
perceived rejection with maladaptive behavior, like substance use, leaving work early, etc.,57 and 
as a result of a desire to avoid rejection, the individual may avoid relationships altogether.  
Atypical depression tends to manifest at an earlier age than normal depression (many patients 
report a change in mood beginning in high school), and tends to have a more chronic course 
(unlike the more acute major depressive disorder).58 
Mixed State 
The major diagnostic features of a mixed episode involve meeting the diagnostic criteria 
for both manic and depressive episodes in rapid succession, but without meeting the minimum 
duration (i.e., more than a week but less than two weeks).  The mood disturbance must cause the 
patient in social and occupational functioning or demonstrate a danger to oneself or others (with 
potential psychotic features), and the symptoms must not be due to a general medical condition 
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or substance use.59  Mixed episodes can last up to several months; periods of remission can occur 
with little to no symptoms, or the episode can develop into a major depression.60  The DSM 
suggests that mixed episodes tend to appear more often in younger or elderly patients (over age 
60) and may preferentially affect men more than women.61  Laboratory findings in mixed 
episodes tend to parallel the findings in major depression.62 
Bipolar Disorder I 
The DSM-IV-TR suggests the clinical criteria of Bipolar I Disorder as multiple 
occurrences of Manic or Mixed Episodes, with an occasional episode of depression.63  There is a 
significant risk of suicide in individuals with Bipolar I Disorder, frequently occurring in a 
depressive episode (estimated at 10%-15%), as well as a risk of violent behavior towards others 
in severe manic or psychotic episodes.64  There appear to be some physiological correlates, in 
that imaging studies have shown a higher rate of right-hemisphere or bilateral lesions in the 
frontal lobe.65  The age of onset tends to be about 20 years old, and the DSM notes that first 
episodes after age 40 suggest the symptoms may be explained by a comorbid medical condition 
like hypothyroidism.66  There does not appear to be a race or gender difference in the incidence 
of Bipolar I Disorder, but there does seem to be a difference in the initial clinical presentation.  
Men tend to present first with manic episodes, while women tend to present first with depressive 
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episodes.67  This gender differentiation seems to carry over into the course of the illness – men 
tend to have more manic episodes, while women tend to have more depressive episodes.68  The 
DSM estimates the lifetime prevalence of Bipolar I Disorder in community samples at 0.4%-
1.6%.69  The illness is chronic, and many individuals experience multiple episodes of mania or 
depression, sometimes with psychotic features.  Epidemiological evidence and twin studies 
suggest a greater incidence of bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder in first-degree 
biological relatives of individuals with Bipolar I disorder than in the general population (Bipolar 
I Disorder: 4%-24%; Bipolar II Disorder: 1%-5%; Major Depressive Disorder: 4%-24%).70  
There are a variety of treatments for bipolar disorders; treatment tends to involve the use of 
lithium or anti-psychotic medication.  For a compelling narrative on bipolar disorder, Kay 
Redfield Jamison’s An Unquiet Mind offers a marvelous personal account of her experience with 
the illness.71 
Bipolar Disorder II 
 The DSM-IV-TR suggests criteria for Bipolar II Disorder as multiple episodes of major 
depression accompanied by at least one hypomanic episode.72  In light of the above discussion of 
Bipolar I Disorder, it should be clear that Bipolar I accounts for mood lability that is essentially 
“up” while Bipolar II Disorder accounts for mood lability that is essentially “down.”  These 
recurrent down periods with occasional euthymia must not occur with an incidence of genuine 
mania or a mixed episode, must not be better accounted for by a psychotic disorder, must cause 
significant impairment in daily life, must not be due to substance-use, and must not be due to a 
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general medical condition, as these would warrant other diagnoses.73  Suicide is a genuine risk 
with these patients – the DSM notes successful suicide in approximately 10%-15% of patients 
with Bipolar II Disorder.74  The age of onset for Bipolar II Disorder is similar to that for Bipolar 
I Disorder (around age 20); likewise, if a clinician notices late-onset Bipolar II, she should 
suspect the possibility of an underlying medical condition (e.g., thyroid dysfunction) or 
substance use.75  There appears to be a gender difference in the epidemiology of Bipolar II 
Disorder, with women more frequently carrying the diagnosis.76  Further, there appear to be 
gender differences in the course of the illness, with men experiencing more hypomanic episodes 
and women experiencing more depressive episodes.77  Overall, the DSM suggests that the 
lifetime prevalence of Bipolar II Disorder is approximately 0.5%,78 and there appears to be a 
greater risk for Bipolar II Disorder in first-degree biological relatives of individuals with the 
disorder than for other individuals in the general population.79 
Cyclothymia 
The ICD-10 defines cyclothymia as a chronic lability of mood with numerous periods of 
alternating dysthymia and hypomania, neither of which is severe enough to warrant diagnosis of 
a bipolar disorder or recurrent depression.80  Cyclothymia is frequently found in the relatives of 
individuals with bipolar disorder.  The DSM-IV-TR suggests more specific criteria, including: 
multiple periods of hypomanic and dysthymic symptoms, symptom-free episodes that do not last 
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longer than two months (in the two-year period necessary for the diagnosis), no full-blown 
depressive, manic, or mixed episodes, symptoms that are not better accounted for by a psychotic 
disorder, the symptoms are not substance induced, and the presence of a notable impairment of 
functioning as a result of the illness.81  In addition to the symptoms discussed above, there may 
also be a greater prevalence of substance-related disorders and sleep-continuity disturbances in 
individuals with cyclothymia.82  Cyclothymia tends to begin early in life, and may represent a 
predisposition to the development of other mood disorders (especially bipolar disorder).83  There 
seems to be no real gender difference in the incidence of cyclothymia, but women seem to come 
for treatment more often than men.84  The lifetime prevalence of cyclothymia is 0.4% to 1%, 
while the prevalence in mood disorder clinics is between 3%-5%.85  As in other depressive 
conditions, there appears to be a greater prevalence of other affective disorders in first degree 
biological relatives of individuals with cyclothymia than in the general population.86 
Adjustment Disorder 
 The DSM notes another type of disorder that can result in depressive symptomology.  
“Adjustment disorder” refers to a “psychological response to an identifiable stressor or stressors 
that results in the development of clinically significant emotional or behavioral symptoms.”87  
The specific criteria for an Adjustment Disorder include onset within 3 months of the occurrence 
of the stressor, marked distress or impairment in the subject, insufficient symptomology to meet 
the criteria for other Axis I disorders, symptoms not better accounted for by bereavement, and 
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abatement of the symptoms within six months of the stressor.88  What constitutes a stressor can 
vary from person to person – stressors can come from every sphere of a person’s life, from the 
environment he lives in to the termination of employment to a medical illness.  The adjustment 
disorder puts the individual at serious risk for self-harm, as well as increasing the severity of 
comorbid medical illness.89  The disorder appears to be twice as prevalent in women as in men, 
and the overall prevalence varies with specific target populations: between 2-8% in community 
samples of children/adolescents and the elderly, up to 12% in general hospital inpatients, in 10-
30% of outpatient mental health patients, and up to 50% in specific medically compromised 
patients (e.g., following heart surgery).90 
Other Conditions/Research Conditions 
The DSM notes two other categories of interest – Depressive Disorders Not Otherwise 
Specified (NOS) and Depression with Melancholic Features.  Depressive Disorder NOS is a 
general catch-all category for all disorders with depressive features not better accounted for by 
“the criteria for Major Depressive Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder, Adjustment Disorder with 
Depressed Mood, or Adjustment Disorder With Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood.”91  This 
category includes premenstrual dysphoria, minor depressive disorder (see above discussion), 
recurrent brief depressive disorder, post-psychotic depressive disorder (occurs during the 
residual phase of schizophrenia), major depression superimposed on delusional, psychotic, or 
schizophrenic disorders, and”[s]ituations in which the clinician has concluded that a depressive 
disorder is present but is unable to determine whether it is primary, due to a general medical 
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condition, or substance induced.”92  Depression with melancholic features is a complete loss of 
interest or pleasure in almost all activities or pleasurable stimuli.93  The essential criteria for this 
disorder is the maintenance of a depressed state even when something desirable happens, as well 
as at least three additional criteria like “a distinct quality of the depressed mood, depression that 
is regularly worse in the morning, early morning awakening, psychomotor retardation or 
agitation, significant anorexia or weight loss, or excessive or inappropriate guilt.”94  This 
disorder is considered in cases when there is a marked difference between the current state and a 
normal depressed state; severe depression of longer duration is not distinct in its quality, and 
therefore would not be considered to have melancholic features.95  These individuals tend to 
have clear precipitants to the episode, tend not to have premorbid Personality disorders, and may 
respond to placebo medication.96 
In addition to the qualified categories of depressive illnesses, there are a variety of other 
conditions that are being researched.  These proposed categories were not included in the 
diagnostic categories of the DSM-IV-TR because there was “insufficient information to warrant 
inclusion of these proposals as official categories or axes.”97  Included in this group are a 
discussion of an alternative criterion for dysthymic disorder, symptoms for the proposed 
recurrent brief depressive disorder and mixed anxiety-depressive disorder, and criteria for a 
depressive personality disorder.  As these are research criteria for conditions, only a brief 
description of each will be offered. 
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As has been already presented, dysthymic disorder is a pervasive dysphoric mood of at 
least two years duration.  Criterion B normally requires that at least two common symptoms of 
major depression be present during this two year period (e.g., appetite changes, sleep 
disturbances, anergia, etc.).  What has been proposed instead is the concomitant presence of at 
least three diagnostic criteria, including feelings of low self-esteem, pessimism or despair, 
general loss of interest in activities or pleasure, social withdrawal, chronic fatigue, persistent 
guilt or brooding, irritability or excessive anger, decreased activity or productivity, or difficulty 
with cognitive functioning (memory, concentration, decisiveness).98 
Recurrent Brief Depressive Disorder has been suggested as a complement to Major 
Depressive Disorder.  The principle difference is that the patient does not meet the time duration 
of MDD – Recurrent Brief Depressive Disorder lasts for at least two days but less than two 
weeks, and must last for several days.  These episodes must recur at least once a month for 
twelve consecutive months, and must not be tied to the menstrual cycle.99 
Mixed Anxiety-Depressive Disorder requires a persistent or recurrent dysphoric mood 
that lasts for at least one month.  In addition to dysphoric mood, the patient must experience at 
least four additional criteria, including cognitive difficulties (e.g., in concentration or memory), 
sleep disturbances, fatigue, irritability, worry, hypervigilance, pessimism, low self-esteem, or 
feelings of worthlessness.  These symptoms must be severe enough to interfere with everyday 
functioning.  The DSM notes that current prevalence rate is about 0.8% in community samples, 
and 1.3%-2% in primary care.100 
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 The DSM finally discusses Depressive Personality Disorder as a possible future 
diagnosis.  These individuals do not demonstrate any acute pathology, but rather tend to display 
persistent negative feelings like “dejection, gloominess, cheerlessness, joylessness, and 
unhappiness.”101  These individuals tend to exhibit an inability to have fun, are overly serious, 
tend to worry and ruminate on their negative thoughts.  There tend to be feelings of inadequacy, 
a lack of hope for the future, low self-esteem, and chronic pessimism towards the future.102  The 
DSM notes that these symptoms must not occur exclusively during periods of major depression, 
and must not be better accounted for by Dysthymic Disorder (the DSM notes that there may be 
considerable overlap between Depressive Personality Disorder and other depressive disorders); 
further, this disorder may appear more frequently in close relatives of an individual with major 
depression.103 
 The ICD-10 offers other diagnostic criteria for depressive disorders.  Mood disorders, as 
defined by the ICD-10, contain fundamental changes in affect to a state of depression without or 
without associated anxiety.  It notes that the mood change results in an overall decrease in 
activity, tends to be recurrent, and may respond to environmental triggers.104  Persistent affective 
disorders refer to conditions that result in frequent affective change, but not to a degree severe 
enough to be labeled hypomanic or dysthymic.  They last for many years, and may involve 
comorbid single episodes of genuine depressive or manic episodes.105  Recurrent depressive 
disorder is characterized by multiple instances of depression without any manic episodes; 
hypomania may occasionally occur following a depressed episode (possibly caused by 
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antidepressant treatment).  These recurrent episodes can begin at any stage of life with either an 
acute or insidious onset, and can last from weeks to months.106 
Etiologies 
The National Institute of Mental Health suggests that diagnoses of major depression tend 
to fit into three categories: “major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, and bipolar disorder 
(manic-depressive illness).”107  As has been noted above, there is a rather large grouping of 
disorders which fit into the depressive model.  
 Victor and Ropper note that there is currently some question regarding the essential 
nature of a depressive disorder.  Specifically, the question is asked whether it is a disease state (a 
neurological dysfunction; the kraepelinian concept) or a psychological reaction (like grief or 
frustration; the meyerian concept).  They argue that both can be right: 
 
These two disparate concepts are not irreconcilable.  An eclectic position is that 
both are correct – i.e., that there are two basic forms of depression: exogenous and 
endogenous.  Exogenous (or reactive) depressions have an overt external cause, 
such as the loss of a loved one, loss of one’s fortune or position, or a disabling or 
life-threatening illness.  In this framework, grief would exemplify a reactive or 
exogenous depression.  In contrast, the endogenous depressions have no apparent 
external cause; they seem to occur in susceptible individuals as a response to 
some unknown biologic alteration.108 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 World Health Organization, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, p. 
336-7 
107 National Institute of Mental Health, The Invisible Disease: Depression, p. 1.  This is, of course, a simplification 
of a much more complex picture, but it serves as an overall summary – it suffices to note that this split is generally 
made in terms of acute vs. chronic onset, as well as the severity of the symptoms.  Major depression and bipolar 
disorder have an acute onset with severe symptoms (generally seen in a matter of one or two weeks), while 
dysthymic disorder (dysthymia) requires a significantly longer period to diagnosis with less severe symptoms (at 
least two years in adults).There are other concerns regarding this generalization.  Bipolar disorder is chronic – the 
current standard of practice involves pharmacological regulation of lithium levels throughout the patient’s lifetime, 
and as such, bears more resemblance to the chronicity of dysthymia.  However, the bipolar crises – i.e., those which 
require hospitalization – are acute (seen by this author much more frequently in the manic phase of the illness than 
in the depressive phase).  As noted above, there is an entire family of depressive disorders; this dissertation does not 
follow the NIMH split. 
108 Victor and Ropper, Principles of Neurology, p. 1608 
 200
Psychosocial Factors 
While it is a truism to state that environmental crises can affect us profoundly, empirical 
research has demonstrated that there are correlational links between specific environmental 
factors and resultant conditions.  Pliska notes that:  
It is clear that adverse life events contribute to the development of mood and 
anxiety disorders.  Persons who were sexually or physically abused during 
childhood are up to four times more likely to develop major depression or commit 
suicide; child abuse is associated with an earlier age of onset of depression and 
greater chronicity of the depression.  Other factors known to be related to 
affective disorders are early parental loss and nonspecific life stressors.  As 
expected from heritability figures, these environmental stressors play a larger role 
in unipolar depression than in bipolar disorder.109 
 
Not all depressions are endogenous – there is a correlation between patterns of life events and the 
onset of depression and other affective disorders.  Nemeroff notes that the specific interaction of 
the prevailing hypotheses regarding depressive etiology cannot really account for the complex 
interplay of the genetic, monoamine, and hormonal causes of depression.110  He suggests that a 
more workable model would involve a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors, and 
that the “stress-diasthesis” model offers a better explanation for the prevalence of depressive 
disorders.111  The stress-diasthesis model (environmental experience and inborn predisposition, 
respectively) suggests that there is likely an inborn quality that predisposes an individual to 
develop a given affective disorder, but that this alone is insufficient to trigger the onset of the 
condition.  Rather, there must be an environmental factor which serves as the catalyst for the 
disorder.  This would seem to offer support for twin-study data in which only one twin develops 
the disorder being studied – it is plausible that the affected twin may have been exposed to an 
environmental influence that the other did not experience (e.g., troubled marriage, abuse, trauma, 
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etc.).  Nemeroff notes that there are cases of depressive disorder that do not fit the stress-
diasthesis model; there are individuals who may have a genetic predisposition and yet never 
develop the condition in question, just as there may be people who do not have the predisposition 
and yet develop a depressive disorder.112  Despite these aberrant cases, the model does offer a 
compelling explanation for depressive illness, and parallels examples from the medical model 
(e.g., predispositions to cancer, heart disease, diabetes, etc.). 
Reductionism 
There are a variety of possible etiologies of depression – psychosocial, biochemical, 
neuroanatomical, endocrinologic, genetic, medical, etc.  Biochemical causes can involve 
dysregulation of one or more neurotransmitters or neuropeptides.113  Neuroanatomical causes can 
include the misfiring, underdevelopment, or hyperactivity of several communicative systems, 
structural changes due to age or illness, or neurological trauma.114 Endocrinologic causes can 
include dysregulation of myriad hormones, from growth hormone to corticotrophin-releasing 
hormone to thyroid-stimulating hormone, as well as suppression or abnormal responses in other 
hormones like prolactin or dexamethasone.115  Genetic causes can include familial predisposition 
to develop an affective illness, awaiting only the correct trigger to instigate the disorder.  
Medical causes are myriad – as has been noted already, depression can result from, be 
exacerbated by, or be masked by a variety of medical conditions from metabolic disturbances to 
infections to gastrointestinal and genitourinary disorders. 116  None of this, however, should be 
taken to suggest that there is one common factor or cause.117  Rather, it should be taken as a 
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 202
general caution that depression is multifactorial, and the primary care physician should take care 
to note the subtleties of psychiatric diagnosis.  Psychosocial causes of depression are fairly well 
known and obvious; while there are exceptions to this rule in claims of depression from bizarre 
or counterintuitive stimuli,118 it should not be controversial to suggest that there is little difficulty 
in spotting exogenous causes of depression.  What follows in the next few sections concerns 
endogenous depressive illnesses – concerning first reductive accounts of depression, followed by 
discussions of several medical disorders common in house medicine that carry a noteworthy risk 
of depression. 
Genetic 
Both Kandel and Victor and Ropper note that there is compelling evidence that 
depressive illness is not simply environmental – heritability studies have demonstrated that the 
incidence of mood disorders among biological relatives of adopted children with unipolar or 
bipolar depression is higher than that of biological relatives of adopted normal children.119  
Several authors have addressed the genetic aspect of depressive disorders, and the general 
consensus is that there is not simply one particular gene that is causative of depressive illness; 
rather, what is more likely is that predisposition to affective disorders (and, as some argue, all 
psychiatric disorders) is polygenetic.120  Genetic predisposition towards depressive illness has 
been approached through a variety of means – monozygotic/dizygotic twin studies and 
chromosome/allele linkages have been explored, as well as stress-diasthesis considerations 
(genetic predisposition triggered by environmental factors).  There is still significant debate 
                                                 
118 In the psychiatric emergency room, this author interviewed and assessed patients who stated that they were 
depressed because they spent all of their money on crack cocaine; patients that were depressed because they were 
served macaroni and cheese for dinner; adult patients of normal intellectual function who were depressed because 
their mother did not buy them an action figure as a housewarming gift, etc. 
119 Kandel, "Disorders of Mood: Depression, Mania, and Anxiety Disorders.", p. 1212; Victor and Ropper, 
Principles of Neurology, p. 1616 
120 Nemeroff, "The Neurobiology of Depression.", p. 266; Kandel, "Disorders of Mood: Depression, Mania, and 
Anxiety Disorders.", p. 1212; Pliszka, Neuroscience for the Mental Health Clinician, p. 134 
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concerning which genes are the likely culprits; research is currently directed at a handful of the 
chromosomes regulating human growth and development. Linkages have been proposed on 
chromosomes 4, 12, 13, 18 (in two places), 21, 22, and the X chromosome; thus far, the strongest 
evidence seems to implicate linkages on chromosomes 18 and 22. 121  Pliska notes that such 
suggestions ought to be taken with some caveats – these reports are preliminary, and they do not 
indicate that a link with a specific psychiatric disorder has been identified.  Further, he notes, 
some conditions may be linked to mitochondrial DNA.122  As such, the specific genetic loci of 
mental illnesses are still in the process of being identified. 
Twin studies 
Twin studies have proven to be very useful tools in ruling out environmental influences 
in the development of physical and mental disorders.  In essence, twin studies have suggested 
that while environmental factors can be an influence in the onset of particular disorders, there is 
a specific genetic component or predisposition for the development of an illness (e.g., 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, etc.).123  Monozygotic twins have identical DNA, and as such, 
can provide a model of behavior and development of identical genes in differing settings; they 
offer a greater degree of control and reliability than dizygotic twins, who have different genes.  
There is some dispute concerning the actual rate of monozygotic concordance.  Kandel argues 
that there is a 40-60% rate of concordant affective illness in monozygotic twins reared apart, and 
that the concordance rate of bipolar disorder in monozygotic twins could reach 80%, versus 10% 
in dizygotic twins.124  Victor and Ropper suggest that in bipolar disorder, monozygotic twins 
exhibit a concordance rate of 72% versus 14% concordance in dizygotic twins; for unipolar 
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depression, monozygotic twins are concordant for the illness 40% of the time, while dizygotic 
twins are concordant 11% of the time.125  Pliska suggests that the bipolar concordance rate in 
monozygotic twins is 58-70%, versus 16-24% in dizygotic twins.  Overall, he suggests that 
bipolar disorder has a heritability of 0.8-0.9, versus 0.45 for unipolar depression.126 
Stress-diasthesis 
Genetic predisposition ought not to be interpreted as inevitability, however.  Modern 
medicine has demonstrated that a variety of gene-linked diseases do not have to manifest, simply 
because a susceptibility exists.  When unmanaged, phenylketonuria results is profound 
intellectual disability; current medical practice, however, has shown that dietary changes can 
prevent these intellectually crippling effects from occurring.  In a like manner, environmental 
changes and behaviors can prevent the onset of cancers, diabetes, etc.  The stress-diasthesis 
model has been proposed as an explanation for the onset of illness in one patient with a relative 
absence in another.127  Several sources have suggested that life stressors are likely triggers for the 
onset of depression; this interplay is complex, and the genetic predisposition may even give rise 
to the environmental stressors that cause a full-blown depressive episode.128 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125 Victor and Ropper, Principles of Neurology, p. 1616 
126 Pliszka, Neuroscience for the Mental Health Clinician, p. 203.  0.8-0.9 and 0.45 are on a scale from 0 to 1, which 
signifies complete absence of heritability to total heritability. 
127 Victor and Ropper, Principles of Neurology, p. 1616; K.S. Kendler, et al., "A Longitudinal Twin Study of 1-Year 
Prevalence of Major Depression in Women," Archives of General Psychiatry 50, no. 11 (November 1993): 843-52. 
128 K.S. Kendler and L. Karkowski-Shuman, "Stressful Life Events and Genetic Liability to Major Depression: 
Genetic Control of Exposure to the Environment?" Psychological Medicine 27, no. 3 (May 1997): 539-47; O. Agid, 
et al., "Environment and Vulnerability to Major Psychiatric Illness: A Case Control Study of Early Parental Loss in 
Major Depression, Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia," Molecular Psychiatry 4, no. 2 (March 1999): 163-72.; 
Pliszka, Neuroscience for the Mental Health Clinician, p. 207 
 205
Monoamine transport and reception 
Part of the genetic predisposition to affective disorder may involve the development of 
monoaminergic systems.129  Kandel suggests that: 
Certain major depressive illnesses may be the result of genetically determined 
defects in chemical synaptic transmission involving at least two major transmitter 
pathways of the brain: the serotonergic and noradrenergic systems.  Although the 
mechanisms that cause the defects in transmission remain obscure, progress in 
studying allelic variations in the human genome provide hope that aspects of the 
molecular basis of affective disorders might soon be elucidated.130 
 
There is some controversy, however.  Pliska notes that studies have shown that there is no 
noticeable genotype difference for serotonin transporter binding alleles between depressed 
individuals who had committed suicide versus normal controls, suggesting that “the individual’s 
genotype was not related to serotonin transporter binding in the brain.”131  Further, he argues that 
none of the genes for norepinephrine transporters or receptors have been implicated in affective 
disorders, nor have the enzymes that convert dopamine β hydroxylase (the chemical precursor of 
norepinephrine) been implicated.  This, he argues, suggests that the common 
serotonin/norepinephrine disruption in depression may not be due to genetic reasons, but rather, 
these dysfunctions in neurotransmission may actually be “downstream of the actual cause of the 
condition.”132 
Neurochemistry 
The most common reductionistic model of depressive disorders hinges upon dysregulation of 
monoamines, a group of neurotransmitters involved in a variety of processes and behaviors from 
                                                 
129 Monoaminergic systems involve the production, transmission, and reception of monoamines.  Monoamines are 
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sleep and relaxation to pleasure and stimulation.133  Nemeroff notes that a significant body of 
evidence suggests that “regardless of the initial triggers, the final common pathways to 
depression involve biochemical changes in the brain.  It is these changes that ultimately give rise 
to deep sadness and the other salient characteristics of depression.”134  Victor and Ropper 
describe the importance of monoamines in the biological basis of depressive disorders when they 
state: 
The biogenic monoamines (norepinephrine, serotonin, and dopamine) are the key 
elements in these theories.  Following the observations that the tricyclic 
antidepressants and the MAO inhibitors exert their effect by increasing 
norepinephrine and serotonin at central adrenergic receptor sites in the limbic 
system and hypothalamus and that depression-provoking drugs (such as reserpine) 
deplete biogenic amines at these sites, the theory followed that naturally occurring 
depressions might be associated with a deficiency of these latter substances.  
Furthermore it was observed that depressed patients and their first-degree 
relatives, as well as healthy individuals, develop a greatly depressed mood after 
dietary depletion of the monoamine precursor tryptophan.135 
 
There are two classes of neurotransmitters in the monoamine group – catecholamines (dopamine, 
norepinephrine (noradrenaline), and epinephrine (adrenaline)) and serotonin.  Dopamine, 
norepinephrine, and epinephrine are all derived from the common chemical precursor tyrosine, 
while serotonin is derived from tryptophan.  These neurotransmitters are manufactured in the 
axon terminal of the respective monoamine neuron (e.g., certain neurons produce dopamine, 
others produce epinephrine, others produce serotonin, etc.), and are released into the synaptic 
cleft between neurons as a means of excitatory or inhibitory communication throughout the 
central nervous system.136  Once the neurotransmitter has been released, the synapse is cleared 
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by reuptake and enzymatic action (i.e., the neurotransmitter is reabsorbed into the releasing 
neurons terminal or is deactivated and disassembled by an enzyme).   
There are several mechanisms that can lead to a dysregulation of monoamines.  Neuronal 
death from a medical condition or trauma can result in monoaminergic dysregulation; 
insufficient neurotransmitter release, excessive enzymatic “clean-up” activity, excessive reuptake 
of monoamines, and neurological response to exogenous conditions are also possible causes.  
Medications treating depression through monoamine regulation are of several classes: 
monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOI) operate by inhibiting the enzyme that deactivates 
monoamines, resulting in a greater amount of the neurotransmitter in question in the synapse for 
a longer period of time; selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors and serotonin-noradrenaline 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs and SNRIs, respectively) operate by preventing the reabsorption of 
the neurotransmitter into the transmitting terminal; tricyclic antidepressants (named for their 
ringed structure) operate by inhibiting the reuptake of serotonin and norepinephrine. 
Serotonin 
There are several physiological signs that serotonin depletion is correlated with 
depression – serotonin-producing cells extend into some of the critical areas involved in emotion 
(amygdala), arousal (hypothalamus), and cognitive functions (frontal cortices);137 the effects of 
hypothalamic dysfunction – and thereby the HPA axis (hypothalamus, pituitary gland, adrenal 
gland) – will be discussed below in the section presenting endocrinologic bases of depression.  
Second, serotonin metabolite levels typically are low in depressed patients, suggesting reductions 
in available serotonin in the brain.138  Third, lower levels of surface molecules unique to 
serotonin-releasing cells are found in depressed patients, suggesting that the amount of 
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serotonin-releasing cells themselves is also reduced.139  Fourth, there is an overabundance of 
type-2 serotonin-receptors in the brain tissue of depressed patients – up-regulation of 
neurotransmitter receptors is indicative of the brain’s compensatory mechanism for lower levels 
of neurotransmitter (the brain tries to increase the amount of serotonin transmitted by increasing 
the number of serotonin receptors in cells).140  Nemeroff also notes that there is a noticeable 
difference in the absorption of serotonin by blood platelets in depressed patients versus normal 
patients.141  Last, Pliska notes that “there appear to be fewer serotonin transporters in the cortex 
of persons with major depression, and several studies show the number of the 5-HT1A and 5-
HT2A receptors to be decreased.”142 
Norepinephrine 
Deficiencies in serotonin can also lead to deficiencies in norepinephrine – some of the 
systems enervated by serotonin neurons produce and regulate the synthesis and distribution of 
norepinephrine.143  If the supply of serotonin is suppressed or inadequate in a noradrenergic 
system, there will likely be a comorbid suppression or insufficiency of norepinephrine. 
 There are two pieces of evidence supporting the involvement of norepinephrine in 
depression.  First, Nemeroff notes that the level of norepinephrine metabolites (waste products of 
norepinephrine use) in the urine and cerebrospinal fluid of depressed patients were low in 
depressed individuals in relation to ‘normal’ patients.144  This suggests that there is a low level of 
the neurotransmitter in the brains of depressed patients.  Second, postmortem studies have noted 
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an increase of norepinephrine receptors in the post-synaptic membranes of depressed patients – 
again, suggesting a compensatory mechanism for low levels of the neurotransmitter.145 
There is some controversy as to whether the monoamine model is accurate.  Pliska 
suggests that the monoamine hypothesis of affective disorder may have to be revisited, as 
“tianeptine, a substance that enhances the uptake of serotonin (the opposite effects of the SSRIs), 
has been shown to have antidepressant properties.” 146  A stronger objection comes from Kandel, 
who suggests that the biogenic amine model has a likely basis, but that there are several 
confounding factors, including a more complex interlacing of the monoaminergic systems than is 
presently understood, as well as the likelihood that the categories of depressive disorders are in 
actuality groups of disorders with common pathologies.147  Victor and Ropper note that there is 
presently no reliable biological test for depression (see below for the discussion of the 
dexamethasone suppression test).  Rather, “further knowledge of the metabolism and physiology 
of transmitter function of the biogenic amines is needed before a complete theory can be 
developed.”148  Psychiatry is relatively new in relation to internal medicine, and undergoes 
paradigm shifts with greater frequency than house medicine. 
Neuroanatomy 
The structure of the brain itself is currently under investigation as a cause for depressive 
symptoms.149  There are a variety of structures in neuroanatomy which influence mood – 
pleasure centers, pain centers, regulatory mechanisms, sleep mechanisms, alert centers, etc.  A 
full treatment of the neuroanatomy of mood would require a much longer work, and several 
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volumes in biopsychology have already covered this topic.  A brief introduction should suffice to 
cover the major structures in question – the structures tend to revolve around the limbic system 
(emotional regulation) and the frontal lobes: 
Above the cerebellum is the group of structures known as the limbic system.  This 
part of the brain, which we share in common with all other mammals, provides us 
with primal urges and powerful emotions crucial for self-preservation: rage, 
terror, hunger, and sexual desire.  The limbic system’s direct connections with 
some of the higher brain faculties allow us both to cogitate upon what we feel 
emotionally, as well as have emotional reactions to that which we think about.  
The found major components of the limbic system are the amygdala, the 
hippocampus, the hypothalamus, and the thalamus.  The almond-shaped 
amygdala, which plays a role in the emotions, especially aggression, is the basic 
pathway into the limbic system for nerve impulses.  The hippocampus is an 
information processor, matching new data against those already stored in the 
brain.  It therefore is one of the structures absolutely critical in the process of 
ascribing meaning to the symbols and events of our lives.  The hypothalamus, 
integral to our moods, regulates food intake, internal water balance, and 
reproductive cycles.  It generally acts as a liaison between the brain and the rest of 
the body, initiating the release of at least seven different hormones to the pituitary 
(or master) gland, which in turn releases other hormones into the bloodstream that 
influence growth, aging, and all aspects of reproduction.  The thalamus, located 
near the center of the brain, processes all the senses except smell.  It takes the 
incoming sensory signals and, like a switchboard, sends them to the appropriate 
region in the brain for interpretation.150 
 
Depression exerts profound stress on the nervous system; the National Institute of Mental Health 
has noted that “brain imaging research is revealing that in depression, neural circuits responsible 
for moods, thinking, sleep, appetite, and behavior fail to function properly, and that the 
regulation of critical neurotransmitters is impaired.”151  Kandel notes that some of the symptoms 
of depression suggest a dysregulation of the pleasure/reward and fear systems.152 
Efforts to find a specific anatomical correlate for depression have thus far been 
unsuccessful, but Victor and Ropper note that several structures have consistently been found to 
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be involved in a concomitant depressed mood.  They note that the cingulate, orbitofrontal 
cortices, the insular cortex, amygdala, and basal ganglia have been proposed as causative bases 
for depression.153  The structure that shows up most frequently in physiological studies of major 
depression is the left frontal cortex154 – the frontal cortices are the basis of cognition and 
planning; they are the “executive” of the brain, so to speak.  In patients experiencing depression, 
the most frequent finding is hypoactivity in the left frontal cortex.  Dysfunction of the left frontal 
lobe produces the characteristic signs and symptoms of major depression – anhedonia, apathy, 
lack of volition, anergia, etc.155  While there are a variety of neurochemical, hormonal, and 
structural abnormalities that can give rise to depressive states,156 it is useful to note the 
importance of the hippocampus and frontal lobes, as the literature tends to revolve around their 
function in biopsychology. 
Hippocampus 
 The hippocampus has attracted significant recent attention, as it may demonstrate a 
specific biological marker for depression.157  A variety of studies have examined the total 
volume of the white and gray matter in the hippocampus, and have noted that the volume of 
these areas decreases in patients with depression.158  There are some questions about these 
results, however.  Some concern has been expressed concerning whether depletion in 
hippocampal volume is causative for, caused by, or correlative to major depressive episodes, 
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while others suggest that the depletion may simply be coincidental.159  Pliska notes that the 
degree of the reduction in hippocampal volume is directly linked to the lifetime duration of the 
depressive disorder, and that at times it can be so marked as to “be visible to the untrained eye on 
the MRI scan.”160  Schatzberg suggests that decreased hippocampal volume could result in 
elevated levels of glucocorticoid during stressful periods, which may put the patient at an 
elevated risk for neural atrophy and dysfunction in the prefrontal lobes (see below).161  Frodl 
notes that while depression is more frequently seen in women, men have a higher risk of 
depleted hippocampi, which he suggests may be attributable to gender differences in brain 
development and response to neurotoxins and stress.162 
Frontal Lobes 
As noted above, the frontal lobes can have a significant impact on mood and emotional 
functioning.  The frontal lobes are the seat of executive functioning – they not only decide what 
will be done, but also put the plan into action (through the motor cortices on the posterior frontal 
lobes).  They are directly connected to a variety of other processing areas, involving memory, 
association, volition, etc., and indirectly connected to deeper sensory and regulatory structures.  
Joseph offers a succinct summary of psychopathology associated with frontal lobe damage: 
The frontal lobes can be subdivided into major functional neuroanatomical 
domains, which, when injured, surgically destroyed, or reduced in activity or 
volume, give rise to signature pathological and psychiatric symptomology.  A 
review of case reports and over 50 years of research, including magnetic 
resonance imaging, positron emission tomography, and single photon emission 
computed tomography scans, indicates that apathy, ‘blunted’ schizophrenia, major 
depression, and aphasic-perseverative disturbance of speech and thought are 
associated with left lateral as well as bilateral frontal (and striatal) abnormalities.  
Impulsiveness, confabulatory verbosity, grandiosity, increased sexuality, and 
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mania are associated with right frontal (as well as bilateral) disturbances.  
Gegenhalten, catatonia, and disturbances of ‘will’ are indicative of medial frontal 
injuries.  Disinhibitory states and obsessive-compulsive perseverative 
abnormalities are more frequently observed with orbital frontal lobe dysfunction, 
including frontal-striatal disturbances.  These associations, however, are not 
always clear-cut as patients with the same diagnosis may demonstrate different 
symptoms that may be due to an additional abnormality in a different region of 
the brain.  Moreover, as the frontal subdivisions are richly interconnected, and as 
frontal lobe abnormalities are not always discrete or well localized, a wide array 
of seemingly divergent waxing and waning symptoms may be manifest, 
sometimes simultaneously, including manic depression and what has been 
referred to as the ‘frontal lobe personality.’163 
 
Pliska notes that positron-emitting tomography studies have shown a decrease in the activity of 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which may “correlate with the cognitive impairments in 
depression, such as decreased concentration and poor memory.”164  Further, it is noted that this 
decrease in activity returns to normal following treatment for depression.165  There are also 
structures that appear to have hereditary weaknesses – Kandel notes that fMRI (functional 
magnetic resonance imaging) studies have defined an area of the prefrontal cortex beneath the 
corpus callosum that appears to be only affected in hereditary affective disorders.166  The activity 
in the region decreases during periods of depression (in both unipolar and bipolar depression), 
while activity in the regions spikes during manic phases.  Kandel suggests that the decrease in 
activity may be accounted for by a significant (45%) reduction in grey matter in that section of 
the prefrontal cortex.167  Schatzberg notes that cognitive decline in the left frontal lobe correlates 
with depressive symptoms, and may be a marker for depression in elderly patients.168  Left 
frontal dysfunction and hypoactivity suggest a possible therapeutic intervention – artificial 
stimulation (chemical or somatic) of left frontal structures may suffice to reverse the depressive 
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symptomology (see the treatment section below concerning pharmacological and somatic 
treatment interventions). 
Endocrinology 
In addition to the neurochemical and neuroanatomical explanations of depression, 
answers can also be found in the endocrine system.  Dysregulation of several hormones have 
been proposed for the symptoms found in major depression.  Nemeroff suggests that 
dysregulation of hormones responsible for growth hormone [GH] and thyroid-stimulating 
hormone [TSH] produce depressive symptomology.169  Nemeroff and Kandel have also explored 
dysregulation of adrenocorticotropic hormone [ACTH] in the pituitary gland.170  This 
hypersecretion of ACTH leads to an overproduction of cortisol, a stress hormone (see below).  
Kandel notes that depression is often associated with signs of hypothalamic disturbance, leading 
to ACTH dysregulation.171 
Each chemical modifying brain behavior has a receptor fitted specifically to it.  Cortisol 
is normally secreted according to the body’s circadian rhythms, with periods of peak activity in 
the mid-morning; in general, cortisol keeps the individual awake and alert.  Cortisol production 
is connected to activation of the sympathetic nervous system – a branch of the autonomic 
nervous system that governs the body during times of exertion or conflict.  When the 
sympathetic nervous system is activated, the body tends not to engage in activity that expends 
energy unrelated to fight or flight – appetite is suppressed, digestion slows, the body is more 
alert, etc.  When an individual neuromodulator or neurotransmitter is not produced in sufficient 
quantities or is overproduced, the nervous system can compensate for the deficiency or excess by 
increasing or decreasing the number of corresponding receptors.  However, in the case of the 
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overproduction of corticotrophin-releasing factor [CRF], there is an overabundance of the 
chemical and an increase in the number of its receptors – the opposite effect we would expect.  
Thus, we have too much CRF and too many receptors sensitive too it; the net result is a chronic 
overproduction of cortisol.  When cortisol is present in excessive amounts chronically, it can 
produce classic signs of depression – appetite loss and weight loss, sleep continuity disturbance, 
loss of sexual appetite, loss of interest in outside activities and interests, anhedonia, etc.  In short, 
the body keeps itself in a condition primed for conflict rather than relaxation, ultimately spiraling 
the patient into a depressive episode.172  In some cases, the hypersecretion of ACTH swells the 
adrenal glands to a noticeable degree.173  Three principle structures in neuroanatomy are 
implicated in the overabundance of cortisol – the hypothalamus, the pituitary gland, and the 
adrenal cortex, collectively referred to as the HPA axis.  Nemeroff suggests that HPA-axis 
hyperactivity is “surely the most replicated one in all of biological psychiatry.”174 
Returning to the theme of the difficulty of corroborating a patient’s complaint of 
depression clinically, it has been suggested by some that neuroendocrinological tests might be 
employed to verify a claim.  The dexamethasone suppression test has been proposed as a 
possible solution to this need.  Adrenocorticotropin normally is suppressed in individuals 
exposed to dexamethasone, a synthetic corticosteroid.  Researchers have found that cortisol 
hypersecretion is not suppressed in approximately 40% of depressed individuals.175  This 
approach is controversial, however, in that dexamethasone is also suppressed in dementia, 
                                                 
172 National Institute of Mental Health, The Invisible Disease: Depression, p. 2 
173 Kandel, "Disorders of Mood: Depression, Mania, and Anxiety Disorders.", p. 1220 
174 Nemeroff, "The Neurobiology of Depression.", p. 271 
175 Kandel, "Disorders of Mood: Depression, Mania, and Anxiety Disorders.", p. 1220 
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anorexia nervosa, bulimia, alcohol withdrawal, and weight loss; as such, there is some question 
as to its specificity.176 
Pharmacology 
A final consideration is the possibility of developing a depressive disorder from routine 
medications.  Again citing J.L. Cummings, Kaplan and Sadock note that there are multiple 
medications that can cause depressive symptomology (Figure 1)177: 
 
Figure 1: Pharmacological Causes of Depression 
Cardiac and antihypertensive drugs 
Bethanidine Digitalis 
Clonidine Prazosin 
Guanethidine Procainamide 
Hydralazine Veratrum 
Methyldopa Lidocaine 
Propranolol Oxprenolol 
Reserprine Methoserpidine 
  
Sedatives and hypnotics 
Barbituates Benzodiazepines 
Chloral hydrate Chlormethiazole 
Ethanol Chlorazepate 
  
Steroids and hormones 
Corticosteroids Triamcinalone 
Oral contraceptives Norethisterone 
Prednisone Danazol 
  
Stimulants 
Amphetamine Diethylproprion 
Fenfluramine Phenmetrazine 
  
Psychotropic drugs 
Butyrophenones Phenothiazines 
  
Neurological agents 
Amantadine Baclofen 
Bromocriptine Carbamazepine 
Levodopa Methosuximide 
Tetrabenazine Phenytoin 
  
Analgesics and anti-inflammatory drugs 
Fenoprofen Phenacetin 
Ibuprofen Phenylbutazone 
Indomethacin Pentazocine 
Opiates Benzydamine 
  
Antibacterial and antifungal drugs 
Ampicillin Griseofulvin 
Sulfamethoxazole Metronidazole 
Clortimazole Nitrofurantoin 
Cycloserine Nalidixic acid 
Dapsone Sulfonamides 
Ethionamide Streptomycin 
Tetracycline Thiocarbanilide 
                                                 
176 Kandel, "Disorders of Mood: Depression, Mania, and Anxiety Disorders.", p. 1220 
177 Kaplan and Sadock, Synopsis of Psychiatry, Eighth Edition, p. 531. 
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Antineoplastic drugs 
C-Asparaginase 6-Azauridine 
Mithramycin Bleomycin 
Vincristine Trimethoprim 
 Zidovudine 
  
Miscellaneous drugs 
Acetazolamide Anticholinesterases 
Choline Cimetidine 
Cyproheptadine Lysergide 
Methysergide Mebeverine 
Meclizine Metaclopramide 
Pizotifen Salbutamol 
 
Because depressive disorders can result from medication used to treat other conditions, it is quite 
possible that it can be effectively combated by changing medications to a substitute without the 
extra-pyramidal symptom of depression. 
Treatment 
There are a variety of treatments for affective disorders – psychopharmacological, 
psychotherapeutic, and somatic.  The National Institute of Mental Health notes that 80% of 
depressive disorders are treatable through a combination of psychopharmacology and 
psychotherapy.  Bipolar disorders have been shown to respond favorably to treatment with 
lithium and psychotherapy.178  Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is a useful treatment for 
depressions that do not respond to other therapeutic interventions, and because of its efficacy and 
cost, may become the treatment of choice.179  Each of these therapeutic modalities will be 
explored briefly, as full discussion of each individually would require textbook-length treatments 
                                                 
178 In this author’s experience, many bipolar patients have an aversion to lithium treatment – while there are 
therapeutic effects, many have complained of somatic disturbances, and many more find it easier to comply when 
they are experiencing dysthymic or depressed moods.  Characteristically, patients with bipolar disorder tend not to 
stay on their medications during manic and hypomanic phases – they have repeatedly stated that these periods 
“simply feel too good to stop.”  The hypomanic and manic phases are subjectively described as periods of increased 
intelligence, increased insight and wisdom, greater intuition, energy, etc.  During the manic phase, patients will 
frequently take on more projects than can be handled, as well as engage in behaviors that are dangerous and 
potentially self-injurious (e.g., hypersexuality, impulsive spending, etc.).  For an excellent subjective account of 
bipolar disorder, see Kay Redfield Jamison’s An Unquiet Mind. 
179 Patients undergoing ECT report some memory loss following the procedure, however, which may present an 
unacceptable side effect.  In addition, there is still a stigma towards the treatment – in this author’s experience, many 
patients have expressed an aversion based upon popular media presentations of much older methods of “shock 
therapy.” 
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(specific treatment pathways, underlying medical and psychosocial etiologies, discussion of 
ethical considerations like informed consent, etc.). 
Psychopharmacology 
 There are several classes of medications employed in the treatment of depression – 
Kandel notes that depression can be combated through the use of antidepressants, mood 
stabilizers (lithium), and some anticonvulsants.180  The antidepressants, generally the first “line 
of defense” against depression, are further divided into tricyclics (TCA, like amitriptyline 
(Elavil), doxepin (Sinequan), imipramine (Tofranil), etc.), monoamine oxidase inhibitors 
(MAOIs, like phenelzine (Nardil), isocarboxazid (Marplan), etc.), selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs, like citalopram (Celexa), fluoxetine (Prozac), sertraline (Zoloft), etc.), 
serotonin-noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs, like nefazadone hydrochloride (Serzone), 
venlafaxine (Effexor), etc.), and atypical antidepressants (like trazodone, mirtazapine (Remeron), 
etc.).  For many of these medications, the specific means of their therapeutic effect involves 
correcting monoamine insufficiencies, while for others the specific means of their therapeutic 
effect are unknown.  As noted above in the discussion of neurochemistry, monoamine 
deficiencies can result from a variety of etiologies – insufficient production of the monoamines 
in question, enzymatic deactivation, terminal reuptake, etc.  The tricyclic antidepressants prevent 
the reuptake of serotonin and norepinephrine back into the axon terminal, thus allowing more of 
them to bind with their corresponding receptors on the post-synaptic membrane and thereby 
increasing their effect (SNRIs operate in a similar manner, but have a different chemical 
structure – the tricyclics are so named for their common “three rings” shape).  Monoamine 
oxidase inhibitors operate by preventing the enzyme monoamine oxidase from deactivating the 
neurotransmitter, allowing more to bind to the corresponding receptor on the post-synaptic 
                                                 
180 Kandel, "Disorders of Mood: Depression, Mania, and Anxiety Disorders.", p. 1213 
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membrane.  Like tricyclics and SNRIs, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors prevent the 
reuptake of serotonin into the axon terminal, allowing for greater amounts to bind to serotonin 
receptors on the target neuron. 
 Mood stabilizers like lithium are more suited for individuals with a bipolar disorder – 
these patients have a delicate neurochemistry which tends to react unfavorably to certain 
medications.  For example, if a patient with bipolar disorder is given an antidepressant, it is quite 
likely that they will not return to baseline – rather, they will enter a manic phase, with a 
corresponding shift in behavior and affect.181  Kandel notes that lithium is occasionally used in 
treating unipolar depression, but only when used in conjunction with an MAOI, TCA, or SSRI, 
as the lithium augments the therapeutic effects of these antidepressants).182  The efficacy of the 
monoamines is noteworthy; Kandel states that “the monoamine oxidase inhibitors and the 
tricyclic antidepressants produce remission or marked improvement in about 70% of patients 
with major depressions.  When optimal doses are given, the success rate with tricyclic drugs and 
the specific serotonin reuptake inhibitors may reach 85%, almost as effective as ECT.”183  
Anticonvulsants currently in use include carbamazepine (Carbatrol, Tegretol), gabapentin 
(Neurontin), lamotrigine (Lamictal) and valproate (Depakene). 
Many of these medications have side effects, and some carry other concerns – with 
MAOIs, for example, there are dietary considerations, as patients must avoid a high tyramine 
diet (as a result, there are restrictions on wine, cheeses, etc.).  The side effects are frequently a 
barrier to medication compliance; further, in patients with concomitant substance abuse 
problems, medication compliance suffers due to the psychopharmacologic properties of alcohol, 
street drugs, and prescription drugs used improperly.  In dually diagnosed patients – patients with 
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182 Kandel, p. 1216 
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comorbid psychiatric disorders and substance abuse disorders – medication compliance 
frequently takes second priority to self-medication.  Self-medication is frequently used as a 
coping mechanism for other psychosocial and medical problems (e.g., a patient who drinks 
because he has pancreatitis, and thereby exacerbates his condition, or a patient with 
schizophrenia who uses cocaine to stop the voices, only to discover that the voices get worse184). 
Psychotherapy 
There are a variety of mechanisms utilizing psychotherapies (“talk therapies”).  A full 
presentation of the available talk therapies is well beyond the purview of this dissertation; such a 
project would require a book in and of itself.185  There are, however, several popular approaches, 
which can be covered succinctly.186 
Cognitive-behavioral therapy, developed by Alfred Beck, enjoys widespread practice, 
and a body of literature exists suggesting that it is an effective means of treating depression.  
Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) suggests that the emotional reactions a patient has towards 
stressful situations is not a result of the situation itself, but rather the result of a specific thought 
the patient had.  In essence, the patient would automatically interpret a situation or event, 
creating a thought reaction to the event.  This reaction gives rise to an emotional response (anger, 
frustration, depression, anxiety, etc.).  CBT suggests that by exploring the reaction (an 
                                                 
184 An excess of dopamine frequently causes the onset of auditory and visual hallucinations (a side effect found 
while exploring therapeutic vs. toxic doses of L-dopa in Parkinson’s disease); cocaine is dopaminergic, causing a 
spike in already high dopamine levels, which makes the auditory/visual hallucinations worse. 
185 E.g., Gerald Corey, Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy, Sixth (Belmont: Brooks/Cole, 2001); 
Corey, Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy; Combined Treatments for Mental Disorders, edited 
by Morgan T. Sammons and Norman B. Schmidt (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2001). 
186 The treatment modalities discussed below are in no way indicative of the limits of available therapies; these have 
been selected from the author’s personal experience as being appropriate for consideration in an acute care facility.  
Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic perspectives, family therapy perspectives, etc. are all germane and useful 
therapeutic interventions, but tend to require longer periods of intervention.  Cognitive-behavioral and individual 
psychotherapies can be introduced and taught on a short-term basis, offering rapid psychological treatment to 
compound pharmacological treatments.  Acute care facilities may consider group therapies useful in a variety of 
house medicine situations (e.g., in oncology units, neurological units, internal medicine wards, etc.) as a supplement 
to the medical care being offered, in light of the demonstrated prevalence of comorbid depression in common 
medical illnesses and its effects on recovery and immunology. 
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‘automatic thought’ like “They’re laughing at me” or “They don’t like me”), we can see whether 
it represents a true assessment of a given situation or whether it represents what Beck calls a 
“cognitive distortion” – a misrepresentation of the situation to oneself.  CBT suggests that 
depression is the result of cognitive distortions, and leads to a negative bias in decision-making; 
by addressing the underlying distortions, the patient can improve her mood.187  As discussed 
later, CBT is one of the recommended psychotherapeutic interventions for new stroke patients.   
Goal-oriented interventions (especially Alfred Adler’s Individual therapy) are also 
suggested in combating depression and self-destructive behavior.  The therapist is non-
judgmental, and attempts to build rapport with the patient, exploring the patient’s life goals 
(conscious and subconscious).  The basis of belief is that the patient wishes to move from a 
subjectively inferior to a subjectively superior position (to get better physically, get a better job, 
earn more money, earn more respect, develop a healthy relationship from a dysfunctional one, 
etc.), and it is the therapist’s role to explore these goals, and the means to them, with the patient.  
If barriers to these goals can be identified, life changes can result which will allow the patient to 
overcome those challenges.  In a depressive disorder, the patient may not necessarily be able to 
objectively assess her situation; the therapist can provide a means of finding solutions to the 
problem presently inaccessible to the patient as a result of her condition.   
 Group therapies and process-oriented therapies are also popular in many acute care and 
outpatient clinics.  A supportive environment is provided to several patients experiencing 
common problems, and discussion of personal challenges, individual progress and regress, and 
problem-solving solutions are discussed.  Access to group and process treatments may not 
                                                 
187 We will return to the theme of cognitive bias and distortion in later discussions on depressive realism, which 
suggests that individuals with mild and moderate forms of depression can actually produce more realistic 
assessments of control than individuals with severe depression, mania, hypomania, or baseline mood and affect. 
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necessarily be available to patients in critical care settings, and as such, may not be appropriate 
recommendations. 
Somatic interventions 
 The type of mechanical intervention most referenced and stigmatized is electroconvulsive 
therapy.  So-called “shock therapy” is the oldest mechanical intervention, and that which gave 
rise to the current interest in non-pharmacological, non-psychotherapeutic interventions.  
Contemporarily, ECT is significantly different from its rather barbarous past.  Patients are 
anaesthetized, with the exception of one foot, before the shock is administered (usually a fraction 
of a second).  Following the shock, the patient experiences a surge of electrical activity initiated 
in the left frontal lobe (ECT generally involves electrode placement in one of two places – either 
one on the posterior left forehead and the other on the center of the forehead, or one on the 
posterior left forehead and the other on the posterior right forehead.  In both cases, the current 
travels through the left frontal lobe.  As mentioned in the section describing neuroanatomical 
causes of depression, left frontal lobe lesions and/or hypoactivity are both linked to depressive 
symptomology.  Consequently, artificial stimulation of this area of the frontal cortex can cause 
significantly improved mood.  Kandel notes: 
ECT has been used for the longest period of time, over 50 years.  Although 
antidepressants are generally the first choice in the treatment of major depression, 
ECT is very effective.  It produces full remission or marked improvement in about 
85% of patients with well-defined major depression…On average, six to eight 
treatments given at two-day intervals over a period of 2-4 weeks usually suffice to 
produce a complete remission of symptoms.188 
 
Rush, et al., estimate that approximately 100,000 patients annually receive electroconvulsive 
therapy.189  While the procedure is generally safe, there are some cardiac concerns – ECT is 
                                                 
188 Kandel, "Disorders of Mood: Depression, Mania, and Anxiety Disorders.", p. 1213 
189 A. John Rush, et al., "Vagus Nerve Stimulation (VNS) for Treatment-Resistant Depressions: A Multicenter 
Study," Biological Psychiatry 47 (2000): 276-86, p. 276-7 
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associated with activation of the parasympathetic autonomic system (principally through 
increases in vagus nerve tone [see below]), it can disrupt or suppress heart rate, causing 
arrhythmias and brief asystole.190 
An alternative controversial somatic intervention proposed for treatment-resistant 
depressions is stimulation of the vagus nerve.  Originally developed as a treatment for epilepsy, 
direct vagus nerve stimulation involves surgical placement of an electrical stimulator beneath the 
skin in the patient’s upper left chest/shoulder.  A second incision is made nearer to the patient’s 
neck to attach the stimulating device to the left vagus nerve.  A controlled shock is then sent, 
stimulating the nerve.  The afferent nerve fibers in the vagus activate the parasympathetic 
autonomic system (responsible for returning the body to rest), along with a variety of other CNS 
structures.191  The treatment was found to be effective for patients experiencing epilepsy, but 
researchers also noted that a significant number began to experience an elevation in mood that 
was not adequately accounted for by the reduction in seizure activity.192  It was hypothesized that 
stimulation of the vagus nerve could have antidepressant effects.193 
 The vagus nerve travels extensively, and connects to several structures in the forebrain, 
as well as deeper structures involved in autonomic responses and emotional regulation.  The 
exact therapeutic methodology of vagus nerve stimulation is presently idiopathic, but it is 
hypothesized that artificial stimulation of the vagus nerve leads to changes in neurotransmission, 
specifically in serotonin, norepinephrine, gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA), and glutamate, all 
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of which are “implicated in the pathogenesis of major depression.”194  While there have been 
cases in which vagus nerve stimulation has had the desired anti-depressive effect, there are also 
cases in which no significant reduction in depressive features was realized, and at least one case 
in which the implant may have caused a depressive reaction.  Clearly there is more to be 
researched, and the role of the vagus nerve in influencing mood ought to be more fully 
explored.195 Other mechanical interventions relying on direct stimulation of the nervous system 
(like deep brain stimulation, in which “a thin electrode is inserted directly into the brain and 
different currents are applied at varying depths until the desired effects are found”196) have been 
suggested as possible future therapeutic interventions.  Therapeutic interventions that are less 
invasive (e.g., transcranial magnetic stimulation) are also presently being explored.197 
Depression in Medical Illness 
There are a variety of medical conditions which give rise to depressive illnesses.  
Comorbid depression can be caused by neurological conditions, cerebrovascular conditions, 
metabolic conditions, endocrine conditions, autoimmune conditions, infections, and 
neoplasms.198  Citing J.L. Cummings199, Kaplan and Sadock note a variety of medical 
dysfunctions that can cause the onset of depression (Figure 2)200: 
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Figure 2: Neurological and Medical Causes of Depression 
 
Neurological Disorders 
Extra pyramidal diseases 
• Parkinson’s disease 
• Huntington’s disease 
• Progressive supranuclear palsy 
Alzheimer’s Disease 
Cerebrovascular disease 
Cerebral neoplasms 
Cerebral trauma 
CNS infections 
Dementia 
Migraine 
Multiple sclerosis 
Epilepsy 
Narcolepsy 
Hydrocephalus 
Sleep apnea 
Wilson’s disease 
 
Systemic disorders 
Infections 
• Viral 
• Bacterial 
 
Endocrine Disorders 
Adrenal (Cushing’s, Addison’s diseases) 
Hyperaldosteronism 
Menses-related 
Parathyroid Disorders (hyper- and hypo-) 
Postpartum 
 
Thyroid Disorders (hypothyroidism and apathetic hyperthyroidism) 
 
Inflammatory disorders 
Systemic lupus erythematosus 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 
Temporal arteritis 
Sjögren’s syndrome 
 
Vitamin deficiencies 
Folate 
Vitamin B12 
Niacin 
Vitamin C 
Thiamine 
 
Other Disorders 
Cancer 
Cardiopulmonary disease 
Renal disease and uremia 
Systemic neoplasms 
Porphyria 
Klinefelter’s syndrome 
Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) 
Postpartum mood disorders 
Postoperative mood disorders 
 
Further, depression comorbid with a medical condition can greatly increase the risk of suicide.201  
The DSM notes that the prevalence of affective disorders in medical illness is rather high – on 
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average, 25%-40% of individuals with a neurologic condition (such as Parkinson’s disease, 
Huntington’s disease, multiple sclerosis, stroke, Alzheimer’s disease, etc.) will develop a 
depressive illness during the course of their illness.  In general medical conditions, this rate 
fluctuates greatly, with an 60% estimated prevalence of comorbid depression in Cushing’s 
syndrome to an 8% estimated prevalence of comorbid depression in end-stage renal disease.202  
Comorbid depression is frequently masked by medical illnesses, but there seem to patterns in 
symptomology – complaints of fatigue and lassitude have frequently been linked to some manner 
of psychiatric illness.  Victor and Ropper note that: 
In one series, 85 percent of persons admitted to a general hospital and seen in 
consultation by a psychiatrist for the chief complaint of chronic fatigue were 
diagnosed, finally, as having anxious depression or anxiety neurosis.  In a 
subsequent study, Wessely and Powell found similarly that 72 percent of patients 
who presented to a neurologic center with unexplained chronic fatigue proved to 
have a psychiatric disorder, most often a depressive illness.203 
 
They note that patients presenting with medical or neurological illness rarely discuss feelings 
like sadness or despair without mentioning concomitant physical disabilities or symptoms (e.g., 
fatigue, anxiety, loss of appetite, sleep continuity disturbances, etc.).  When these conditions are 
present, they suggest that there may be a concomitant depressive episode.204  In fact, they 
strongly suggest that endogenous depression should be suspected in every chronic case of illness 
or disability.205  What follows is a general discussion of commonly presenting medical 
conditions which can give rise to comorbid affective illness. 
MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS 
Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a disease affecting the myelin sheath of axons.  Symptoms 
include motor weakness, partial paralyzation (paraparesis), abnormal sensations or lack of 
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sensation (parasthesias), visual impairment, double vision (diplopia), abnormal oscillations of the 
eyes (nystagmus), difficulty in speech production (dysarthria), intention tremor, loss of balance 
(ataxia), impairment of deep sensation, and bladder dysfunctions.206  Early-onset symptoms 
include weakness or numbness in one or more limbs, a tingling feeling during passive flexion of 
the neck, pain in the lower back or limbs, partial or complete vision impairment/loss (optic 
neuritis), inflammatory and demyelinative lesions of the spinal cord (transverse myelitis), loss of 
balance or stability in movement (cerebellar ataxia), vertigo, facial pain or numbness, 
paresthesias, and disorders of urination (micturation).207 
Epidemiology 
 In the United States, MS has a prevalence that varies from 6-14 per 100,000 to 30-80 per 
100,000, dependent upon one’s geographic location208 - the overall rate in western countries is as 
high as 1 in 1,000.209  Chwastiak et al note that it is “the most common chronic disabling CNS 
[central nervous system] disease in young adults.”210  MS tends to affect younger adults more 
than the elderly – two thirds of MS cases first present symptoms between the ages of 20 to 40.211  
There is a genetic link, approximately 15% of MS cases have an affected relative (siblings with 
the same parents have the highest risk (two to three times higher than siblings with only one 
parent in common).212 
Course of the Illness 
 MS results in progressive neurological damage and dysfunction.  While some remission 
occurs after each attack (even complete remission in some cases), the morbid and mortal nature 
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of the illness is undeniable.  MS assaults the patient in a series of attacks, each resulting in 
greater levels of CNS deterioration as the lesions accumulate.213  These attacks are episodic, and 
tend not to be a steady decline from the initial onset of the condition (only about 10% of the 
cases are a continuous decline from the first attack).214  As these attacks accumulate, the patient’s 
cognitive and adaptive abilities decline, increasing the difficulties they face: 
Impairment could be seen whether neurological involvement was mild or severe, 
suggesting that cognitive impairments were sometimes present early in the 
disease.  Peyser et al. stress that cognitive impairments in multiple sclerosis can 
be subtle, need not be apparent to the patient, and are liable to be missed in the 
routine neurological evaluation.  From the above it seems clear that patients with 
the disease have not only to adapt to progressive physical disability, but must 
often do this against a background of progressively diminishing intellect and 
impaired adaptive capacity.215 
 
Patients typically survive over 30 years – only a small number of patients die within the first few 
months or years.216 
Rates of depression 
The incidence of comorbid depression in MS is significant.  Chwastiak et al note that 
studies have indicated as many as 1 in 2 patients with MS will experience an episode of major 
depression: 
Depression may be more common in multiple sclerosis than in other chronic 
neurological conditions.  Epidemiologic studies of patients at specialty clinics 
have indicated that the lifetime risk of major depression in multiple sclerosis is 
between 22.8% and 54.0%.  Small studies also suggest a wide range for the point 
prevalence of depression in multiple sclerosis, 27%-54%.  These studies have 
used a variety of screening measures to detect depression and have been 
conducted in specialty clinics, which may not be representative of the underlying 
population.  Risk factors for major depression in multiple sclerosis were identified 
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in one study and included female gender, age less than 35 years, family history of 
major depression, and a high level of stress.217 
 
These numbers are indicative of only one of the disorders within the spectrum of depressive 
symptomology.  The overall prevalence of depressive disorders is likely higher as the inclusion 
criteria are widened.218  While the disease is a chronic condition of long duration, the risk of 
depression is not principally linked with the amount of time the patient carries the diagnosis.  
While there is some risk of comorbid depression in newly diagnosed patients, the likelihood of a 
major depressive episode decreased as the time since the diagnosis increased.  Chwastiak et al 
note that “the lower prevalence of severe depressive symptoms in patients with longer durations 
of multiple sclerosis suggests that patients may adapt to illness over time.  Subjects who were 
within 1 year of the diagnosis of multiple sclerosis were more often severely depressed.”219  As 
such, while physicians ought to concern themselves with newly diagnosed cases of MS, they 
should not be as concerned with patients who have carried the diagnosis for longer periods of 
time.  Instead, comorbid depression seems to be primarily dependent upon the severity of the 
resulting dysfunction: 
 In this large community sample of persons with multiple sclerosis, severity of 
multiple sclerosis was more strongly associated with depressive symptoms than 
was duration of illness or pattern of progression…These findings are consistent 
with longitudinal findings on chronic mental illness and normal aging that suggest 
that depressive symptoms and major depressive disorder develop as functional 
impairment increases.220 
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The overall risk of comorbid depression is markedly different for patients with mild, moderate, 
and severe resultant dysfunctions.  They note that in one study “the odds of depressive symptoms 
in subjects with intermediate illness was three times that of the group with minimal severity of 
multiple sclerosis, and the odds for those with advanced severity was six times as high.”221  Last, 
the amount of social support enjoyed by the patient with MS directly affects their reaction to 
their condition.  Patients with a larger network of support (friends, family, support groups, etc.) 
tend to be more resilient in weathering illness.  As such, the most important clinical risks for 
depression are recent diagnosis, major loss of function, and limited social support.222 
Treatment options 
There are two principal methods of treatment: corticosteroids and interferon injections.223  
Corticosteroids attempt to treat the symptoms of MS, while interferons attempt to alter the course 
of the illness.   There are risks and benefits to both.  Corticosteroids have been shown to offer 
relief of many of the symptoms of MS, but there is a significant number of patients for whom 
this treatment is of no benefit.  Further, it is to be considered a short-term treatment, as “there is 
no evidence that steroids have a significant effect upon the ultimate course of this disease or that 
they prevent recurrences, so there is little justification for steroid treatment over a period of many 
months or years.”224  In fact, some of the common side effects of corticosteroid treatment are 
insomnia and depressive or manic symptoms.225  In light of what has been said above, the irony 
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of these side effects is that a patient may become depressed as a result of both his condition and 
his treatment for it. 
 The other principal treatment is the use of interferons, which can “give promise of 
modestly altering the natural history of the disease.”226  Betaseron (interferon beta-1b) has been 
shown to decrease the frequency and severity of relapses by approximately one-third, as well as 
decreasing the number and size of new lesions; further, it has been demonstrated to slow the 
progression of the disease over extended periods.227  Avonex (interferon beta-1a) has been shown 
to be equally effective, and does not require injections of the same frequency as Betaseron.228  
Copolymer I (glatiramer acetate) has been shown to be effective in patients who have developed 
a resistance to interferon beta.229  There are several potential detriments to interferon treatment, 
however.  The side effects include “flu-like symptoms” and “malaise,” questions still remain 
about the long-term effects of the treatment, and the health effects are “not overwhelming.”230 
PARKINSON’S DISEASE 
Parkinson’s disease is a condition in which dopaminergic neurons in the central nervous 
system are progressively damaged, leading to progressively worsening muscle rigidity and 
tremors.  It is idiopathic, but several possible etiologies have been proposed, including 
environmental influences, infections, and genetic predispositions.  The classic triad of 
parkinsonian symptoms consists of tremor, muscular stiffness, and bradykinesia.231 The principle 
marker of Parkinson’s disease is damage to the substantia nigra (specifically the pars compacta) 
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– a dopamine creation, storage, and transport mechanism.232  The substantia nigra transports 
dopamine to various locations in the corpus striatum (deep gray matter in the central nervous 
system).  Dopamine elevations and deficiencies have been correlated to depression, euphoria (as 
in cocaine intoxication), and psychosis (extreme excess of dopamine).  When the corpus striatum 
has a severely reduced dopamine level, the affected brain cells are prevented from performing 
their normal inhibitory function.233  Parkinsonian symptoms then develop, leading some to label 
parkinsonism as a state of “brain dopamine depletion.” 234 
Epidemiology 
In the United States, Parkinson’s disease affects approximately 1% of the population over 
the age of fifty (approximately 500,000 people in 1991,235 approximately 1,000,000 in 2002236).  
Overall, the prevalence is approximately 100 per 100,000 people less than fifty years old and 
1,100 per 100,000 for people older than eighty.237  It rarely affects individuals under the age of 
forty.238  Chow and Cummings note that it is the most commonly encountered extrapyramidal 
movement disorder. 239  Men tend to develop the condition more than women,240 and the disease 
apparently is not isolated to any one particular region or environment.241  Race does seem to play 
a factor in susceptibility; the prevalence in white populations tends to be higher than in other 
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races.242  As the disease remains idiopathic, it cannot be stated with absolute certainty the means 
by which a patient develops the condition.  Twin studies have demonstrated that there may be a 
genetic component to the development of the disease,243 but this is not absolute or beyond 
question;244 current literature suggests that approximately 10% of Parkinson’s is familial with 
specific genetic defects.245 
Course of the illness 
 The difficulty of properly diagnosing Parkinson’s disease is in its gradual onset.  The 
symptoms may appear so mild as to escape detection or to be misdiagnosed.  Duvoisin notes that 
“The beginning is usually so insidious and the progression so gradual that it can rarely be dated 
precisely…Indeed, progression is so gradual that little if any changes can be seen from one year 
to the next.”246  The duration of Parkinson’s varies, but most patients tend to be disabled within 5 
to 7.5 years;247 only one-third of Parkinson’s patients have mild and/or stable symptoms beyond 
10 years. 248  Parkinson’s is highly debilitative and ultimately fatal; death typically results from 
aspiration pneumonia or other infections.249 
 Parkinson’s disease can be exacerbated by dementia, and there is a significant amount of 
comorbidity dependent upon age.  Victor and Ropper note that while the frequency is dependent 
upon the patients selected and type of testing, an average of 10-15% of Parkinson’s patients have 
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comorbid dementia, and this frequency increases to nearly 65% above 80 years of age. 250  They 
also note that MRI studies have demonstrated lesions in cerebral white matter in patients with 
comorbid dementia.251  Harrison, et al., found a similar rate of comorbid dementia.252  Kaplan 
and Sadock suggest that the rate is higher (20-30%), and that measurable cognitive impairment 
can be found in an additional 30-40% of patients.253 
Rates of Depression 
 As noted above, Parkinson’s affects the levels of dopamine in the corpus striatum by 
damaging and inhibiting the dopaminergic qualities of the substantia nigra; dopamine 
insufficiency has been linked to depressed mood and anhedonia.254  Chow and Cummings note 
that: 
According to a two-pronged model of dopamine deficiency in depression, 
dysfunction in the dopamine-mediated reward system induces anhedonia (the 
‘reduced capacity to experience reward or pleasure’), while the dysfunction of 
serotonin pathways exacerbates abnormalities in the levels of dopamine via 
neurotransmitter interactions.  Anhedonia may reflect a dysfunction in positive 
reward mechanisms, whereas negative reward systems are mediated by opioid 
receptors and may contribute to the dysphoric component of depression.255 
 
Parkinson’s disease leads to depletion in both dopamine and serotonin, as such, it can lead to 
depression by multiple pathways. 
 The rate of depression in Parkinson’s disease varies greatly, dependent upon the source, 
scope of depressive criteria, diagnostic criteria employed (e.g., DSM-III-TR or DSM-IV-TR), 
and reporting methodology.  Chow and Cummings cite one community-based study which 
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reported depressive symptoms meeting DSM-III-TR standards for Major Depressive Disorder in 
only 7.7% of the patients, but noted that approximately 46% demonstrated mildly depressive 
symptoms.256  They also note that “the estimated rate of clinically important depression in 
patients with PD (37%) is more than twice that seen in medically ill patients.”257  They note 
further that the rate of major depression increases dramatically in cases of advanced Parkinson’s 
patients who are not receiving antiparkinsonian treatment; 40-60% experience major depression 
“regardless of the duration of illness or degree of physical disability.”258  Kaplan and Sadock rate 
the incidence of comorbid depression at 30% overall,259 and 50% in elderly Parkinson’s 
patients.260  Lavretsky and Kumar suggest that the prevalence falls somewhere between 20-40%; 
half of these patients meet the criteria for Major Depressive Disorder, while the remainder 
exhibit features consistent with minor depression and Dysthymia.”261 Victor and Popper set the 
incidence of major depression at approximately 25-30%.262  Chwastiak, et al., note that the use of 
a structured psychiatric interview demonstrated in several studies yielded comorbid depression in 
41-49% of patients with Parkinson’s disease.263  Harrison, et al., note a range of 23-50% of 
comorbid depression, dependent upon the cohort and testing methodology.264  In light of the 
above figures, for the purposes of this dissertation it seems safe to set a prevalence of comorbid 
depression at approximately 40%.  
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 The difficulty of assessing rates of depression is complicated by the symptoms – they can 
mimic or be masked by the signs of Parkinson’s.  Weakness and fatigue are present in both 
depression and Parkinson’s, and apathy and anergia can produce bradykinesia.  Further, the most 
prevalent therapeutic intervention for Parkinson’s – L-dihydroxyphenylalenine (L-dopa) – can 
produce psychiatric dysfunction, including depression.265  Further, they note that: 
Paucity of movement, unchanging attitudes and postural sets, and a slightly stiff 
and unbalanced gait may be observed in patients with an anergic or hypokinetic 
(‘retarded’) type of depression.  Since as many as 25 to 30 percent of 
parkinsonian patients are depressed, the separation of these two conditions may be 
difficult.  The authors have seen patients who were called parkinsonian by 
competent neurologists whose movements became normal when antidepressant 
medication or electroconvulsive therapy was given.266 
 
Clearly it seems necessary that proper diagnostic measures must include assessment for 
depression in addition to medical examination and history of the illness. 
Treatment 
 As noted above, Parkinson’s is a fatal condition – at present, there is no curative 
treatment.  Rather, “the goal of treatment is to relieve symptoms and keep the patient functional 
as long as possible.”267  The current standard of care is treatment with L-dihydroxyphenylalenine 
(L-dopa).  L-dopa has produced the most consistent results and has been demonstrated to be the 
most effective treatment for Parkinson’s disease in comparison with other drug therapies 
(dopamine agonists, anticholinergics, and antihistamines).268  L-dopa acts as a dopamine 
replacement; while the levels of dopamine are depleted, the remaining nigral cells can still 
convert L-dopa to dopamine (the neurons in the striatum that respond to the nigral cells remain 
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receptive to dopamine).269  L-dopa is frequently administered with carbidopa, which maximizes 
the amount of L-dopa to reach the nigral cells (L-dopa can be converted to dopamine in 
peripheral tissues (outside the nigral cells), which can decrease the total amount of dopamine that 
reaches the striatum).270 
While this therapy is effective for most patients, there are several concerns.  First, the 
number of dopamine-converting nigral cells diminishes, and the striatal target neurons become 
overly receptive to dopamine.  The consequence of this is a decreased response to L-dopa and 
excessive dyskinesias.271  Second, the most common consequence of L-dopa therapy is the 
inevitable appearance of secondary disorders.  Victor and Ropper note: 
The most common and troublesome effects of L-dopa, requiring individualization 
of therapy, are end-of-dose failure, the “on-off” phenomenon, and the induction of 
involuntary movements – restlessness, head wagging, grimacing, lingual-labial 
dyskinesias, and choreoathetosis [continuous movements] and dystonia [painful 
posturing] of the limbs, neck, and trunk.  The on-off phenomenon refers to an 
unpredictable change in the patient, in a matter of minutes or from one hour to the 
next, from a state of relative mobility to one of complete or nearly complete 
immobility.  These disorders eventually appear in about 75 percent of patients 
within 5 years.  Above a certain daily dose, which varies from patient to patient, 
very few patients escape these effects, forcing a reduction in dosage. [italics in the 
original; definitions are the author’s]272 
 
Further, L-dopa itself can cause psychiatric reactions in 15 to 25% of patients (particularly the 
elderly) ranging from depression to psychosis, delusions, and suicide.273 
Alternate therapies have been suggested that target acetylcholine instead of dopamine.  
Anticholinergic medications seek to decrease the amount of acetylcholine in relation to 
dopamine.  This treatment is less common, but it appears to manage the symptoms of patients 
who cannot tolerate L-dopa as their primary pharmacological intervention.  Victor and Ropper 
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note that successful results can be achieved with a variety of anticholinergics in treating 
Parkinson’s (trihexyphenidyl (Artane), benzotropine mesylate (Cogentin), Amantadine (an 
antiviral agent with anticholinergic properties), and ethopropazine (Parsidol)).274  Some 
antihistamines are also employed to augment treatment, such as diphenhydramine and 
phenindamine.275  There are, however, side effects with anticholinergic treatment – memory 
impairment, confusion, auditory/visual hallucinations, and bradyphrenia (slowing mental 
processes) – which can deter their use.276 
 A third alternative has been surgical treatment – a neurosurgeon will create lesions on 
specific areas of the brain.  This surgery involves stereotactic damage either to the globus 
pallidus or subthalamic nucleus, and tends to be used in the treatment of patients with advanced 
disease or who respond poorly to medications. 277,278  The surgery has the best results on patients 
with unilateral tremor or rigidity, and has the least effect on “postural imbalance and instability, 
paroxysmal akinesia, bladder and bowel disturbances, dystonia, and speech difficulties.”279  The 
long-term benefits of surgery are unclear – the procedure only relieves some of the symptoms, 
while the disease itself continues to advance.  Patients have found that some benefits are lost 
within a year or two.280 
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DEMENTIA 
 Dementia is a disorder frequently associated with advancing age.  It frequently involves a 
progressive loss of mental faculties with a variety of etiologies.281  Victor and Ropper describe it 
as follows: 
[T]he term dementia (literally, an undoing of the mind) denotes a deterioration of 
all intellectual or cognitive functions with little or no disturbance of 
consciousness or perception.  Implied by the word is the idea of a gradual 
enfeeblement of mental powers in a person who formerly possessed a normal 
mind.282 
 
The most common associated sign of dementia is a progressive loss of short and long-term 
memory.283  Butler, et al., note that these changes can also hallmark a demonstrable shift in other 
aspects of the individual, including changes in “judgment, intellectual abilities, activities of daily 
living, and in some cases, personality”284; Kaplan and Sadock expand upon this list, noting 
changes in “general intelligence, learning and memory, language, problem solving, orientation, 
perception, attention and concentration, judgment, and social abilities.”285  The DSM notes that 
these deficits cannot simply be minor inconveniences – they must represent a significant 
impairment in social or occupational functioning, and they must represent a significant change in 
the person’s ability to function.286  The specific changes are variable dependent upon the type of 
dementia and areas of the brain which are affected.  Rapp and Bachevalier note that there are, at 
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present, approximately fifty disorders known to cause dementia.287  Most of these dementing 
illnesses are of insidious onset – the change is gradual and protracted; often it is difficult to note 
when the first symptoms appeared. 
 Knowledge deficits seem to be a natural consequence of advancing age – neurons die off 
at a significant rate without any environmental causes.  Some sources rate this loss as high as 
nearly 20 million neurons per year.288  This loss, however, does not immediately translate into 
deficits in “crystallized” intelligence.  This is to say that knowledge we have acquired over the 
years is not affected.  The deficit appears, however, when we attempt to learn something new – 
“fluid” intelligence diminishes with aging.289 As such, the onset of senility is not an inevitable 
result of advancing age.  Neuron death is selective – there are regions of the brain that remain 
relatively unaffected by aging – the cerebellum and the brainstem incur very little to no neuronal 
death, while the cortex can experience daily losses of up to 50 thousand neurons.290  Fortunately, 
however, there are several million “reserve neurons” which can take up the responsibilities of the 
dead cells.  The only instances in which abnormal loss occurs usually involves trauma (injury), 
infection, neurological insult (e.g., stroke), or nutritional deficits (e.g., malnutrition, alcoholism, 
etc.).291 
 Dementia typically manifests itself first in the fifth or sixth decade of life, followed by a 
progressive deterioration.292  The age and rate of deterioration vary with the type of dementia 
encountered, and approximately 10 to 15 percent of dementias can be stopped or reversed.293,294  
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In patients with Alzheimer’s disease – the most common degenerative disease of the brain295 – 
the mean survival rate is approximately eight years (this can vary, and has been estimated to vary 
considerably – as short as one year and up to twenty years).296  In general, Alzheimer’s disease 
involves a series of neurological lesions – an abnormal aggregation of senile plaques and 
neurofibrillary tangles in and around the neurons of several CNS structures, particularly the 
neocortex, entorhinal region, hippocampus, amygdala, nucleus basalis, anterior thalamus, and 
areas of the brain stem.297  These lesions have significant neurological consequences – entorhinal 
cortex, medial temporal cortex, and hippocampal abnormalities have been suggested as the basis 
of the memory impairment in Alzheimer disease. 298  These abnormalities are complicated by the 
functional impairments associated with insult to the association areas of the neocortex and the 
basal forebrain cholinergic system.299  Behavioral and affective disturbances have been linked to 
insult to the limbic cortex (the limbic system is the basis of emotion), amygdala, thalamus, and 
the brain stem. 300 
 In addition to the lesions described above, marked brain atrophy is suggestive of 
Alzheimer’s disease.  The brain normally atrophies with age, but this tends not to be inimical of 
any particular dysfunction (see the discussion of normal neuronal death above).  When this 
atrophy is severe and diffuse, however, credence is lent to a suggested diagnosis of Alzheimer’s 
disease. 301  Certainty in the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease normally is only obtained post-
mortem, when an examination of the patient’s brain is possible.  However, criteria have been 
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proposed for research purposes and to establish inclusive/exclusive criteria for diagnosis.  Victor 
and Ropper note: 
The National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke 
(NINCDS) and the Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Diseases Association 
(ADRDA) have proposed the following diagnostic criteria: (1) dementia defined 
by clinical examination, the Mini-Mental Scale, the Blessed Dementia Scale, or 
similar mental status examination; (2) the age of patient (over 40 years); (3) 
deficits in two or more areas of cognition and progressive worsening of memory 
and other cognitive functions – such as language, perception, and motor skills 
(praxis); (4) absence of disturbed consciousness; and (5) exclusion of other brain 
diseases…Using these criteria, the correct diagnosis is achieved in more than 85 
percent of patients.302 
 
Drislane, et al., also suggest that “elevated tau protein and low Ab-42 levels in the cerebrospinal 
fluid (CSF) have been suggested as early diagnostic markers for AD,”303 while Price suggests 
that CT and MRI scans of the medial temporal lobe may reveal structural abnormalities and 
decreased blood flow, both of which can be predictive of Alzheimer’s.304  Victor and Ropper 
also note that in the later stages of the disease, MRI scans can reveal profound atrophy of the 
hippocampus, which they suggest lends credence to an Alzheimer’s diagnosis.305  There are, 
however, difficulties in the differential diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease.  They note that the 
most frequent barrier to appropriate diagnosis is distinguishing Alzheimer’s disease and other 
dementias from late-life depression – both can involve symptoms like anergia, memory loss, 
sleep disturbances, etc.  This is further complicated by occasional comorbidity – both dementia 
and depression can be found in the same patient, which makes it difficult to distinguish which 
conditions is responsible for which neurological/psychosocial symptoms.306 
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Epidemiology 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common cause of dementia in older populations,307 but 
the prevalence of dementia varies with age and location. In 1992, the National Institute of 
Neurological Disorders and Stroke and the National Institute of Mental Health estimated that 5% 
of the population age 65 and over are severely demented, with an addition 10% mildly to 
moderately demented.308  Half of these dementias were of the Alzheimer type.309  In 1996, 
Murray and Lopez suggested a point prevalence of 888 cases of dementia per 100,000 people in 
established market economies (resulting in a prevalence of about 0.88%),310 compared with a 
point prevalence of 357 cases per 100,000 people globally (0.36% globally).311 Seven years later, 
Zubenko, et al., suggested that the rate of Alzheimer’s disease is significantly higher – 8% to 
15% of the current population over the age of 65, with more expected as the current population 
ages.312 Bird’s estimates fall within this range,313 while other studies assess the overall rate of 
Alzheimer’s as significantly higher – many have suggested prevalence as high as 17%-40% of 
the population over the age of 80-85.314  This dissertation follows the epidemiological 
assessment by Kaplan and Sadock, as it represents a middle ground in the estimates provided.  
They suggest that: 
In the United States, approximately 5 percent of people older than age 65 have 
severe dementia and 15 percent have mild dementia.  Of those older that age 80, 
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approximately 20 percent have severe dementia.  Of all patients with dementia, 50 
to 60 percent have the most common type of dementia, dementia of the 
Alzheimer’s type.  About 5 percent of everyone who reaches age 65 has dementia 
of the Alzheimer’s type, compared with 15 to 25 percent of everyone age 85 or 
older.315 
 
The incidence of Alzheimer’s disease increases with age, and several sources have suggested that 
it will pose a growing concern in the next 15 years. 316 
Most of those affected by Alzheimer’s disease are over the age of sixty, but cases have 
been found in every period of life.317  The physiological manifestations of Alzheimer’s disease 
parallel the neurological effects of other conditions, suggesting a similar process occurs in a 
younger age with individuals affected by trisomy 21 (Down syndrome – see below) and other 
familial forms of early-onset Alzheimer’s disease.  Further, risk may be sex-linked, as women 
have a disproportionate incidence of the disease.318 
Physiology 
Alzheimer’s disease presents with both behavioral and physiological signs and 
symptoms.  Looking at the behavioral/psychosocial manifestations first, the patient typically 
presents with signs of dementia (significant enough to interfere with social/occupational 
functioning), an insidious onset of symptoms (progressive, irreversible, and so gradual as to 
make difficult any particular date of onset), and an absence of other potential dementias 
(established by history, physical examination, and testing).319  The physiology of Alzheimer’s 
disease is marked by reductions in brain volume, widening of sulci (fissures in the brain), 
decrease in the levels of specific neurotransmitters,  and the presence of neurofibrillary tangles 
and neuritic plaques – atrophy is particularly marked in the cortex, hippocampus, amygdala, and 
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thalamus.320  The effects on the hippocampus lead to perhaps the most marked psychosocial 
changes – because the hippocampus is a central structure in memory formation and recall, 
changes in its function can adversely affect a person’s ability to recall old and form new 
memories.321  Alzheimer’s disease is normally of insidious onset, and memory disturbances are 
generally the first signs to appear.  There are also concomitant changes in neurochemistry – 
deficits can be found in the enzymes which synthesize the neurotransmitters dopamine, 
norepinephrine, and, to a lesser extent, acetylcholine.322 Similar to the reduction in hippocampal 
volume, a decreased level of choline acetyltransferase, the enzyme which synthesizes 
acetylcholine, can affect memory – a common side effect of anticholinergic medications. 
Zubenko, et al., suggest that because the etiology of Alzheimer’s disease is 
heterogeneous, it may be more accurate to describe our current understanding of Alzheimer’s not 
as a particular disease, but rather as a syndrome.323  The cause of Alzheimer’s is presently 
idiopathic, but a variety of explanations have been proposed, including “neurochemical factors, 
such as deficiencies of the neurotransmitters acetylcholine, somatostatin, substance P, and 
norepinephrine; environmental factors, such as aluminum and manganese; trauma; genetic 
factors; and viral factors such as slow-growing central nervous system viruses.”324  There appear 
to be genetic ties to some forms of Alzheimer disease, linked to the interaction of amyloid 
precursor protein (APP) and Apolipoprotein alleles (ApoE – discussed below), referred to as the 
amyloid hypothesis.  Victor and Ropper suggest that there are legitimate questions which remain 
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to be answered concerning the presence of neurofibrillary tangles and neuritic plaques – 
depending upon the pathogenesis of Alzheimer’s, the tangles and plaques may be secondary 
characteristics of the condition, rather than causative characteristics.325  Regardless, they note 
that the amyloid hypothesis remains the most compelling explanation. 
Plaques/Tangles/Amyloid Protein 
In addition to the behavioral signs of dementing illness, the hallmark pathophysiological 
signs of Alzheimer disease are atrophy of the brain, neurofibrillary tangles, and neuritic plaques, 
each of which is summarized below.  In general, there seems to be a dysfunction of 
neuroanatomy and neurochemistry; there is a marked dysfunction of tau protein in the case of 
neurofibrillary tangles and of amyloid beta-protein in the case of the neuritic plaques.326  The 
tangles and plaques can adversely affect the inter- and intracellular communication of neurons.  
The tangles and plaques seem to preferentially affect the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex 
initially, later spreading to other areas of the CNS.  These plaques and tangles are normal signs 
of aging, but when present in an abnormal amount, are indicative of a deeper pathology.327  
Similar processes of neuritic plaques and neurofibrillary tangles occur in other diseases, but 
specific attention has been paid to trisomy-21 (Down Syndrome), due to the presence of 
immature plaques in youth and mature neuritic plaques and tangles in the patient’s thirties and 
forties. 
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Neurofibrillary tangles [NFTs] are intercellular aggregations of phosphorylated tau 
protein that surround the neural nucleus and extend towards the dendrites.328  Bird notes that tau 
“may function to assemble and stabilize the microtubules that convey cell organelles, 
glycoproteins, and other important materials through the neuron.”329  The tangles consist of 
paired helical filaments constructed from cytoskeletal protein in the neuron.  Alterations in 
cytoskeletal structure can disrupt the cells ability to traffic material and neurotransmission, 
resulting in dysfunction and neuronal death.330  These filaments are not explicitly linked with 
Alzheimer’s – there are several neurological disorders in which they manifest (e.g., progressive 
supranuclear palsy, frontotemporal dementia, etc.).331  However, in combination with the neuritic 
plaques (see below), they are one of the hallmark signs of Alzheimer’s disease. 
Neurofibrillary tangles and neuritic plaques (see below) seem to be normal signs of 
aging.  The key difference (i.e., the mark of a dementing illness) is found in the number of these 
tangles and plaques; the higher the number, the greater the severity of the dementia.332  These 
filaments are so numerous and dense that the cell body can appear swollen with a displaced 
nucleus.333 The NFTs normally first affect the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex, suggesting 
that they initially target the anatomical bases of declarative memory, leading to a disruption of 
memory of ongoing events.334  As the disease progresses, the tangles expand into areas 
responsible for “language, semantic knowledge, abstract reasoning, and other capacities.”335 
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One of the hallmark signs of Alzheimer disease is the presence of neuritic plaques; these 
plaques are protein fragments – approximately 40 amino-acid long collections of amyloid-beta-
protein (Aβ protein).336  These plaques were first observed by Alois Alzheimer scattered 
throughout the cortices of his patient.  These neuritic plaques are extracellular; unlike the 
neurofibrillary tangles, they are found outside of the neuron, typically surrounded by dystrophic 
neurites.337  The dystrophic neurites are malformed dendrites and axons (sections of the neuron 
which receive synaptic transmissions and which carry the nerve impulse, respectively; axons 
release neurotransmitters into a junction between the axon and the dendrite of another neuron to 
transmit an inhibitory or excitatory signal).  At the core of these plaques, one typically finds 
microglial cells (inflammatory cells), while around the outside one typically finds reactive 
astrocytes – glial cells found most often in injured areas of the CNS.338  The core of the plaque 
can contain several different forms of Aβ, including Aβ42 which is prone to aggregation.339 
There are a variety of diseases that result in deposition of amyloid filaments (called 
amyloidoses); these filaments are constituted by differing types of protein fragments, dependent 
upon the disease in question. 340  Selkoe argues that while the identity of the cell types which 
produce beta-APP [amyloid precursor protein] are unknown, plausible causes can be found in 
platelets, endothelial cells, neurons, and glial cells.  He suggests: 
If these cells synthesized either excess or altered forms of beta-APP, some of 
those molecules might be broken down by an alternative enzymatic pathway, 
thereby liberating large fragments that contain the amyloid beta-protein.  Over 
time, I suspect, these fragments are further cleaved by proteases to release the 
intact amyloid beta-protein, which then accumulates in the extracellular spaces of 
the brain in the form of diffuse plaques.  Because of local tissue factors in the 
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cerebral cortex and other brain regions important for cognitive function, a 
minority of these diffuse plaques becomes increasingly filamentous and compact.  
The addition of so-called beta-amyloid-associated proteins – some of which have 
already been identified – and the activation of nearby microglia and astrocytes 
probably contribute to the maturation of the plaques.341 
 
Waxman and deGroot note that Aβ is neurotoxic, and suggest that “recent studies suggest (but 
have not yet conclusively proved) that deposition of abnormal amyloid beta protein triggers 
neuronal death in Alzheimer’s disease.”342  APP has been shown to have a variety of effects, 
both neurotrophic and neuroprotective.343 
Several authors have noted a link between trisomy-21 (Down Syndrome344) and 
Alzheimer’s disease.345  Upon their death, many individuals with Down Syndrome exhibit 
similar plaques in their CNS; while they are not the mature neuritic plaques exhibited in 
Alzheimer’s disease, it has been suggested that these patients ultimately would exhibit similar 
pathophysiology.346  These plaques occur at a significantly younger age than the average age of 
onset for Alzheimer’s disease; Victor and Ropper note their presence in the third and fourth 
decade of life,347 while Selkoe has noted them in patients in their teens and twenties.348  It has 
been suggested (and will be explored in greater detail below) that specific alleles of 
apolipoprotein on chromosome 21 can be linked with a greater prevalence of Alzheimer’s 
disease. 
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Neurochemistry 
There are a variety of chemical changes that occur as a result of Alzheimer’s disease.  
Neurotransmission is fundamentally affected, as both the enzymes which synthesize 
neurotransmitters as well as the neurotransmitters themselves are reduced.  Specific deficiencies 
have been noted in the neurotransmitters acetylcholine, somatostatin, substance P, 
norepinephrine, serotonin, cholecystokinin, and corticotrophin, as well as the enzyme choline 
acetyltransferase (which synthesizes acetylcholine).349  Along with the neurochemical deficits, 
functional losses abound, included inhibited uptake and functioning of a variety of receptors 
(e.g., nicotinic cholinergic receptors, GABAergic functions, etc.).350  The cholinergic deprivation 
is noteworthy, given that a common side effect of anticholinergic medications (medications 
regulating and reducing the level of acetylcholine) is memory loss.  This anticholinergic effect is 
compelling, but not causative.  Pliska notes that therapies aimed at increasing the cholinergic 
functions of the brain have been shown to be of limited benefit in the treatment of Alzheimer’s 
(see below), but that they do not alter the prognosis or course of the illness.351  Structural 
changes have been attributed to the loss of specific neurotransmitters – Zubenko, et al., note that: 
Projections from the dorsal and median raphe nuclei provide extensive 
serotonergic innervation of the forebrain.  The noradrenergic cells of the locus 
ceruleus project axons widely to both the neocortex and the hippocampus.  
Alzheimer’s disease is associated with the loss of neuronal cells from both of 
these nuclei, and a substantial fraction of those that remain develop neurofibrillary 
tangles.  The neurochemical correlates of this process include decrements in the 
levels of these amine neurotransmitters and their metabolites, their respective 
biosynthetic enzymes, and in the presynaptic reuptake of both neurotransmitters 
in their projection areas.352 
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Hence, in the process of disrupting cognitive function and memory recall, Alzheimer’s disease 
affects the cells ability to synthesize, transmit, and receive both neurotransmitters as well as their 
enzyme precursors. 
Genetics 
Significant research has gone into explorations of the human genome in explaining the 
prevalence of Alzheimer’s disease.  Current research is focusing on marker genes at several 
locations (alleles on chromosomes 1, 12, 14, 19, and 21).353 Evidence suggests that up to 40%-
70% of Alzheimer patients have a familial history of the disease, lending credence to the genetic 
hypothesis.354  Further, twin studies have demonstrated that there is a significantly higher 
correlation of Alzheimer’s disease between monozygotic versus dizygotic twins (43 percent 
versus 8 percent, respectively).355  Price notes that, in general: 
Five principal genetic risk factors for Alzheimer disease are known: (1) mutations 
in the APP gene on chromosome 21; (2) mutations in the presenilin 1 gene on 
chromosome 14; (3) mutations in the presenilin 2 gene on chromosome 1; (4) 
alleles for the ApoE positioned on the proximal long arm of chromosome 19; and 
(5) possibly a mutation or polymorphism in a gene on chromosome 12 that 
encodes alpha-2 macroglobulin.  Any of the first three mutations is associated 
with early onset of the disorder in the third through sixth decades.356 
 
It is also possible that these genetic risk factors may interact – for example, it is possible that an 
allele of ApoE may influence production of beta-amyloid; dysfunctions in this process could 
give rise to the neuritic plaques and neurofibrillary tangles evidenced in Alzheimer’s disease and 
older adults with Down syndrome (see below).  Contrary to Price, however, Victor and Ropper 
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suggest that the only potential genetic marker for Alzheimer disease is the abnormal 
apolipoprotein allele.357 
Presenilins/APP Mutations 
Close attention is currently being paid to the genes responsible for the production of the 
amyloid precursor protein.  Selkoe suggests that there is a causative role between beta-amyloid 
abnormalities and the onset of Alzheimer diseases.358  Bird notes that there is correlation 
between APP abnormalities on chromosome 21 and Alzheimer’s disease in adult Down 
syndrome patients, supporting Selkoe’s optimistic assessment.359  In fact, multiple mutations in 
the APP gene have been correlated with a small percentage of the cases of Alzheimer disease.360  
Despite Selkoe’s optimism and Bird’s support, the role of normal amyloid in the brain is unclear; 
however, it has been suggested that while “the normal amyloid stimulates neuron proliferation 
and enhances the effects of nerve growth factors, the abnormally long amyloid produces the 
mutation that causes neuron death.”361 
In addition to the APP abnormalities noted above, two candidate genes called presenilins 
have been suggested as causative of early onset forms of Alzheimer disease.  All of the known 
mutations of presenilin-1 and presenilin-2 increase the production and deposit of the longer 
amyloid protein.362  Price notes that approximately 30% of the cases of early-onset Alzheimer 
disease are linked to the presenilin-1 gene, but the mechanism by which the mutations in 
presenilins lead to Alzheimer disease is not yet known.363  There are, however, specific proteins 
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derived from presenilin mutations which are present in higher quantities in affected patients than 
in controls.364 
Apolipoprotein E 
Links between the gene apolipoprotein-E (a regulator of lipid metabolism, found on 
chromosome 19) and Alzheimer disease are currently being explored.365  Several sources have 
linked ApoE ε4 and the formation of neurofibrillary tangles and neuritic plaques, suggesting that 
ApoE it forms binds with tau protein or APP.366  Bird notes that “in a group of AD patients, 
approximately 40 to 65% have at least one ε4 allele, a highly significant difference compared 
with controls,”367 but cautions that “ε4 is neither necessary nor sufficient as a cause of AD.”368 
There are several alleles of the ApoE gene; the most prevalent form in Caucasians is the ε3 
allele, found in 75% of the Caucasian population, followed by alleles ε4 and ε2 at 15% and 10%, 
respectively.369  The risk of Alzheimer’s disease appears to be dependent upon which allele an 
individual inherits.  It has been suggested that individuals with one copy of the ε4 allele carry a 
risk four times higher than the general population, while individuals with two copies of the ε4 
allele are eight times as likely to develop Alzheimer’s.370  Several sources have noted that the 
ApoE ε4 allele is not a proven cause of later development of Alzheimer disease, but it can be 
noted as a risk factor. 371 
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Familial Alzheimer’s Disease 
Part of the current research into the genetics of Alzheimer’s disease involves exploring 
family-linked early-onset forms of Alzheimer’s disease.  Mutations in the presenilin-1 gene (PS-
1, on chromosome 14) are causally linked with approximately 40% to 70% of early-onset 
familial Alzheimer’s disease (FAD).372  PS-1 mutations tend to cause onset around the age of 45 
with a mean duration of 6-7 years, while presenilin-2 (PS-2, on chromosome 1) mutations tend to 
cause onset of the disease around the age of 53 years with a duration of 11 years.373  The normal 
functions of the proteins these genes encode and the effect they have on Alzheimer’s disease are 
currently unknown.374  Mutations in the gene is associated with higher levels of Aβ amyloid, 
suggesting a link with the production of APP375 and, perhaps, with a higher risk for developing 
neuritic plaques.  Defects on chromosome 21 involving the beta-APP (amyloid precursor 
protein) have also been linked to familial Alzheimer’s disease, despite it’s correlation with only a 
small percentage of proved familial cases.376 
Course of the Illness 
As indicated above, Alzheimer’s disease results in progressive loss of executive and 
motor function, culminating in a state of extreme dependency.  It is characterized by an insidious 
loss of memory, judgment, and emotional stability.  Difficulties in assessing the onset of 
Alzheimer’s disease are magnified by the likelihood of a significant “pre-clinical” phase in 
which the symptoms are unnoticed or not present.377  Estimates of its duration range from 4-12 
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years378 to as high as 10-15 years379, but wide variations exist – Bird for example notes that the 
duration can vary from 1 to 25 years.380  Some patients show a consistent pattern of decline, 
while others have periods in which their degeneration plateaus; ultimately, however, the end is 
the same.  The duration is also contingent upon outside factors such as when the diagnosis is 
made (i.e., early, middle, or late stage), as well as the type of care the patient receives after the 
diagnosis is made.  Attention paid to details such as proper nutrition and hydration, as well as 
attention to skin integrity in bed-bound patients, hygiene, wound care, urinary tract infections, 
etc. can lengthen the survival of an Alzheimer’s patient.  These are especially important as death 
frequently results not from the dementing illness itself, but rather from secondary infections, 
medical conditions, or malnutrition, thus, as Butler states “people do not die of Alzheimer’s per 
se…they die with Alzheimer’s.”381 
Early 
The early stages of Alzheimer’s disease typically involve a mild loss of memory and 
difficulty learning new tasks.382  Most frequently this is attributed to age, and is not given much 
notice, unless it is pronounced or happens to occur at roughly the same time as a head injury, 
medication change, or illness.383  These memory difficulties typically involve recent memories, 
older memories remain relatively intact.  The patient’s behavior typically becomes more docile 
and apathetic – patients tend to exhibit difficulty in motivating themselves to do novel or 
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unfamiliar tasks, and may withdraw from social situations.384  Personal hygiene may also begin 
to deteriorate.385 
Middle 
As the disease progresses to the middle stage, there is increased impairment in cognitive 
function (e.g., in abstract thinking), memory, and language.386  The patient is no longer able to 
work and requires supervision.  Routine behaviors may be unaffected, as well as social 
interaction and superficial conversation, but there is frequent difficulty in expression – the 
patient finds it increasingly difficult to say what they want to say.  Verbal instructions may not 
be followed, and it may not be clear as to whether the instructions were forgotten or 
misunderstood.387  Behavioral shifts occur – the patient may become more irritable or aggressive, 
with symptoms worsening towards the evening (referred to as “sundowning”).388  Personal 
attention may wane, and the patient may require increased assistance with dressing and personal 
hygiene. 
Late 
 Late in the course of the illness, profound and broad cognitive and psychosocial 
impairment exists.389  The patient is frequently bed-ridden, and there occasional seizures in about 
5% of patients.390  They require increasing assistance with bathing, dressing, voiding, and other 
activities of daily life.391  The patient may forget how to use common objects while retaining the 
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motor coordination necessary to use the objects.392  It has been this author’s experience that 
simple objects like utensils present profound challenges to the Alzheimer’s patient – the spoon is 
used backwards, upside-down, like a knife, etc.  Dressing the patient appropriately is a challenge, 
as the patients in this author’s care will resist efforts to disrobe and wash soiled clothing, 
preferentially putting clean clothing directly over the soiled clothing, becoming very agitated in 
the process.  Basic language skills are gone, as well as recent memory and most remote 
memories.393  The patient frequently is mute and incontinent as bowel and bladder control is 
frequently lost.394  Only the most habitual and automatic actions are retained – patients cannot 
execute verbal, written, or imitative commands (termed “ideational” and “ideomotor 
apraxia”).395  It is at this state that secondary infections and comorbid illnesses most frequently 
cause death.396 
Treatment 
There is presently no curative treatment for Alzheimer’s disease.397  Treatment currently 
revolves around management of secondary conditions (medical problems, psychosocial and 
behavioral problems, etc.) as well as therapies designed to address specific physiological 
difficulties (e.g., hyperbaric oxygenation of the brain) and extend plateau periods (e.g., 
postponing memory loss for a few months).  Identification of psychosocial stressors can prevent 
unnecessary escalation of a patient’s behavioral problems, as well as facilitating care and 
allowing for more effective treatment.398  Some patients show a modest response to 
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acetylcholinesterase inhibitors (12-20%), which can stabilize – but not improve – a patient’s 
condition for several months, but these drugs are not beneficial in later stages.399  Future 
strategies are examining hormone replacement, reduction of oxidative damage, as well as 
prevention of the formation of the neuritic plaques.400 
Comorbid Depression 
There is a significant rate of comorbid psychiatric dysfunction in conjunction with 
dementing disorders, principally involving depression and psychosis.401  Rates of comorbid 
depression historically have varied.  Class, et al., suggest that comorbid depression can be found 
in approximately 10% to 30% of patients with Alzheimer’s disease, 402 while Zubenko, et al., 
note historical studies with a range as great as 0% to 86%.403  Zubenko, et al., suggest generally 
that approximately half of Alzheimer’s patients experience major depression in their lifetime, 
and that approximately one-third develop major depression after the onset of cognitive 
impairment.404  They further suggest that “the major depressive syndrome of Alzheimer’s disease 
may be among the most common mood disorders of late life.”405  Class, et al., note that it is 
likely that depression may go unnoticed in long-term care settings, because the concomitant 
passivity is not seen as a behavioral problem.406  It has been this author’s experience that most 
commitments (voluntary and involuntary) from long-term care facilities are due to overt 
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behavioral problems (e.g., violence towards staff or over threats of suicide), rather than unvoiced 
depression. 
Victor and Ropper note that depression in Alzheimer’s makes it difficult to posit what 
symptomology is attributable to which condition, as memory impairment is common to both.407  
Further, depression has a variety of consequences that complicate an existing medical diagnosis.  
Zubenko, et al., note that it “increases the suffering of patients and their families, produces 
excess disability, promotes institutionalization, and hastens death.”408  They note, however, that 
there may be mitigating factors – the physiological changes that occur may actually prevent 
future episodes of depression: 
This last observation [that patients with Alzheimer’s disease have relative 
preservation of the cholinergic neurons in the basal forebrain than innervate the 
hippocampus and neocortex] is interesting in the context of Alzheimer’s disease, 
since the progression of the central cholinergic deficit that occurs in this disorder 
may interact with the pathophysiology of depression to limit the development of 
major depressive episodes in later stages of this disorder.  Several lines of 
evidence from published autopsy studies suggest that these neuropathological and 
neurochemical correlates of major depression in Alzheimer’s disease have relative 
specificity for this mood disorder and differ from those associated with psychosis, 
exposure to psychotropic medications, and the neurodegeneration in Alzheimer’s 
disease more generally.409 
 
As such, while the disease may lead to depressive disorders initially, as the patient is both aware 
of the loss and of the progressive nature of the disease, as it progresses the physiological damage 
it inflicts may salve the psychosocial and emotional trauma of earlier stages. 
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Other Behavioral Disturbances 
There are other complicating features of Alzheimer’s disease – other aberrant behaviors 
can develop as the disease progresses.410  In addition to the depression noted above, Alzheimer 
patients may develop auditory/visual hallucinations, paranoid ideation, and other psychoses.411  It 
has been this author’s experience that Alzheimer disease markedly increases aggressiveness in 
patients, particularly after sunset, accompanied by verbalized statements of fear, anger, and/or 
accusations of persecution or theft of property.  Butler, et al., suggest that “up to 70% of patients 
with dementia develop symptoms of psychosis within seven years of getting the diagnosis.”412  
Concomitant psychosis exacerbates incapacity and cognitive dysfunction in Alzheimer’s disease, 
and compounds the difficulties in intellectual function already experienced, leading to conditions 
referred to as “excess disability states.”413 
STROKE 
An overview of a cerebral vascular accident (CVA, or stroke) must begin with a quick 
summary of neural vasculature; the brain consumes a significant portion of the total blood 
volume – approximately 18% of the total blood volume goes to the brain,414 despite its minute 
percentage of the total body weight.  The brain also uses approximately one-fifth of all the 
oxygen absorbed in the lungs, and requires a constant supply of oxygen – irreparable brain 
damage occurs within five minutes of cerebral anoxia.   
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The brain is supplied by two sets of arteries – two internal carotid and two vertebral 
arteries.415  The internal carotid arteries supply the cerebrum with blood and oxygen, with each 
carotid dividing into an anterior and middle cerebral artery.  The middle cerebral artery supplies 
the bulk of the lateral surface of the cerebrum, while the anterior cerebral artery supplies the 
majority of the sagittal surface of the brain (brain regions on the midline area of the cerebral 
hemispheres).416  Occlusion of a cerebral artery results in contralateral deficits (e.g., occlusion of 
the right carotid artery causes weakness and sensory loss on the left side of the body).  Occlusion 
of the anterior cerebral artery affects sensorimotor functions in the lower part of the body, while 
occlusion of the middle cerebral artery affects sensorimotor functions in the upper parts of the 
body.417  The vertebral artery supplies the cerebellum and the ventral portions of the cerebrum, 
but it undergoes several name changes along the way.418  The two vertebral arteries fuse into a 
single artery called the basilar artery.  The basilar artery splits into two posterior cerebral arteries 
at the base of the circle of Willis (a roughly circular collection of cerebral and communicating 
artery pairs near the pituitary gland), and branches out throughout the cerebellum and 
ventrolateral cerebra.  These branches are referred to as the superior cerebellar arteries, anterior 
inferior cerebellar arteries, and the posterior inferior cerebellar arteries.419  Occlusion of the 
basilar artery results in total blindness, as it supplies blood to the visual cortex.  Occlusion of one 
vertebral artery may not have any resultant deficits, as additional blood is supplied by the other 
vertebral artery.420  Occlusion of the cerebellar arteries result in brainstem damage.421  There are 
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a host of veins that return blood to the heart – perhaps the most familiar is the jugular vein, into 
which the other veins empty.  There are, however, veins emptying from all over the pia mater, 
cerebrum and cerebellum.  Less attention will be given to blood return, as the primary 
pathophysiology of stroke involves the arteries. 
When this blood flow is compromised, either by damage or hemorrhage, the patient 
suffers an ischemic or hemorrhagic accident.422  Ischemia causes a rapid loss of ATP, resulting in 
a buildup of potassium in the extracellular space in the central nervous system.  This 
overabundance of potassium depolarizes the neurons, resulting in massive release of a variety of 
neurotransmitters (including excitatory neurotransmitters), which leads to a toxic buildup of 
calcium, a proposed explanation of neuronal cell death.423  If this ischemic attack is brief, the 
damage may be reversible; if, however, it is prolonged, the neurons die and neurologic deficits 
result (the specific deficit will depend on the location of the infarct; see below).  Several terms 
are used to refer to cerebral vascular accidents – transient ischemic attack (TIA), stroke, and 
reversible ischemic neurologic deficit (RIND) – but Drislane, et al., note that these labels are 
“arbitrary and somewhat meaningless,” as there is no clear correlation for the rough time interval 
they are meant to denote.424 
Most infarcts are caused by vascular narrowing or occlusion, cerebral embolism, 
prolonged hypertension, hypotension, drugs (illicit drugs like cocaine and amphetamines, as well 
as prescription drugs like heparin or warfarin), vascular malformation, disease (like amyloid 
angiopathy, which affects blood vessel walls), or inflammation.425  Most of the atherosclerotic 
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changes in cerebral arteries occur in the neck and brain.426  It is a progressive condition, and has 
been linked to disturbances in metabolism and blood pressure.427  In the case of embolism or 
occlusion, the blood supply is interrupted by a foreign particle (clot, fat, tumor, etc.) which plugs 
or constricts the artery, resulting in infarction and cell death – a common cause is atrial 
fibrillation.428  Further, high blood pressure can result in vasculature change; the blood vessel can 
become distended in smaller branches – an increase in blood pressure can then breach these 
distensions, resulting in cerebral hemorrhage.429  The resultant hemorrhage can damage 
surrounding tissue as the blood clots, compressing the tissue beneath, causing further 
neurological deficits.430  Hemorrhages can occur in a variety of locations in the brain and the 
protective tissues surrounding it.   
In addition to the bone of the skull, the brain is protected and supported by several layers 
of meninges.  The outermost layer is referred to as the dura mater, a tough, somewhat flexible 
tissue.  Beneath the dura matter is the arachnoid layer, separated from the lowest layer – the pia 
mater – by the subarachnoid space, a porous layer with filaments resembling a spider’s web.  The 
pia mater conforms to the folds and fissures of the brain, both covering the brain’s exterior 
surface as well as the surface of the ventricular spaces within.  Hemorrhages in the subarachnoid 
space are normally found in individuals with normal blood pressure; the aneurysms leading to 
hemorrhage usually are the result of minor trauma, congenital defects, or infections.  
Complications of subarachnoid hemorrhages can lead to increased pressure on the brain and 
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cerebral infarction.431  Subdural hemorrhage (hemorrhage between the brain surface and the 
dura) can result from even minor trauma (children and adults with cerebral atrophy are at 
particular risk because of age-related vascular properties).  While the bleeding from the 
hemorrhage may be reabsorbed, there are risks that it may become encapsulated or calcified. 432  
Epidural hemorrhage (outside the dura) typically results from major trauma and/or skull fracture 
resulting in an arterial bleed.  If this bleeding is not controlled, it can put pressure on the brain, 
leading to significant neurological deficits.433  Profound neurologic deficits can also result from 
low blood pressure (hypotension) as a result of hypovolemia or cardiac failure – this type of 
damage tends to be more perfused than that of a localized ischemic event, low blood volume 
affects a variety of areas at once.434   
 The symptoms of a stroke can vary greatly.  Individuals suffering a cerebral vascular 
accident can present with the most commonly associated symptoms like slurred speech, blurred 
vision, hemiparesis or weakness, or headache, but can also experience symptoms as diverse as 
seizures, progressive focal deficits, aphasia of several sorts, sensorimotor deficits or loss, neglect 
of one side, auditory/visual/olfactory/tactile deficits, subjective distortion of space, limb 
alienation, memory loss, ataxia, apraxia, vomiting, decreased arousal, neck stiffness, and 
syncope.  In fact, the type of symptoms presenting can aide the diagnosing clinician greatly in 
isolating the brain region affected by the stroke (e.g., sensorimotor loss would localize the stroke 
to the contralateral sensorimotor cortex; the type of aphasia experienced would suggest 
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localization to either Broca’s or Wernicke’s areas, etc.), as well as whether the patient had 
suffered arterial versus ventricular hemorrhage.435 
Epidemiology 
 Stroke is a major cause of death in the United States, only heart disease and cancer are 
more lethal.  Victor and Ropper note that “among all the neurologic diseases of adult life, the 
cerebrovascular ones clearly rank first in frequency and importance.  At least 50 percent of the 
neurologic disorders in a general hospital are of this type.”436 Waxman and deGroot estimate that 
every year in the United States there are 500,000 strokes (175,000 of the patients will die), and 
that 15% of admissions to chronic care facilities are due to stroke.437  Drislane, et al., and Smith, 
et al., offer a more morbid prognosis, suggesting that approximately 25%-33% of individuals 
suffering a stroke will die as a result (about 187,500 to 250,000 people each year).438  The World 
Health Organization estimates the prevalence of stroke at 9,467,000 cases in established market 
economies in the year 2000, with a global prevalence of 30,872,000 – of these, 870,000 and 
5,580,000 will die, respectively.439  Robinson and Smith, et al., warn that the prevalence of 
stroke increases with each decade of life.440  
Drislane, et al., note that “risk factors for stroke include older age, male sex, family 
history, hypertension, diabetes, smoking, hypercholesterolemia, heavy alcohol use, and cardiac 
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or peripheral vascular disease.”441  Victor and Ropper add that atrial fibrillation, hyperlipidemia, 
hypercoagulable state diseases, and the use of birth control pills also contribute to stroke 
liability.442 
Course of the Illness 
The onset of a stroke is acute – while the stenosis, occlusion, or aneurysm leading up to 
the event may develop over time, the resulting deficits are of rapid onset (thrombotic strokes tend 
to be of more insidious progression than embolic strokes).443  These lesions tend to lead to focal 
disturbances of cognitive or sensorimotor function (e.g., blurred vision, slurred or absent speech, 
hemiplegia, etc.444  The specific means of neuronal destruction can vary – some intracranial 
bleeds result in pressure on the cortices, some result in cerebral anoxia, etc.; many strokes result 
in cerebral hemorrhage, which can yield cerebral dysfunction “through a variety of mechanisms, 
including destruction of tissue, mass effect, and compression of blood vessels leading to 
ischemia.”445  Cerebral infarction involves two pathological processes – oxygen and glucose 
deficits from occlusion, and changes in cellular metabolism which destroys cellular 
membranes.446  The severity of the stroke varies widely – some result in neurologic dysfunctions 
so slight as to not warrant medical attention, some are so severe as to result in hemiplegia, coma, 
and death.447 
The resultant symptoms of the stroke can locate the location of the accident.448  Left 
hemisphere lesions tend to produce contralateral weakness and neglect, aphasia, and potential 
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deficits in reading, writing, and calculation.449  Right hemisphere lesions tend to result in 
contralateral weakness, neglect, and cortical sensory deficits.450  Left posterior cerebral artery 
lesions tend to result in contralateral visual field deficits, difficulty naming colors presented 
visually, and potential contralateral sensory deficits and difficulty reading.451  Right posterior 
cerebral artery lesions tend to result in contralateral sensory/visual losses and neglect.452  
Vertebrobasilar artery occlusion can result in both cerebellar and brain-stem dysfunction.  The 
patient may experience vertigo, diplopia, nystagmus, extremity weakness, ataxia, vomiting, 
headache, or sensory dysfunctions.453  Pure motor strokes (usually resulting from a lesion in the 
interior capsule or pons) and pure sensory strokes (usually resulting from thalamic lesions) 
involve contralateral deficits in motion/control or sensation, respectively, but tend not to produce 
other deficits (e.g., a pure motor stroke should not present with sensory deficits and vice 
versa).454  Computerized tomography (CT) scans are useful in finding localizations of the 
neurological deficits, but magnetic resonance imagine (MRI) tends to be more useful, as bone 
can obscure CT results.455 
As noted above, not all strokes require medical attention or surgical resolution.  
Sometimes the neurological deficits reverse themselves within a few hours to days; more often, 
however, the effects can take weeks to months to reverse themselves, and can leave the patient 
considerably disabled.456  The severity of the attack is dependent upon the degree of the 
occlusion and the duration of the attack.  Victor and Ropper note that: 
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[C]ertain major vessels (carotid, vertebral, and less often a cerebral artery at its 
origin) can sometimes be occluded with little or no disturbance of neurologic 
function, and at autopsy there may be complete integrity of the tissue in the 
territory of the occluded vessel.  Moreover, if infarction has occurred, it usually 
involves a zone that is smaller than the anatomic territory of supply of the artery 
in question.  The margins of the infarct are hyperemic, being nourished by 
meningeal collaterals, and here there is only minimal or no parenchymal damage.  
The necrotic tissue swells rapidly, mainly because of excessive intracellular and 
intercellular water content.  Since anoxia also causes necrosis and swelling of 
cerebral tissue (although in a different distribution), oxygen lack must be a factor 
common to both infarction and anoxic encephalopathy.  Obviously the effects of 
ischemia, whether functional and reversible or structural and irreversible, depend 
on its degree and duration.457 
 
They note that other influences can affect the severity of the injury.458  Specifically, the speed of 
the occlusion and the patient’s blood pressure can affect the opening of collateral channels; these 
channels can shunt off excess fluid, preventing anoxia and pressure damage.  Altered blood 
viscosity and osmolality may also play a role, but their influence is difficult to infer presently.  
Further, each patient has variations in their neural vasculature, and as such, there may be 
anatomical factors which alleviate or worsen the effect of a stroke.  Current research is 
examining the role of excitatory neurotransmitters during ischemia.  It has been found that 
glutamate and aspartate are released by ischemic cells, which then excite surrounding cells, 
leading to massive influxes of sodium and calcium, which it is suggested are responsible for cell 
injury and death.459 
Depression and Cognitive Dysfunction 
Depression following stroke is a serious comorbid illness.  Starkstein and Robinson note 
that “post-stroke depression is one of the most frequent complications of brain injury, and 
approximately 40% of patients with an acute stroke lesion will show either a major or a minor 
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depression.”460  After analyzing patient data from a variety of sources, Robinson has found two 
types of depression following a stroke – major depression, occurring in up to 25% of post-stroke 
patients, and minor depression, occurring in approximately 10% to 30% of post-stroke 
patients.461  There is a significantly higher mortality among stroke patients experiencing 
depression.  Previous studies have indicated that individuals experiencing a depressive disorder 
following a stroke are 3.5 times more likely to die during the first two to three years following 
the stroke.462  Robinson notes two key factors that influence post-stroke depression – treatment 
with antidepressant medication and the location of the stroke lesion (see below for discussions of 
each).463 
Kneebone and Dunmore suggest that there are significant problems in attempting 
diagnosis of depression in patients who have had a stroke.  They note that: 
Features of some strokes, such as pathological emotionalism, lethargy and 
memory impairment, can suggest depression when in fact they are common 
results of such neurological assault.  Assessment is most obviously a problem 
with those who have communication difficulties due to dysphasia or other 
cognitive losses.  In the latter case lack of awareness can also compromise PSD 
assessment.  For some individuals this is so frank that it extends to a complete 
denial of the stroke itself.  Up to 45% of those having suffered a stroke 
approximately 1 year previously have been found to minimize their mood 
disorder substantially when their responses were compared with a structured 
clinical interview modified to allow better assessment of depression in brain-
damaged individuals. Such lack of awareness has lead writers in the area to 
suggest specialist assessment strategies are required for PSD, perhaps involving a 
family member or caregiver in the process.464 
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Lyketsos, et al., suggest that two causal explanations for post-stroke depression need to be 
delineated.465  First, post-stroke depression can result from the psychosocial impairments of the 
disease process.  Second, the individual may feel depressed because of the specific 
pathophysiology of the neurological insult – critical pathways affecting mood may become 
damaged, giving rise to feelings of depression.  They suggest that both models are compelling 
and warrant further research. Nicholl, et al., found similar results, and suggest that the potential 
split between the endogenous model and the exogenous model of post-stroke depression makes 
diagnosis much more complicated.466  Predicting post-stroke depression is not easy; Lyketsos, et 
al., note that the manifestation secondary to stroke does not have a unique clinical manifestation 
– when present, it tends to parallel the manifestation of a primary depression.467  Post-stroke 
depression can be masked by some of the typical signs associated with physical infirmity, e.g., 
fatigue, anergia, etc.  Starkstein and Robinson note that difficulty with activities of daily living 
(ADLs) is not a good predictor of post-stroke depression.  Once post-stroke depression 
developed, however, the individual’s recovery of ADL functioning suffered.468  Ramasubbu, et 
al., echo this ADL deficiency, noting that “post-stroke depression during the acute phase of 
recovery adversely affects functional abilities, short-term physical therapy outcome, and long-
term functional recovery.”469 
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Epidemiology 
Starkstein and Robinson suggest that the prevalence of depression in stroke patients in 
acute stroke units, general hospitals, rehabilitation centers, and community studies falls between 
30% to 50%.470  Ramasubbu, et al., note that approximately 20% to 50% of stroke patients may 
have a demonstrable depression;471 of these 20% to 50%, only 15% of depressed stroke patients 
were identified as carrying the disease, and only 10% of those patients received antidepressant 
medication.472  Ramasubbu, et al., also note that white patients tend to be more depressed than 
other ethnic group (as per the United States Data Bank).  Hachinski suggests that depression 
occurs in approximately 50% of stroke patients.473  Van de Wag, et al., note that the reported 
rates of post-stroke depression (PSD) vary significantly, with a range from 25% to 79%, with the 
most conservative estimate of the incidence being 500,000 people with PSD in 1999 alone.474  
They suggest a general prevalence of 35% in the post-stroke patient population.475  Nicholl argue 
that despite the wide disparity in the prevalence rate, it is important to identify and treat 
depression in its early stages.476  Tateno, et al., place the rate of post-stroke depression at 23%-
40% of patients, while 7% to 57% of patients with a traumatic brain injury experience 
depression.477 
                                                 
470 Starkstein and Robinson, "Depression in Cerebrovascular Disease.", p. 30. 
471 Ramasubbu, et al., "Functional Impairment Associated with Acute Poststroke Depression: The Stroke Data Bank 
Study.", p. 27. 
472 Ramasubbu, et al., p. 29. 
473 Hachinski, "Post-Stroke Depression, not to Be Underestimated," The Lancet 353 (May 22 1999): 1728, p. 1728. 
474 FB van de Wag, DJ Kulk, and GJ Lankhorst, "Post-Stroke Depression and Functional Outcome: A Cohort Study 
Investigating the Influence of Depression on Functional Recovery from Stroke," Clinical Rehabilitation 13 (1999): 
268-72, p. 269. 
475 van de Wag, Kulk, and Lankhorst, "Post-Stroke Depression and Functional Outcome: A Cohort Study 
Investigating the Influence of Depression on Functional Recovery from Stroke.", p. 268. 
476 Nicholl, et al., "Cognitions and Post-Stroke Depression.", p. 221-2. 
477 Amane Tateno, Yuichi Murata, and Robert G. Robinson, "Comparison of Cognitive Impairment Associated With 
Major Depression Following Stroke Versus Traumatic Brain Injury," Psychosomatics 43, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 
295-301, p. 295. 
 272
 Starkstein and Robinson suggest that there are two principle risk factors for post-stroke 
depression.  Specifically subcortical atrophy and genetic markers for depression were found to be 
more frequent in patients with left hemisphere lesions.478  Nicholl, et al., expand on this list, 
noting that: 
Other risk factors that have been associated with an increased prevalence of post-
stroke depression are: subcortical atrophy, structural brain asymmetries, lesion 
volume, female gender, family or previous history of mood disorder, neuroticism 
trait, younger age, greater impairment in activities of daily life, impaired social 
support (especially support from spouse), and negative life events.  Some of them 
independently increase the prevalence of diagnosed depression following stroke, 
while others have been shown to have an additive effect.  Thus, the cause of PSD 
probably includes several mechanisms that vary with premorbid as well as post-
stroke factors.479 
 
Paradiso and Robinson note that gender may play a role in the manifestation of depression 
following a stroke, simply by virtue of a greater overall prevalence of depression in the female 
population: 
One might expect, given these gender-based differences in brain organization, that 
brain injury would affect women and men differently.  A common 
psychopathological manifestation after stroke is mood disorder.  Mood disorders 
following stroke have been proposed as a model to study affective illness in 
general.  If women are biologically more vulnerable to developing a depressive 
disorder, one might expect that a precipitating factor common to men and women 
(such as a cerebrovascular accident) would provoke more depression in females 
than males.  One would also predict post-stroke depression to be associated with 
clinical variables indicating a greater biological predisposition in females.  On the 
other hand, depression in males might be associated with nonbiological factors 
such as severity of physical and psychosocial impairment.480 
 
Women, they note, tend to respond more negatively towards impairments affecting social 
interaction, while men tend to respond more negatively to impairments in motor coordination.  
They suggest that as a result of specific correlates in the data, women with post-stroke depression 
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may respond more to psychological or somatic therapies, while men may respond more to 
physical therapy.481 
Major versus Minor Depression 
Starkstein and Robinson note that both major and minor depression tend to manifest 
following stroke, but the duration and remission vary.482  They link the presence of major 
depression with the location of the lesion (see below).  Paradiso and Robinson follow the DSM 
discussion of major versus minor depression and dysthymic disorder, noting that both present for 
the same duration, but that minor depression presents with fewer symptoms of major 
depression.483  While noting some disparities in the literature,484 they suggest that there are 
differences in the physiognomy of the younger patients, stating that they “found that minor 
depression was associated with younger age, left-hemisphere lesion location, and more caudal 
hemisphere lesions than found in nondepressed control patients.  The more caudal lesion location 
also held true when minor depression and major depression were compared.”485  They also found 
the prevalence of comorbid anxiety to be higher than non-depressed controls and lower than 
patients with major depression. 
Functional Impairment 
Several studies have explored the link between depression and functional impairments 
following a stroke.  Robinson noted that in a controlled study equalized in terms of lesion 
variables, demographics, rehabilitation efforts, and acute stroke treatment, stroke patients with 
depression showed significantly less recovery in activities of daily living than non-depressed 
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stroke patients.486  Ramasubbu, et al., noted that this was a controversial topic, in that the 
literature to date yielded inconsistencies, but found similar ADL deficits in depressed patients 
(but did not find an ADL difference between major and minor depression).487  They also noted 
that age negatively affected ADL performance, and that a significant contributor to functional 
impairment is motor loss.488  Van de Wag, et al., found a prevalence of 35% for post-stroke 
depression, and noted that the results of their study supported a hypothesis linking the presence 
of a depressive disorder with increased disability on two rehabilitation tests at both admission 
and follow-up.489  They also noted a significant negative effect of depression on the 
rehabilitation process.490   
Lesion Location/Physiological Correlation 
Several studies have been conducted exploring a possible link between the location of the 
neurological insult and any resulting affective disorder.491,492  Robinson, et al., state that: 
The clinical correlates of post-stroke depression include younger age, greater 
impairment in activities of daily living, social impairment, premorbid personality, 
prior personal or family history of psychiatric disorders, nonfluent aphasia, 
cognitive impairment, and enlarged ventricle-to-brain ratio.  Perhaps the most 
interesting and controversial correlate of post-stroke depression, however, has 
been lesion location.493 
 
They note that previous studies have suggested an inverse relation between the severity of the 
depressive episode and the distance of the lesion from the anterior edge of the left frontal lobe.494 
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Others have found similar evidence for the influence of lesion location.  Lyketsos, et al., 
have noted that left prefrontal cortical abnormalities can be found in patients with primary 
depression.  They argue that “with the exception of the neuropathology of depression in 
Alzheimer’s disease, this correlation of severity of depression with proximity of the stroke lesion 
to the frontal pole is perhaps the most consistently replicated clinical-pathological correlation in 
psychiatry.”495  Further, MRI scans have identified hyperintensitites in subcortical white matter 
and in the basal ganglia, which they suggest shows overlap in the anatomical bases of primary 
and post stroke depression.496  Paradiso and Robinson found comorbid depression in both left 
and right frontal lobe lesions, but found a greater instance of depressive disorders in patients with 
left-sided lesions, and greater severity of symptoms when the lesions were closer to the anterior 
edge of the left frontal lobe.497  They also note that minor depression was associated with more 
posterior-oriented lesions, which may involve a different mechanism of depression.498  In a 
previous study, Paradiso and Robinson also suggested a possible gender link in post-stroke 
depression, as they found a greater instance of left hemispheric lesions in women than in men.499  
In a 2-year longitudinal study, Nicholl, et al., found the severity of the depressive episode to be 
linked to lesion location, but they also suggested that the severity is time-linked, with greater 
depression occurring within six months of the accident.500   
Starkstein and Robinson also suggested monoaminergic disruption (i.e., lesions affecting 
the structures receiving the neurotransmitter, the delivery mechanism, and/or the production 
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mechanism).501  They also suggest that there may be a lateralized biogenic amine response in 
unilateral lesions.  Nicholl, et al., note that rat studies also suggest significant disruption of 
monoamine distribution in anterior lesions – specifically, the pathways for norepinephrine and 
serotonin delivery seem to be especially vulnerable.502    Starkstein and Robinson also suggest 
metabolic disruptions in depression following left anterior frontal lobe lesions, citing earlier 
studies demonstrating significantly lower glucose metabolism (indicating decreased neuronal 
activity) and dexamethasone suppression.503 
 The overall duration of the depressive reaction tends to vary depending on lesion location 
and type of depressive disorder.  Startstein and Robinson note: 
In conclusion, major depression lasts for approximately 1 year, while minor 
depression lasts for more than 2 years.  Lesion location is an important factor 
influencing the duration of PSD, and patients with subcortical or 
cerebellar/brainstem lesions have significantly briefer depressions than patients 
with lesions in the MCA [middle cerebral artery] territory.504 
 
Treatments for underlying depression and cognitive dysfunction (see below) ought to take into 
consideration this lengthy duration and is morbid effects on recovery. 
Cognitive Dysfunction 
Tateno, et al., note that several researchers have found cognitive impairments to be more 
severe in patients with major depression compared with patients with minor depression or no 
depression.505  They noted a variety of intellectual dysfunctions, and reported that while the most 
severe phase of the depression was during the acute stroke period, the depressive episode was 
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present for up to a year following the cerebral accident.506  They also suggest that aging itself 
influences cognitive function, noting that Mini Mental Status Exam scores without brain injuries 
tend to be lower than younger subjects.507  They reported that the same age-based score 
discrepancy occurred when comparing young versus elderly stroke patients with depression – 
depression did not result in cognitive deficits in younger stroke patients.508  Starkstein and 
Robinson note that the deficits: 
[W]ere most severe in tasks assessing orientation, language, visuoconstructional 
ability, executive motor functions, and frontal lobe tasks; however, no significant 
differences in cognitive performance were found between eight patients with 
major depression after right hemisphere lesions and 19 patients with a similar 
lesion location but no depression.509 
 
They suggest that lesion location might not necessarily yield different cognitive effects.  Nicholl, 
et al., suggest that stroke patients experience more negative and less positive cognitions than 
non-depressed stroke patients.510 
Other Neuropsychiatric sequelae 
There are a number of potential neuropsychiatric sequelae to stroke,511 including 
depression, anxiety, apathy, and fatigue.  These can fundamentally affect the morbidity and 
mortality of the neurological condition, and they can exert a powerful effect on the patient’s 
ability to recover.  Robinson notes that in a previous study, stroke has been linked with general 
anxiety disorder, and that a majority of patients in question also had major or minor 
depression.512  Depression with anxiety was linked with left cortical lesions, depression alone 
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was linked with left subcortical lesions, and anxiety alone was linked with right cortical 
lesions.513  Robinson also discusses a study that 22% of patients in one study displayed 
symptoms of either apathy alone or apathy with depression.514  He noted an apparent link 
between the age of the patient and the frequency of basal ganglia lesions, as well as a greater 
decrement in activities of daily life functioning in patients with both depression and apathy than 
in patients with depression or apathy alone.  Staub and Bogousslavsky suggest that fatigue, a 
common complaint in neurological patients, may be related to, be masked by or exacerbate 
comorbid depression.515  They suggest that fatigue in neurological patients (e.g., patients with 
multiple sclerosis, Parkinson Disease, stroke, etc.) be considered a potentially separate 
neurological sequela of the condition – i.e., fatigue on top of a potential depressive disorder.516 
Treatment 
At present, treatment focuses on the neurological damage concomitant to the stroke – if 
the cause of the cerebral infarction is a stenosis (e.g., more than 70% of the carotid artery), the 
course of treatment would suggest carotid endarterectomy.517  If there is no evidence of a 
stenosis, antiplatelet agents tend to be employed (e.g., aspirin); if there is concomitant coronary 
fibrillation, anticoagulants may be used, though there is a risk of further cerebral hemorrhage.518  
Therapy tends to involve limitation of the extent of the damage by blocking the NMDA (N-
methyl-D-aspartate) channel, a calcium channel receptive to glutamate that opens in ischemia, 
creating a series of secondary reactions which culminate in neuronal death.  This treatment is not 
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always effective, as it is suggested that other calcium channels are dysfunctional in addition to 
the NMDA channel.519 
 Treatment for post-stroke depression (PSD) parallels that of traditional depressive 
disorders – a combination of psychotherapeutic and pharmacological approaches tends to yield 
the best results.520  PSD tends to be associated with a number of psychosocial variables.  
Kneebone and Dunmore note that PSD risk factors include “institutionalization, divorce and pre-
stroke alcohol consumption, younger age and activities of daily living impairment and perception 
of social support.”521  They note that the relative lack of attention that the recognition of and 
treatment for PSD have received has profoundly negative impacts on recovery.522    Ramasubbu, 
et al., note that comorbid depression is frequently missed in the diagnosis and treatment of 
stroke.523  Given the effects of depression on recovery, they suggest that “depression should be 
taken into account in the evaluation and treatment of functional abilities of all stroke patients,” 
and that patients with depression have greater improvement in their activities of daily life if they 
are treated with antidepressants.524  Robinson notes that benzodiazepines (anti-anxiety 
medications) may be used in treatment of post-stroke depression, but suggests that caution must 
exercised, as post-stroke patients are vulnerable to side effects like sedation, ataxia, disinhibition 
and confusion.525  He also suggests that tricyclic antidepressants may be effective.  Nicholl, et 
al., suggest that antidepressant therapy can be contraindicated in some stroke patients, and 
suggest that cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) be employed as a possible supplement or 
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replacement to pharmacological interventions.526  Kneebone and Dunmore note that there “is 
some evidence that PSD is more a ‘depression of dementia’ than a ‘dementia of depression’, that 
is depression develops as a result of cognitive impairment, rather than is caused by it post 
stroke.”527  Therapies directed at this cognitive impairment (e.g., problem solving) can greatly 
improve the family function difficulties experienced by many post-stroke patients.528  They note 
that other forms of therapy can compliment CBT, noting that “research with depressed older 
caregivers of persons with dementia has identified interpersonal psychotherapy as more useful 
early in the process, CBT later.”529 
CANCER 
Cancer is a genetic aberration, but this is not meant in the sense of something uncommon 
or out of the realm of normal human experience.  Cancer is an aberration in the sense of the 
cell’s function; as a neoplastic disorder, it describes a condition in which the cells grow 
abnormally, out of sync or proportion with the host’s body or natural cycle of cell replacement.  
In a patient with cancer, it can lead to “a sense of betrayal by one’s own body.”530  A cancer 
diagnosis generally relies most on tissue biopsy – it is not recommended to make the diagnosis 
absent this invasive but necessary test.531  It is critical to identify malignancies early; early 
detection makes treatment easier, as well as increasing the odds of surviving.  Longo notes that 
“the curability of a tumor usually is inversely proportional to the tumor burden.”532  Given a 
variety of therapeutic interventions (including surgery, chemotherapy, radiotherapy, and 
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biological therapy), more than half of all patients diagnosed with cancer will be cured.533  There 
are, however, a wide variety of psychological sequelae to the diagnosis, involving changes in 
self-image, psychosocial function, and long-term goals.534 
Several authors have noted that nearly all cancers stem from a single cell, but that 
multiple triggers are necessary for a cell to convert from a normal to a malignant phenotype.535  
Like other illnesses, it is suggested that cancer follows the stress-diasthesis model of pathology.  
Most if not all cancer has a genetic component, but there must be some other factor present to set 
the malignancy in motion.536  Further, latent susceptibility to cancer does not follow strictly 
Mendelian patterns, and specific risks to particular types of cancers can vary in differing 
populations.   
Several types of genes are involved in the production of cancer.  Genes that promote 
normal cell growth are called protooncogenes; once the protooncogene is activated through 
mutation or dysregulation, it is converted into an oncogene.537  Protooncogenes can be converted 
to oncogenes through several mechanisms – point mutations, DNA amplification, and 
chromosomal alterations can all cause upregulation of protooncogenes to active oncogenes.538  
At the opposite end of the genetic spectrum are the genes which inhibit cell growth, called tumor 
suppressor genes.539  Tumors are produced when the tumor suppressor genes are dysfunctional – 
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the cause of most cancers.540  A third type implicated in cancer involves genes which repair 
DNA, as DNA can experience mutation errors in transcription during cell division.541 
 Cell growth itself is not a sign of malignancy – cell growth and division is a natural 
process and part of the body’s ability to heal, grow, and develop.  Cell growth is malignant, 
however, when two key properties are evidenced: Fenton and Longo note first that cell growth 
unregulated by external signals is characteristic of all new growth tissues (termed neoplasia, 
which may be benign or malignant); second, malignant neoplasia occurs when the new growth 
invades other tissues and metastasizes to other distant sites.  Cancer, they note, is synonymous 
with malignant neoplasia,542 and is “most common in tissues in tissues with rapid turnover, 
especially those exposed to environmental carcinogens and whose proliferation is regulated by 
hormones.”543 
 Cell growth normally is naturally limited – Fenton and Longo note that on average each 
somatic cell can replicate itself about 30 times (the Hayflick limit).544  Each replication involves 
a loss of some DNA from the end of the DNA chain (the loss occurs in tandem repeats of a six 
nucleotide sequence called telomeres (the sequence is three guanine nucleotides, two thymine 
nucleotides, one adenine nucleotide)).  The replication of telomeres is performed by telomerase, 
an RNA-dependent polymerase.  Germ-line cells express their own telomerase, which can, in 
theory, allow for unlimited replication.  Normal somatic cells, however, do not produce their 
own telomerase, hence the natural limit on the number of potential replications for each somatic 
                                                 
540 Fenton and Longo, "Cell Biology of Cancer.", p. 510. 
541 Collins and Trent, "Cancer Genetics.", p. 503. 
542 Fenton and Longo, p. 509. 
543 Fenton and Longo, p. 510. 
544 Fenton and Longo, p. 510. 
 283
cell.  It has been proposed that a dysfunction in telomerase production is implicated in the 
process of malignant neoplasia.545 
 Cells normally are self-regulating in their life and death cycle.  A variety of mechanisms 
exist that prevent cell growth from becoming neoplastic.  A transcription factor called p53, for 
example, is normally not needed in cell reproduction, and as a result is shuttled out of the cell 
nucleus to degrade.  However, when DNA damage occurs, it builds up in the cell and either halts 
cell cycle progression (allowing for repair) or initiates self-destruction in the cell (a process 
called apoptosis).  There are a variety of mechanisms of p53 activity, including hypoxia, DNA 
damage, ribonucleotide depletion, telomere shortening, and dysregulated oncogene activity.  
Mutation of p53 is the most common genetic aberration in human cancer (found in greater than 
50% of human cancers).546 
 Overexpression or increased signaling of tyrosine kinase-linked pathways are also linked 
with human cancer.  Fenton and Longo note that about 30% of human cancers have a mutation in 
the ras protein.547  In addition to ras, other overexpressed tyrosine kinase receptors include EGF 
receptors, IGF-I receptors, HER-2/neu, and mutations in the Ret receptor.548 
 There are other physiological processes involved in cancer.  Neovascularization – the 
formation of new capillaries – is a normal process of wound repair, muscle repair, reproduction 
and embryonic development.  These processes, however, are normally self-limiting.  In 
pathologic angiogenesis, however, the growth of new vasculature is unregulated.  When this 
unregulated angiogenesis continues for extended periods of time (months/years), it supports the 
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growth of solid tumors and leukemias, facilitates inflammatory diseases, and leads to 
hemorrhages and intraperitoneal bleeding, among other angiogenic disease processes.549  
Folkman notes that non-angiogenic lesions exist in a far greater percentage of the population 
than is diagnosed with a tumor – a small percentage of these convert to angiogenic tumors after 
long periods of time.550  The shift to an angiogenic form of the tumor is denoted by increased 
tumor mass (to a detectable level), localized bleeding, and tumor metastasis.  Four triggers of 
angiogenesis have been found: avascular carcinomas stimulate neovascularization in adjacent 
vasculature; circulating endothelial cells may localize around the tumor, stimulating 
angiogenesis; tumors may induce other cells to overexpress angiogenic factors like vascular 
endothelial growth factor (VEGF); or preexisting vessels may be accessed by the tumor.551  
Folkman notes that once tumors have switched to an angiogenic phenotype, they rarely revert to 
the nonangiogenic phenotype.”552 
 There are a variety of psychosocial sequelae to a diagnosis of cancer; some are very 
specific (e.g., disfigurement in head and neck cancers or breast cancer; impotence following 
prostate cancer surgery), others are generalized, and applicable regardless of the site or type of 
cancer (e.g., depression or anxiety following diagnosis or anticipatory anxiety in the face of a 
potential recurrence or metastasis – what Longo refers to as the “Damocles syndrome”).553  
Psychological sequelae will be covered in greater detail below.  Physical pain can be a 
significant concern for cancer patients.  Longo notes that: 
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Pain occurs with variable frequency in the cancer patient: 20 to 50% of patients 
present with a pain at diagnosis, 33% have pain associated with treatment, and 
75% have pain with progressive disease.  The pain may have several causes.  In 
about 70% of cases, pain is caused by the tumor itself – by invasion of bone, 
nerves, blood vessels, or mucous membranes or obstruction of a hollow viscous or 
duct.  In about 20% of cases, pain is related to a surgical or invasive medical 
procedure, to radiation injury (mucositis, enteritis, or plexus or spinal cord 
injury), or to chemotherapy injury (mucositis, peripheral neuropathy, phlebitis, 
steroid-induced aseptic necrosis of the femoral head).  In 10% of cases, pain is 
unrelated to cancer or its treatment.554 
 
As such, there are a variety of concerns secondary to the disease process that need to be managed 
in a patient with cancer.  Understanding of the disease process, treatment options, influence of 
lifestyle, self-image, and risk of recurrence are but a handful of the multifaceted care cancer 
demands. 
Epidemiology 
The epidemiology of cancer varies in accordance with the type of malignancy in 
question.  Overall, Longo notes that: 
In 2000, 1.2 million new cases of invasive cancer (619,700 men, 600,400 women) 
were diagnosed and 552,300 people (284,100 men, 268,100 women) died from 
cancer…Cancer incidence has been declining by about 2% each year since 1992.  
The most significant risk factor for cancer overall is age; two-thirds of all cases 
were in people over age 65.  Cancer incidence increases as the third, fourth, or 
fifth power of age in different sites.  For the interval between birth and age 39, 1 
in 62 men and 1 in 52 women will develop cancer; for the interval between ages 
40 and 59, 1 in 12 men and 1 in 11 women will develop cancer; and for the 
interval between ages 60 and 79, 1 in 3 men and 1 in 4 women will develop 
cancer.  Cancer is the second leading cause of death behind heart disease…Along 
with the decrease in incidence has come an increase in survival for cancer 
patients.  The 5-year survival for white patients was 39% in 1960-1963 and 61% 
in 1989-1995.  Cancers are more often deadly in blacks; the 5-year survival was 
48% for the 1989-1995 interval.  Incidence and mortality vary among racial and 
ethnic groups.  The basis for these differences is unclear.555 
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Uchitomi notes that lung cancer is the “most common cancer and the most common cause of 
cancer-related death in the world.”556  This claim is supported by the World Health 
Organization’s Global Health Statistics, in which tracheal/bronchial/lung cancers account for 
1,331,000 projected deaths globally in 2000557 (stomach cancers were next on the list at 
1,010,000 projected deaths558, followed by liver cancer at 703,000 projected deaths559, colorectal 
cancers at 592,000 projected deaths560, and esophageal cancers at 493,000 projected deaths561).  
For a more complete picture of the projected global epidemiology of neoplastic disorders, please 
see Global Health Statistics. 
Epidemiology of Depression 
Psychological sequelae of cancer are significant concerns in treatment – comorbid 
psychological illness can fundamentally affect a patient’s ability to recover or fight the illness.  
Katz, et al., note that depression is a common issue in depression; they note that “depression is 
thought to be one of the most common psychosocial sequelae of cancer and the most likely 
reason for referral to a mental health professional.  While transient states of dysphoria are part of 
the expected response to a life threatening illness, prevalence rates of clinically significant 
depression have varied widely, with reported rates between 1-53% in published studies.”562  
Overall, they note a commonly cited prevalence between 20-30% of a comorbid depressive 
disorder in cancer patients.563  Sellick and Crooks cite studies noting that 47% of cancer patients 
met the criteria defining a psychiatric illness; of this 47% “13% of the 47% met the criteria for 
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major depression and 68% had an Adjustment Disorder characterized by anxiety or 
depression.”564 They further note that it would, in fact, be surprising if a patient did not 
experience a spectrum of psychological sequelae consistent with a diagnosis of depression.565  
Ciaramella and Poli suggest that comorbid depressive disorders occur in 5-40% of cancer 
patients,566 and in their own reports, they find a comorbid rate of major depression of 28%.567  
Longo notes an overall rate of comorbid depression of approximately 25%, but this rate may 
fluctuate in patients who are more compromised.568  McQuellen, et al., note that “up to 30% of 
patients report moderate to severe levels of anxiety and depressive symptoms at their initial 
outpatient visit.”569   
Individual rates of depression based on different types of cancer can vary.  Uchitomi, et 
al., found a rate of approximately 15% of comorbid major or minor depression in non-small cell 
lung cancer.570  In older adults, Deimling, et al., note that approximately 13-25% of cancer 
survivors experience clinically significant levels of depression.571  Kaguya, et al., found that 
among patients with head and neck cancers, “66.4% of the patients met criteria for a psychiatric 
diagnosis, and 16.8% showed psychologic distress (adjustment disorders or major depression)” 
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based on DSM-IIIR criteria.572  They caution, however, that their sampling may have been 
biased by their population focusing on somatic complaints. Golden-Kreutz & Andersen noted 
previous studies finding the prevalence of diagnosable depression in breast cancer to be 20-30% 
in general, with specific studies finding rates of 6% to 29%.573  Their own research yielded a 
comorbid rate of 18%, with specific risk factors correlated with depressive symptoms (i.e., 
perceptions of global stress, intrusive thoughts about cancer-related traumatic stress, financial 
difficulties and other stressful life events, neuroticism and racial minority status).574  Kurtz, et al., 
found that as many as half of all lung cancer patients “experience depressive symptomatology at 
a level that would qualify for clinical diagnosis,”575 with the greatest prevalence in patients 65 
and older.576  In a study of changes in endocrine levels in patients with metastatic cancer, Cohen, 
et al., found that “18% of the sample were experiencing moderate to severe symptoms of 
depression.”577 Fitzsimmons, et al., note that the psychopathology of pancreatic cancer may also 
be linked to endocrine or acid-base changes.578 
Several studies have noted that clinically significant depression is not diagnosed in cancer 
patients.579  Further, there are barriers that prevent recognition of depression and depressive 
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symptomology, including a lack of time to assess depression, a lack of familiarity with 
assessment measures, or “ignorance or pessimism about treatment approaches.”580  Berard, et al., 
expand upon this list, suggesting that:  
The overlap of symptomatology, the fact that sadness and psychological distress 
are to an extent normal and expected reactions to a diagnosis or recurrence of 
disease, the lack of resources and staff prohibiting effective biopsychosocial 
assessment and care, and patients’ unwillingness to disclose emotional problems 
are some of the reasons for this state of affairs.581 
 
Further difficulties exist in symptom recognition and isolation.  Ciaramella and Poli note that 
some of the somatic symptoms of cancer can be mistaken for the somatic symptoms of 
depression.  They state: 
Anorexia, weight loss, low energy and sleep disturbance are common in all 
acutely ill cancer patients, but are also neurovegetative signs of depression.  
Several authors have proposed excluding these somatic symptoms from 
depression diagnosis criteria.  They also found that the prevalence point of major 
depression dropped from 42 to 24% when all somatic symptoms were eliminated 
as criteria.582 
 
Berard, et al., note that several authors have suggested using the HADS and BDI as screening 
tools for depression.  The HADS removes many of the somatic symptoms from the diagnostic 
criteria in favor of the psychological criteria, and hence, may be able to discern symptoms that 
stem from an underlying psychiatric comorbidity.583 
Risk Factors for Depression 
 There are a variety triggers for depression in cancer, including medical comorbidities, 
self-perception, and psychosocial support.  Depression is not an uncommon phenomenon, and as 
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such is a significant concern in psychooncology, especially in light of the suggested influence of 
depression on long-term survival.584  Research has identified several notable risk factors. 
Uchitomi found that satisfaction with one’s confidants was the only variable significantly 
related to depression in lung cancer patients in the three months following surgery; at four 
months, pain and performance were also significantly related.585  He noted that while several 
studies have linked social support and communication with confidants as significant in 
psychosocial management, there are other interpretations of this data.  He argues that “patients 
who are depressed might by much more likely to express dissatisfaction with support.”586 
The presence and severity of depression have been linked to and may be contingent upon 
the type of cancer diagnosed and whether it has metastasized.  Ciaramella and Poli note that 
there is a demonstrable difference in psychopathological sequelae in pancreatic cancer versus 
other types.587  They also note that the presence of pain has been found to be a risk factor for 
major depression in all cancer patients.588  They note previous research demonstrating a higher 
lifetime incidence of depression in low-pain versus high-pain groups, but a higher point 
prevalence of major depression in high-pain groups than in low-pain groups.589  Finally, they 
note that metastasis is a contributory factor in the onset of depression – 50% of their patients 
with metastasized cancer experienced major depression, which they suggest explains why the 
diagnosis of depressive comorbidities increases as the disease progresses to more advanced 
stages.590   
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 Deimling, et al., suggest that the strongest predictor of psychological sequelae like 
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder is current cancer-related symptoms.  They suggest 
that “individuals who continue to experience sequelae of cancer are more likely to be depressed 
and report hyper-arousal symptoms such as impaired concentration or sleep disturbance.”591  
Further, they note that the means of cancer treatment can produce specific sequelae – e.g., the 
toxic short-term and long-term effects of chemotherapy may contribute to psychopathological 
sequelae and distress.592  They found that aging may offer a somewhat protective function 
against the development of depression – it is suggested that other losses or challenges in the 
patient’s life may displace cancer as his or her preeminent concern.593 
 Street endorsed other risk factors, noting that several studies found elevated risks of 
depression in three areas.  Specifically, he notes that “the majority of these studies have 
suggested that negative self-beliefs, feelings of hopelessness and a lack of perceived social 
support are all significant in predicting depression in cancer patients.”594 
 Akechi, et al., found poor performance status, employment status, and severe depression 
to be significant risk factors for suicidal ideation in cancer patients in univariate analysis.595  
Multivariate analysis linked poor physical functioning and severity of depression with suicidal 
ideation, which correlated with earlier studies linking poor physical functioning with depression 
and depression with suicidality.596 
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 Sellick and Crooks note a variety of characteristics, expected and unexpected, linking 
gender, education levels, familial history of affective disorder, stage of the illness, etc.  They 
argue that: 
Significant correlates for depression include: female gender, lower level of 
education, never married, separated, widowed or divorced, employed as a 
homemaker, lower income earners, Hispanics and persons aged 15-24.  Other 
correlates include age under 60; patients with a history of affective disorder, 
alcoholism, or poorly controlled pain, and patients on medications and/or 
treatments causing depression; patients with physical impairment, medical illness, 
disability, or advanced illness; and women with early stage disease.597 
 
Unlike other researchers, they do not posit a link between the patient’s available support network 
and comorbid affective illness. 
 Kaguya, et al., note that in head and neck cancers, being unmarried and living alone are 
predictive of psychological distress (in univariate analysis).598  While they note that social 
support in newly diagnosed patients with head and neck cancers is important, they argue that a 
lack of social support or dissatisfaction with available levels of social support are not necessarily 
predictive of psychological distress.599 
 Berard, et al., found that the severity of the patient’s medical illness was not a significant 
risk factor for depression, but stressed that their data was drawn from outpatient populations, and 
as such, may not be representative of hospitalized patients with advanced disease (they refer to 
depression found in in-patients as the ‘end of the road syndrome’).600  They report that a variety 
of extrinsic factors can be linked with the onset of depressive symptoms, and as such, the 
psychopathological disease model is likely much more complex than simply the patient’s 
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response to his or her physical illness – cancer creates a vulnerability to depression, but is not the 
sole cause.601 
 Golden-Kreutz and Andersen suggest that a combination of psychosocial stressors may 
increase the risk of depression in women.  The trauma of the cancer, financial difficulties, and 
neurotic tendencies may increase the risk of developing depressive symptoms.602  They note that 
prior research has suggested that psychological symptoms in cancer patients “wax and wane over 
time with initial adjustment disorders developing into depressive or anxiety disorders.”603 
 Finally, Kurtz, et al., suggest that in elderly lung cancer patients, severity of their 
symptoms, limitations in social functioning, and radiation treatment were the biggest risk factors 
for the development of depression in the first year following diagnosis.604  The elderly face 
multiple threats – as their friends and relatives age, they face a dwindling support network, and 
as such, are at a greater risk of developing depressive symptoms that they cannot manage 
alone.605  They note that prior research has demonstrated the significance of social support for 
the psychological well-being of the elderly – spouses and children can be protective against 
depression.606 
 The picture that emerges from these findings is that there are a variety of potential risk 
factors for depression.  Clinicians should pay careful attention to the severity of the patient’s 
symptoms and pain, potential for disfigurement as a result of treatment, and efforts to maintain a 
good social support network ought to be incorporated into the patient’s treatment plan. 
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Treatment 
 There are several modalities of cancer treatment – surgical, radiological, 
chemotherapeutic, and biological.607  Surgical therapy is the most effective therapeutic 
intervention – approximately 40% of cancers are cured by surgical resection of the malignant 
tissue (and, sometimes, the tissue surrounding the malignancy).608  Radiation therapy and 
chemotherapy tend to be the most familiar interventions to the general public.  Biological 
therapy involves treatment with interferons, immunotherapy, differentiating agents, and agents 
designed to attack the specific biology of the cancer cell.  The four therapies are often used in 
conjunction with one another.609 
Treatment may not necessarily involve a complete cure.  Proximity to nerves or 
vasculature, inaccessibility to the recommended therapy, stage of the illness, metastasis, etc. may 
prevent a complete cure or remission.  Longo notes that cancer treatment uses a specific 
language to describe the disease and its progression/regression: 
A complete response is defined as disappearance of all evidence of disease, and a 
partial response as >50% reduction in the sum of the products of the 
perpendicular diameters of all measurable lesions.  Progressive disease is defined 
as the appearance of any new lesions or an increase of >25% in the sum of the 
products of the perpendicular diameters of all measurable lesions.  Tumor 
shrinkage or growth that does not meet any of these criteria is considered stable 
disease.610 
 
It may not be possible to completely remove or eradicate a malignancy.  As such, the goal of 
cancer treatment may not necessarily be curative – there are times when palliative care is the end 
desired.611  Tumors compressing a nerve and causing pain, paresis, etc. may be shrunk or 
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partially removed by treatment, but the underlying malignancy remains.  The principle goal of 
cancer treatment, however, is eradication of the cancer. 
 There are side effects of cancer therapy.  Surgery can cause disfiguring scars and 
subsequently profoundly effect the patient’s self-esteem and quality if life.  Radiation can 
compromise immunity or bring about secondary tumors.  Chemotherapy is debilitating, causing a 
variety of somatic problems.  Biological therapies can produce psychological sequelae like 
depression.  As such, Longo notes, “the dictum primum non nocere is not the guiding principle 
of cancer therapy…The guiding principle of cancer treatment is primum succerrere, first hasten 
to help.”612  Treatment of cancer involves more than simply managing the physical aspects of the 
illness – it requires treating both the physical as well as the complex psychological sequelae of 
the disease.613 
The first form of treatment under consideration is surgical management of the neoplasm.  
Surgery is the form of therapy most frequently employed in the management and treatment of 
neoplastic malignancies.    Resection of the tumor through surgical intervention is not without 
potential long-term effects, however, and many patients are concerned about the possibility of 
resultant scarring or physical deformity (especially in breast or head/neck cancers).614  Further, 
like all forms of treatment, there is a risk of recurrence or metastasis. 
 Radiation therapy is another frequently employed mechanism of control or eradication.  
Radiation therapy can shrink tumors or destroy them by destabilizing or damaging the DNA 
within the tumor cell nucleus, a technique that is more effective in oxygenated cells (hypoxic 
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cells are more resistant).615  There are several concerns about radiation therapy, principally the 
possibility of damaging healthy cells in an effort to destroy the malignancy.  Sausville and Longo 
note that “the challenge for radiation treatment planning is to deliver the radiation to the tumor 
volume with as little normal tissue in the field as possible.616  Teletherapy – a beam of radiation 
directed at the tumor site – is the most frequent means of radiation-based treatment.617  
Sometimes the effects of radiation are not immediately lethal – some cells only begin to die off 
after they try to replicate.618  There are a variety of cancers that can be attacked with radiation 
therapy, and it has both curative and palliative uses.  Sausville and Longo note that: 
Radiation therapy is a component of curative therapy for a number of diseases 
including breast cancer, Hodgkin’s disease, head and neck cancer, prostate cancer, 
and gynecologic cancers.  Radiation therapy can also palliate disease symptoms in 
a variety of settings; relief of bone pain from metastatic disease, control of brain 
metastases, reversal of cord compression and superior vena caval obstruction, 
shrinkage of painful masses, and opening threatened airways.  In high-risk 
settings, radiation therapy can prevent the development of leptomeningeal disease 
and brain metastases in acute leukemia and lung cancer.619 
 
There are, however, concerns about radiation toxicity.  There are cells in the human body that are 
far more sensitive to the effects of radiation (like bone marrow), and cells that are resistant (like 
bone, heart and skeletal muscles, nerves). 
 There are long-term effects of radiation therapy that can cause concern.  Sausville and 
Longo note that chronic toxicities can lead to thyroid dysfunction, problems with vision and 
dentition, taste and smell dysfunction, a greater risk of myocardial infarction, vascular and 
pulmonary problems, as well as a significant risk of secondary tumors.620  Perry and Longo note 
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that radiation can damage normal organ function, increase the risk of second solid tumors in 
radiation ports, and promote atherosclerosis.621 
 The form of cancer treatment that tends to be most familiar is chemotherapy.  It is 
commonly used to treat metastatic cancers, and tends to be employed if surgical resection or 
radiation therapy has not been effective in destroying a localized tumor.  Sausville and Longo 
note that chemotherapy can be used as part of a multifactorial primary approach to tumor 
management (i.e., as part of a treatment regime for a given neoplastic malignancy), and/or as “an 
adjuvant to surgery or radiation, a use that may have curative potential in breast, colon, or 
anorectal neoplasms.”622  Chemotherapy tends to be used either in conventional dose or high-
dose regimens.623  Conventional doses produce readily manageable (if uncomfortable or 
dystonic) side effects in patients.  High-dose regimens can produce more therapeutic effects, but 
this comes at the price of an increased risk of potentially life-threatening complications.624  Perry 
and Longo note that chemotherapy can damage bone marrow, create immunodeficiencies, lead to 
a wide variety of organ dysfunctions, or produce latent subclinical damage which can increase 
the risk of developing later illnesses or neoplastic malignancies.625 
 A fourth category of cancer treatment involves biological approaches to tumor 
management.  Sausville and Longo note that “the goal of biologic therapy is to manipulate the 
host-tumor interaction in favor of the host.”626  They further note that several different 
mechanisms have been found to be potentially effective.  The first area of exploration is immune 
function – they note that: 
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The very existence of a cancer in a person is testimony to the failure of the 
immune system to deal effectively with the cancer.  Tumors have a variety of 
means of avoiding the immune system: (1) they are often only subtly different 
from their normal counterparts; (2) they are capable of downregulating their 
major histocompatibility complex antigens, effectively masking them from 
recognition by T cells; (3) they are inefficient at presenting antigens to the 
immune system; (4) they can cloak themselves in a protective shell of fibrin to 
minimize contact with surveillance mechanisms; and (5) they can produce a range 
of soluble molecules, including potential immune targets, that can distract the 
immune system from recognizing the tumor cell…Cancer treatment further 
suppresses host immunity.627 
 
They note that current research is exploring the potential use of allogenic T cells (T cells from a 
donor, rather than T cells from the cancer patient [referred to as autologous]), as this has been 
shown to be effective in bone marrow transplants.  A second intervention involves removal, 
manipulation, and reintroduction of autologous T cells.  Manipulation of autologous T cells 
would allow for the creation of tumor-antigen-specific T cells, or they may be activated with 
polyclonal stimulators and then stimulated by other agents (like interleukin).  A third approach 
involves attempting to use tumor vaccines to boost T cell immunity – the host T cells are primed 
against tumor-associated peptides.628 
 Antibodies, interferons, and interleukins are also being tapped as potential biological 
tools to combat cancer.  Sausville and Longo note that research has found humanized antibodies 
to be effective against some lymphomas and epithelial cancers.  They note that antibodies used in 
conjunction with other forms of treatment may be effective.629  Interferons are not necessarily 
curative, but have been found to be effective – they “can induce partial responses in follicular 
lymphoma, hairy cell leukemia, chronic myeloid leukemia, melanoma, and Kaposi’s sarcoma.  It 
has been used in the adjuvant setting in stage II melanoma, multiple myeloma, and follicular 
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lymphoma.”630  There are some side effects of interferon treatment, including fever, fatigue, 
depression, and immune diseases.631  Interleukins “can produce tumor regressions in ~20% of 
patients with metastatic melanoma and renal cell cancer.  About 5% of patients may experience 
complete remissions that are durable, unlike any other treatment for these tumors.”632  There are 
a number of side effects, however, including hypotension, impaired renal and hepatic function, 
and pulmonary problems.633 
 A common potential concern in any cancer treatment is recurrence of a malignancy or 
metastasis.  Aside from the concomitant psychological stress this causes, there are physiological 
differences in the cancer that result as well.  It has been found that these secondary malignancies 
grow at a faster rate than the primary tumors.634 
 There are long-term effects of all modalities of cancer therapies.  Long-term survival 
rates of all patients with cancer are high, but many survivors will experience some form of 
medical or psychosocial problem.  Perry and Longo note that: 
The 5-year survival rate of all patients diagnosed with cancer is now 59%.  This 
year alone, nearly 700,000 survivors will be added to the 7 million already 
considered cured.  Virtually all of these survivors will bear some mark of their 
diagnosis and its therapy, and many will experience long-term complications, 
including medical problems, psychosocial disturbances, sexual dysfunction, and 
inability to find employment or insurance.635 
 
The medical problems that may result from cancer treatment affect most major organs or organ 
systems.  Perry and Longo note clinically significant long-term consequences of cancer treatment 
in the cardiovascular, pulmonary, nervous, reproductive, musculoskeletal, and endocrine 
systems.  Further, specific organs or areas can develop chronic dysfunction as a result of 
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treatment, including the liver, kidneys, bladder, eyes, and mouth.636  Last, there is a significant 
risk of developing second tumors and/or fatal clinical syndromes like myelodysplasia or acute 
myeloid leukemia.  They note that the risk of developing a second tumor “is modest in the first 
decade after treatment but reaches 1% per year in the second decade, such that populations 
followed for 25 years or more have a ≥25% chance of developing a second treatment-related 
tumor.637  Myelodysplasia and acute myeloid leukemia are uncommon following chemotherapy, 
but occur often enough to warrant attention.  They note that “both forms of acute leukemia are 
highly refractory to treatment, and no preventive strategy has been developed.”638 
Quality of Life 
 A key issue in treatment of cancer is maintaining the patient’s subjective quality of life.  
Fitzsimmons, et al., found that there is a fundamental difference between how patients and health 
professionals assess quality of life.  Among the differences they note are descriptions of quality 
of life factors in generalized terms by health professionals, while patients tend to be more 
specific in their descriptions.  Further, health professionals tended to be more mechanistic, direct 
and linear in their assessment of the illness on the patient’s quality of life.639  They further note 
that patients did not attribute quality of life changes to their symptoms; rather, what seemed to 
influence their assessment most was coping with a perceived threat and maintenance of control 
in their disease process.640  All of this, they note, suggests that in self-assessment, patients have a 
more holistic approach, instead of a pure medical model approach.641  Zittoun, et al., found that 
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self-assessed overall quality of life was influenced principally by fatigue and emotional factors 
rather than physical morbidities.642  Gotay, et al., note that aside from self-reports of function in 
Filipino patients, there were no ethnic differences in perception of quality of life in cancer – they 
suggest that “cancer and its associated toxic treatments likely transcends more subtle differences 
between individuals.”643 
CONCLUSION 
 The illnesses and comorbid depressive disorders described above are by no means 
constitutive of the entirety of the issue.  As was noted previously, there are many, many more 
conditions that have depressive psychological sequelae.  The scope of the problem, however, 
should be apparent – depression is a very common consequence of profound or poorly managed 
illness, and significant concern should be given to decisions that may be the result of the illness.  
Our concern as ethicists must be that the decision to forgo medical treatment is a statement from 
the patient’s authentic self, and not simply the illness speaking for the patient. 
In the next chapter, we will briefly return to the theme of cognitive heuristics.  
Specifically, we will examine a current controversy in the cognitive psychology literature – the 
debate about depressive biases versus depressive realism.  These two schools of thought raise a 
fundamental conflict in their assumptions about depressed cognition – advocates of a depressive 
bias suggest that cognition is fundamentally flawed, producing distorted cognitions which 
perpetuate the depressive episode and lead to significant psychological morbidity.  Depressive 
realists, on the other hand, note research which suggests that individuals who are mildly to 
moderately depressed may actually have more realistic thought processes – they may be capable 
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of more honest assessments of the situations in which they find themselves.  As a logical 
consequence of the depressive realism hypothesis, it may be the case that normal cognition 
actually displays an optimistic bias – we may be unrealistic in our assessments of the world 
around us.  Following this discussion of depressed cognition, we will turn to the autonomy 
models popular in current medical ethics.  It will be argued that they expect unrealistic levels of 
cognitive ability from moral agents, and that they persist in asserting homuncular autonomy – 
there is a tendency to ignore the complex processes actually involved in cognition, specifically 
the backstage elements that exert significant influence. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: OF ICEBERGS AND AUTONOMY – COGNITIVE  
DISTORTIONS AND THE FALLACY OF HOMUNCULAR AUTONOMY 
 
 Previous chapters have demonstrated how cognition is a reducible concept, and that it is 
influenced by a variety of backstage and automatic processes.  The current chapter explores the 
kinds of influences that are particular to depression, before examining contemporary popular and 
influential theories of personal autonomy.  The present discussion examines two competing and 
influential theoretical and empirical viewpoints on depressive cognition.  The cognitive theory of 
depression (raised to prominence by Aaron Beck) argues that individuals with a depressive 
disorder display pervasive cognitive distortions, twisting reality to fit into a pessimistic schema, 
which both maintains the existent depressive state as well as facilitates future depression.  It 
contrasts with the theory of depressive realism, which counters Beck’s claims with studies 
demonstrating that depressed individuals may actually make more realistic decisions – instead of 
being biased by their depressive disorder, they are freed from the unrealistic optimistic bias 
demonstrated by non-depressed individuals.  This conflict and the discussion it has produced 
demonstrate the difficulty with which one can make assessments of cognitive ability and 
decision-making.  This will set the stage for a critique of dominant models of autonomy in the 
contemporary medical ethics literature – quite simply, the most influential autonomy models in 
the field today are based upon cognitive models that do not exist, and, in fact, have never existed. 
DEPRESSIVE COGNITION 
 
 How individuals process information is not simply a concern of cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience.  Clinical psychology also has a vested interest in the topic – how we process 
information is just as vulnerable to inside interference and influence as it is to outside, as argued 
in chapters one and two.  Individuals with psychological or psychiatric disturbances are 
vulnerable to influences at a variety of levels of reduction.  At a social level, psychiatric illness 
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carries a social stigma – in some cultures it is revered and in others reviled.  This social element 
affects relationships and social status, which in turn affects cognition.  At a personal level, the 
individuals self-perception is affected, which in turn affects cognition.  Whether the individual 
has insight into his condition is immaterial; both insight and ignorance have cognitive sequelae.1  
At the cellular level and below, biochemical processes are altered, which in turn affects cognition 
(e.g., serotonin deficiencies producing anxiety, dopamine deficiencies producing novelty-seeking 
behavior, etc.).  There is no shortage of ways in which depression and other affective disorders 
can influence how we think. 
Cognitive Distortion and Beck’s Model 
 In Beck’s model, depression produces systemic distortions in information processing and 
other forms of cognition.  This distortion itself may be the culmination of profound and 
persistent discrepancies between external environmental stimuli and our corresponding internal 
psychological components.2  In short, depression may result from persistently misinterpreting the 
situational and environmental cues and stimuli that surround us.  By exploring the bases of these 
dysfunctional cognitions, we can address and correct them in therapy.  These distortions arise 
from automatic thoughts – much akin to the automatic thoughts discussed in chapter two.  Beck’s 
automatic thoughts are cognitive responses to stimuli which produce affective reactions.  If these 
automatic thoughts are mistaken, a pattern of biased cognition develops, potentially leading the 
agent astray.  Beck noted that the automatic thoughts are very specific, are perceived as very 
plausible by patients, and are very resistant to change: 
                                                 
1 If the individual possesses insight, he may view himself more negatively, which affects self-esteem and self-image, 
or may be more circumspect in reality judgments (see the section below on the phenomenon of depressive realism).  
If the individual does not possess insight, he may view himself as persecuted (in the case of thought disorders or 
psychotic depression), or have unchallenged, unrealistic assessments of the future, the world around him, or himself.  
These are but a few possibilities when it comes to influences on cognition. 
2 Aaron T. Beck, Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders (New York: Meridian, 1976), 25. 
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As already indicated, the more disturbed a patient was, the more salient were the 
automatic thoughts.  As the patient improved, the automatic thoughts were less 
obvious; if his condition worsened, the thoughts became more apparent again.  
These automatic thoughts reported by numerous patients had a number of 
characteristics in common.  They generally were not vague and unformulated, but 
were specific and discrete.  They occurred in a kind of shorthand; that is, only the 
essential words in a sentence seemed to occur – as in a telegraphic style.  
Moreover, these thoughts did not arise as a result of deliberation, reasoning, or 
reflection about an event or topic.  There was no logical sequence of steps such as 
in goal-oriented thinking or problem-solving.  The thoughts ‘just happened,’ as if 
by reflex.  They seemed to be relatively autonomous in that the patient made no 
effort to initiate them and, especially in the more disturbed cases, they were 
difficult to ‘turn off.’  In view of their involuntary quality they could just as well 
have been labeled ‘autonomous thoughts’ as automatic thoughts.  In addition, the 
patient tended to regard these automatic thoughts as plausible or reasonable, 
although they may have seemed far-fetched to somebody else.  The patients 
accepted their validity without question and without testing out their reality or 
logic.  Of course, many of these thoughts were realistic.  But the patient often 
tended to believe the unrealistic thoughts even though he had decided during 
previous discussions that they were invalid.3 
 
The automatic thoughts in question tend to be negative self-evaluations – the individual tends to 
be self-deprecating (e.g., in skill, ability, personality, or other characteristics), tends to 
externalize attributions of success (e.g., believing that he ‘got lucky’, since he could not have 
succeeded on his own), and tends to internalize attributions of failure.  These are elements of a 
‘cognitive triad’ (see below).  These self-evaluations (or self-reproaches) produce feelings of 
guilt or sadness, which over time “shade into pathological states such as depression in which 
self-reproaches and self-criticisms are paramount.”4  
 Beck notes that individuals form rules that guide actions, interpretations, expectancies, 
and self-instructions.  These rules are applied in a variety of situations, and reinforce the 
distortions that arise from persistently negative self-cognition.  This rule book “contains coding 
systems used to determine the meanings of stimuli and events.”5 These rules are idiosyncratic – 
                                                 
3 Beck, Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders, 36. 
4 Beck, 40. 
5 Beck, 42-3. 
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they are specific to the individual in question, and account for a variety of personal 
interpretations of a shared event (i.e., why different people take different meanings from the 
same experience).  This idiosyncrasy, when combined with aberrant or dysfunctional ‘rules’, 
produces inappropriate or excessive emotional responses – affective disorders.6  As such, when 
the cognitive mechanisms of ‘normals’ and individuals with a psychopathology are examined 
(i.e., when they are asked to evaluate their external reality), significant differences become 
apparent.  This is not to say that ‘normal’ cognition cannot produce error – Beck notes that no 
one “respond(s) consistently well to all challenges.  We have specific vulnerabilities, ‘fault lines’ 
along which stresses accumulate and may set off tremors or eruptions – behavior commonly 
labeled ‘over-reacting.’  Under such conditions unrealistic appraisals override realistic 
appraisals, and we may realize that our reactions are largely irrational.”7  As a result, it is 
possible for us to challenge and overcome unrealistic thoughts by examining their bases and the 
automatic elements which gave rise to them.8 
 Beck’s analysis suggests a fundamental challenge to personal autonomy in patients with 
acute emotional disturbances (as autonomy is classically understood).9  Specifically, these 
patients demonstrate an inability to appreciate specific situational stimuli – the patient becomes 
fixated on certain aspects of his situation over others, exhibiting a kind of ‘tunnel vision’.10  In 
the case of depressive cognition, it results in focusing on the negative aspects of one’s life, and a 
                                                 
6 Beck, Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders, 52. 
7 Beck, 76. 
8 This parallels the claims made in the psychological model proposed in chapter two – because our cognition 
depends significantly on backstage elements, we frequently do not challenge the conclusions we reach or the actions 
we perform.  Beck’s argument bolsters the philosophical claim that genuine ‘free will’ comes from divorcing the 
automatic cognitive responses we have to situations from our ultimate actions (i.e., challenging the thought process 
that leads us from environmental stimulus to behavioral or decisional outcome). 
9 I.e., classical autonomy as understood as the deontological, purely rational agent; this will be explored more fully 
in the second half of this chapter when the concept of autonomy is discussed. 
10 Beck, 79. 
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difficulty, if not inability, to think of one’s life being any different than it is at that moment – a 
sensation of being trapped: 
The thought content of depressed patients centers on a significant loss.  The 
patient perceives that he has lost something he considers essential to his happiness 
or tranquility; he anticipates negative outcomes from any important undertaking; 
and he regards himself as deficient in the attributes necessary for achieving 
important goals.  This theme may be formulated in terms of the cognitive triad: a 
negative conception of the self, a negative interpretation of life experiences, and a 
nihilistic view of the future.  The sense of irreversible loss and negative 
expectation leads to the typical emotions associated with depression: sadness, 
disappointment, and apathy.  Furthermore, as the sense of being trapped in an 
unpleasant situation or of being enmeshed in insoluble problems increases, 
spontaneous constructive motivation dissipates.  The patient, moreover, feels 
impelled to escape from the apparently intolerable condition via suicide.11 
 
This results in a variety of cognitive distortions – aside from the immediate distortion Beck 
proposes, it is easy to see how other sources of error (e.g., availability, anchoring, affective 
forecasting, etc. from chapter two) can influence the patient’s thought process.  The decisions 
that result tend to exhibit undue generalizations from event to event, catestrophizing events 
(perceiving minor failures or setbacks as significantly more negative than they actually are), and 
making arbitrary inferences (e.g,. drawing conclusions where the evidence is lacking or 
contradictory to one’s conclusion), among other distortions.12  These sources of error present 
significant challenges to philosophical models arguing that individual autonomy ought never be 
trumped by a concern for the patient’s welfare – they demonstrate that this autonomy is self-
destructive, and not self-affirming, a topic that will be addressed in the second half of this 
chapter.  In fact, Beck specifically notes that an affective disorder prevents individuals from 
making objective judgments.  Individuals with affective disorders cannot “disentangle the 
personal meaning of an event from its objective characteristics” – a characteristic of ‘normal’ 
                                                 
11 Beck, Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders, 84. 
12 Richard G. MacGillivray and Pierre Baron, "The Influence of Cognitive Processing Style on Cognitive Distortion 
in Clinical Depression," Social Behavior and Personality 22, no. 2 (1994): 146. 
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cognition.13  To repeat a previous point, these meanings are idiosyncratic, and as a result, 
subjectively significant losses may not seem significant to others.14 
 There are recurring triggers for depressive cognition.  Beck notes that vulnerability 
factors, like meanings, are idiosyncratic, but that the literature has found themes common 
throughout, including “the disruption of a relationship with a person to whom the patient is 
attached; failure to attain an important goal; loss of a job; financial reverses; unexpected physical 
disability; and loss of social status or reputation.”15  Serious medical illness clearly can affect 
each of these triggers; as a result, the argument of the last chapter concerning the underdiagnosis 
of depressive disorders should not be surprising.  Once a patient experiences a trigger for 
depression, we begin to see the hallmarks of affective forecasting: 
The predictions of depressed patients tend to be overgeneralized and extreme.  
Since the patients regard the future as an extension of the present, they expect a 
deprivation or defeat to continue permanently.  If a patient feels miserable now, it 
means we hill always feel miserable.  The absolute, global pessimism is expressed 
in statements such as ‘things won’t ever work out for me’, ‘life is 
meaningless…It’s never going to be any different.’  The depressed patient judges 
that, since he cannot achieve a major goal now, he never will.  He cannot see the 
possibility of substituting other rewarding goals.  Moreover, if a problem appears 
insoluble now, he assumes he will never be able to find a way of working it out or 
somehow bypassing it.16 
 
As a result, we see how depression can fundamentally alter an individual’s thought process, 
twisting and distorting his perception of reality; skewing it from realistic to unrealistic thought.  
                                                 
13 Beck, Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders, 91. 
14 As a quick example, while on clinical rotations, I was involved in a case consultation for a patient who wished to 
forgo dialysis because of how he believed it would affect his social life (he stated that he believed being dependent 
upon dialysis would limit his mobility, and therefore would limit how he would be able to socialize with his friends 
and family).  This case has since caused me significant concern – when we interviewed him, it was clear that he 
appreciated the consequences of his decision, and that he was clear on his motivations for forgoing treatment.  In 
light of these two factors, as an ethics consult team we recommended that his wishes be upheld, and died several 
days later.  I cannot help questioning, however, whether the right choice was made for this patient, especially in light 
of the kinds of automatic cognitive processes that have been demonstrated in the past several decades.  The hospital 
protocol required only an assessment by the psychiatric consult liaison prior to the ethics consult – the liaison 
assessed the patient for a psychiatric comorbidity, but did not assess or challenge the patient’s overall thought 
process, which may have been the more benevolent course of action. 
15 Beck, 108. 
16 Beck, 117. 
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Decisions based upon this biased cognitive processing immediately become suspect – as 
clinicians, we must be aware of this phenomenon and we must be willing to challenge it.  As has 
been said before, if a patient is going to forego treatment, we must make sure that she does so for 
the right reason, and not because of avolitional, automatic processes.  When a source of 
consistent error is identified, any clinical decision of such significance as forgoing treatment 
must be examined in light of it. 
Supporting Evidence 
Support for Beck’s model of cognition is significant, and a full treatment of the 
supporting research would require significantly more space than is available in the present 
work.17  At present, we will focus on a few studies over the past two decades that have 
corroborated Beck’s theory, through direct exploration of cognition during depression as well as 
psychological sequelae in other conditions (e.g., depression and anxiety, depression and pain, 
etc.). 
Moretti and Shaw18 provide support for Beck’s postulated negative biases in self-
referencing information processing in individuals experiencing a depressive disorder.  They 
suggest that there are demonstrable differences in how depressed versus non-depressed 
individuals view the likelihood of personal failure or inadequacy and how they perceive external 
versus internal sources of positive and negative events.19 These are all essential elements of 
Beck’s proposed ‘cognitive triad’ – views of the self (self-perception and adequacy), views of 
                                                 
17 There are significantly more studies that have supported Beck’s model since it was proposed than I could 
plausibly cover here. Beck’s model, and his corresponding therapeutic intervention model (cognitive-behavioral 
therapy) have been proposed as a paradigmatic model of empirical therapeutic intervention. 
18 Marlene M. Moretti and Brian F. Shaw, "Automatic and Dysfunctional Cognitive Processes in Depression," in 
Unintended Thought, ed. James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh (New York: Guilford Press, 1989), 383-421. 
19 Moretti and Shaw, "Automatic and Dysfunctional Cognitive Processes in Depression," 397-8. 
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the world (internal vs. external locus of control), and views of the future (probability of 
success/failure). 
 Mitchell and Campbell20 explored cognitions resulting from depressive and anxiety 
states, and noted that individuals with depressive disorders tended to generalize inappropriately 
from situation to situation.  They note “cognitions reflecting both helplessness and hopelessness 
are characteristic of depression whereas cognitions reflecting helplessness alone are more 
characteristic of anxiety.  If the measure of generalization across situations is taken to be a 
measure of hopelessness then this suggestion is supported by the present results.”21  This 
provides support both for Beck’s argument concerning generalization; further, the hopelessness 
model provides support for Beck’s cognitive triad (view of the future) as well as the affective 
forecasting noted in chapter two. 
 Smith, et al.,22 explored cognitive sequelae of depression in chronic pain.23  When they 
contrasted the results of chronic pain patients with depressed patients, they found that: 
[D]epressed chronic pain subjects were characterized by high levels of cognitive 
distortion in pain-related situations and less pronounced distortion in nonpain 
situations.  In contrast, depressed nonpain subjects displayed equally high levels 
of distortion in both types of situations.  This suggests some situational specificity 
to the cognitive characteristics of depressed chronic patients that is not apparent in 
typical depressed persons.  The tendency of depressed nonpain patients to 
generalize their distorted thinking to a hypothetical situation (i.e., if they had a 
pain problem) is consistent with the cognitive model of depression.24 
 
                                                 
20 S. Mitchell and E. A. Campbell, "Cognitions Associated with Anxiety and Depression," Personality and 
Individual Differences 9, no. 4 (1988): 837-8. 
21 Mitchell and Campbell, "Cognitions Associated with Anxiety and Depression," 838. 
22 Timothy W. Smith, Jennifer L. O'Keeffe, and Alan J. Christensen, "Cognitive Distortion and Depression in 
Chronic Pain: Association with Diagnosed Disorders," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 62, no. 1 
(1994): 195-98. 
23 This has immediate relevance not only to Beck’s model, but also to patients with cancer, as discussed in chapter 
three.  Pain is a significant concern in managing the illness, and can present a significant conundrum in treatment, as 
severe pain may only respond to powerful pain killers (e.g., morphine), which have concomitant physical concerns 
(e.g., cardiac and respiratory suppression). 
24 Smith, O'Keeffe, and Christensen, "Cognitive Distortion and Depression in Chronic Pain: Association with 
Diagnosed Disorders," 197. 
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The study provides further evidence of cognitive distortion, as well as problems of generalization 
between situations, upholding Beck’s proposed model of depression (and other cognitive 
models).  In addition, there is further evidence of affective forecasting and the problems it 
creates. 
 Henriques and Leitenberg25 explored several models of depression, and found support for 
some elements of Beck’s model.  They note that some of Beck’s assumptions about the stability 
of traits have been questioned by some empirical studies: 
Further, a number of studies have found that, contrary to Beck’s model, 
dysfunctional attitudes do not appear to be stable or trait-like, but seem to wax 
and wane with depressed mood, suggesting that dysfunctional attitudes might 
result from depressed mood rather than vice-versa.  A possible reason for this 
ostensibly contradictory result is that dysfunctional attitudes remain latent or 
inaccessible until an individual is confronted with a negative circumstance that 
activates the beliefs.26 
 
They note that Beck’s proposed model is essentially a diasthesis-stress model, in which latent 
vulnerabilities are only activated by exposure to environmental stressors, which would explain 
the apparent incongruity.  Their study further found that negative social feedback predicted 
alteration in social self-esteem and changes in mood, following Beck’s proposed model 
(although some evidence supported other theories in the etiology of depression [e.g., negative-to-
positive cognitive error ratios as a measure of distortion]).27  They conclude by noting that 
Beck’s proposed cognitive errors (overgeneralizations, abstractions, catastrophizations, etc.) may 
have a critical role in the etiology of depression, and therefore warrant significant further 
research. 
                                                 
25 Gregg Henriques and Harold Leitenberg, "An Experimental Analysis of the Role of Cognitive Errors in the 
Development of Depressed Mood Following Negative Social Feedback," Cognitive Therapy and Research 26, no. 2 
(April 2002): 245-60. 
26 Henriques and Leitenberg, "An Experimental Analysis of the Role of Cognitive Errors in the Development of 
Depressed Mood Following Negative Social Feedback," 246. 
27 Henriques and Leitenberg, 257. 
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Challenges to Beck’s Theory 
 There is, however, some disagreement regarding the validity of Beck’s model.  For 
example, although Moretti and Shaw supported Beck’s theory regarding the content and 
valencing of self-referencing information, they did not support his characterization of these 
thoughts as automatic, a key aspect of Beck’s model.28  In fact, their review of the literature 
noted three key trends in the literature.29  First, as of the time of the writing of their article, few 
studies had explored whether the self-denigrating content of such cognitions actually were 
automatic – the studies cited as support tended to focus on the valence of the cognition, and not 
its speed or source.  Second, they noted methodological problems with other studies purporting 
to demonstrate automaticity – researchers had a tendency to inappropriately interpret response 
latencies as directly indicative of the degree of automaticity without considering confounding or 
nuisance variables.30  Finally, they note that there are other important aspects of depressive 
cognition that warrant further exploration, e.g., whether the automatic processes are susceptible 
to inhibition or control by the individual.  These are all serious concerns, and may confound 
Beck’s model.  Nevertheless, even though they may not necessarily offer proof, they do note that 
the available data are consistent with Beck’s theory, and they urge further research exploring 
“the contexts that are most likely to give rise to dysfunctional processing, the role of affect in 
dysfunctional automatic processing, and the extent to which dysfunctional processes can be 
interrupted and altered.”31 
                                                 
28 Moretti and Shaw, "Automatic and Dysfunctional Cognitive Processes in Depression," 398. 
29 Moretti and Shaw, 406. 
30 Confounding variables are other explanations for the target behavior that were not either not predicted or were not 
accounted for in the experiment (they ‘confound’ the experiment: they make it unclear whether the observations 
were due to the manipulated variable or due to some unknown variable).  Nuisance variables are potentially 
causative factors that have been identified, and which then become further independent variables in the experiment 
(i.e., they are a nuisance because they are a causal factor that cannot easily be removed from the experimental 
conditions). 
31 Moretti and Shaw, 412. 
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MacGillivray and Baron32 studied cognition in depressed women which yielded findings 
contrary to what one would expect under Beck’s model.  Specifically, three key differences were 
noted.33 First, the errors committed by the depressed women might actually have been due to a 
longstanding cognitive style, instead of being idiosyncratic to a depressive state.  The women 
studied may have always thought in a particular manner, and did not demonstrate significantly 
different thoughts following the onset of a depressive state – any errors that may have been 
produced may not have been caused by their depressive state.  Since Beck’s model is predicated 
on demonstrable differences between ‘normal’ and dysfunctional cognition, this is a serious and 
fundamental challenge.  Second, they did not note an interaction between quality of life events 
and the cognitive style of the individual.  As Beck proposes a diasthesis-stress model, the lack of 
an interaction undercuts the idea that situational variables are critical components in the etiology 
of depression.  MacGillivray and Baron suggest that cognitive styles are more pervasive than 
situation-specific.  Third, differences between the women studied did not produce variations or 
differences in the degree of depression – if stressors are interpreted idiosyncratically, one would 
expect differences in symptom severity, which did not occur. 
 Beck’s theory is not static – it has been modified since it was first proposed.  For 
instance, following the depressive realism studies (see below), Beck would revise his theory to 
suggest that individuals with more severe forms of depression would demonstrate cognitive 
distortions, while dysphoric and nondepressed participants would demonstrate unbiased thought.  
Kapci and Cramer, however, noted that inconsistencies would still remain, as both of these 
                                                 
32 MacGillivray and Baron, "The Influence of Cognitive Processing Style on Cognitive Distortion in Clinical 
Depression." 
33 MacGillivray and Baron, "The Influence of Cognitive Processing Style on Cognitive Distortion in Clinical 
Depression." 154-5. 
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groups demonstrated their own types of distortions and biases.34  The objections covered here are 
not the full extent of the objections raised to Beck’s model, but are indicative of the kinds of 
challenges, both methodological and conceptual that have been raised.  By far, however, the 
biggest challenge to Beck’s theory of cognitive distortion is the phenomenon of depressive 
realism, to which we now turn. 
The Theory of Depressive Realism 
Alloy and Abramson 
The most frequently cited article in the depressive realism literature is Alloy and 
Abramson’s discussion of four models of depressive cognition.  They note that a fundamental 
paradox has emerged from recent studies – the commonly accepted model of depressed cognition 
was that of cognitive distortion, but that a trend in research had emerged in which depressed 
individuals actually demonstrated more accurate or realistic perceptions and inferences than 
nondepressed people.35  They note that Beck and other cognitive theorists have proposed 
systematic maladaptive cognitive schemata in depressed individuals, which led them in 
selectively abstracting negative elements in their environment, overgeneralizing other elements, 
and making arbitrary inferences, all of which are the results of rigid schemata automatically 
applied to particular situations.36  These schemata apply to analysis of the self, the world, and the 
future (Beck’s cognitive triad – see above); Beck’s analysis further argues that cognitive biases 
and distortions are not found in normal, nondepressed individuals.37 
                                                 
34 Emine G Kapci and Duncan Cramer, "The Accuracy of Dysphoric and Nondepressed Groups' Predictions of Life 
Events," Journal of Psychology 132, no. 6 (November 1998): 667. 
35 L.B. Alloy and L.Y. Abramson, "Depressive Realism: Four Theoretical Perspectives," in Cognitive Processes in 
Depression, ed. L.B. Alloy (New York: Guilford Press, 1988), 223. 
36 Alloy and Abramson, "Depressive Realism: Four Theoretical Perspectives," 225. 
37 This is ironic, in that systematic cognitive errors and biases were seen to be part of everyday, “normal” cognition 
in chapter two of the present work. 
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 Alloy and Abramson note that depression is likely heterogeneous – as has been noted in 
Chapter three, there are, in fact, a family of depressive disorders, with distinct etiologies.  
Because of this diversity, they suggest that the arguments made by cognitive theorists may be 
applicable only to specific diagnoses (i.e., depressions with concomitant negative cognitions, 
instead of other forms of the illness).  They note that individuals with inferential biases are not 
necessarily inaccurate – the objective circumstances can be congruent or incongruent with the 
conclusions they reach.38  This leads, they argue, to difficulty in understanding rationality and 
irrationality – they propose defining rationality as ‘realism over the long run’,39 in that the 
cognitive biases that a person utilizes may serve them well in the long run.40  If such a ‘long run’ 
perspective is adopted, then it would make sense for the person to adopt them in the present 
situation, even if the bias is contradicted by the available information and leads to immediate 
errors – it might be ‘rational’ to make mistakes.41 
 The experiments which bolstered Alloy and Abramson’s claims dealt with the perception 
of control in experimental conditions – students were asked to judge the degree of control their 
responses had over the illumination of a light in contingent and non-contingent response-
outcome scenarios.  If Beck’s assumptions about depressive cognition were accurate, it would be 
                                                 
38 This objection, I think, is significant, in that Beck’s approach assumes a level of distortion, potentially 
inappropriately.  For instance, a typical example of Beck’s cognitive therapy is to imagine oneself walking down a 
street and observing a pair of individuals approximately fifty feet away.  These individuals turn to look at you, turn 
back to each other, and laugh.  The depressed patient infers from the scenario that the individuals in question were 
laughing about him or her, which tends to produce feelings of anger.  The therapist then examines the thought 
process that gave rise to the emotion, suggesting that there are other ways of interpreting the situation (e.g., the pair 
registered the presence of the patient, but were discussing a funny program they had seen, which made them laugh).  
This is designed to alter the thought process and help alleviate the affective consequences of that situation.  The 
problem, however, is that it is possible that the individuals in question were talking about the patient – in this 
scenario, the patient is accurate in his or her assessment, and the therapist has introduced a distortion! 
39 Alloy and Abramson, "Depressive Realism: Four Theoretical Perspectives," 227. 
40 A comparable argument is made by Gigerenzer and others regarding the evolutionary advantages of fast and 
frugal heuristics (see chapter two). 
41 This point will require clarification, as it leads to a counterintuitive ethical analysis.  I would argue that despite the 
supposed ‘rationality’ of allowing individuals to apply long-term biases to end-of-life decisions, which would seem 
to be the logical consequence were Alloy and Abramson’s analysis applied to these situations, it would be justifiable 
to challenge the bias.  This point will be developed more fully later in this chapter. 
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expected that the depressed participants would demonstrate a bias or inaccuracy in assessing the 
contingency.  However, the experiment yielded results which directly contradicted Beck’s 
argument:  
It was only nondepressed students who systematically erred in judging their 
control.  Nondepressives exhibited an ‘illusion of control’ and overestimated their 
control over uncontrollable outcomes that occurred with high frequency or that 
were associated with success.  In addition, nondepressives showed an ‘illusion of 
no control’ and underestimated their impact on controllable outcomes associated 
with failure.  Nondepressives also underestimated their control over controllable 
outcomes when the passive response of not pressing was associated with greater 
success.42 
 
The non-depressed participants overestimated their control for successes and underestimated 
their control for failure; these offer evidence that instead of a depressive bias (or ‘pessimistic 
bias’ in Beck’s analysis), non-depressed individuals actually exhibit an optimistic bias, an 
illusory and self-promoting image of themselves consistently applied in action and cognition.  
Alloy and Abramson interpret their results as demonstrating that depressed individual’s 
judgments may not be distorted when they have had the chance to perceive the contingencies of 
their situation.  They note that past research has supported this analysis – as depressed 
individuals were exposed to non-contingency situations, their perception of control became more 
realistic, while non-depressed people maintained their perception of control.43  Generalizing 
from their own studies and others, they conclude that “depressed individuals appear to be less 
susceptible to ‘illusions of success’ than nondepressed individuals for themselves (and perhaps in 
private) but more susceptible to ‘illusions of success’ for others.44 
 Other areas of study in depressive realism concern ambiguous and unambiguous 
personality feedback.  Again, if the cognitive model of Beck were accurate, then the 
                                                 
42 Alloy and Abramson, "Depressive Realism: Four Theoretical Perspectives," 228. 
43 Alloy and Abramson, 230. 
44 Alloy and Abramson, 233. 
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interpretations offered by the depressed research participants should demonstrate perceptual 
biases that render their interpretation of the data inaccurate.  The experiments yielded compelling 
results along a continuum – both depressed and non-depressed participants demonstrated some 
optimistic bias; however, the depressed groups consistently demonstrated less optimistic bias 
than the non-depressed groups.  They note that, generally, “the more positive an individual’s 
self-schema, the more positive the degree of bias he or she showed in ambiguous-feedback 
perception.”45 
 The difference between depressed and non-depressed individuals’ cognitive approaches 
and schemata is explicable when one explores the content of each.  Alloy and Abramson suggest 
that the relative absence of optimistic bias in the cognition of depressed individuals may be due 
to a balance between negative and positive content, in contrast to disproportionate 
(“differentiated”) positive content in non-depressed individuals.  Analysis of self-concepts 
supports this suggestion, as there are empirical data demonstrating that non-depressed people 
have a “strong, positive self-schema”, while mild and moderately depressed people have 
schemata containing “mixed and rather balanced positive and negative content.”46  Support for 
the different schemata can be found in studies of the effects of self-directed attention (studies of 
self-focus).  Studies have demonstrated that self-focused attention increases the accuracy of self-
reporting and self-referent judgments, and that depressed individuals may demonstrate more self-
focus than non-depressed individuals.47 
 All of these studies demonstrate the depressive realism; while Alloy and Abramson note 
a variety of perspectives on the data presented, they argue for what they term the “naïve” 
                                                 
45 Alloy and Abramson, "Depressive Realism: Four Theoretical Perspectives," 236. 
46 Alloy and Abramson, 250. 
47 Alloy and Abramson, 251. 
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perspective (‘naïve’ in the sense that it is one which takes the empirical data at face value).  This 
has three main consequences for our understanding of depressive cognition: 
If the naïve perspective is correct, then three intriguing implications may follow.  
First, the perspective would suggest that Beck’s cognitive model of depression, 
with its emphasis on negative depressive distortions, is wrong and that at least one 
psychopathological group is less rather than more susceptible than normals to 
cognitive irrationality and distortion.  Second, this perspective raises the 
possibility that a realistic and unbiased perception of oneself and one’s relation to 
the world contributes to the cause or maintenance of depression.  Finally, the 
naïve perspective suggests that cognitive therapy for depression, a demonstrably 
effective program for treating depression, may work not by enhancing the realism 
of depressives’ cognitions, as is currently assumed, but by training depressives to 
construct for themselves the kinds of optimistic biases and distortions typically 
exhibited by nondepressed people.48 
 
There is a necessary caveat to this discussion – Alloy and Abramson note that depressive realism 
is a phenomenon found in only some degrees of depression (mild and moderate); severe 
depressions do exhibit the maladaptive and unrealistic distortions Beck proposes. 
All of this leads Alloy and Abramson to argue that the experience of depression is the 
dysfunction of normal optimistic biases and distortions.  “Healthy personal illusions” may be a 
hallmark of everyday cognition – this is to say that our cognitive schemata are normally self-
biasing, producing feelings of competency, worth, and ability greater than what we actually 
possess.  They stress that this facet of cognition warrants further research; while cognitive 
psychology has made inroads into optimistic biases, there are still important aspects of cognition 
to be addressed, like the boundaries between depressive realism and depressive distortion.49 
                                                 
48 Alloy and Abramson, "Depressive Realism: Four Theoretical Perspectives," 253. 
49 Alloy and Abramson, 257. 
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Studies providing supporting evidence 
Support for the depressive realism hypothesis comes from a variety of sources.  
Greenberg, et al.,50 elaborate upon the self-schema concept.  They note that schemata separate, 
filter, and compartmentalize the myriad stimuli we constantly experience.  In doing so, schemata 
function as a means of “cognitive economy”; they direct our attention to particular aspects of the 
situation, instead of attempting to take in the situation in its entirety – as such, elements 
inconsistent with the schema is ignored, while others are adapted to make them consistent.  
These processes introduce elements of bias and distortion.51  Studies of schemata are prevalent in 
cognitive, social, and personality psychology, and the mechanisms by which they perform 
analyses and introduce errors have been given particular attention: 
In particular, personality studies have supported the existence of a well-organized 
self-schema that influences a person’s endorsement of trait adjectives as 
personally descriptive, increases the efficiency or speed of processing stimuli that 
match the self-schema content, and enhances the recall of schema-consistent 
information while at the same time producing erroneous recall and recognition of 
self-schema-congruent material that was never presented.”52  
 
They note that studies have suggested different contents for self-schema among depressed and 
non-depressed participants, in line with Alloy and Abramson’s above analysis.  However, they 
note that there are differences in the findings regarding depressed participants’ schemata; some 
studies note explicitly negative schema content, others note unstable or mixed negative/positive 
schema content.  If the schemata are of the mixed variety, the cognitions they produce will shift 
as the balance between negative and positive content shifts.53 
                                                 
50 Michael S. Greenberg, Carmelo V. Vazquez, and Lauren B. Alloy, "Depression Versus Anxiety: Differences in 
Self- and Other-Schemata," in Cognitive Processes in Depression, ed. Lauren B. Alloy (New York: Guilford Press, 
1988), 109-42. 
51 Greenberg, Vazquez, and Alloy, "Depression Versus Anxiety: Differences in Self- and Other-Schemata," 114. 
52 Greenberg, Vazquez, and Alloy, 115. 
53 Greenberg, Vazquez, and Alloy, 116. 
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 Their own study yielded several relevant findings.54  First, the ‘normal’ subjects were the 
only group that consistently favored positive over negative adjectives in self-description, and 
tended to make self-judgments which endorsed nearly all positive adjectives and rejected nearly 
all negative adjectives.  Second, non-depressed participants demonstrated faster responses 
(interpreted as greater processing efficiency) for positive than for negative self-references, and 
demonstrated comparable speed in their rejection of negative self-references.  Third, the non-
depressed participants were the only group not to demonstrate enhanced recall for certain 
depression- and anxiety-related adjectives.  Depressed participants’ schemata demonstrated 
consistently mixed or balanced positive and negative content.  They did not demonstrate any 
particular preference for either positive or negative depression- or anxiety-related adjectives, nor 
did they have the kind of extreme results found in the non-depressed participants.  They 
demonstrated comparable recall times for both positive and negative self-describing adjectives, 
and demonstrated comparable recall for both positive and negative depression-related adjectives.  
These findings, they suggest, offer support for a non-depressed cognitive schema that exhibits 
unrealistic optimism, and suggest that there is no corresponding bias in depressed cognitive 
schemata.55 
 A second pillar of support is found in Rehm’s analysis of the inferences made by 
depressed individuals,56 noting that several characteristics emerge.  First, a recurrent theme in the 
literature stresses that the life experiences of depressed people differ significantly than 
nondepressed people.  Depressed people are more likely to have had fewer positive and more 
                                                 
54 Greenberg, Vazquez, and Alloy, "Depression Versus Anxiety: Differences in Self- and Other-Schemata," 130-2. 
55 Greenberg, Vazquez, and Alloy, 132. 
56 Lynn P. Rehm, "Self-Management and Cognitive Processes in Depression," in Cognitive Processes in Depression, 
ed. Lauren B. Alloy (New York: Guilford Press, 1988), 143-76. 
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frequent negative life events,57 which can lead to and reinforce a particular schema for 
interpreting the world around them.58  This affected cognitive schema does not distort their 
perception of the outside world (i.e., paralleling the depressive realism hypothesis) – depressed 
individuals are more accurate in reporting specific life events.  Depression does lead to a 
different perspective on how they interpret information, however – Rehm notes that ambiguity 
and abstraction in self-referential information tend to be interpreted more negatively: 
Inferences, interpretations, and judgments should be viewed as internal processing 
variables rather than as input variables.  Inference in judgmental processes has 
received a great deal of attention, but different theories have postulated different 
types of inferences as the core factors in determining depression.  Although the 
evidence is somewhat mixed, there is a trend suggesting that depressed 
individuals make negative attributions about failures, and perhaps about 
successes.  Depressed individuals are more negative in their estimates of their 
own ability to produce desired responses (self-efficacy).  They do not, however, 
seem to be unrealistic in objectively making predictions or offering expectancies 
about their performance.  This seems quite consistent with the idea that depressed 
persons are accurate in their perceptions.  The only exceptions to accurate 
expectancy would be in those areas in which depressed persons may, in reality, 
perform more poorly (e.g., in social skills).  It is quite clear that depressed persons 
evaluate themselves negatively, and it appears that a discrepancy between 
expectancy and standards is the determining factor.59 
 
As noted in chapter two, affective valence is an essential element of memory and cognition.  
Rehm notes that a lifetime of negatively valenced memories and experiences can produce a 
particular cognitive schema that affects future cognition.  Information that was neutrally 
valenced would not necessarily be organized by this schema in the same manner as negatively-
valenced information, and as a result, it might not be accessed as readily.  In fact, Rehm suggests 
that individuals may actually find it difficult to access neutral information when they are in a 
depressed state.60  Rehm suggests that this cognitive modeling schema has therapy implications 
                                                 
57 Rehm, "Self-Management and Cognitive Processes in Depression," 167. 
58 Rehm, 169. 
59 Rehm, 168. 
60 Rehm, 169. 
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as well, and that depressive cognition could be challenged in an effort to access positive 
cognition. 
Miller and Moretti61 suggest that differences in information processing also lead to 
differences in causal attribution.  Part of the difficulty of the issue of depressive realism versus 
distortion in cognition stems from difficulties in assessing what constitutes a normative model of 
cognition – questions about accuracy in perception may be more appropriate when rephrased in 
terms of which type of cognition is more rational.  Miller and Moretti stress that the different 
experiences of depressed and non-depressed individuals must be understood, assessed, and 
considered if we are to make sense of their self-representations.62  They note that the available 
data, however, suggest that depressed individuals tend to be less self-serving in their causal 
attributions (e.g., statements of control).63  In light of the optimistic bias that has emerged in the 
depressive realism research, being less self-serving may reflect a tendency to avoid unwarranted 
optimism in self-assessment and judgments of efficacy (causality).  Miller and Moretti propose 
that differences in information processing may be indicative of a deeper difference in seeking 
explanations: 
It is possible that the most significant difference between depressives and 
nondepressives lies in the presence or absence of the tendency to ask ‘Why?’ 
questions and to seek explanations for the events in their lives.  We know that 
there are individual differences in the inclination to ponder causal questions, and 
this may be one of the differences between depressives and nondepressives.  
Indeed, recent studies have demonstrated that depressives differ from 
nondepressives in their use of attributional information.64 
 
Perhaps nondepressed individuals simply do not seek explanations of causal factors (accurately) 
perceived to be outside of their control. 
                                                 
61 Dale T. Miller and Marlene M. Moretti, "The Causal Attributions of Depressives: Self-Serving or Self-
Disserving?" in Cognitive Processes in Depression, ed. Lauren B. Alloy (New York: Guilford Press, 1988), 266-88. 
62 Miller and Moretti, "The Causal Attributions of Depressives: Self-Serving or Self-Disserving?" 277. 
63 Miller and Moretti, 281. 
64 Miller and Moretti, 282. 
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Evans and Hollon65 suggest that the differences in information processing between 
depressed and non-depressed individuals parallel the cognitive heuristics proposed by Tversky 
and Kahneman (see chapter two) – specifically, the fact that the heuristics operate in a non-
normative function, which can produce errors or biases.  They note quite plainly that the 
information processing approaches in non-depressed individuals “appear frequently to operate in 
nonnormative ways.”66  This is especially problematic, in that non-depressed individuals readily 
generate new explanations for the information they receive, but are quite reluctant to revise these 
explanations.67  Simply put, the positions created by optimistic biases tend to be very resistant to 
change.  This is a phenomenon comparable to having pet theories – we force new information to 
fit the theory, instead of the other way around.  Evans and Hollon suggest that Beck’s depressive 
distortion and the phenomenon of depressive realism are examples of cognitive heuristics: 
The distortions in information processing described by Beck as operating in 
depressives are actually representatives of the ubiquitous class of events labeled 
‘heuristics’ by Tversky and Kahneman.  In discriminating between the accuracy of 
beliefs and the normativeness of information processing, we would argue that 
both depressives and nondepressives may be inaccurate in many of their beliefs, 
although typically in opposite ways; at the same time, both may share the same 
general nonnormative heuristics.  We know of no empirical evidence that speaks 
either for or against this premise, but we think the parallels between heuristics in 
nondepressives and ‘distortions’ in depressives are so striking as to merit study.68 
 
They are so confident of this that they suggest that neither the depressive distortion nor the 
depressive realism phenomena will be tenable in the long-run.  Instead, they suggest that the 
particular schema by which information is acquired and processed by depressed and 
nondepressed individuals will be found to be simply opposing and predictable heuristics (and 
                                                 
65 Mark D. Evans and Steven D. Hollon, "Patterns of Personal and Causal Inference: Implications for the Cognitive 
Therapy of Depression," in Cognitive Processes in Depression, ed. Lauren B. Alloy (New York: Guilford Press, 
1988), 344-77. 
66 Evans and Hollon, "Patterns of Personal and Causal Inference: Implications for the Cognitive Therapy of 
Depression," 350. 
67 Evans and Hollon, 351. 
68 Evans and Hollon, 352. 
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that both of which can lead to inaccuracy).  In the cases of mild depression, individuals may 
make more accurate decisions simply because they use the heuristics of both depressed and non-
depressed individuals.  As a final caveat, they note that they “cannot, however, rule out the 
possibility that at least mild depressives are universally accurate, while nondepressives are 
optimistically inaccurate.  Individuals who evidence low levels of depression may do so as a 
result of viewing themselves and their environments more critically, and hence accurately.”69  
While this amounts to less enthusiastic support, it is still support nonetheless. 
 Rosenfarb and Burker70 found differences in sensitivity to changing contingencies 
between depressed and nondepressed people.  They suggest that depressed individuals may be 
less sensitive to externally applied rules when those rules become inaccurate.71  This, in turn, 
allows them to be more accurate in their judgments since they are no longer bound to rules that 
lead to mistakes. 
Koenig, et al.,72 explored the optimistic bias phenomenon in greater detail, but found 
mixed results favoring both the depressive distortion and depressive realism models.  They found 
that depressed individuals were less accurate in both self-evaluations as well as self-versus-other 
evaluations, which they note supports Beck’s proposed model of depressive distortion.  
However, they found that there was no evidence that the depressed individuals’ self-inaccuracy 
was due to systematic distortions of self-relevant evaluations; instead, the differences emerged 
because the depressed individuals were less derogatory towards others than the non-depressed 
participants.  They hypothesize that this tendency to be derogatory towards others serves to 
                                                 
69 Evans and Hollon, "Patterns of Personal and Causal Inference: Implications for the Cognitive Therapy of 
Depression," 356. 
70 Irwin S. Rosenfarb and Eileen J. Burker, "Effects of Changing Contingencies on the Behavior of Depressed and 
Nondepressed Individuals," Journal of Abnormal Psychology 102, no. 4 (November 1993): 642-46. 
71 Rosenfarb and Burker, "Effects of Changing Contingencies on the Behavior of Depressed and Nondepressed 
Individuals," 646. 
72 Linda J. Koenig, Ann B. Ragin, and Martin Harrow, "Accuracy and Bias in Depressive's Judgments for Self and 
Other," Cognitive Therapy and Research 19, no. 5 (1995): 505-17. 
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maintain a self-enhancement/self-esteem function (part of the self-serving, optimistic bias).73  
They note that their findings appear to conflict with Alloy and Abramson, but they then propose 
that this discrepancy may be due to having examined more depressed subjects (i.e., subjects who 
were more than mild to moderately depressed).  They suggest that there are enough supporting 
studies to call into question some of Beck’s assumptions regarding depressive cognition, 
specifically the assumption that depressive cognition is unrealistic.74 
 Johnson and DiLorenzo75 found that both depressed and non-depressed individuals 
demonstrate accuracy and error in cognition – specifically they are more accurate in interpreting 
schema-congruent information.  While they note that this offers support for schema-influenced 
processing, they note that it is unclear exactly how self- and other-schemata produce the biases in 
question. 
McKendree-Smith and Scogin76 explore the difference between milder forms of 
depression and more severe forms, underscoring the differences in processing between the two 
(and between both and non-depressed individuals).  In analyzing previous experiments, they note 
that: 
In 20 of 23 studies involving ambiguous information or events, nondepressed 
participants showed optimistic biases.  However, they showed these biases in only 
11 of 18 studies using unambiguous information.  Depressed participants showed 
pessimistic distortions in only six of 23 studies providing information but in eight 
of 18 studies using unambiguous information.  These results suggest that 
depressed people do not negatively bias ambiguous information.  However, the 
evidence is not conclusive.77 
 
                                                 
73 Koenig, Ragin, and Harrow, "Accuracy and Bias in Depressive's Judgments for Self and Other," 513. 
74 Koenig, Ragin, and Harrow, 515. 
75 Thomas J. Johnson and Thomas M. DiLorenzo, "Social Information Processing Biases in Depressed and 
Nondepressed College Students," Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 13, no. 3 (September 1998): 517-30. 
76 Nancy McKendree-Smith and Forrest Scogin, "Depressive Realism: Effects of Depression Severity and 
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Clearly, further and more refined study is necessary to get an accurate picture of depressed 
versus non-depressed cognition and distortion. 
 The literature suggests that distortion occurs in both depressed and non-depressed 
populations, but it is possible that it occurs at different times.  They note that depressed 
participants tended not to show bias when discussing immediate perceptions (unlike the non-
depressed participants); however, they did display bias when recalling information later or 
thinking about it further78 – time may be the variable in transforming unbiased accuracy to 
biased inaccuracy.79  They note that their study supports the hypothesis that depressive realism is 
moderated by the severity of the patient’s depression.  Specifically, individuals with mild forms 
of depression were relatively accurate in their assessments, non-depressed participants tend to 
exhibit positive biases, and moderately/severely depressed participants tend to exhibit negative 
biases.80  They suggest, however, that further research is warranted. 
Challenges to Depressive Realism 
 Depressive realism has proven to be a very controversial issue, and like Beck’s theory, 
finds itself challenged at fundamental levels.  As with the discussion of Beck, instead of 
providing a survey of the entire body of literature, it will suffice to focus on a smaller group of 
studies over the past fifteen years critiquing Alloy and Abramson’s position. 
                                                 
78 This potentially makes the issue of the choice to forgo medical treatment even murkier.  If the heuristics and 
biases perspective is accurate, then decisions are spur of the moment and potentially more accurate than choices 
stemming from longer rumination.  However, we encourage patients to think about their choices, a process which 
leads them to rumination and recall (and hence, greater distortion), which is already subject to sources of error as 
demonstrated by the availability heuristic.  Taking some time to think about the choice to forgo treatment may 
exacerbate the depressive disorder itself, as well as potentially increasing the likelihood of an error in cognition 
occurring! 
79 McKendree-Smith and Scogin, "Depressive Realism: Effects of Depression Severity and Interpretation Time," 
1603. 
80 McKendree-Smith and Scogin, 1606-7. 
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Campbell and Fehr81 explored perceptions of self-concept in individuals of varying 
degrees of self-esteem.  They also explored the role of “negative affectivity” in judgments of 
observer feedback.  They noted that, contrary to what one would expect from the depressive 
realism model, individuals with high negative affectivity do have more pessimistic views of 
themselves and the world, but that one ought to be skeptical as to whether this provides a more 
objectively accurate perspective.82  They note that they have only tested judgments of conveyed 
impressions, but suggest that their results might be extended to other areas of cognition and 
judgment, but only after empirical testing.  They reject the characterization of depressed 
individuals as ‘sadder, but wiser’: 
Many current texts in psychology portray people high in NA as ‘sadder, but 
wiser.’  On the basis of the research evidence to date, this characterization seems 
clearly inappropriate with respect to knowing how others view the self.  These 
individuals are certainly sadder; they hold more negative beliefs about themselves 
and the impressions they convey to others.  This general pessimism, however, 
provides no special access to wisdom because others’ impressions of a given 
individual exhibit considerable variability over people, time, and roles (e.g., 
partners vs. observers).  When reality itself is not constant, any stereotypical view 
of that reality sometimes will be right, but also sometimes will be wrong.83 
 
As such, any bias or distortion that is systematically applied to judgments will occasionally be 
accurate, in the same manner that a broken watch will still tell the right time twice a day.  They 
note that the research on depressive realism tends to ignore the relative adjustment of low versus 
high negative affectivity – despite occasional sources of error in individuals with low negative 
affectivity, they are generally better adjusted, healthier, and adapt much more readily than high 
negative affectivity. 
                                                 
81 Jennifer D. Campbell and Beverley Fehr, "Self-Esteem and Perceptions of Conveyed Impressions: Is Negative 
Affectivity Associated with Greater Realism?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58, no. 1 (January 
1990): 122-33. 
82 Campbell and Fehr, "Self-Esteem and Perceptions of Conveyed Impressions: Is Negative Affectivity Associated 
with Greater Realism?" 130. 
83 Campbell and Fehr, 131. 
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 Ackermann and DeRubeis84 surveyed the literature on depressive realism in a variety of 
contexts and noted that the findings are mixed.  Specifically, the accuracy of depressed and 
dysphoric individuals appears to be contingent upon the kind of task examined: 
Upon reviewing the depressive realism literature, two things become evident.  
First, although many of the findings are consistent with the hypothesis, almost as 
many are inconsistent with the hypothesis.  Second, the findings appear to vary 
systematically as a function of the type of task used in the studies.  Whereas in the 
contingency judgment and self-other studies the dysphoric subjects tend to be 
more accurate or evenhanded than the nondepressed subjects, in the recall of 
evaluative feedback studies the nondepressed subjects were more accurate than 
their depressed and dysphoric counterparts in every study but two.85 
 
This appears to contradict the assumptions of Alloy and Abramson’s theory – again, there are 
times when the resultant cognitive schema are in fact more accurate, and times when they 
produce further errors.  Extending this analysis, Ackermann and DeRubeis suggest that both 
depressed and nondepressed individuals employ cognitive schemata, which will both have 
corresponding accurate and inaccurate situations.  Anticipating later studies86 (and offering some 
support for depressive realism), Ackermann and DeRubeis note that the studies demonstrating 
accuracy frequently used dysphoric, instead of depressed individuals, and suggest that accuracy 
may result from the more mild and moderate forms of depression, instead of severe cases,87 but 
note that other explanations are also possible (e.g., motivational factors may be present or 
absent). 
                                                 
84 Ruby Ackermann and Robert J. DeRubeis, "Is Depressive Realism Real?" Clinical Psychology Review 11 (1991): 
565-84. 
85 Ackermann and DeRubeis, "Is Depressive Realism Real?" 579. 
86 For instance, J.A. Hancock, A.P.R. Moffoot, and R.E. O'Carroll, ""Depressive Realism" Assessed Via Confidence 
in Decision-Making," Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 1, no. 3 (1996): 213-20. 
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Dunning and Story88 examined depressed participants’ views of the future, and found that 
contrary to the depressive realism hypothesis, depressed individuals were more unrealistic in 
their assessment of the likelihood of future events.  Reviewing the literature critiquing the 
depressive realism hypothesis, they note two key criticisms.89  First, there is concern about the 
normative standards employed by previous experiments – it was assumed to be possible to 
classify one set or pattern of responses as accurate or normative, and that therefore others were 
dysfunctional.  This seems quite unlikely, as cognition is idiosyncratic.90  However, it does seem 
clear that there are interpretations of the world that are completely at odds with the actual 
phenomena.91  The second criticism concerns the ecological validity of the depressive realism 
phenomenon – the studies conducted were laboratory experiments, which may not necessarily 
translate into everyday behaviors.  If a phenomenon cannot be reproduced outside of carefully 
controlled situations, a fundamental question must be raised as to whether that phenomenon is a 
valid representation of normal behavior. 
 The conceptual criticisms aside, Dunning and Story note that the results of their study 
yielded a fundamental challenge to depressive realism: depressed individuals were actually less 
realistic about their anticipations of future events than non-depressed individuals.  This strikes at 
the core of the depressive realism hypothesis, which assumes greater realism in depression.  
                                                 
88 David Dunning and Amber L. Story, "Depression, Realism, and the Overconfidence Effect: Are the Sadder Wiser 
When Predicting Future Actions and Events?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61, no. 4 (October 
1991): 521-32. 
89 Dunning and Story, "Depression, Realism, and the Overconfidence Effect: Are the Sadder Wiser When Predicting 
Future Actions and Events?" 522. 
90 Idiosyncratic in more than the sense proposed by Beck.  How we think is a unique reflection of a variety of 
learned and inherited mechanisms – as indicated in chapters one and two, there are myriad genetic and 
environmental influences on how we process information.  Further, the experiences we have had in life offer further 
influences which are generally unique to us – the likelihood of having the exact same experience as someone else 
(i.e., employing exactly the same cognitive structures with exactly the same relevant memories and exactly the same 
interpretation) is quite low. 
91 In making this claim, I think back to a patient I worked with on the behavioral health unit who maintained 
psychotic beliefs about her family being imposters, another who attempted to eat a sandwich while holding it six 
inches from his mouth, etc.  These beliefs may be subjectively accurate (i.e., in line with the individuals’ beliefs at 
that time), but are objectively inaccurate, in that they are disconnected from reality. 
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While they note that their study found some differences in the confidence of the perception 
between the two groups, they stress that non-depressed individuals were more realistic: 
The results of both studies converged to a single and surprising answer: 
Depressed individuals were less realistic about their futures.  In both studies, the 
level of accuracy they achieved was lower than that attained by their 
nondepressed counterparts.  In addition, across the two studies, they proved to be 
more overconfident in the predictions they rendered.  In sum, in our mildly 
depressed student sample, we did not find any evidence of the realism observed in 
past social psychological work.  If anything, we found the exact opposite.  We 
should note, however, that although nondepressed subjects made more realistic 
judgments than depressed participants, this is not to say that the nondepressed 
were realistic and the depressed were not.  Both groups displayed unrealistic 
confidence in the likelihood that their predictions would prove accurate.92 
 
As a result, they suggest that depressive realism may reflect a tendency in certain situations, 
rather than a uniform phenomenon in depressive cognition. 
Dobson and Pusch93 note that while depressive realism has been replicated in 
experiments, it is becoming clear that boundary conditions are being identified.94  Noting that 
Abramson and Alloy tested college students, Dobson and Pusch focused on the cognition of 
depressed versus nondepressed women in judgments of contingency.  They note that depressive 
realism would suggest that the depressed women would be more accurate in assessing 
contingency; this hypothesis, however, was not upheld – the depressed subjects overestimated 
their control significantly.  These results, they argue, suggests that a phenomenon observed in 
college students may not be generalizable to other populations.95  In fact, they note that there are 
reasons to doubt the ecological validity of other experiments supporting depressive realism (as 
noted by Dunning and Story) – the results from experiments attempting to overcome the 
                                                 
92 Dunning and Story, "Depression, Realism, and the Overconfidence Effect: Are the Sadder Wiser When Predicting 
Future Actions and Events?" 529. 
93 Keith S. Dobson and Dennis Pusch, "A Test of the Depressive Realism Hypothesis in Clinically Depressed 
Subjects," Cognitive Therapy and Research 19, no. 2 (April 1995): 179-94. 
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ecological validity criticism do not offer much support for the phenomenon.  They note that 
“[r]esults from these studies have tended to be somewhat contradictory, leading to the suspicion 
that while depressive realism may be relatively easy to identify in a laboratory setting, as 
researchers move into domains that have greater personal relevance to subjects the phenomenon 
becomes increasingly elusive.”96 
 Albright and Henderson97 explored social comparisons in cognition between depressed 
and nondepressed individuals.  They noted that dysphoric individuals had a tendency to rate 
themselves unfavorably in comparison with others (i.e., promote others and put themselves 
down), while non-dysphoric individuals tended to rate themselves favorably (i.e., they had a 
tendency to put others down and be self-promoting).  However, while both groups demonstrated 
persistent schemata in information processing, Albright and Henderson argue that it would be 
inaccurate to claim that depression produces the more realistic cognition between the two: 
Finally, it is important to note that both groups demonstrated distortion; thus, 
interpretations of depressive realism which suggest that depression represents an 
absence of distortion may be incorrect.  One hypothesis is that realism may occur 
only for mildly depressed or dysphoric subjects, whose self-schemata may consist 
of both positive and negative content, but not for individuals who are more 
severely depressed, who should demonstrate consistently negative distortions.  
However, because distortion in the magnitude of social comparison differences 
occurred for the mildly depressed subjects in our sample, we propose that 
negative distortion, not realism, is a fundamental component of depression, and 
that the magnitude of distortion may increase as the severity of depression 
increases.98 
 
Again, there appears to be empirical evidence that the phenomena of ‘depressive realism’ may be 
limited in scope, may be only be applicable in particular circumstances, or may be a 
misunderstanding of the appropriate depression model. 
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 Wood, et al.,99 echo the concern that depressive realism may be a limited phenomenon – 
they noted significant differences between dysphoric and depressed participants.  As Alloy and 
Abramson relied upon dysphoric college students, they argue that it may be inappropriate to 
attempt to extend the principle to depressed individuals, as there are notable differences: 
Although dysphoric undergraduates are certainly more plentiful and easier to 
recruit into research studies, we conclude that they may not provide valid models 
from which to extrapolate to clinically depressed patients.  An alternative 
viewpoint is that the key factor in studying depressive phenomena is depression 
severity.  The mean BDI score of the dysphoric subjects (14.3) was less than half 
that of the clinically depressed subjects 33.0).  Correlational analyses revealed 
particularly strong associations between severity and self-confidence, which 
correct, only in Experiment 1, which included severely depressed patients.  It may 
be that if we had studied more severely dysphoric undergraduates who had higher 
BDI scores, we may have replicated the findings obtained with patients suffering 
from major depression.  However, we maintain that dysphoric subjects with BDI 
scores in the range of 12-15 do not provide a valid analogue of major depression.  
It is ironic that this is exactly the range of BDI scores of the dysphoric subjects 
used in the seminal study of Alloy and Abramson, which claimed to have 
established the phenomenon of ‘depressive realism.’100 
 
As such, these concerns about the generalizability of the depressive realism findings contain a 
fundamental critique of the depressive realism phenomenon – if there is something to the theory, 
it might make more sense to be rechristened ‘depressive dysphoria.’ 
 Pusch, et al.,101 reaffirm the contradictory results of studies in the depressive realism 
literature – they note that as the control of ecological validity in a given experiment increases, 
the degree of support for the depressive realism hypothesis decreases.102  In their own study, they 
noted that all groups under study exhibited some negative bias in their reality assessments.  This 
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contradicts research suggesting that non-depressed individuals demonstrate a consistent 
optimistic or self-enhancing bias.103  They suggest further that earlier experiments may have 
failed to account for personality styles in constructing experimental methodologies, which may 
be an important variable in accounting for participant’s responses, cognitive processing and 
judgments; i.e., these earlier experiments may have been confounded.  They suggest that future 
research ought to do more than simply explore differences in mood state – specifically, they 
suggest that researchers take into account mood state, personality style, and the nature of the 
experimental task, as these variables interact and may explain the variance in the observed 
behaviors.  They found that when dysphoric individuals were asked to evaluate personally non-
salient scenarios, they demonstrated cognition free from distortion; errors only crept in when 
they became personally involved in the scenarios being evaluated. 
 Kapci and Cramer104 also noted that dysphoric and non-dysphoric research participants 
demonstrate different kinds of bias in cognition and judgment.  Testing the predictions and 
experiences of positive and negative experiences, they found that “[t]he dysphoric participants 
were more accurate than the nondepressed participants in predicting which positive events they 
would not experience.  An opposite pattern, however, emerged for negative events.  The 
nondepressed participants proved to be more accurate than the dysphoric participants in 
predicting negative life events.”105  This provides further evidence for the explanation presented 
earlier that both depressed and non-depressed individuals display biases and distortions in their 
thinking.  Kapci and Cramer suggest that in the case of dysphoric individuals, the pessimistic 
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expectation of the future may maintain the depressive state106 – this may actually create a kind of 
self-fulfilling version of affective forecasting (e.g., “I will feel bad at some future date because I 
will worry about feeling bad until then.”). 
 A final critique is offered by Stone, et al.,107 who reaffirmed the idea that different mood 
states carry corresponding biases.  They suggest that it is impossible to divorce depressive 
realism from a general negativity108 – that is, depression carries with it behavioral and 
personality characteristics that fundamentally affect cognitive processing.  This general 
negativity presents a significant concern when evaluating cognition, as it may not necessarily be 
clear what behaviors and decisions stem from a particular cognitive process versus a pervasive 
attitude.  Further, Stone, et al., entertain the possibility that the negative biases may cancel out 
the positive biases, producing “accuracy without any true insight.”109  If this were to be the case, 
the judgments made by dysphoric individuals may be more accurate, but the person in question 
may have no real understanding of the decision or its bases.  They reject this possibility, 
however, suggesting that a pervasive negativity may offer a better explanation: “Although it 
would be possible to posit that the depressed participants were realistic in their individual item 
judgments but not in their aggregate judgments, a more parsimonious explanation is that the 
depressed participants displayed a general negativity, which was manifested as reduced 
overconfidence in one situation and as underconfidence in the second.”110  Depressive realism, 
therefore, may actually represent specific situations in which inappropriate overconfidence is 
reduced – an accidental property, rather than anything indicative of systematic greater realism. 
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Which Is Right? 
 None of the above is meant to argue for or against either Beck’s model or the depressive 
realism model.  It should be quite clear that there is significant disagreement as to whether 
depression produces systematic errors in cognition, systematic realism, or situation-specific 
accuracy.  In fact, the above discussion presents an interesting quandary.  If the depressive 
realism hypothesis is true, then dysphoric patients are more realistic about their prognosis, and 
hence the decisions made when mild to moderately depressed will be a more (objectively) 
accurate expression of autonomy, in which case we would want to correct cognitive heuristical 
errors generated that are not affective in nature, which requires selective challenges to specific 
opinions.  If the depressive distortion hypothesis is true, then patients are operating out of a 
flawed cognitive process, in which case we would want to challenge both the cognitive and the 
affective heuristics to make the patient’s choice as accurate as possible.  However, if in this 
process we restore them to a baseline function, we reintroduce optimistic bias, which is an 
irrational process.  However, restoration to this state of optimistic bias carries with it a reduced 
chance of morbidity and mortality, which then may change the actual prognosis and outcome.  In 
essence, depending on the perspective we take on the literature, either we continue down a path 
that fosters depression, which normally would potentially render the patient incompetent to make 
a choice under current standards of autonomy, or we foster a positive cognitive illusion, which 
creates irrational thought processes, which normally would potentially render the patient 
incompetent to make a choice under current standards of autonomy. 
What is germane for the purposes of the larger argument is that the presence of 
depression in a patient is not necessarily automatically a reason to deem a patient unable to make 
his or her own medical decisions.  However, it should offer an impetus for greater dialogue and 
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exploration of the choice to forgo treatment – not merely the final decision, or the experiences 
upon which the decision is based, but also upon the cognitive process involved.  If it becomes 
apparent that a distortion is influencing the patient’s choice, we would be remiss not to attempt 
to correct it – this may not necessarily change the outcome, but at least it will be for reasons not 
predicated on inaccuracy, misunderstanding, or distorted thought. 
We turn now to a discussion of autonomy, a central principle of medical ethics.  We will 
first discuss dominant or highly influential theoretical perspectives on patient autonomy, and will 
then turn to models that take into account arguments from psychology and psychiatry, as well as 
critiques of the traditional model from other philosophical perspectives.  These perspectives offer 
critical insights into how we actually view the world.  Current autonomy models don’t account 
for the concepts stressed in chapters one, two, and in the above discussion.  Instead, they stress a 
homuncular autonomy that is divorced from heuristical and bounded rational thought – these 
models are predicated upon the most basic reference to cognition, the very tip of the cognitive 
and decisional iceberg.  This presents a fundamental problem – as they are formulated and have 
been developed, current autonomy models have created an idealized rational agent that doesn’t 
actually exist, and never has. 
AUTONOMY 
The debate surrounding autonomy has demonstrated several interesting points.  
Paramount in this debate are the assumptions regarding human cognition – many historical and 
contemporary models are predicated upon a ‘classical model’ of reason, in which we, as rational 
agents, debate in a risk/benefit, maximin (maximum gain, minimum loss) manner.  Lakoff and 
Johnson111 note five recurring assumptions of the classical model: it is assumed to be literal, 
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logical (in the sense of formal logic), conscious, transcendent (disembodied), and 
dispassionate.112  All of this assumptions, however, are wrong – our cognition is actually 
metaphorical, not literal, dependent upon framing, metonymy, and prototype-based inferences, 
not logical, for the most part unconscious, fundamentally embodied, and fundamentally 
connected to and influenced by emotion.113  As such, the idealized conception of rationality and 
reason simply is not supported by the empirical evidence. Lakoff and Johnson phrase it more 
succinctly: “The traditional view of rationality, together with Kant’s idea of autonomy, gave rise 
to the view of human beings as autonomous rational actors, with complete freedom of the will 
and a transcendent rationality that allows them to think anything at all and to freely choose their 
purposes and beliefs.  This view is false.”114  There are implicit limitations upon the ways in 
which we can think, both in terms of content as well as methodology – the product of evolution 
has yielded heuristical, not algorithmic, cognitive processes.  To make this kind of thought 
meaningful in our everyday lives and major moral decisions, it becomes evident that we must 
first explore and understand how we think – we must abandon philosophies that fiat homuncular 
models of cognition.  There is an inherent difficulty, however, in that the objections faced are not 
empirical – as the empirical evidence of cognitive science and neuroscience repeatedly 
demonstrate the concepts mentioned by Lakoff and Johnson – but ideological.  It is difficult to 
abandon deeply held beliefs about radicalized autonomy; despite the implicit danger of such an 
ideology: 
Cognitive science has something of enormous importance to contribute to human 
freedom: the ability to learn what our unconscious conceptual systems are like 
and how our cognitive unconscious functions.  If we do not realize that most of 
our thought is unconscious and that we think metaphorically, we will indeed be 
slaves to the cognitive unconscious.  Paradoxically, the assumption that we have a 
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radically autonomous rationality as traditionally conceived actually limits our 
rational autonomy.  It condemns us to cognitive slavery – to an unaware and 
uncritical dependence on our unconscious metaphors.  To maximize what 
conceptual freedom we can have, we must be able to see through and move 
beyond philosophies that deny the existence of an embodied cognitive 
unconscious that governs most of our mental lives.”115 
 
Simply put, if we want to be genuinely autonomous, to genuinely demonstrate a semblance of 
free will in decision-making, we must become much more aware of the role of the cognitive 
unconscious and other influences in routine, everyday cognition.  By extension, a meaningful 
sense of autonomy in medical ethics must also incorporate this understanding – sticking to 
unempirical viewpoints, in addition to being bad science by forcing fact to fit ideology, is 
inherently dangerous, and threatens to constrict autonomy further by denying that the shackles 
are even there. 
What further evidence exists for the requisite nature of cognitive models of autonomy?  A 
variety of researchers and theorists over the past two decades have begun to stress the important 
of heuristics and biases, along with other cognitive constructs, in maintenance of ‘normal’ 
thought.116  Well before Lakoff and Johnson, Miller and Moretti noted that the evidence 
increasingly supported cognitive models promoting bounded rationality – the idea that rationality 
is limited in scope and situationally dependent, even in ‘normal’ cognition.117  Evans and Hollon 
support this conclusion, noting that “Existing beliefs appear to distort the processing of new 
information and to bias the retrieval of prior information from memory; information processing 
itself may rely more on intuitive heuristics that only haphazardly produce accurate 
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inferences.”118  Moretti and Shaw note that many of the assumptions we make about the world 
around us go unchallenged, regardless of their accuracy, and as such, we ought not to assume 
that our own cognitive feedback mechanisms will catch the automatic and habitual errors we are 
making.119  Matthews notes that illness undermines personal autonomy – the underlying 
structures of cognition are altered by the experience of illness, producing decisions that may 
stem from the disease process, instead of the patient’s authentic wishes.120  Medical intervention 
then becomes necessary, to restore individuals capacity to speak for themselves.  Parascandola, 
et al., note that clinicians should make themselves aware of common errors and cognitive biases, 
and to be aware of them in themselves as well, as they fundamentally affect treatment 
decisions.121  Draper and Sorell lament that very little attention is paid to the kinds of decisions 
that patients ought to make – they note that it appears at times as if some models of autonomy 
create infallible patients, and that bad decisions are the responsibility of the physician, not the 
patient.122  Clearly, then, there is significant need to explore influences on cognition not 
traditionally covered in theories of medical ethics. 
Critiques of Autonomy 
 In addition to critics calling for exploration of the cognitive elements of autonomy, the 
principle has sustained attacks from a variety of perspectives, from feminist viewpoints,123 
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sociological viewpoints,124 and other philosophical objections.125  The recurrent conflict between 
autonomy and beneficence – briefly, a concern for the patients well-being, but a principle 
explored in more detail later – has raised the specter of paternalist thought.  While ethicists have 
attempted to centralize patient autonomy, which has been rather successful in the past few 
decades, some are questioning whether this centralization of autonomy is a wise decision.  
Gawande, for instance, notes that giving autonomy trump power, instead of pluralistic 
importance: 
Where many ethicists go wrong is in promoting patient autonomy as a kind of 
ultimate value in medicine rather than recognizing it as one value among others.  
Schneider found that what patients want most from doctors isn’t autonomy per se; 
it’s competence and kindness.  Now, kindness will often involve respecting 
patients’ autonomy, assuring that they have control over vital decisions.  But it 
may also mean taking on burdensome decisions when patients don’t want to make 
them, or guiding patients in the right direction when they do.  Even when patients 
do want to make their own decisions, there are times when the compassionate 
thing to do is to press hard: to steer them to accept an operation or treatment that 
they fear, or forgo one that they’d pinned their hopes on.  Many ethicists find this 
line of reasoning disturbing, and medicine will continue to struggle with how 
patients and doctors ought to make decisions.  But, as the field grows ever more 
complex and technological, the real task isn’t to banish paternalism; the real task 
is to preserve kindness.”126 
 
Clearly the conflict regarding autonomy requires an examination of popular autonomy models – 
the concept appears to fall victim to its own assumptions about the individual, both in respect to 
his cognitive ability, as well as his psychosocial environment.  In order to clarify the differences 
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between the homuncular and cognitive autonomy models, important theories of each will be 
explored.  We will examine theories in which cognitive elements are not given priority first. 
Homuncular Autonomy Models 
 There are three principle models that will be examined in this section – those of Veatch, 
Faden and Beauchamp, and Beauchamp and Childress.  A running theme in these models is an 
overt claim of rationality on the part of the patient in question.  Some of these models make 
direct appeals to Kantian rational agents, a paradigmatic representation of the classical sense of 
rationality.  Others make covert appeals to the model, linking cognitive bias and distortion to 
specific pathologies or outside influences.  The recurring problem, then, is that the models 
propose personal autonomy without recognizing that the cognition upon which the autonomy is 
predicated is much less volitional than they make it out to be.  They fiat a kind of homuncular 
autonomy – an idealized rational agent whose mind is akin to a little man selectively choosing 
what will influence his decision-making; a little man whose only apparent sources of weakness 
are disease, addiction, infancy, or dementia.  As is evident from chapters one and two, this 
homuncular autonomy does not exist, nor has it ever existed.  Our cognition involves the 
formation of myriad associations and interpretations well before our thought enters our conscious 
awareness – there is no “little man” to be found. 
Veatch 
 One of the first influential theories of medical ethics was proposed by Robert Veatch in 
1981.127  Veatch establishes a relationship between deontological and consequentialist principles, 
which includes promise keeping, beneficence and autonomy.  The fundamental question in his 
model, however, is whether personal autonomy – derived from liberty – ought to be an absolute, 
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or whether it ought to be potentially restricted by other concerns..128  Veatch further divides 
autonomy into ‘liberty rights’ and ‘entitlement rights’; the former prevent others from infringing 
upon the individuals ability to act, while the latter require others to act in some manner to allow 
us to act in turn (i.e., others must perform some action in order for us to be able to exercise our 
rights).  Veatch categorizes the right to refuse medical treatment, the right to control one’s body, 
and the right to consent to treatment under liberty rights.129  The principle of autonomy carries 
with it innate moral worth, and as such, is classified as a deontological norm – it’s good and 
worth is not derived or dependent upon any consequent good it may produce.130  Veatch then 
proposes a rather counterintuitive claim – although professionals engaged in covenantal 
relationships (e.g., doctor and patient) have a prima facie duty to provide necessary information 
to their patients in the process of informed consent, they have no right to force information upon 
them.  In fact, Veatch claims that the “same principle of autonomy that generates a right to be 
informed gives humans the freedom to act in a less than responsible manner.  Imposing 
information on a person would violate the individual’s autonomy just as withholding information 
would.”131  This claim will be problematic in light of the analysis presented thus far – Veatch is 
making an autonomy claim trump informed decision-making, and essentially allowing the 
irrational to trump the rational.  This will be explored more fully following the presentation of 
his argument.132 
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 Implicit in the covenantal model is the ability to remove oneself from the professional 
relationship.  Veatch argues that entering into the care of a physician is not entering into a 
covenantal relationship for the rest of their lives for either physician or patient.  Instead, both 
possess the ability to sever the relationship once it becomes clear that the course of treatment 
proposed or desired violates either the physician’s or the patient’s value systems or 
conscience.133  For example, a patient would be free to sever the covenant were the physician to 
insist upon a course of treatment that violated the patient’s religious views (e.g., transfusing 
blood products in the case of a Jehovah’s Witness), or if the patient were to insist on a course of 
treatment that the physician believes to be completly unwarranted or against the standards of 
medical practice (e.g., a patient insisting on hemodialysis for a case of gout).134 
 The principle of autonomy carries trump value at all stages of life.  Veatch explicitly 
argues that the right to refuse treatment applies equally throughout the stages of one’s health – 
one cannot, for instance, arbitrarily treat against a patient’s wishes simply because he or she is 
terminally ill: 
In this regard the fact that the patient is terminally ill would appear to count for 
little.  Of course, we, as a society, might adopt the position that the principle of 
autonomy applies less rigorously once one is terminally ill.  Unless we adopt such 
a stance, though, the right of self-determination applies equally in these 
circumstances.  If there is any obligation to prolong life at all (independent of 
considerations of benefit and harm or a duty to avoid killing), it cannot authorize 
professionals to violate the autonomy of the terminally ill.  The society cannot let 
a minority of physicians who believe that they have a duty to prolong life override 
the principle of autonomy in such situations.135 
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This clearly represents a significant point of contention between Veatch and my argument – it 
has been the purpose of this dissertation to demonstrate in no uncertain terms that common 
medical conditions, including terminal illnesses, can profoundly affect how an individual 
processes information and makes decisions.  It would be simply negligent to fiat autonomy as a 
trump in the case when an individual’s cognition has been fundamentally compromised.  This 
clearly does not happen in every patient, however, which is a topic to be explored in the final 
chapter of the present work.  Veatch does recognize that moral decisions do not exist in a social 
vacuum – patients have other relationships that constitute moral communities, which must be 
factored into decision-making.136  As such, he does recognize that autonomy is a larger concept, 
but he chooses to allow it only to grow outward (moral communities), rather than inward 
(reductive cognition and automaticity). 
 Veatch considers whether consequentialist principles might be better explanations for our 
moral sense.  He notes that a variety of social perspectives – religious, Western secular, socialist, 
etc. – have all found the utilitarian perspective insufficient as an absolute (highest) norm in 
explaining our moral judgments.137  All have modified it in some manner.  The same critique 
holds true for the principle of promise-keeping; in fact, Veatch concludes that “a single, 
overarching principle as a solution to the dilemma of conflicting principles seems most 
implausible and probably would not be much help even if it could be found.”138  Instead of 
focusing on a single principle, Veatch explores the possibility that a pluralistic system might be 
more tenable – it might be possible for a class of principles to take precedence in cases of 
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conflict.  There is precedence for this approach, as other systems of ethics have employed similar 
considerations (e.g., virtue ethics’ pluralistic approach).  This leads him to consider whether non-
consequentialist principles as a class should be given priority over consequentialist principles. 
 Veatch ultimately concludes that the entire class of deontological norms must be satisfied 
before we explore consequentialist norms.  This is to say, we can only begin to explore the 
consequences of our actions after we have ensured that our prima facie duties have been met: 
Perhaps, though, traditional professional physician ethics have the priority just 
reversed – perhaps the nonconsequentialist principles should be given first 
priority.  Certainly this would change the character of medical ethical decisions 
made by lay people and professionals, but the decisions could be made.  The 
nonconsequentialist principles could, in the normal case, be satisfied and still give 
leeway to pursuit of decisions under the principle of beneficence, or benefiting the 
patient.  In fact, if the nonconsequentialist principles are to have any power in a 
medical ethical system, it may be that they together have to be given a lexical 
priority over the principle of beneficence.  Otherwise consideration of 
consequences can always swamp the other moral considerations.  As we saw in 
considering the ethics of human experimentation – especially with the Nazi 
experiments – if enough benefit is put into the calculus other moral considerations 
will always be overpowered.  That is why it makes sense to insist that the other 
principles (autonomy, with its requirement of consent, keeping of contracts, 
avoiding killing, telling the truth, and promoting justice) must be satisfied as prior 
necessary conditions before consequences of the research can be put on the 
agenda.  No amount of good consequences can overpower the inherent moral 
requirements of the nonconsequentialist principles.139 
 
As such, we can never trump autonomy concerns by noting that good consequences will result.  
On the face of it, this makes sense.  A persistent concern in utilitarian ethics (and other forms of 
consequentialism) is that of the “utility monster”, in which actions against which many have a 
visceral reaction (e.g., genocide and slavery) become the moral course of action because of the 
good consequences they may produce – in short, it is a fundamental objection to the idea that the 
end justifies the means.  Veatch categorizes a variety of principles as non-consequentialist, 
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including promise keeping, autonomy, honesty, avoiding killing, and justice.140  These all carry 
similar moral weight, and as such, become a potential source of conflict – a persistent critique of 
deontological systems of ethics is that it becomes very difficult to reconcile conflicting absolute 
principles.  Veatch suggests that when exploring different courses of action, one ought to 
consider what course of action will produce the fewest violated non-consequentialist principles.  
If two options produce an equal minimum of violations, one could then proceed onto 
consequentialist considerations.141  Veatch notes that this conflict resolution process may not be 
satisfying, but may be the only tenable approach, unless one were to attempt again to find the 
heretofore elusive, single, overarching principle.142 
 As indicated earlier, there are several potential areas of contention with Veatch’s account 
of autonomy, but I will focus on two at the moment: Veatch’s apparent cognitive model, and 
fundamental problems with other deontological principles (i.e., promise keeping).  Both involve 
significant theoretical and empirical concerns. 
 The first immediate concern is that Veatch builds his conception of autonomy and 
rationality upon an unrealistic cognitive model.  He offers very few potential exceptions to this 
model – he only makes occasional concessions that illness may compromise a patient’s 
competence, and focuses more on exceptions resulting from a patient’s lack of information.143  
As has been demonstrated in chapter one, the structure of cognition and consciousness is 
reducible to several levels of organization, and as such, is susceptible to influence at a variety of 
levels.  We can alter thought by changing the environment the individual finds herself in.  We 
                                                 
140 Veatch, A Theory of Medical Ethics, 303. 
141 It seems almost ironic that Veatch resorts to a negative utilitarian calculus (minimizing the violation instead of 
maximizing the good) in resolving conflicting deontological norms. 
142 Veatch, 304. 
143 I will give Veatch the benefit of the doubt regarding backstage cognition and automaticity, in that this research 
did not really come into its prime until several years after Veatch published his work, as well as regarding 
neuroimaging, which only reached its prime in 1985 with the advent of magnetic resonance imaging. 
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can alter thought by changing the physical structure of her brain.  We can alter thought by 
changing the sensitive biochemistry of her neurochemical pathways.  Each of these is a 
significant cause for concern, as each of them is affected by hospitalization, especially when the 
hospitalization is due to a serious or terminal illness.  Even the therapies we use can alter thought 
processes – by their very nature, medications alter biochemistry, which can affect cognition, a 
process some have referred to a ‘pharmacological Calvinism’ after the determinist theologian.144  
We have further seen that the cognitive phenomena of which we are aware are only the tip of the 
iceberg – it is quite possible that our ‘consciousness’ is only an epiphenomenon of our deeper 
and underlying mechanisms.  In chapter two, we have seen that psychological processes are also 
dependent upon deeper, backstage elements and automatic processing.  The way humans have 
evolved is not that of a Cartesian information processor – we do not algorithmically take in and 
weigh every bit of information that is presented to us.  Instead, we adopt a variety of cognitive 
heuristics which allow us to quickly judge and assess situations, and thereby act in an 
environmentally adaptive manner.  We have already seen that this produces both good and bad 
decisions; in fact, the nature of our cognition allows us to make disastrous decisions which we 
can, ostensibly, learn from.  Further, we have seen that emotion plays a significant role in 
cognition, not only providing valences for memory, but also triggering these emotional memories 
in new situations.  All of these considerations demonstrate that ‘rational’ cognition is susceptible 
to significantly greater errors than simply not having all the information – there is no guarantee 
that the patient will understand the information presented, and, without challenging the patient’s 
decision-making process, there is no manner of assessing how persons come to the conclusion 
they reach.  The cognitive model proposed by Veatch – and by extension, to other philosophical 
models positing autonomy as an absolute – is unrealistic in its assessment of human cognition.  
                                                 
144 G. Klerman, "Psychotropic Hedonism Vs. Pharmacological Calvinism," Hastings Center Report 2 (1972): 1-3. 
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Even if one wished to preserve the ability of patients to be mistaken in the choices they make, I 
would suggest that this presents a case of the letter of the law destroying its spirit.  Many 
philosophical, psychological, and theological models have suggested that mistakes allow for 
personal growth, by being able to appreciate and learn from the consequences of our actions 
(e.g., empiricist epistemology, Irenaean theodicy, associationist learning models, etc.).  How is a 
patient to learn from a mistaken choice to forgo medical treatment, if this is potentially the last 
choice he or she will make in life?  The choice to forgo medical treatment ought to be a, if not 
the, choice in which we would seek to eliminate as much error as humanly possible, since, 
ostensibly, this is a choice we might not be able to reconsider. 
 A second fundamental concern is the principles included in the deontological category, 
specifically promise-keeping.  My concern about this principle revolves around times when it 
may be inappropriate to do so.  In light of Veatch’s argument, I find it quite likely that he and I 
will disagree regarding the exceptions to this prima facie duty.  As an example, I offer advanced 
directives.  In a covenantal relationship, one can apply Veatch’s principle of promise-keeping to 
respecting treatment preferences expressed in an advanced directive.145  Many ethicists have 
espoused the merit of documenting one’s health care preferences, as it is widely believed to be 
an accurate presentation of one’s values, and will help in making personal-value-congruent 
treatment decisions were one to become incapacitated.  Once the legal standards have been met 
verifying and validating the advanced directive and the treatment team has the documentation on 
the patient’s chart, one would hope that they would then simply respect the preferences 
contained within.  Here, however, the issue gets murky.  First, it is not so clear that the legal 
standards have been met, as these vary from state to state.  Does one have an obligation to ‘keep 
                                                 
145 One could actually apply promise-keeping or autonomy to this situation.  It will be evident, however, that both 
become problematic when analyzed in light of contemporary psychological research. 
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the promise’ of a potentially legally non-binding document?  Even if the legal standards have 
indeed been met, there are deeper and more problematic issues.  Fagerlin , et al., have challenged 
both of the above assumptions of the medicophilosophical community – there is no guarantee 
that an advanced directive will accurately present one’s values, and there is no guarantee that the 
document will help make value-congruent treatment decisions.146  Through metanalysis of the 
medical and psychological literature, they note that it became evident that individual preferences 
change over time, sometimes quite drastically, and that sometimes uninvolved third parties can 
make more value-congruent choices than the proxies named in the advance directive.  These both 
raise fundamental challenges – if preferences change over time, how certain are we that the 
document in front of us is an expression of contemporaneous wishes?  Further, in light of the 
errors introduced by affective forecasting (how we believe we will feel about future events), how 
can we be sure that the patient was able to really understand in the past their present situation?  If 
promise-keeping is a deontological norm, and therefore precedent to beneficence, do we have an 
obligation to uphold promises that might no longer represent what the patient wants? 
 Neither of these fundamental concerns are easy to resolve, but a step in the right direction 
is adopting a model of decisional ethics which appreciates the complexity of human thought, a 
topic we will return to later. 
Faden and Beauchamp 
 A second influential model is that proposed by Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp.147  Like 
Veatch, they stress the primacy of autonomy in medical ethics, and define it in terms of 
individual rights.  They argue that the right to make autonomous choices and perform 
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University Press, 1986). 
 350
autonomous actions correlates to the duty to refrain from interfering in the choices and actions of 
others.148  Others, therefore, have a corresponding duty not to infringe upon our rights.  They 
note that ‘autonomy’ serves as an umbrella term, by which we mean disparate concepts like 
“privacy, voluntariness, self-mastery, choosing freely, the freedom to choose, choosing one’s 
own moral position, and accepting responsibility for one’s choices.”149  In moral philosophy 
specifically, it carries the connotation of self-governance and self-direction, along with a 
freedom from undue influence from other external or internal sources (i.e., control by others or 
from personal limitations).  They diverge from the literature, however, by focusing on the action 
performed, instead of the actor – their concern is that it is possible for otherwise autonomous 
individuals to make non-autonomous choices, due to a variety of influences.150 
 There are a variety of means by which autonomous individuals can render non-
autonomous decisions; Faden and Beauchamp immediately note manipulation on the part of 
clinical staff as especially pernicious (e.g., withholding relevant information, not recognizing 
refusal of treatment, etc.).  Respect for autonomy, they argue, is recognizing that individuals are 
entitled to their own views, values, and beliefs.151  Failure to respect that autonomy is to raise the 
specter of paternalism – a phrase referring to the philosophical outlook that the clinician must 
look out for the welfare of his children, and therefore has the ability to overrule a recalcitrant 
patient as one would a misbehaving child.  This is a significant concern, as medical ethics has 
strived to equalize the physician-patient relationship as much as possible.152  They note that 
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placing authority in the patient’s hands has been a popular recourse in the medical and research 
communities, for reasons as diverse as promoting beneficence, preventing morbidity and 
mortality, and preventing undue risks – extrinsic values, instead of implicit valuation of patient 
autonomy.153  Paralleling Veatch, Faden and Beauchamp argue for a pluralistic approach to 
medical ethical principles (e.g., respect for autonomy, beneficence, and justice are all important 
considerations).  Contrary to Veatch’s model (among others), however, they argue that respect 
for autonomy is not lexically prior to other principles – there are conditions in which beneficence 
and justice can outweigh respect for autonomy: 
Numerous authors in biomedical and research ethics believe that if a person is 
acting autonomously and is the bearer of an autonomy right, then his or her 
choices morally ought never to be overridden by considerations of beneficence or 
proper care.  This is not our assumption.  Although the burden of moral proof will 
generally be on those who seek to intervene in another’s choice, as the need to 
protect persons from harm becomes more compelling, thereby increasing the 
‘weight’ of moral considerations of beneficence in the circumstances, it becomes 
more likely that these considerations will validly override demands to respect 
autonomy.  Similarly, because some autonomy rights are less significant than 
others, the demands to protect those rights are less weighty in the face of 
conflicting demands.154 
 
As such, we begin to see a balancing principle emerging in Faden and Beauchamp’s model; 
unlike Veatch, it is essentially consequentialist in nature. 
 Faden and Beauchamp’s concept of an autonomous agent does not employ a significant 
number of strict and rigid criteria.  They contrast themselves with other models, which might 
require the autonomous person to be “consistent, independent, in command, resistant to control 
by authorities, and the source of his or her basic values and beliefs.  The person’s life as a whole 
                                                                                                                                                             
the physician does not have automatic trump power over the patient’s preferences.  This produces a more collegial 
relationship and group decision-making as a result. 
153 Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, 14. 
154 Faden and Beauchamp, 19. 
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expresses self-directedness.”155 Such strict criteria create a nearly impossible standard to meet – 
in practical terms, very few individuals display these characteristics.  Faden and Beauchamp 
suggest that a theory of personal autonomy does not require such extreme criteria; instead, they 
offer a model that involves three basic criteria: “We analyze autonomous actions as follows: X 
acts autonomously only if X acts 1. intentionally, 2. with understanding, and 3. without 
controlling influences.”156  They note that these criteria might still be wanting, but they believe 
that they suffice for an everyday understanding of autonomy.  With the exception of 
intentionality, these criteria exist along a continuum – it is possible for the individual to possess 
greater or lesser degrees of understanding or control; intentionality is an all-or-nothing condition.  
As such, autonomy itself exists along a continuum, as measured by varying understanding and 
non-control. 
 The variables interact, but do not have collective trump power – this is to say, one cannot 
label an action autonomous if one of the three criteria is not met.  No degree of intentionality and 
understanding can render an action autonomous if it is coerced, nor can intentionality and 
complete non-control render an action autonomous if it is not understood.  In developing the idea 
of ‘autonomy by degrees’, Faden and Beauchamp establish thresholds for autonomous actions – 
points along the continuum above which all actions are considered autonomous, and below 
which they are considered non-autonomous.157  However, as was mentioned earlier, 
intentionality does not exist along a continuum – as an all-or-nothing condition, it is necessary to 
establish criteria to discern whether or not an action is intentional.  Drawing upon literature in 
philosophy and psychology, they argue that intentionality requires that the moral agent “integrate 
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his cognitions into a blueprint for action.”158  Essentially, for an agent to act intentionally, he 
must have a definite plan and act to follow through on this plan.  This removes accidental 
actions, unformulated plans, and habituated behaviors from consideration when discussing 
intentionality.159  Faden and Beauchamp do recognize that their suggestion that intention is not a 
matter of degree may seem questionable to some, and they note that one might consider it a 
matter of degree based on two possible grounds: ‘mindfulness of willing’ and ‘correspondence 
with an action plan.’160  The first of these notes that the degree of intentionality changes 
dependent upon how emphatically one wills the action.  Less intentional actions are more 
automatic, with little cognitive awareness.161  Ultimately, however, Faden and Beauchamp reject 
a continuum of intentionality, in favor of the all-or-none standard. 
 Their second critieria of autonomous action – understanding – presents unique 
challenges, as they note that ‘understanding’ as a construct in philosophical and psychological 
literature has garnered very little discussion.  They argue that psychology has endeavored to 
explain the mechanism by which people “understand or comprehend human communications, 
with…emphasis on cognitive and neurophysiological human processes.”162  In essence, they 
suggest that the literature has sought an exploration of the mechanism of understanding, and has 
failed to examine what the term actually means.  In order to clarify the issue, they define 
‘understanding’ in propositional terms – the agent must understand that the action fits into a 
specific descriptive category and carries specific consequences.  In essence, they want to be sure 
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that the agent has justified beliefs about what it is that he is doing.163  If the moral agent is able to 
describe the intended action and its consequences, then that agent demonstrates understanding in 
their sense of the term.  They refine their definition, however, in that there is a difference 
between ideal versus partial understanding: 
A person has a full or complete understanding of an action if there is a fully 
adequate apprehension of all the relevant propositions or statements (those that 
contribute in any way to obtaining an appreciation of the situation) that correctly 
describe (1) the nature of the action, and (2) the foreseeable consequences and 
possible outcomes that might follow as a result of performing and not performing 
the action.  To the extent that this ideal is less than satisfied, an action is based on 
less than full understanding, and thus is less than a fully autonomous action.164 
 
This explains the necessity of placing understanding along a continuum – it is intuitively 
apparent that one can have greater or lesser understanding of one’s actions.  Further, Faden and 
Beauchamp argue that having false beliefs about the proposed action fundamentally undermines 
understanding, opening the door to non-autonomous actions (even in situations in which the 
individual is ‘responsible’ for these false beliefs).165  There is, however, difficulty in determining 
whether and which beliefs diminish understanding. 
 The third criterion centers on coercion and controlling influences.  Faden and Beauchamp 
argue vigorously for the separation of the ideas of willful action, voluntary action, and 
controlled/non-controlled action.166  While some sources conflate these concepts, Faden and 
Beauchamp note that it is possible for actions to fit into one category without necessarily fitting 
into another.  For instance, while one might be controlled, it does not therefore logically follow 
that the agent does not intend the outcome or action.167  In a like manner, actions can be 
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completely free from coercion, and yet be non-intentional (e.g., accidents, muscle spasms, etc.).  
Further, Faden and Beauchamp distinguish influencing an action versus controlling an action.  It 
is entirely possible to be influenced by others without being controlled by them.  An attempt at 
influence is an attempt to persuade, not to control.  Persuasion and influence do not exist on a 
continuum – Faden and Beauchamp understand them as standing at opposite ends of a spectrum: 
“Coercion and persuasion are not continuum concepts: Coercion is always controlling, but not by 
degrees; persuasion is never controlling and involves no degree of noncontrol.  Manipulation, by 
contrast, is controlling or noncontrolling and admits of degrees.”168  As a result, an agent is 
nonautonomous when he is being manipulated (e.g., when relevant information is withheld). 
 Having established their three criteria for autonomous action, Faden and Beauchamp turn 
their discussion to other concepts that have been proposed in the autonomy discussion, taking 
time to address the concept of authenticity.  In a nutshell, authenticity argues that actions must 
represent the reflected-upon values and life plans of the patient to truly qualify as autonomous.  
It is raised here because Faden and Beauchamp recognize that individuals can act in a manner 
that meets all three proposed criteria, and yet fail to act autonomously (e.g., acting due to 
addictions or other psychiatric conditions).169  Ultimately they reject authenticity as a necessary 
condition for autonomy, principally because while it does raise germane concerns about 
ownership of actions, it places an undue and unnecessary burden upon the moral agent.  As a 
matter of practicality, the great bulk of the decisions that we make that would normally fit the 
                                                                                                                                                             
posterior region of the frontal lobe).  If one were to manipulate the motor neurons of a patient’s arm, thereby causing 
him to strike a loved one (whom he does not want to strike), it is clear that the patient is being controlled 
avolitionally – we are forcing him to perform an action he does not want to do.  If, on the other hand, we were to 
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definition of autonomy would be rendered non-autonomous.170  For instance, when we conduct 
our day-to-day affairs, it is the exception, rather than the rule, that we weigh each and every 
decision in light of who we were, who we are, and who we intend to be.171  Further, they argue 
that as a result, authenticity claims would fundamentally narrow the range of decisions to be 
respected as autonomous.  They stress that this is not to say that only autonomous decisions are 
to be treated with respect, but that authenticity would narrow the range of decisions enjoying a 
principled defense due to their being autonomous.  As such, they stress that one cannot 
arbitrarily refuse to honor an autonomous decision simply because there is reason to believe that 
it is not authentic.172  At this point, it is necessary to note a caveat – thus far, it has been assumed 
that authenticity refers to a consistent reflective process on the part of the agent.  Faden and 
Beauchamp note that it is also possible to conceptualize authenticity in terms of ‘nonrepudiation’ 
of one’s values – i.e., the agent is not required to reflect actively upon his or her values in 
decision-making; authenticity can be satisfied so long as the decision does not repudiate 
previously held beliefs or principles (i.e., the action is ‘in-character’).  While this seems to be a 
promising reformulation, ultimately it faces empirical challenge and is of questionable merit in 
defining autonomous actions, and as such, it is rejected.173 
 As with Veatch’s model, serious concerns can be raised about the ‘rational’ assumptions 
proposed in Faden and Beauchamp’s model.  While they note that psychiatric illness can be a 
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influential factor, they do not address backstage elements of cognition.174  Further, they do note 
that psychology can offer insight into cognitive traits and abilities (which they label as 
inadequate when analyzed in terms of capacity to consent to treatment)175  As has been 
demonstrated, however, psychology has provided significant insights into how we actually 
process information; when augmented with the analyses offered by cognitive science, we have a 
significantly greater understanding of what it means to be a cognitive agent, which allows us to 
make more accurate claims about what it means to be an autonomous agent.  If my decisions are 
the result of persistent biases in information interpretation that do not fit neatly into one of the 
exceptions covered by Faden and Beauchamp’s model (e.g., affective forecasting or the 
availability heuristic), it would seem to make less sense to automatically defer to my 
‘autonomous’ choice.  The crux of this objection is that research has demonstrated that there are 
a variety of potential internal influences which can render decisions fundamentally flawed but 
which would still fit their proposed definition of ‘autonomy’; I would suggest that we do our 
patients a disservice by simply acquiescing to flawed, correctable, and terminal decisions. 
 Second, they fundamentally reject shared decision-making models, favoring a model in 
which a patient consents to treatment as a sole moral agent.176  This is troublesome in that it 
seems to place an undue amount of confidence on the part of the patient.  This is to say, instead 
of leveling the decision-making playing field, it seems that they are simply reversing the 
hierarchy, placing the patient above the physician.  Concerns about power-relationships aside, 
there is significant concern about whether a patient genuinely will appreciate the medical facts of 
the situation, and whether the patient will be able to make objectively accurate judgments based 
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upon a potentially limited understanding.  The benefits of a shared decision-making model is that 
it allows for the greatest possible interaction between medical understanding of the physician and 
the psychosocial realities of the patient.  Like the physician’s privileged access to medical 
training and experience, the patient also possesses specialized knowledge – her life experience 
and the meanings derived from them.  Shared decision-making allows for mutual ownership and 
responsibility in outcomes. 
 Third, there is significant concern about their rejection of authenticity as a criterion for 
autonomous action.  While it is true that a great many decisions do not meet this authenticity 
concern, there is no reason to abandon it.  It may be more reasonable to use it as a threshold 
criterion – as the severity of the consequences of the decision rises, it approaches a threshold 
point at which authenticity may become a necessary criterion.  Day-to-day decisions would not 
be affected – whether we buy white or wheat bread is not a matter of great moral importance.  
However, when our decision-making shifts to life-altering or life-ending consequences, it does 
not make sense to abandon the underlying goals and plans by which we have lived our lives. 
Beauchamp and Childress 
 By far the most widely known theory of medical ethics is that proposed by Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress.177  Melding consequentialist with deontological arguments, the 
two proposed a theory exploring and balancing four key principles: justice, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, and autonomy.  A recurring issue in medical ethics is the occasional conflict 
between two or more of these principles.  While interpretations of the principles vary – e.g., 
whether beneficence ought to be understood as the medical health and welfare of one’s patient, 
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or whether the principle includes an appreciation of their agency178 – many clinical case 
consultations can be framed and reconciled in light of common understandings. 
 Autonomy in Beauchamp and Childress’s model is not given priority over beneficence, 
non-maleficence, or justice.179  Rather, each is of significant, but not paramount, concern – 
which principle is to be upheld in a given case is discerned through precedent analysis, 
clarification of the relevant issues and conflicts, and balancing conflicting concerns.  Beauchamp 
and Childress note that autonomy is an umbrella term, and has taken on a variety of meanings.  
Central to their argument, however, is the minimal conception of personal autonomy as “self-rule 
that is free from both controlling interference by others and from limitations, such as inadequate 
understanding, that prevent meaningful choice.”180  This self-rule allows the individual to choose 
and follow a life-plan.  However, even agents autonomous per this proposed definition 
sometimes fail to act autonomously, for a variety of reasons, including “illness or depression, or 
because of ignorance, coercion, or other conditions that restrict their options.”181  Mirroring 
Faden and Beauchamp, they understand autonomous actions to be defined by intentionality, 
understanding, and an absence of control, the first of which is absolute, while the latter two exist 
on a continuum; similarly, they establish thresholds for understanding and freedom from 
constraint in autonomous actions, instead of absolute standards, in an effort to explain autonomy 
in everyday life. 
 Respect for autonomy is a key governing principle; it is not sufficient to posit that a 
patient is autonomous – rather, we have an obligation to respect the rights of others to hold their 
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own views and act accordingly.  Respect for autonomy, therefore, conveys a duty for “respectful 
action, not merely a respectful attitude.”182  Respectful actions include facilitating autonomous 
actions, assisting in building the capacity to act autonomously, and acting to prevent conditions 
that undermine autonomous actions.  As such, respect for autonomy can be phrased in terms of 
both positive and negative obligations: we have a duty to refrain from constraining the 
autonomous actions of others, and we have a duty to facilitate autonomous actions for others 
(who then reciprocally have corresponding obligations to us).  This sense of autonomy is not an 
absolute obligation; instead, it is a prima facie obligation – we recognize that there are implicit 
limitations:  
Our obligations to respect autonomy do not extend to persons who cannot act in a 
sufficiently autonomous manner (and cannot be rendered autonomous) because 
they are immature, incapacitated, ignorant, coerced, or exploited.  Infants, 
irrationally suicidal individuals, and drug-dependent persons are examples.  Those 
who vigorously defend rights of autonomy in biomedical ethics, as do the present 
authors, do not deny that many forms of intervention are justified if persons are 
substantially nonautonomous and cannot be rendered autonomous for specific 
decisions.183  
 
Aside from these gross impairments, respect for autonomy is clouded by the knowledge that 
beliefs and values change over time.  As discussed above in the critique of Veatch’s model, there 
is a substantial problem raised when we face individuals who have changed their mind.  Which 
autonomous choices ought one to respect when the current choices conflict with previously 
codified choices?  Akin to Faden and Beauchamp, Beauchamp and Childress address questions 
of authenticity and the congruence of the patient’s choices with her character.  They draw similar 
conclusions – authenticity is not a necessary criterion of autonomy – but do caution that actions 
deviating from one’s character “can raise caution flags that warn others to seek explanations and 
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probe more deeply into whether the actions are autonomous.”184  While it makes intuitive sense 
that actions out of character ought to raise warning flags, it is not so clear that authenticity ought 
to be abandoned as an autonomy principle. 
 The question of autonomy necessarily involves the question of competence to give 
consent (or to refuse it).  Beauchamp and Childress stress that ‘competence’ ought not to be 
understood in global terms – instead, a more accurate understanding of the term recognizes that 
different actions have different criteria of competence (e.g., the competence criteria to set up a 
gel electrophoresis is quite different than the competence criteria to give a philosophy lecture, 
which in turn differs from the competence criteria to make a soufflé).  As such, one ought not be 
judged incompetent in every aspect of her life, merely regarding specific tasks.  Further, 
competence can wax and wane over time – as such, it is necessary to recognize that competence 
is neither a global nor a static concept.  As such, if competence cannot be readily assessed 
immediately, it would make sense to assess it over a period of time.185  In the case of the 
competence criteria for medical decisions, Beauchamp and Childress propose that “Patients or 
subjects are competent to make a decision if they have the capacity to understand the material 
information, to make a judgment about the information in light of their values, to intend a certain 
outcome, and to communicate freely their wishes to care givers or investigators.”186  As such, 
they note that the criteria for autonomy and for competence are quite similar, and that similar 
thresholds can be established. 
 There is not a single, overarching threshold for competence – instead, these will vary 
with the decision at hand.  The threshold increases with the complexity or difficulty of the task, 
but not necessarily with the riskiness of the outcome: 
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It is correct to say that the threshold level of competence to decide will rise as the 
complexity or difficulty of a task increases (deciding about spinal fusion, say, as 
contrasted with deciding whether to take a minor tranquilizer).  However, the 
level of competence to decide does not rise as the risk of an outcome increases.  It 
is confusing to blend a decision’s complexity or difficulty with the risk at stake.  
No basis exists for believing that risky decisions require more ability at decision-
making than less risky decisions.  To the contrary, a solid basis exists for 
believing that many non-risky decisions require more ability at decision-making 
than many risky decisions…We can avoid these problems by recognizing that the 
level of evidence for determining competence should vary according to risk, while 
competence itself varies only along a scale of difficulty in decision-making.187 
 
This may be problematic, however.  While Beauchamp and Childress are correct in tying 
competence standards to the difficulty of the task at hand, it is not clear to this author why one 
ought to divorce risk from competence standards as cognitive psychology has demonstrated that 
risk perception fundamentally influences health decisions.188 
 There are essential pieces of information that must be conveyed to the patient to facilitate 
autonomous action.  Standard disclosures (e.g., in the process of informed consent) include such 
basic elements as the patient’s diagnosis, prognosis, proposed intervention, alternatives, risks and 
benefits, and recommendations.189  Patients must voice their understanding of these elements, 
and must be clear about the terms of their agreement as well – absent these requisites, there is no 
guarantee that an autonomous decision has been made.190  At this point, however, there is 
concern about the patient’s ability to process all of the information provided.  Beauchamp and 
Childress note that some critics have suggested that patients cannot comprehend or appreciate 
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188 See, for instance, Neil D. Weinstein, "Exploring the Links Between Risk Perceptions and Preventive Health 
Behavior," in Social Psychological Foundations of Health and Illness, ed. J. Suls and K.A. Wallston (Malden: 
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189 Beauchamp and Childress, 89. 
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the information provided, a claim which they suggest is an overgeneralization: “From the fact 
that actions are never fully informed, voluntary, or autonomous, it does not follow that they are 
never adequately informed, voluntary, or autonomous.”191  As such, patients do not necessarily 
need to become physicians themselves in order to be competent to decide the course of their 
treatment.  Beauchamp and Childress do note, however, that how the information is framed can 
unduly influence the patient, producing decisional errors.192  Clearly one must avoid framing 
effects in relaying information in order to allow the patient to reach an autonomous decision – 
intentionally framing the information to elicit a specific response is simple manipulation instead 
of ethical disclosure.193 
 The voluntary aspect of autonomy concerns undue influence by both internal and external 
factors.  As Faden and Beauchamp noted, voluntary actions are distinct from autonomous actions 
– it does not suffice to use the same definition or criteria for both.  They note that the voluntary 
aspect of an action can be undermined by disease, psychiatric disorders, and drug addiction.194  
The list of possible influences, however, is not exhausted by these three.  Rather, they note that 
influence can occur as a result of elements as diverse as loved ones, threats and overt coercion, 
education, manipulations, and emotional appeals.  However, simply because an influential factor 
is present, there is no reason to assume that the patient’s decision has been altered – in fact, 
Beauchamp and Childress argue that clinicians have a moral responsibility to attempt to persuade 
the patient to pursue medically necessary treatments.195  Such efforts to persuade may be 
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necessary to ensure that the patient both has and understands the medical information necessary 
to inform her choice. 
 As noted above, the principles proposed by Beauchamp and Childress can conflict.  The 
most frequent conflicts occur between the principles of beneficence and autonomy.  The 
principle of beneficence has a long history in medicine – Beauchamp and Childress note that it 
extends back at least to Hippocrates’ edict in his Epidemics: “As to disease, make a habit of two 
things – to help, or at least to do no harm.”196  Patient welfare is the proviso of this principle – 
beneficence establishes the duty of the physician to ensure that the patient receives the treatment 
he needs.  By raising this concept to the level of a medical norm, the stage is set for conflict – the 
physician may want to pursue a course of treatment that the patient does not.  Historically, 
clinicians simply overruled their patients – the concept of patient autonomy is a relatively recent 
phenomena in the practice of medicine.  As mentioned previously, this attitude became known as 
paternalism.  Beauchamp and Childress note that paternalism itself is normatively neutral – 
individuals acts of paternalism can be either justified or unjustified.197 
 Paternalism can be divided into two types of action.  ‘Weak paternalism’ involves 
interventions only in cases when the patient in question is engaging in a patently nonautonomous 
manner.  Severely demented patients, newborns, patients experiencing delirium, etc., are 
examples of individuals with clearly compromised or absent autonomy.  These patients cannot 
process information, cannot make free choices, etc. – autonomy is substantially absent in these 
cases, and the ‘choices’ made may not be binding for clinicians.198  ‘Strong paternalism’, in 
contrast, occurs when a clinician simply refuses to honor or overrides an autonomous patient’s 
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request or wishes, or manipulates the information provided to her, preventing her from making 
an autonomous choice.  This type of paternalism is more difficult to justify – there is no evidence 
that autonomy is substantially absent as it was in the weak paternalism cases.  Beauchamp and 
Childress note that the justification of paternalism exists on a sliding scale.  As the personal risks 
a patient takes on increase and the benefits of the patient’s wishes decrease, the scale shifts away 
from upholding autonomy to upholding beneficence.  They note that “preventing minor harms or 
providing minor benefits while deeply disrespecting autonomy lacks plausible justification; but 
actions that prevent major harms or provide major benefits while only trivially disrespecting 
autonomy have a highly plausible paternalistic rationale.”199 As such, there are times when 
strong paternalism is justified, but these are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, instead of 
establishing an overarching paternalistic policy. 
 As with the previous two theorists, significant objections can be raised.  First, the 
similarities in the arguments of Faden and Beauchamp with those of Beauchamp and Childress 
warrant similar objections.  Beauchamp and Childress suffer the same critiques concerning an 
overly ‘rational’ patient model – they make assumptions about what will influence the patient 
without incorporating known sources of error.200  Likewise, concerns about divorcing 
authenticity from autonomy are applicable to this model.  There is no need to restate the entirety 
of the arguments presented, however. 
A second fundamental concern is their argument that divorces risky outcomes from 
evaluations of competence.  As noted earlier, the literature on cognitive psychology has noted 
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that risk perception does indeed influence health care decisions.  Concerns about optimistic 
biases in health decisions aside, it is disconcerting that an area of research that has consistently 
demonstrated influence would be not be given more weight in the course of their argument. 
Conclusion 
 The preceding analysis is not meant to fundamentally scuttle the theories discussed.  
They have individual strengths and weaknesses that ought to inform subsequent models.  It 
makes eminent sense to establish prima facie duties, for instance, and to value a collaborative 
relationship between physician and patient.  It makes eminent sense to recognize that ethics is 
pluralistic, and that it is unlikely that any single principle ought to carry universal and absolute 
weight.  It makes sense to draw upon a variety of philosophical outlooks in offering justification 
for action, or in discerning the appropriate moral methodology for a given ethical conflict. 
 However, it does not make sense to predicate an ethical theory on a model of human 
thought that does not exist.  Fiating cognitive abilities amounts to requiring us not to be human 
when exploring ethical dilemmas or making treatment decisions.  It makes no sense to believe 
that we exercise control over avolitional backstage processes, or to ignore demonstrable sources 
of error in decision-making, especially when the choices to be made are potentially the most 
meaningful and most irrevocable of decisions.  It makes no sense to suggest that identifiable 
sources of error ought not to be eliminated as much as possible, to ensure that the choice made is 
a genuine reflection of the patient’s desires, and is not simply the disease process speaking for 
them.  The models that follow attempt to elicit these sources of error, while reaching 
fundamentally different conclusions. 
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Cognitive Autonomy Models 
 In contrast to the homuncular models, the cognitive models endeavor to explore the 
backstage and automatic elements of patients making health decisions.  Four principle models 
are examined, and the strengths and shortcomings of each are noted.  A recurring theme in these 
critiques is that cognition is fundamentally influenced by a variety of factors not considered in 
the homuncular models.  As such, by their very nature, they present models of autonomy that 
have much more empirical and ecological validity – they are autonomy models of actual human 
beings, rather than of idealized cognitive agents. 
Redelmeier, et al. 
 The first cognitive model to be considered is that of Redelmeier, et al.,201  Contrary to the 
homuncular models discussed earlier, Redelmeier, et al., note that the ‘ideal’ decision maker – 
characterized by the agent who gathers all available information, calculates the risks and benefits 
of every option, and then selects the optimal choice – simply does not exist.202  Instead, actual 
decision-makers employ cognitive heuristics to simplify situations and find palatable solutions.  
Further, actual decision-makers are influenced by a variety of sources, including external and 
internal stimuli, as well as how information is presented to them.  Framing effects – discussed 
earlier in relation to Beauchamp and Childress – are quite powerful: 
Peoples’ interpretation of most events depends on both the nature of the 
experience and the manner in which the situation is presented or ‘framed.’ For 
example, a foul odor near a sewer may be disgusting, whereas the same aroma 
emanating from a cheese counter can be enticing.  Psychological research has 
shown that people are often sensitive to the presentation of problems and that they 
fail to realize the extent to which their preferences can be altered by an 
inconsequential change in formulation.203 
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Minor shifts in decision context, option order, defaults, or semantics can radically alter 
perception and subsequent processing, and yet these are not necessarily changes of which we are 
aware.204  Further, individuals can demonstrate a phenomenon called ‘hindsight bias’ – when 
individuals learn of the outcome of a given action, this knowledge affects their assessments of 
the likelihood of that outcome occurring.205  This is to say that individuals tend to ignore 
contradictory evidence, focus only on corroborating evidence, and overestimate the probability 
of the outcome.  This is a significant concern in medical liability cases, for instance – arguments 
that a clinician “should have seen this coming” demonstrate hindsight bias.  In the context of 
medical treatment, this can affect individuals perception of their current situation (e.g., ‘it was 
inevitable that I would get cancer’), and can feed into other sources of cognitive error (e.g., 
affective forecasting and the availability heuristic). 
 Redelmeier, et al., note that many research studies fail to take into account salient 
features of the patient experience when exploring outcomes and efficacy.  There are emotional 
aspects of being a patient, for instance, which are reflected in one’s sense of well-being and 
validation.  Patients, as a result, often seek medical care for sympathy and reassurance.206  This 
presents a difficulty for research, however, in that these emotional valences and experiences are 
difficult to quantify in the same way as one could quantify physical or mental disability.  
Difficulty in measurement, however, does not translate into irrelevancy. 
                                                 
204 This really is a remarkable phenomenon.  Environmental cues, for instance, have been demonstrated to be a 
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 This emotional content complicates medicolegal issues as well.  Redelmeier, et al., note 
that the process of informed consent requires the clinician to disclose the risks, benefits, and 
outcomes of particular interventions.  Ostensibly the patient then decides which option best suits 
his needs and values, but this concept does not take into account the plasticity of human emotion 
– his needs and values may not be the same once the intervention has been selected and 
performed.  They note that “psychologists have shown that people are prone to err when making 
decisions about long-term consequences because they fail to anticipate how their preferences will 
change over time.”207  This is not limited to medical settings – studies have demonstrated that 
attempts to forecast how one will feel produce errors in such diverse conditions as being fired 
from one’s job to winning the lottery.  We have a tendency to believe erroneously that the joy or 
sorrow we are experiencing now will continue unabated for the foreseeable future.  As a result, 
Redelmeier, et al., suggest that the informed consent process include an appreciation of changes 
over time, and that patients might benefit from including “statistics and interviews of people who 
underwent each therapeutic alternative months of years previously.”208  As a corollary to their 
suggestion, it would seem that in the case of forgoing treatment, comparable information might 
be included, if available.209 
 A special case is presented for patients who are experiencing a recurrence of their illness 
– some conditions are long-standing with periods of remission (cancer, for instance, or multiple 
sclerosis).  Initially, one might be more inclined to accede to their wishes, as they have already 
experienced the positive and negative effects of the given intervention.  However, even this first 
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hand experience is not necessarily accurate.  Redelmeier , et al., note that memories can also be 
inaccurate and subject to error.210  As such, we ought not simply defer to patients’ prior 
experience – they may have a distorted sense of the experience: 
When people make a medical decision between alternatives that they have already 
experienced (e.g., a second round of radiation therapy), they compare their mental 
representations of each of the alternatives and, presumably, choose the alternative 
that they remember as less unpleasant.  But memories are inaccurate and subject 
to error.  One major distortion is that duration may not be as well represented as 
peak intensity.  Thus, a few days of intense acute pain may be remembered as 
more unpleasant than many weeks of moderate chronic pain, in the same way that 
a brief media soundbite may be more memorable than a longer detailed report.”211 
 
In light of all of these concerns, Redelmeier , et al., caution that the process of medical decision-
making must involve clinicians providing guidance about medical information, but also about 
common cognitive errors.212 
 This model provides a more accurate picture of actual cognitive processing in decision-
making, but it is hardly a complete ethical theory.  Rather, the article serves as an effort to 
translate the heuristic and biases literature into clinical settings, and to make clinicians aware of 
the issues that they will have to face.  More developed theories of autonomy are found in the 
arguments and models presented next. 
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 371
Grisso and Appelbaum 
 Like Beauchamp and Childress, Thomas Grisso and Paul S. Appelbaum213 stress that the 
concepts of autonomy and of competence to consent to (or refuse) treatment are related.  They 
argue that competence to consent necessarily involves four criteria.214  First, it is necessary that 
the moral agent be able to express a choice – this is not tied to any particular medium of 
communication (e.g., the patient does not need to be able to speak to do so), but rather, the 
patient must possess the ability to make his or her choices known.  Second, the patient must be 
able to understand the information germane to the health care decision.  If the patient cannot 
understand the information at hand, there is no way to act upon it or to voice a preference for one 
intervention over another.  Third, the patient must appreciate the significance of the information 
and the expected outcomes.  If there is no way for the patient to gauge risk or to weigh outcomes, 
there is no way for the patient to take ownership of the decision – there is a fundamental 
disconnect between the decision and the outcome.  Fourth, the patient must be able to reason 
with the germane information in a manner that allows him or her to logically weigh treatment 
options.  If a patient cannot reason and deliberate about the decision, there is no manner by 
which he or she can make a genuinely autonomous choice – it is akin to being asked to write a 
paper without having any writing implement – some organization may be possible, but clearly 
the ultimate goal will not be able to be realized.  These four criteria are not to be understood as 
being ‘all-or-none’ principles – that is to say, each of these criteria exists on a continuum; 
patients manifest different abilities for each at different times.  As such, like Beauchamp and 
Childress, Grisso and Appelbaum argue that competence is not to be understood globally, but is 
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task specific.  Ethical judgments must be cognizant of each of these criteria, but “in practice, not 
all of them uniformly will be ‘required.’215  Further, Grisso and Appelbaum reject appeals to 
competence criteria based popular wisdom – i.e., they reject competence criteria tied to whether 
most people would consider the judgment wise or correct.  As such, respect for autonomy in their 
model requires us to respect patients’ decisions despite apparent eccentricity or inadvisability 
(although cases of gross deficiency to make a choice do not enjoy similar protection).216  These 
criteria individually are necessary, but not sufficient, for autonomy – a marked inability to meet 
one of these criteria would render the autonomy of the decision suspect, but being able to meet 
one of these criteria is not sufficient evidence to render the autonomy of the decision beyond 
reproach.217 
 The most referenced criterion is that of Understanding – Grisso and Appelbaum note that 
courts often rely upon this in decisions about competence.218  The concept, however, is quite 
tricky – the underlying mechanisms and processes of the ‘Understanding’ construct are not well 
known or easily defined: 
A person’s accurate assimilation involves a complex series of events.  First the 
information must be received as presented, a process that is influenced not only 
by sensory integrity, but also by perceptual functions such as attention and 
selective awareness.  Whatever is received then undergoes cognitive processing 
and is encoded in a manner consistent with the person’s existing fund of 
information and concepts, which in turn influences how, and how well, the 
message is recorded and stored in memory.219 
 
This complex series of events is not the only mechanism by which cognition is influenced.  
There are a host of medical disorders, medications, and other injuries that can profoundly affect 
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cognition.  The ease with which disruption occurs facilitates examination and assessment – if a 
lack of understanding seems evident, there is reason to suspect disrupted underlying cognitive 
mechanisms.  This is not, however, a clearly defined case of cognitive deficiency – patients may 
appear to misunderstand information when the actual underlying mechanism is 
miscommunication.220 
 Grisso and Appelbaum note that Appreciation as a competence standard refers to whether 
patients appreciate that they have a disorder and acknowledge the consequences of that disorder 
and its treatments.221  This use of the term parallels other authorities who refer to an absence of 
this appreciation and acknowledgement as demonstration of holding objectively false beliefs, 
explicable in terms of definite cognitive distortions.  A caveat is introduced, however, in that this 
lack of appreciation or acknowledgement must be due to more than disagreement with the 
diagnosis.  They note that several conditions are necessary to demonstrate that a distortion is 
present, rather than simple disagreement.  First, the underlying beliefs the patient holds must be 
substantially irrational or unrealistic.222  For instance, it is not unrealistic to doubt a diagnosis 
when conflicting information is presented, or there is evidence of clinical disagreement.223  It is 
quite another issue, however, to doubt a diagnosis because one believes that he has superhuman 
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powers.  The second criterion is that the belief must be the consequence of impaired cognition or 
affect.224  This is necessary in light of the objections of established religions to specific aspects 
of otherwise routine treatment – there is a fundamental difference between impaired cognition 
(“I have superhuman abilities”) versus expressions of systemic values or belief sets (e.g., 
Jehovah’s Witnesses prohibitions on using blood products).  Some of these systemic beliefs sets 
may be considered by the clinician to be eccentric, but that does not mean that they can be 
ignored.  The third criterion is that the belief must be relevant to the patient’s treatment 
decision.225  If the patient is exhibiting distorted cognition that does not reflect on the treatment 
decision at hand, it is not germane to an assessment of Appreciation.  If a patient maintains the 
belief that gravity does not apply to him, but manifests no treatment-relevant cognitive 
distortions, there is no compelling reason to doubt his ability to appreciate other information.226 
 As mentioned in chapter three, comorbid depression is a significant concern, in that it 
directly affects morbidity and mortality, and it is frequently underdiagnosed.  There is a common 
reaction in medicine that patients are expected to react negatively to bad health news – in fact, 
many consider it a sign of pathology if bad news does not engender some manner of depressive 
reaction.  However, this can have a profound impact on the course of treatment – clinicians can 
quite easily endorse decisions of questionable competence: 
It is easy for caregivers to perceive patients’ expressions of discouragement or 
hopelessness as reasonable reactions to patients’ illnesses, when they may 
actually reflect their depressed moods.  This ‘false empathy’ can lead clinicians to 
accept decisions to forego medical treatment that are, in fact, of questionable 
competence.  Since it is often impossible to know the extent to which depression 
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is affecting patients’ appreciation, evaluators need to have a high index of 
suspicion.  The best course may be to defer a decision about patients’ capacities, 
and about the proper course of treatment, while antidepressant medication is 
instituted on an empirical basis.227 
 
As has been stressed before, it may be preferable to err on the side of caution when there is 
evidence of cognitive distortion.  Not all cases will be clear cut, and require significant 
sensitivity to the biopsychosocial elements of the disease and its pathophysiology. 
 The Reasoning criterion requires that patients be able to engage in logical cognitive 
processes using the information they understand and appreciate.228  As noted above, there is 
significant concern that one may be given information but not be able to use it.  Cases of 
anterograde amnesia, for instance, present challenges to processing because of the speed with 
which information is forgotten.  Alzheimer’s dementia and cerebrovascular accidents near 
memory structures carry similar risks – they prevent individuals from being able to work with 
new information presented to them.  As such, clinicians assessing competence in patients with 
conditions similar to these ought to be aware of potential influences.  Grisso and Appelbaum 
caution, however, that this criterion ought not be used to deny individuals their right to autonomy 
simply because they employ non-normative approaches to information processing.229  They note 
that most, if not all, individuals fail to meet idealized standards of decision-making in everyday 
situations, and that these deficits may become more apparent in times of crisis.  As such, they 
stress that Reasoning deficits should focus on cases in which “a patient’s mental abilities are so 
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impaired by illness or disability that even basic functioning with regard to these considerations is 
seriously and negatively influenced.”230 
 Grisso and Appelbaum stress that certain cases merit greater attention than others – 
significant changes in mental functioning (generally with behavioral correlates) should serve as 
warning signals that cognition has been altered.231  While refusal of treatment or evaluation may 
be atypical for a particular patient, that alone does not suffice to demonstrate that cognitive 
changes have occurred, but it should serve as a warning sign, for several reasons: 
First, physicians usually try to recommend treatment that will minimize the 
impact of the patient’s disorder.  Declining to follow that recommendation raises 
the risks of an adverse outcome for the patient.  Although patients may sometimes 
know more than their physicians do about what is best for them, often they do not.  
Their decisions may reflect misinformation, irrational biases, or the influence of 
other persons without extensive medical knowledge.  In most circumstances, 
rejecting the treatment recommended by a physician is a riskier decision than 
agreeing to the proposal.  If one of the goals of the competence requirement is to 
protect patients from bad outcomes, this would seem like a situation in which 
particular attention to patients’ capacities might well be warranted…The second 
justification for centering attention on refusals of treatment is the empirical reality 
that many patients who refuse treatment do so because of diminished decision-
making capacities.  To admit this is by no means to agree that every patient who 
differs with his or her physician is incompetent.  But as we have seen in the case 
examples in the preceding chapters, intellectual impairment, attentional 
difficulties, anxiety denial, delusions, dementia and other manifestations of 
psychopathology and impaired cognition can all lead patients to reject 
recommendations for treatment.232  
 
They note that patients with organic impairments are especially prone to decisional incapacity 
(e.g., dementias, deliriums, etc.).   They further note that while depression has been a frequently 
studied group, the results have varied (as demonstrated in the first half of this chapter).  They 
suggest that the differences in the research findings may reflect different degrees of depression, 
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with correspondingly different degrees of impairment.233  Further, influencing factors are 
additive – comorbid psychopathologies can exacerbate cognitive distortions and disabilities, 
which are further exacerbated by medical illness and pharmacological interventions, with 
polypharmacy being especially problematic (and, among elderly patients, all too common).  
While age itself does not necessarily reduce competence, it does increase susceptibility to 
decisional impairment.234 
 The metaphor proposed by Grisso and Appelbaum is a scale whose cups are labelled 
‘autonomy’ and ‘protection’.235  The fulcrum is off center, allowing autonomy a natural 
advantage (representing social preference for personal autonomy).  In the context of a patient 
either providing or refusing consent to a particular treatment, assessment of information is added 
to each side, with evidence supporting competence filling the ‘autonomy’ cup, and evidence 
undermining competence filling the ‘protection’ cup.  Clearly in this model it requires more 
evidence to countermand the patient’s autonomy than it does to countermand the duty to protect 
him or her.  It is very uncommon for a patient to completely lose her capacity for Understanding, 
Appreciation, or Reasoning – as these are continuum concepts, it is more likely that the patient’s 
abilities will simply experience a reduced capacity.  As such, clinician’s need to be cognizant of 
the degree of impairment when balancing the metaphorical scale.236  The consequence of 
maintaining this balancing metaphor is a sliding standard of competence dependent upon risk-
gain ratio analysis of the intervention in question: 
In effect, a low probable gain-high risk decision, which adds substantial weight to 
the cup representing protection, will require a much greater weight of ability in 
the opposing cup to keep the scale tipped towards autonomy.  In contrast, if the 
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patient’s preference is for a high probable gain-low risk treatment, a lower degree 
of ability is acceptable; less weight in the autonomy cup will be required for the 
patient to be perceived as competent.237  
 
The fulcrum of the scale is also subject to adjustment – Grisso and Appelbaum allow the 
clinician to move the fulcrum dependent upon the treatment preferences of the patient.  For 
instance, if the patient elects a procedure that has a less desirable risk-gain ratio than the 
intervention proposed by the clinician, the fulcrum may be adjusted slightly, requiring more 
evidence of competence than would normally be required.  The patient, however, would need to 
be duly informed that greater decisional capacity must be demonstrated before the preferred 
treatment is initiated. 
 There are significant strengths in this model – for instance, its awareness of the complex 
interactions of illness and cognition, its understanding that normal judgment can be biased by a 
variety of sources not normally accounted for in other autonomy models, etc.  There are some 
concerns, however, in that it does not acknowledge that clinicians themselves can demonstrate 
cognitive biases.  Studies have demonstrated that clinicians tend to focus on one particular 
diagnosis, ignoring others (displaying the anchoring heuristic), for instance.238  The very same 
cognitive heuristics that plague patient decision-makers are found in the clinical staff treating 
them; as such, awareness of cognitive biases and distortions is not a one-way process.  The 
model proposed by Grisso and Appelbaum would be strengthened by a more dialogical 
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approach, in which the distortions and biases of both physician and patient are exposed and 
challenged. 
Katz 
 The psychodynamics of the physician-patient is a key element of the autonomy model 
proposed by Jay Katz.239  Katz notes that there are many definitions of autonomy, but chooses to 
focus on what he refers to as ‘psychological autonomy’ – the capacity of persons to exercise the 
right to self-determination, which includes their ability to reflect on the choices they have 
made.240 He further notes that current conceptions of autonomy make a significant number of 
psychological assumptions which go unexplored in the literature.  Contemporary medical ethics 
is dominated by abstractions – specifically, abstract norms that generalize conduct in a manner 
that is inappropriate when considering how human agents actually behave.  Ethicists have a 
tendency to rely upon the theories of Kant and Mill, among other philosophers, to relate the 
abstract formal norms to material situations.  These abstractions contain implicit models of the 
human psyche which are not developed or clarified, which is unfortunate, in that “[a] careful 
scrutiny of many philosophical, moral, political or legal principles reveals all kinds of hidden, 
albeit woefully mutilated, assumptions about human nature.”241 
 Paradigmatic in medical ethics are the assumptions made by Immanuel Kant – his 
idealized moral agent is a being of pure rationality; in the ideal agent, moral decision making 
will not be influenced by whims, emotions, or personal inclinations.  Katz notes that current 
philosophers have championed this model – but the problem lies in that the model itself is 
untenable.242  Kant himself noted that he was making a distinction between an idealized moral 
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agent, which he distinguishes from actual moral agents – it was a theoretical model, not a 
practical model.  Kant’s model recognizes only one aspect of human behavior – the capacity for 
rational thought – but ignores many other aspects of our behavior, which is contingent upon 
other processes, some of which are completely irrational.  Because we can be influenced by so 
many different aspects of our rational and irrational nature, Katz notes that Kant’s model is 
simply impractical, and therefore is irrelevant in practical situations: 
Human beings are subject to the influence of reason and unreason, with the 
relative strength of either being affected by many innate, developmental, and 
situational factors.  Moreover, capacities for reason are impaired whenever human 
beings are in pain, in love, in mourning, or in the throes of biological, 
environmental, or social crises.  Kant’s theoretical conception of the nature of 
human beings is too neglectful of the complex interrelations between reason, 
emotions, and the external world; it is therefore of little relevance to practical 
situations.243 
 
As a result of this irrelevancy, Katz adopts an autonomy radically different than Kant’s ideal – 
psychological autonomy.  Katz’s clarifies his definition of the concept, noting that as an ideal 
definition, “psychological autonomy refers to the capacity of persons to reflect, choose, and act 
with an awareness of the internal and external influences and reasons that they would wish to 
accept.”244  Katz stresses that this is an ideal – the sheer volume of internal and external 
influences makes it impossible for a moral agent to ever be fully aware of them all.245  Self-
reflection and dialogic interaction with others can help to draw out unconscious influences, 
returning them to the control of the agent. 
 Katz notes that past discussion of psychological capacities of moral agents has tended to 
reflect psychopathology instead of underlying motives, i.e., questions of incompetence.  Katz 
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supports those who conclude that only the choices of clearly incompetent patients should be 
rejected – he argues that it quite different to recognize the sources influencing a patient and 
interfering with the patient’s choice when one believes that they have made the ‘wrong 
choice.’246  There are implicit dangers in raising psychological objections to patient autonomy – 
he notes that exceptions to autonomy can be too readily ‘found’ and that the purview of 
psychological objections are too far-reaching and too difficult to control.  This represents a 
significant break between Katz’s model and my own – while I can appreciate his concern 
regarding the ease with which questions and challenges to autonomy can be raised, it would 
seem that the circumstances and the choices to be made would dictate the standard of 
psychological evidence necessary to maintain patient autonomy (as per Grisso and Appelbaum’s 
model).  I will return to this objection below. 
 At this point, Katz develops the sense of the unconscious employed in his model.  
Employing a psychodynamic approach, he breaks from other models which suggest that 
unconscious elements are to be identified, evaluated, and potentially discarded.  Specifically he 
notes the central role of the unconscious in normal decision-making – the psychodynamic 
perspective seeks to understand and account for unconscious influences, rather than identifying 
and eliminating them, as well as identifying potential conflicts between conscious and 
unconscious motivations.247  Further, the conscious/unconscious split is not the only germane 
factor – cognitive modelling of autonomy must take into account the rational/irrational split, as 
our decision-making process incorporates both.  It is extraordinarily rare to find actions that stem 
from only one motivational source, and the rational/irrational mixture are idiosyncratic, and vary 
with the individual’s situation.  In Katz’s model, ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ reflect “capacities for 
                                                 
246 Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, 113. 
247 Katz, 115. 
 382
adaptation to the external world, that is, persons’ conscious and unconscious efforts to reconcile 
their internal mental processes with the external possibilities and limitations of the world in 
which they live.  They denote persons’ abilities to take reality into account and to give some 
account of the conflicts between their inner and outer worlds to themselves and others.”248  As a 
result, ideal decision-making will be a dialogic process, in which the idiosyncrasies of both the 
patient and the clinician can be explored, leading to a greater understanding of the motivations 
and thought processes of both.  This dialogue is not likely to reveal all unconscious motives, but 
it can reveal more than might be accessible solely through introspection and reflection.249 
 This model has immediate consequences for individual autonomy and liberty.  Katz notes 
that it immediately undermines two concepts in the autonomy debate – radicalized patient 
autonomy, and standards of perfect understanding in the clinician: 
If I am correct, then individual freedom should be equated neither with simply 
permitting patients to do what they initially desire nor with requiring them simply 
to make complete sense to their physicians.  Instead, and above all, respect for 
freedom would demand respectful conversation.  True freedom entails constant 
struggle and anguish with oneself and with others.  This is the lesson of 
psychoanalysis and its theories about human conduct and interactions.250 
 
By being aware of the limits of human thought, both conscious and unconscious, rational and 
irrational, clinicians and patients can achieve a greater understanding and awareness of their own 
thoughts and motivations, and allow them to recognize how their perspectives and experience 
have influenced them directly and indirectly.  This, in turn, gives rise to greater freedom in 
decision-making – the more motivational factors we are conscious of, the more control we 
exercise in the decision-making process.  This will never produce absolute control, however, and 
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as such, there is always an influence of unconscious and irrational factors in human thought.  As 
such, the first, necessary step in self-determination is self-reflection and reflection with others.251  
This reflection may not produce agreement with the physician and patient, but it can clear up 
misunderstandings and misperceptions.  Katz still opens the door to physicians being able to 
interfere in patient decisions (and hence to weak paternalism in Beauchamp and Childress’s 
sense of the term), but he stresses that neither party is asked to submit to the other, and that 
conversation and shared decision-making prevent significant harms: 
In conversation with one another, patients may uncover mistaken notions about 
their diseases and their treatment that they have held for a long time or have 
recently acquired through misunderstanding the import of their doctors’ 
recommendations.  Physicians may uncover the fact that their unconscious 
preferences and biases compelled patients to yield to their recommendations even 
though consciously they had intended otherwise.  Without conversation, 
individual self-determination can become compromised by condemning 
physicians and patients to the isolation of solitary decision making, which can 
only contribute to abandoning patients prematurely to an ill-considered fate.252 
 
If our aim is to facilitate autonomous decision-making, a recurring theme in myriad theories of 
medical ethics, it seems that conversation and mutual exploration of motives and thought 
processes are necessary foundational criteria.  But what should be done if the patient insists on 
medical decisions fundamentally at odds with the opinion of the clinician?  Katz argues that if 
we adopt the psychological autonomy model he proposes, clinicians will be required at times to 
accede to ‘foolish choices’ – as a matter of principle of respect, the clinician does not possess the 
ability to simply overrule any decision which he feels to be ill-advised253 – I will address this 
aspect of Katz’s model below. 
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 Katz’s allows for clinicians to disobey a patient’s choice only when two conditions have 
been met.254  First, the consequences of the decision must pose significant risks to the patient’s 
immediate physical condition.  Katz clarifies this by limiting it to cases in which the patient’s 
illness has interventions which have a good chance of preventing death or persistent serious 
injury, and when such outcomes are likely in a relatively short period of time.  The second 
condition requires that the patient’s cognitive processes are so seriously impaired that neither the 
clinician nor the patient can understand each other.  If there is no apparent means of overcoming 
the communication barrier, then it is reasonable to proceed in the patient’s best medical interest.  
These are very limited conditions, to be sure, but Katz argues that one ought to err on the side of 
autonomy.  This does not create absolute patient autonomy, however, as Katz is cognizant of 
challenges which might arise as a result: 
If all final authority is vested in patients, the danger is great that in situations of 
either a total refusal to give an account of one’s reasons or an unwillingness to 
explore one’s possible confusion – when the need for conversation is the greatest 
– doctors will wittingly and unwittingly give up on conversation and patients 
prematurely because they have been stripped of all power to stop even patients’ 
most inexplicable self-destructive course.  To protect doctors and, in turn, patients 
from such pernicious consequences supports the creation of a rare exception to 
the rule that doctors otherwise must obey: In case of disagreement, doctors and 
patients should either go their separate ways, or agree to provide and to receive 
care within the limits imposed by the patient.255 
 
Hence, significant authority remains with the patient, but not total authority – respect is a 
principle that is not unidirectional.  Many theories of medical ethics note that clinicians are not 
automatons – they have moral values and beliefs, just like the patient.  One cannot expect a 
clinician to ignore her own important principles in medical decision-making. 
 There are significant strengths in the model proposed by Katz.  It is clear that recognition 
of the complex cognitive processes underlying decision-making is emphasized in this model.  As 
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a corollary, recognition that both patients and clinicians carry with them their own sets of 
rationalities and irrationalities is an important step in shared decision-making.  This model 
explicitly requires the identification and exploration of unconscious cognitive factors for both (or 
all) parties involved in decision-making, in an effort to increase understanding.  This allows for 
critical insight that might be unavailable were one to attempt simple self-exploration and self-
reflection.  The emphasis on a dialogic process as a requisite first step towards self-determination 
clearly demonstrates the need for the patient to understand himself before he can make informed 
decisions.  It is quite clear that we cannot make meaningful decisions if we are unclear as to what 
it is that we want.  We can certainly make choices, but it is evident that they may not actually 
reflect our values or beliefs – in short, they will lack the ‘self’ criterion of self-determination. 
 However, there are some concerns about Katz’s model as well.  First, it is unclear that 
one ought to adopt a Freudian model of the unconscious, as there are significant methodological, 
empirical, and theoretical concerns about the Freudian model.256  It is clear that unconscious 
processes influence cognition, but the empirical data and research support the model proposed in 
chapter two much more readily than Freudian analysis.  As such, when unconscious motivations 
are discussed later, it will not be in the terms Katz’s proposes, but rather a reflection of 
automaticity, heuristics and biases, and emotionally-valenced memory and recall. 
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 Second, the criteria set by Katz for incompetence appear to be too high.  It is 
understandable that he would establish such strict criteria in light of the psychoanalytic model he 
proposes, which integrates the unconscious, but as that methodology is suspect, it seems 
reasonable to question the need for such restrictive criteria.  This is not to say that clinicians 
ought to have carte blanche in deciding which decisions to accept or to reject, but it certainly 
suggests that the standards for rejecting bad choices ought to be lowered.  It is clear that 
cognition is dependent on a variety of factors, of which we are only aware of the surface 
phenomena.  It is likewise clear that our cognition can be affected in manners great and small at 
a variety of levels of reduction.  It would therefore seem to be reasonable to suggest that 
clinicians have more leeway than Katz’s proposes in challenging the decision-making process of 
patients, who by their nature are more vulnerable to influences due to medical illness, 
pharmacology, and potential psychopathology.  I do not challenge the idea that patients have the 
right to make bad choices; I do challenge the idea that this right is an absolute, especially as the 
consequences of their decisions increases in severity.  As suggested earlier, it seems that a quite 
compelling case can be made for a sliding scale of autonomy, contingent upon the severity of the 
predicted outcomes, with the most scrutiny applied to terminal decisions. 
Anderson and Lux 
 Higher cognitive standards are established by Anderson and Lux,257 who argue that the 
keystone of autonomy and self-determination is ‘accurate self-assessment.’  They argue that 
autonomy is contingent upon an ability to recognize impairments in one’s own cognitive 
capacities.258  They offer the clinical case of ‘John’ – a patient who experienced severe frontal 
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lobe injury, which severed his optic nerves (as a result, he had no perception of light at all).  As a 
result of his accident, John experienced a fascinating cognitive impairment: despite the severing 
of his optic nerves, John was unaware that he was blind.  Consequently, he would attempt to 
navigate his way around as he would were his vision normal, with the result that he would walk 
into walls, trip over furniture, and found himself in various dangerous situations for one who 
cannot see.  Anderson and Lux argue that his actions ought not to be considered autonomous, not 
because of his visual impairment, but because of his cognitive inability to recognize that he had 
a visual impairment.  This is to say, they argue, “[a]t least with respect to those actions, he was 
deeply alienated from himself as an agent.”259  There are a number of types of agnosognosia 
(being unaware that one is unaware of a deficit) – visual, auditory, etc. – each of which pose the 
same kind of problem for one’s self-concept.  Further, there are multiple conditions which 
produce similar deficits in one’s sense of self – V.S. Ramachandran, Oliver Sacks, and others 
describe neurological conditions in which a patient experiences a disconnect between sense data 
and association cortices, sense data and perception, perception and association cortices, sense 
data and emotional valence, etc.260  Clearly it is possible to meet previously proposed criteria for 
autonomy and yet experience a profound deficit in self-perception.  As such, it makes eminent 
sense for clinicians to examine self-perception for accuracy before asking patients about 
treatment preferences – if their self-perception is unrealistic or bizarre, there is reason to believe 
that decisions made upon these perceptions will also be compromised. 
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 Anderson and Lux draw parallels to the category of ‘insight into illness’ in establishing 
their criterion of accurate self-assessment.261  A variety of conditions manifest decreased insight 
– there are several psychiatric illnesses in which the patient categorically denies any illness.262  
Inaccurate self-assessment in Anderson and Lux’s sense has three criteria.263  First, the patient 
must intentionally undertake a given task.  Several authors have noted that intentional action is a 
requisite part of autonomy and self-determination; accidental actions are not intentional, and as 
such, are not dependent upon an agent’s belief about their skill in performing said action.  The 
second criterion is that the agent believes that she will be able to perform the given task as it is 
intended.  That is to say, the agent believes that she possesses the requisite skill and ability to 
complete the task.  The third criterion is that this self-assessment of capacity must be inaccurate.  
Specifically, the agent objectively must not possess the requisite skill or ability in question.  It 
must be demonstrable that the agent possesses a deficit that she does not believe she has.  This 
lack of insight is quite relevant to the sense of autonomy developed in this dissertation, a topic 
we will return to later. 
 When erroneous beliefs are examined, these self-perceptions are not understood in terms 
of whether they are subjectively reasonable, but rather whether they correspond with the facts of 
the case.  This lack of insight does not translate into global incompetence – rather, it is a task-
specific deficit.264  As such, we see that clinicians assessing insight must possess an accurate 
understanding of the degree of skill necessary to complete the task in question – if the 
evaluator’s criteria for normal function are set too high, it is entirely possible that competent 
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individuals will be judged incompetent.  This is not the only continuum involved in testing 
accurate self-assessments – in addition to standards varying with the task, the self-assessment 
itself is a statement of probability.  Further, Anderson and Lux argue that there is no single 
threshold for accuracy, and hence no threshold for autonomy – for most individuals and for most 
occasions, a general self-assessment of one’s capacities should suffice.  They suggest that the 
cases in which inaccurate self-assessment produces non-autonomous actions will be severe 
enough as to be immediately recognizable (e.g., stumbling into furniture that one cannot see, but 
claiming no visual impairment).  Some agents are able to recognize that they are experiencing 
cognitive deficits, and can act to correct them or to incorporate them into their cognitive 
modeling.  Anderson and Lux argue that the capacity (and hence the autonomy) of these 
individuals is still compromised in some degree, but less than it was before (maintaining the 
continuum approach to autonomy.265  They further note that just as individuals with cognitive 
deficits can overestimate their abilities, so too can they underestimate their abilities.266 
 Anderson and Lux stress that the establishment of non-autonomous actions requires more 
than simple demonstration that the patient is making poor choices or has some unjustified 
beliefs.  They suggest that autonomy does include the ability to make mistakes.  As such, they 
stress that in utilizing their proposed criteria, it must be clear that the deficit in question is 
preventing the agent from exercising self-governance – i.e., there must be something inherent in 
the deficit that prevents autonomy itself.267  There are several methods by which this may be 
assessed, and Anderson and Lux focus on two.  First, it is possible to explore the causal link 
between the action and the source of the action – if the action occurs in such a way as to prevent 
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evaluation of the motives behind one’s action, then the causal pathway has been disrupted, 
preventing the agent from taking ownership of the action.268  This is a key concept, and one 
which will be revisited later.  The second method by which ownership of the action can be 
disrupted concerns problems in integrating the action with its motivations – the agent cannot 
make sense of his motives or is alienated from them (i.e., the agent experiences a baffling “Why 
did I do that?” moment).  If the agent cannot understand and reconcile his motivations with his 
actions, there is reason to believe that they are non-autonomous.  Anderson and Lux note that 
these two concerns demonstrate the need for integrated actions, as well as a means of registering 
that integration has not occurred – a feedback mechanism, in short.  They note that this feedback 
mechanism “must be constituted in such a way that the unintelligibility surfaces.  For to the 
extent to which one is unable to note the internal tensions, one is without this compass, which is 
so crucial for guiding one’s actions in the manner we dub ‘autonomous.’  And this is why rigidly 
inaccurate self-assessments undermine autonomy.”269  In short, absent this feedback mechanism, 
our compass is broken, and we have no way of knowing whether we are moving in the right 
direction.  For all we know, instead of reaching our goal, we could be simply traveling in circles.  
The primacy of accurate self-assessment carries with it a three-fold advantage: first, it is neutral 
in regards to competing theories; second, it is more plausibly linked with self-direction in 
autonomy; and third, it is more empirically supported in clinical neuroscience.270 
 The aspect of Anderson and Lux’s analysis that is most crucial to the argument developed 
in the present work is that they extend it to cover mental as well as physical incapacities.271  As 
the analysis in chapter two notes, automaticity, cognitive heuristics and biases, and emotional 
                                                 
268 Anderson and Lux, "Knowing Your Own Strength: Accurate Self-Assessment as a Requirement for Personal 
Autonomy," 283. 
269 Anderson and Lux, 284. 
270 Anderson and Lux, 285. 
271 Anderson and Lux, 286. 
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valencing occur outside of our awareness, and constitute significant but correctable sources of 
error and distortion.  It would seem that these types of errors dovetail with Anderson and Lux’s 
analysis; it is necessary to note, however, that they focus their analysis on traumatic brain 
injuries, rather than on phenomena of cognitive psychology.  However, as the psychological 
phenomena in question have empirical bases, it seems evident that such considerations as 
Anderson and Lux propose ought to be extended to them as well.  In fact, Anderson and Lux 
note that the criteria they develop can be applied outside of traumatic brain injury.  They note 
that “[o]ur self-assessments are sometimes off-the-mark, but to the extent to which we can 
reduce the inaccuracies in our self-assessments, we are better able to guide our actions in a fully 
autonomous sense.”272 
 As with the other cognitive models proposed, there are significant strengths in Anderson 
and Lux’s model.  Meaningful self-direction is impossible if one’s compass is flawed and there is 
no way to check it.  To the extent that we can become aware of our own cognitive shortcomings, 
we can correspondingly increase our personal autonomy. 
 There are weaknesses to be found, however.  First, it is unclear how far back they are 
willing to extend their analysis cognitively.  As was noted earlier, the literature on cognitive 
phenomena discussed in chapter two provides clear indications of the kinds of error that can 
systematically creep into one’s cognition.  The kinds of deficits produced by the conditions 
Anderson and Lux consider also produce systematic error, since they produce a recurring 
mistaken belief.  It is unclear, however, whether Anderson and Lux intend for their argument to 
be extended to the automatic and backstage elements discussed in the present argument.  If they 
are unwilling to extend their analysis to the types of cognitive errors discussed in chapter two, it 
                                                 
272 Anderson and Lux, "Knowing Your Own Strength: Accurate Self-Assessment as a Requirement for Personal 
Autonomy," 291. 
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would seem a rather arbitrary distinction, and the autonomy model proposed would certainly 
require clarification. 
 The second weakness is that while the model raises compelling arguments, it does not 
establish a clear metric for establishing non-autonomous actions.  They do specify some criteria, 
but they also place these criteria upon continua, which allows for significant room for 
interpretation.  For the autonomy standard to be meaningful, it would seem that a little more 
structure or clarity is needed for clinical application beyond claims that distortions and 
corresponding non-autonomy will be immediately recognizable. 
 A third concern is that this is not a fully-developed theory of autonomy.  To be fair, it 
does not appear to be intended as such, but the criterion of accuracy in self-perception is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, element of autonomy.  It is quite clear that individuals can act in 
non-autonomous ways while maintaining accurate perceptions of their abilities.  Additional 
criteria, as have been explicated in the previously discussed models, are critical to an accurate 
and meaningful picture of autonomy. 
CONCLUSION 
The model that emerges from this discussion must necessarily take into account multiple 
factors drawn from the strengths of the homuncular and cognitive models of autonomy.  Four 
key categories of autonomy criteria emerge – foundational, medical, psychiatric, and 
psychosocial.  Each of these categories is necessary for an autonomous action, but none are 
sufficient.  Each will be explored in turn.   
Before presenting them, however, there are several caveats.  First, it must be made clear 
that this model ought only to be considered applicable to end-of-life decisions.  It is quite clear 
that this kind of decisional process has little day-to-day validity – it will not pass the ‘buying 
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bread’ test.  However, as has been suggested earlier, a compelling argument can be raised that as 
the consequences of our decisions become more severe, greater evidence is needed that the 
action is autonomous.  In terminal decisions, it is unclear why a lower evidentiary standard 
should be preferred.  Second, this model is intended for use in cases when a patient is awake, 
aware, and able to voice her own preferences.  Last, quite obviously this should not be 
understood as a fully developed theory of medical ethics, nor should it be seen as anything other 
than criteria necessary for autonomous action as evidenced by the theoretical and empirical 
challenges raised to the autonomy models found in contemporary theories.  It is quite possible to 
incorporate this understanding of autonomy in existing models (e.g., substituting a cognitive 
model of patient autonomy would not fundamentally undermine Beauchamp and Childress’s 
principlism), albeit in some more than others (this model does present a fundamental challenge 
to models giving disproportionate weight to autonomy, e.g., Veatch). 
Foundational Criteria of Autonomy 
 Foundational criteria of autonomy refer to underlying psychological structures, in the 
sense developed in chapter two and the current chapter.  Foundational structures are primary and 
fundamental – absent these criteria, significant doubt can be raised about the autonomy of the 
patient’s decision.  There are five criteria in this category: the ability to consider, make, and 
make known one’s preferences (which I will refer to as capacity for preference); intentionality in 
action; accurate self-assessment; awareness of common sources of cognitive error (which I will 
refer to as bias vigilance); and dialogue aimed at self-discovery, which includes the willingness 
to participate in dialogue.  There is no lexical priority for these criteria, and they fit into both 
absolute and continuum scales.273  Each of these requires further exploration and clarification. 
                                                 
273 As a necessary caveat and matter of clinical significance – I realize that these proposed standards are theoretical, 
and may have some difficulty translating well into clinical settings (e.g., discussions of backstage cognition).  This is 
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Capacity for Preference 
 In this criterion, the moral agent engages in reflection upon the treatment options open to 
her, weighs their strengths and weaknesses as she understands them, and makes her preferences 
known in some manner to the clinician (ideally through a contemporaneous statement).  By its 
very nature, this will post challenges, as the interpretation the patient gives to the treatment 
option will be contingent upon her perception and understanding, which may require further 
discussion and dialogue with the clinician, to ensure as much accuracy as possible.  This capacity 
for preference is not absolute, in that patients will differ in both the degree of their preferences as 
well as their ability to communicate them.  Patients unable to weigh information or express 
preferences due to cognitive impairment or illness ought not to be considered autonomous 
agents, and treating clinicians should defer to a best-interest standard until the impairment is 
resolved or a proxy decision-maker is identified. 
Intentionality 
 Several theories have noted the necessity of this criterion.  For an action to be personally 
meaningful and autonomous, it must be intended and not accidental or reflexive.  It is entirely 
possible to act without meaning to act, and a number of neurological and psychiatric conditions 
have demonstrated that involuntary actions can be physical or verbal.  As has been demonstrated 
in chapter two, mental actions are also driven by automaticity, and therefore the agent may find 
herself acting or thinking in a manner she does not desire.  Following earlier theories, this is an 
absolute scale – either one intends to act or one does not, and it is quite possible to discern 
between the two.  Unintended actions ought not be considered autonomous. 
                                                                                                                                                             
a barrier faced by cognitive therapies  in psychology, as well – the theoretical concepts will be dependent upon the 
underlying cognitive capacity of the patient in question.  This can be resolved by using age-, understanding-, or 
education-appropriate terms (e.g., switching “People frequently make systematic cognitive errors in information 
processing.” with “Sometimes we can get so used to thinking about things some way that we forget there are other 
ways to see it.”) 
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Accurate Self-Assessment 
 Following Anderson and Lux’s argument, agents must have insight into their illness.  If a 
patient demonstrates agnosognosia, whether correctable or resistant, their autonomy has been 
weakened.  Following Anderson and Lux’s analogy, if a patient demonstrates a consistent source 
of error germane to their medical decision-making process, they cannot process the information 
necessary to make the judgment (or can only do so in a diminished capacity), and as such lack 
the insight necessary to be self-directing.  This analysis extends not just to awareness of physical 
injury, but also to persistent cognitive errors and distortions, per the earlier discussion of 
Anderson and Lux’s theory.  This criterion exists along a continuum, as the degree of accurate 
self-assessment increases, so to does autonomy increase. 
Bias Vigilance 
 Given that cognitive biases and sources of error are so prevalent in ‘normal’ cognition, 
and that special circumstances may exist in patients with depression, patients must be educated 
regarding common sources of cognitive error.  This does not mean that the patient must hold a 
doctorate in psychology, but she must be made aware of the ways in which we frequently 
misinterpret information, emotional information, and memory.  This is a continuum criteria, as 
patient understanding is variable.  If a patient demonstrates an inability to understand backstage 
cognition (i.e., an inability to recognize that thought can be influenced by other conditions 
[environmental triggers, personal biases, heuristics, etc.]), there is reason to question her 
autonomy.274  This criterion ties in directly with Dialogic Self-Discovery. 
 
                                                 
274 This argument will no doubt raise significant questions, and so I feel it requires further clarification.  I am not 
arguing that if the patient is skeptical about the information they are not autonomous – simple examples can 
demonstrate heuristical thinking, which should permit the patient to at least be willing to entertain the idea, in an 
effort to facilitate Dialogic Self-Discovery.  If a patient demonstrates a profound inability to conceptualize backstage 
cognition, there is reason to suspect compromised autonomy. 
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Dialogic Self-Discovery 
As has been demonstrated earlier, it is quite common that we are unaware of the 
idiosyncratic and systematic slants we place upon the information we take in, or upon the 
memories we selectively recall.  These biases and slants can be explored in a shared decision-
making model as proposed by Katz.  While the content is somewhat different than Katz’s model, 
in that the clinician and patient are not attempting to explore the Freudian unconscious, the aim 
is similar – dialogic interaction can provide illumination on those processes that evade self-
exploration and reflection.  This criterion exists along a continuum for two reasons: first, patients 
will have varying degrees of insight, so the amount of benefit from dialogic interaction will vary 
from patient to patient; and second, patients will have varying degrees of willingness to 
participate in dialogic self-discovery.  The more open a patient is to self-discovery, the greater 
the likelihood of an autonomous action resulting.  If a patient categorically refuses to engage in 
dialogic self-discovery, there is reason to suspect compromised autonomy, but not necessarily 
proof.275 
Medical Criteria of Autonomy 
 Medical criteria concern issues that are the traditional purview of medical treatment; i.e., 
these are routine elements that recur in many theories of medical ethics.  There are two key 
medical criteria for patient autonomy: the absence of a medical condition which directly affects 
cognition (which I will refer to as Structural Integrity), and access to the information typically 
required for informed consent.  Both of these criteria are continuum-based, as disease processes 
                                                 
275 There is also the possibility that the patient simply does not want to discuss the matter any further for a variety of 
reasons (e.g., irritation with the clinical staff, fatigue, pain, personality disorder, desire for privacy, guilt, crisis of 
faith, etc.).  In the event that a patient expresses unwillingness to engage in dialogic self-discovery, it would 
behoove the clinical staff to identify and document the reasons for refusal, alleviate whatever conditions are 
immediately preventative (e.g., fatigue or pain), and attempt at a later time, when the patient may be more receptive.  
Reluctance or refusal are not necessarily indications of compromised autonomy. 
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result in different degrees of impairment, and some pieces of information might be more relevant 
or available than others. 
Structural Integrity 
 The most significant challenge to patient autonomy in the models discussed is a physical 
impairment which prevents the patient from taking in information or processing it.  Dementia, 
delirium, traumatic brain injury, cerebrovascular accidents, etc., can exert profound effects on 
the ability of the patient to take in new information, make their preferences known, form 
associations between concepts or words, etc., all of which are necessary elements of cognition.  
Clearly any illness which fundamentally disrupts this process prevents the patient from making a 
meaningful decision.  However, because the effects of these illnesses are not uniform, it would 
be inappropriate to make blanket statements about the degree to which subsequent actions are 
autonomous or non-autonomous.  As such, a threshold point would need to be established, which 
could employ any of a number of psychiatric and neurological tests (e.g., the Mini Mental Status 
Exam). 
Informed Consent (or Refusal) 
 The standard protocol for medical intervention involves securing the informed consent of 
the patient.  While the standards of this vary from state to state (e.g., whether the ‘batting 
average’ – the clinicians success rate with the suggested treatment – is required disclosure), there 
is enough commonality to require that the patient be provided with information concerning the 
nature and purpose of the intervention, alternative interventions (including non-intervention) and 
their outcomes, risks, probable outcomes of the intervention proposed, etc.  This information 
should be presented in normal language, and should not require the patient to have extraordinary 
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education to understand it.  State standards of informed consent could suffice for threshold points 
(and due to variance, this criterion exists along a continuum). 
Psychiatric Criteria of Autonomy 
 There is only one principle psychiatric criterion of autonomy: the minimization of any 
psychiatric comorbidity (which I will refer to as psychiatric minimization).   
Psychiatric Minimization 
Given the documented underdiagnosis of depression and other depressive disorders in 
common medical illnesses, given the effect of depression on morbidity and mortality, and given 
the influence depressive disorders can exert on a patient’s cognitive process, it is important to 
identify and account for any psychiatric comorbidities, and to attempt to minimize their effect on 
the patient’s thought process.  This may employ a trial period on an anti-depressant or mood 
stabilizing medication, cognitive therapy or another talk-based intervention, etc., in an effort to 
isolate and control thought processes stemming from a depressive disorder instead of the 
patient’s own expressed values.  This criterion exists along a continuum, as the severity of 
depressive disorders varies.  This criterion is linked with the psychosocial criterion of 
authenticity.  
Psychosocial Criteria of Autonomy 
 Psychosocial criteria of autonomy refer to the relational individual – i.e., it recognizes 
that the individual exists as part of a network of relationships which can exert influences – as 
well as referring to the narrative individual – i.e., the individual as she exists over time.  There 
are two essential psychosocial criteria: the minimization of external coercion (which I refer to as 
coercive minimization) and the ownership and congruence of the individual’s choices 
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(authenticity).  Both of these criteria are based on continua – recognizing that coercion and 
authenticity are not all-or-none principles. 
Coercive Minimization 
 Moral agents do not exist in a vacuum – even the choice to forgo medical treatment 
involves at least two people (physician and patient).  As such, it makes no sense to fiat a model 
of radical individualism, as there is significant empirical refutation of this idea.  The choices that 
we make in life affect other individuals in a variety of ways, some strongly and others weakly.  
This is not unidirectional, however – the relationships in which we engage, personal and 
professional, influence how we approach problems and decisions.  Some relationships can exert 
significant influence – our motives can shift from egoistic to altruistic, focusing more on how a 
decision affects someone else than how it affects ourselves.  Further, our decisions can be 
manipulated by others, through bad information and deception, emotional appeals and threats, 
etc.   Most systems of medical ethics reject such manipulations as fundamentally undermining 
autonomy, a position advocated here as well.  This is not to attempt to argue for radical 
individualism, as this seems to be untenable.  However, it does seem plausible that a proper 
accounting of personal autonomy should attempt to minimize the coercion applied to any 
individual – it is unlikely that all forms of coercion can be accounted for and prevented, but in a 
decision as serious as the choice to forgo medical treatment – a terminal decision – it seems clear 
that one would seek to minimize any undue influence. 
Authenticity 
 The authenticity criterion is complicated – on the one hand, it is intuitively reasonable to 
desire for decisions to reflect the values and choices an individual has taken to be her own; on 
the other hand, humans have the capacity to change, and that inherent plasticity makes it difficult 
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to insist that the individual act in accordance with the same principles at every point in his or her 
life (e.g., changing faiths from Roman Catholicism to agnosticism, or vice versa).  A 
compromise position would seem to have individuals explore their contemporaneous values, in 
light of the other cognitive criteria, and in a dialogic process, in an effort to establish which 
principles should be considered authentic.  The individual’s decision could then be examined in 
light of the congruence between contemporaneous, reflected values and the decision made, with 
incongruence suggestive of compromised autonomy. 
 The autonomy model proposed above is no doubt open to criticism, as some claims (e.g., 
authenticity) have been controversial in the literature.  However, they are reasonable criteria, 
when examined in light of the homuncular and cognitive models of autonomy discussed earlier – 
there is a compelling reason for each element, and the absence of any of them raises fundamental 
questions as to the autonomy of the action in question.  However, as most of these criteria exist 
on a continuum, it may be unclear as to how this can be used clinically.  This is the purpose of 
the last chapter, which will use a case-based approach to provide a continuum of patients, 
ranging from compromised to uncompromised autonomy. 
 
 401
CHAPTER FIVE: FACES OF CHOICE AND VOLITION – A CASE METRIC APPROACH TO 
ASSESSING DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY 
 
 
 At this point, it is useful to consider and briefly review the cognitive arguments made 
over the previous chapters.  The recurring concern is that the choice to forgo medical treatment is 
subject to a variety of influences at a variety of levels.  The patient is susceptible to influences 
from the cellular to the psychosocial level – and each of these influences can produce automatic, 
backstage cognition upon which conscious experience is founded.  This necessitates the use of 
metrics sensitive to the complex cognitive causal phenomena of which patients may be unaware 
or to which they may be inattentive.  Further, the behaviors manifested as a result of a depressive 
disorder may be masked by their illnesses’ symptomatology.  To overcome this diagnostic 
barrier, it is necessary both to raise the awareness that reactive depression affects morbidity and 
mortality, as well as employing a metric capable of discerning comorbid depression in common 
medical illnesses.  There are three tools which immediately spring to the forefront of relevancy 
to the current argument: the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, the Dysfunctional Attitudes 
Scale, and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale.  Each of these scales will be discussed in 
turn and contact information pertaining to all of the scales discussed can be found in the 
Appendix. 
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire 
 The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ), like the Beck Depression Inventory 
below, was derived from Aaron Beck’s cognitive model of depression.  Hollon and Kendall 
found a deficit in cognitive and cognitive-behavioral therapies and treatment – they noted that 
there were no “suitable specific measures of cognitions associated with depression.” 1   In 
                                                 
1 Steven D. Hollon and Philip C. Kendall, "Cognitive Self-Statements in Depression: Development of an Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire," Cognitive Therapy and Research 4, no. 4 (1980): 384. 
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response to this shortcoming, they developed a 30-item self-statement metric highly sensitive to 
differences in the cognitions of depressed and nondepressed criterion groups in men and 
women.2  The patient is asked to rate the frequency with which a particular sample thought has 
occurred to them over the previous week, e.g., how frequently a patient has thought to herself 
“I’m a loser” or “Nothing ever works out for me.”  Dobson and Breitner found the ATQ to be 
very reliable and sensitive, and declared that “[if] there were no other considerations, the ATQ 
would be the instrument of choice for assessing cognitions in depression.”3  Harrell and Ryon 
describe similar results in the literature, noting significant specificity for depressive cognitions, 
significant correlation with the Beck Depression Inventory, and adequate concurrent validity;4 
they did, however, note that there are questions about the theoretical basis of the questionnaire – 
they suggest the possibility that the ATQ and BDI may simply share a tendency to access an 
aberrant cognitive response set instead of actually assessing it.5   More recently, Glass and 
Amkoff have reiterated the wealth of supporting evidence demonstrating the ATQ’s concurrent 
validity, specificity, and sensitivity.6   Further, Netemeyer, et al,  have demonstrated that shorter 
versions of the ATQ can be employed which retain high levels of reliability and nomological 
validity.7 
 
                                                 
2  Hollon and Kendall, "Cognitive Self-Statements in Depression: Development of an Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire," 390; Torbjorn Ohrt and Lars-Hakan Thorell, "Ratings of Cognitive Distortion in Major Depression: 
Changes During Treatment and Prediction of Outcome," Nordic Journal of Psychiatry 52, no. 3 (1998): 240; 
Richard G. Netemeyer, Donald A. Williamson, and Scot Burton, "Psychometric Properties of Shortened Versions of 
the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire," Educational and Psychological Measurement 62, no. 1 (2002): 126. 
3  Keith Dobson and Hans J. Breiter, "Cognitive Assessment of Depression: Reliability and Validity of Three 
Measures," Journal of Abnormal Psychology 92, no. 1 (1983): 108. 
4 Thomas H. Harrell and Nancy B. Ryon, "Cognitive-Behavioral Assessment of Depression: Clinical Validation of 
the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire," Journal of Counseling and Clinical Psychology 51, no. 5 (1983): 724. 
5  Harrell and Ryon, "Cognitive-Behavioral Assessment of Depression: Clinical Validation of the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire," 733. 
6 Carol R. Glass and Diane B. Arnkoff, "Questionnaire Methods of Cognitive Self-Statement Assessment," Journal 
of Counsulting and Clinical Psychology 65, no. 6 (1997): 917. 
7 Netemeyer, Williamson, and Burton, "Psychometric Properties of Shortened Versions of the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire," 125. 
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The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale 
 Like the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS) was 
derived from Beck’s cognitive theory of depression; it is designed to measure vulnerability to 
depressive disorders outside of an actual depressed state.8  As Beck’s theory is predicated on 
cognitive schemata – stable and persistent cognitive states – the DAS is a measure of beliefs 
indicating predispositions to depression.9   These predispositions are triggered by personally 
meaningful events – e.g., illness, loss, etc. DAS scores have been found to be associated with 
poor responses to cognitive and pharmacological interventions.10 The DAS is a rather long scale 
– it was originally a 100-item measure, which contrasted significantly with many other metrics.  
Later revisions scaled it down to 66-items, then to a 40-item questionnaire.11 Scores range from 
40 to 280, with higher scores indicating dysfunction.  Several studies have noted that the DAS 
has significant test-retest reliability,12 and that it is recommended for use in the general adult 
population.13  Some studies, however, have suggested that the DAS is not as powerful a metric of 
depressive cognitions as the ATQ.14 More recent research, however, has suggested that the DAS 
is in fact a reliable and valid metric of depressive schemata,15 and that the DAS and ATQ may be 
                                                 
8 Gary P. Brown, et al., "Dimensions of Dysfunctional Attitudes as Vulnerabilities to Depressive Symptoms," 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology 104, no. 3 (1995): 431. 
9 J.M. Oliver and Elayne P. Baumgart, "The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale: Psychometric Properties and Relation to 
Depression in an Unselected Adult Population," Cognitive Therapy and Research 9, no. 2 (1985): 162. 
10  Ohrt and Thorell, "Ratings of Cognitive Distortion in Major Depression: Changes During Treatment and 
Prediction of Outcome," 239. 
11 Sharon K. Calhoon, "Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale in a Student Sample," 
Cognitive Therapy and Research 20, no. 1 (1996): 81-91; Ohrt and Thorell, "Ratings of Cognitive Distortion in 
Major Depression: Changes During Treatment and Prediction of Outcome." 
12 Test-retest reliability is a measure of how consistent the results of a given research tool are; specifically, it refers 
to whether the same test will yield similar results when the test is repeated. 
13 Oliver and Baumgart, "The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale: Psychometric Properties and Relation to Depression in 
an Unselected Adult Population," 165; Ohrt and Thorell, "Ratings of Cognitive Distortion in Major Depression: 
Changes During Treatment and Prediction of Outcome," 239. 
14 Dobson and Breiter, "Cognitive Assessment of Depression: Reliability and Validity of Three Measures," 108. 
15 Linda D. Nelson, Stephen L. Stern, and Dominic V. Cicchetti, "The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale: How Well Can 
It Measure Depressive Thinking?" Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment 14, no. 3 (1992): 222. 
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sensitive to different aspects of depressive disorders and cognitive distortions.16  Brown, et al, 
found further support for Beck’s proposed diathesis-stress model of depression and the utility in 
the DAS in screening for said vulnerabilities.17 As such, it seems plausible that the DAS may 
make for an appropriate screening tool for vulnerability to depression in medical inpatients. 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
 The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) was designed by Zigmond and 
Snaith as a means of employing the anhedonic state, the central characteristic of depressive 
psychopathology,18 to screen patients for clinically significant anxiety and depression.19  It is a 
14-item self-report scale, with seven questions keyed to depression and seven questions keyed to 
anxiety.  Each subscale has a maximum score of 21, with scores of 11 or higher on either 
subscale indicating the probable presence of the corresponding psychopathology,20  although 
some have found lower cut-off scores to have a more optimal balance between sensitivity and 
specificity.21  By separating the emotional from the somatic aspects of depression, they sought to 
minimize the number of false positives that would plague metrics which relied on the 
endorsement of both physical and psychological criteria.  Studies began to demonstrate the utility 
of the HADS in screening – for instance, in comparison to other scales like the Beck Depression 
Inventory and the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, Kenn, et al,  found that the HADS quite 
                                                 
16 Torbjorn Ohrt, Ingemar Sjodin, and Lars-Hakan Thorell, "Cognitive Distortions in Panic Disorder and Major 
Depression: Specificity for Depressed Mood," Nordic Journal of Psychiatry 53, no. 6 (1999): 463. 
17 Brown, et al., "Dimensions of Dysfunctional Attitudes as Vulnerabilities to Depressive Symptoms," p. 434-5. 
18 Some have challenged this characterization, however.  For instance, see David A. Clark, Allan Cook, and Dean 
Snow, "Depressive Symptom Differences in Hospitalized, Medically Ill, Depressed Psychiatric Inpatients and 
Nonmedical Controls," Journal of Abnormal Psychology 107, no. 1 (1998): 45. 
19 A.S. Zigmond and R.P. Snaith, "The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale," Acta Psychiatrica Scandanavica 67 
(1983): 364. 
20 G. Johnson, et al., "Screening Instruments for Depression and Anxiety Following Stroke: Experience in the Perth 
Community Stroke Study," Acta Psychiatrica Scandanavica 91 (1995): 253. 
21 Ingvar Bjelland, et al., "The Validity of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale: An Updated Literature 
Review," Journal of Psychosomatic Research 52 (2002): 71; Bernd Löwe, et al., "Diagnosing ICD-10 Depressive 
Episodes: Superior Criterion Validity of the Patient Health Questionnaire," Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics 73 
(2004): 133. 
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useful in screening elderly patients, who normally have significant somatic complaints.  They 
noted that “the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Rating Scale is felt to relate well to the 
anhedonic state and to be influenced as little as possible by concomitant physical illness.”22  
Razavi, et al,  found it to be quite useful in screening cancer in-patients for a variety of 
psychological conditions (e.g., general psychological distress, adjustment disorders, and major 
depressive disorders),23 and Hamer, et al,  found it to be applicable across a range of clinical 
situations.24  Koenig, et al,  noted some discrepancies, however, noting that in their study the 
General Health Questionnaire identified depression more reliably than the HADS.25  Johnson, et 
al,  found similar results.26  These findings however, have been challenged.27  Recently, Savard, 
et al,  found the HADS to have good sensitivity in addition to “excellent internal consistency and 
test-retest reliability, as well as a very good convergent validity” in their study involving 
screening for depression in the presence of HIV symptomatology.28  While they note that there is 
some debate about the factor structure, i.e., whether a two or three subscale methodology is more 
accurate, the HADS has generally been found to be reliable and valid.  They note that “because it 
is simple and brief to administer, the HADS may easily become an integral part of routine HIV 
care.  It may thus be considered the best currently available self-report scale to assess anxiety 
                                                 
22 Chris Kenn, et al., "Validation of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Rating Scale (HADS) in an Elderly 
Psychiatric Population," International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 2 (1987): 191. 
23  Darius Razavi, et al., "Screening for Adjustment Disorders and Major Depressive Disorders in Cancer In-
Patients," British Journal of Psychiatry 156 (1990): 82. 
24 D. Hamer, et al., "Using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale to Screen for Psychiatric Disorders in People 
Presenting with Deliberate Self-Harm," British Journal of Psychiatry 158 (1991): 784. 
25 Harold G. Koenig, et al., "Screening for Depression in Hospitalized Elderly Medical Patients: Taking a Closer 
Look," Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 40 (1992): 334. 
26 Johnson, et al., "Screening Instruments for Depression and Anxiety Following Stroke: Experience in the Perth 
Community Stroke Study," 256. 
27 Martin Härter, et al., "Screening for Anxiety, Depressive and Somatoform Disorders in Rehabilitation - Validity 
of HADS and GHQ-12 in Patients with Musculoskeletal Disease," Disability and Rehabilitation 23, no. 16 (2001): 
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and depression in the context of HIV.”29  Further support is found in Berard, et al., who note that 
the HADS has been found to be reliable in oncology settings in studies in the United Kingdom, 
Europe, the United States, and India,30 Johnston, et al., who note that it can be an acceptable and 
not unduly burdensome metric of emotional distress for a variety of physically compromised 
patients,31 and Herroro, et al., who note that the scale demonstrates reliability and sensitivity 
when translated out of English.32  The HADS can also be employed as part of a battery of 
screening tools – for example, Fossa and Dahl suggest that the HADS be used as a 
complementary depression-specific tool when evaluating other aspects of cancer-patients’ 
psychological state.33  Some concerns remain about the scale, however.  McCue, et al., raise a 
criticism of the HADS, suggesting that the two-factor/three-factor debate raises a fundamental 
question about the validity of the scale in chronic fatigue syndrome patients.34  As McCue, et 
al.’s concern is limited in scope to a small subset of the overall patient base, however, it seems as 
if the majority of the evidence favors the HADS, and suggests it to be quick to administer, valid 
and reliable in construct assessment, and quite useful in screening a variety of patients. 
Other Common Scales 
 The above discussion is not to suggest that it is inappropriate to use other scales – there is 
empirical support for a number of other metrics, and several of the more prominent are discussed 
below.  The concern, however, is not simply diagnosing the presence of a depressive disorder, 
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but more specifically, if one is present, identifying what effect it has on cognition and decision-
making.  These criteria seem to be best met with tools discussed above.  However, successful 
screening and diagnosis are possible using other tools.  Three of the most common are 
summarized here: the Beck Depression Inventory, the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, and 
the Geriatric Depression Scale.  Each will be addressed in turn. 
The Beck Depression Inventory 
 The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) is directly derived from the theories and 
therapeutic modalities of Aaron Beck’s cognitive-behavioral model of depression.35  The BDI 
itself, presently in its second iteration, is a multiple-item, multiple choice inventory of symptoms 
of depression (the first version conforms to the depressive symptomatology of the DSM-III, 
while the more recent version utilizes the criteria of the DSM-IV).  The BDI is a 21-item self-
report inventory scored on a scale from 0 to 48 with higher scores indicating more severe 
depressive symptoms; it has been repeatedly demonstrated to be a reliable and valid screening 
tool for depression in a variety of patient demographics and treatment settings.36  Some studies 
have recommended the BDI be included as part of a battery of screening tools, including a full 
psychiatric interview.37  Norris, et al., suggest caution in the use of the BDI in assessments of 
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geriatric patients, however (see below), and Kenn, et al., echo this concern.38  Schotte, et al., 
found conflicting evidence; they note that while the BDI is a valid measure, there are some 
psychometric weaknesses in it and other self-report measures.39  Richter, et al., suggest that the 
BDI is not appropriately used in frequent testing, but ought instead to be used to assess change 
over a larger time interval (e.g., several weeks).40  The heart of their concern is that they found 
repeated testing to influence the BDI score – the test became a reaction to itself, instead of a 
reaction to depression.  Savard, et al., raised other concerns, specifically the vulnerability of the 
BDI to artificial inflation due to the inclusion of somatic symptoms.  They noted that severely ill 
AIDS patients endorsed a significant number of somatic items, which may have inappropriately 
elevated their scores.41 Clark, et al., found similar results for other patient populations.42  Despite 
the concerns about the inclusion of somatic symptoms, Viinamaki, et al., note that the metric has 
still been useful in screening depression in diabetics, Parkinson’s patients, chronic pain patients, 
and multiple sclerosis patients, although the screening cut-off scores have varied.43  Further 
support for the BDI is found in Vittengl, et al., who found the BDI to be an accurate assessing 
tool for changes in depressive symptoms over time,44 Furlanetto, et al., who found that even 
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shorter versions of the BDI are sensitive screening measures in medical inpatients,45 and findings 
that the BDI is a reliable screening tool across both demographic and socioeconomic status.46 
The Hamilton Depression Rating Scale 
 Moran and Mohr note that the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HRDS) is “one [of] the 
most frequently-used and well-validated clinician-rated measures of depression severity.”47  The 
HRDS dates back to 1960 and was designed to be used with patients who have already been 
diagnosed with a depressive disorder.48  As such, its use as a primary screening tool (i.e., in 
examining a patient to determine whether he or she is depressed) may not be appropriate, but it 
may certainly be an indicator of the severity of the depressive disorder.  The scale contains 17 
items which vary in answer weight – some answers are on a scale of increasing intensity, while 
other responses are weighted equally.  Hamilton notes that scoring is ideally performed by two 
raters – the total score is the aggregate of the two; although it is possible for one person to use 
the scale.49  There is some potential concern, however, in that the HRDS includes somatic 
symptoms as well – these can pose problems in diagnosis; as has been emphasized repeatedly, 
physical symptomology may be either somatic or psychiatric in origin.  In light of this, Kenn, et 
al., recommend that clinicians employ the HADS instead, as it is does not rely on physical 
symptoms.50  Benazzi notes, however, that there is strong correlation between HDRS and GAF 
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(Global Assessment of Function – Axis V in psychiatric diagnoses) scores in major depressive 
episode outpatients.51  It should be noted, however, that Benazzi is examining the HDRS-10, a 
revised version of the original HDRS.  Meyer, et al., recommend the inclusion of the HDRS in 
combination with other cognitive metrics (e.g,. the Mini Mental State Examination) in vascular 
headaches, noting that the sensitivity and specificity of the combined screening tools has already 
been demonstrated to be efficacious in longitudinal studies of cognitive decline during aging.52  
In their study of depression in multiple sclerosis, Moran and Mohr found that a majority of the 
content of the HDRS (12 of the 17 items) were able to distinguish accurately changes in 
depression severity,53  which may make it useful in monitoring a patient’s progress once a 
depressive disorder has been diagnosed.  Vittengl, et al., had similar conclusions, noting that the 
HDRS was sensitive to changes in depression symptom severity over time.54 
The Geriatric Depression Scale 
 The Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) is a commonly used clinical measure for detecting 
depression in the elderly.  Norris, et al., note that it is valid and reliable in the normal elderly and 
in those exhibiting psychopathology, and that validation studies demonstrate it to be superior to 
some other scales.55  They note that diagnosing physicians would benefit from employing the 
GDS in screening elderly patients for depression, instead of simply relying on their own 
instincts; they suggest that while the Beck Depression Inventory may have higher concordance 
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with the DSM-III criteria for a depressive disorder, some of the attributes make it less preferable 
as a screening tool.56  Studies have raised some concerns about the GDS (e.g., some studies have 
demonstrated lower sensitivities to depression in the GDS than in other screening tools),57 but 
more recent research has reaffirmed that it has reasonably sensitivity (approximately 80%).58 
 In addition to the six scales discussed here, there are a host of other metrics available 
germane to the present discussion.59  To discuss them all is well beyond the purview of this 
work, and would require significantly more space than can be afforded here.  It should suffice to 
note that significant effort has been undertaken to measure and understand the complex cognitive 
phenomena accompanying depressive disorders, and clinicians would be remiss to ignore or 
underemphasize their utility in screening and diagnosis. 
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 Having presented several diagnostic and psychometric tools, it is useful to see how they 
can augment the autonomy model proposed in chapter four.  Because patients present 
idiosyncratic challenges, it is necessary to discuss a variety of patients in order to offer a 
compelling cross-section of the patient base.  However, it is also necessary to balance this 
idiosyncrasy with generalizations – recurrent themes and conflicts that have appeared, regardless 
of the individual differences between patients.  In what follows, nine patients are discussed along 
a continuum, in an effort to delineate key aspects of their underlying cognitive structure and 
processes which either support or detract from their expression of genuine autonomy. 
Case Metric Format 
 The cases that follow have been set into a standardized format, in which salient 
information is presented as concisely as possible.  The format covers several elements germane 
under the autonomy model explicated in chapter four.  These cases are meant to be paradigmatic 
and quick references for practicing clinicians; they are amalgams of patients encountered in 
literature and in person. 
Introduction 
 The introduction provides a thumbnail sketch of the patient and his or her medical crisis. 
Demographics, Personal and Family History 
 Background information germane to discussions of support networks, salient events in 
the patient’s life, and psychological motivations are discussed here.  It is not a complete sketch 
or life history, but does delineate those events which are both personally meaningful as well as 
explanatory of how particular patients ended up facing the dilemma they face. 
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Condition and Prognosis 
 This section provides a brief summary of the patient’s diagnosis and estimations of 
recovery or mortality. 
Case Treatment 
 This section denotes the treating clinician’s thought process which brings about the 
autonomy discussion.  It denotes the steps taken, as well as any psychometric tools employed. 
Test Results 
 This section refers to any salient findings of the psychometric tools employed.  It does 
not contain laboratory values or other physical screenings. 
Dialogic Content 
 This section conveys any salient information speaking to the patient’s psychological 
state, attitude towards treatment, motivations, and areas of exploration paralleling dialogic 
approaches to medical decision-making. 
Heuristics and Biases 
 This section discusses any salient heuristics and biases covered in chapter two which are 
evidenced or suggested by the patient’s disclosures. 
Authenticity 
 This section discusses apparent motivations – i.e., authentic values – which appear to be 
strongly represented in the patient’s expressed belief system.  This section will also spell out 
apparent conflicts in motivations, as well as potential means of addressing authenticity concerns 
in autonomy. Sometimes authenticity creates problems for the agent; there are times when 
authentic decisions may be self-destructive, which will pose difficulties for clinicians.   
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Accuracy of Self-Perception 
 This section denotes any salient evidence of cognitive distortion preventing the patient 
from appreciating relevant aspects of his or her condition. 
Resolution 
 This section notes the outcome of the conflict in question. 
Variations 
 This section notes possible variations on the case presentation, and other concerns which 
may be germane (e.g., changing age, prognosis, etc.) in the assessment of the choice to forgo 
medical treatment. 
Case #1: Alice 
 The first patient under consideration is Alice, a 48-year-old Caucasian woman.  Alice 
faces a difficult personal challenge – she has recently been diagnosed with a malignant tumor in 
her right breast, a condition complicated by other comorbidities.  As of yet, it appears that her 
cancer has not metastasized.  Alice is visibly distraught during interviews with her treatment 
team and psychiatric consult liaison.  She currently faces a difficult decision – the degree of 
malignancy favors mastectomy over lumpectomy; alternatively she could do nothing, and risk 
metastasis.  At present, Alice is convinced that her condition is terminal; she states that any 
surgery will be disfiguring, which will alienate her friends and family.  She states that she 
doesn’t believe that she will ever find love bearing the resultant physical and emotional scars so 
frequently associated with breast cancer.  She believes that even if the cancerous breast were 
removed, because she didn’t find the cancer immediately, it is likely to spread – she believes that 
intervention at this point is futile, a case of too little, too late.  She has stated that she does not 
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wish to undergo surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation.  She states that she “wants to live out my 
days in peace as a whole woman,” regardless of the consequences. 
Demographics, Personal and Family History 
 Alice is a college-educated administrative assistant at a mid-sized law firm.  She is 
divorced, and is presently out of a failed relationship.  She is moderately overweight but 
maintains an active lifestyle, exercising two to three times per week.  She is a middle class 
mother of three; her children and ex-husband live out of state. 
 Alice’s life has been difficult at times.  Following the break-up of her marriage due to her 
husband’s infidelity and her children moving away for work and college, she began drinking as a 
coping mechanism.  She returned to dating, but found herself repeatedly in relationships that 
were destructive, emotionally and physiologically – she contracted hepatitis C several years prior 
to her current admission, which was exacerbated by her alcohol abuse.  Upon receiving the 
diagnosis, Alice set her life back on track.  She became a regular figure at Alcoholics 
Anonymous meetings, and developed a significant support network of sponsors and friends.  She 
also began a dietary and exercise regimen in an effort to avoid other health complications, and 
has maintained her regimen since her diagnosis. 
 Although Alice is health-conscious, she did not perform regular self-exams for lumps in 
her breasts.  She happened to notice an irregularity in the shower a few weeks prior, but initially 
attributed it to stress, after discussing ‘stress knots’ with her colleagues at work.  At that time, 
her firm was nearing the end of a significant trial – most of the staff were required to up their 
work schedules by at least an additional 10 hours per week, so she assumed that it was trial-
related.  When the ‘stress knot’ didn’t recede following the conclusion of the case, she became 
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more concerned, and began checking the ‘stress knot’ several times per day.  After an additional 
two weeks, she consulted her primary care physician, who referred her for testing. 
 When she got the news, she relapsed, and spent the entirety of the previous weekend 
intoxicated.  She was admitted to the hospital to detoxify her system on a Librium protocol.  Her 
treatment staff approached her about medical treatment for the malignancy, and presented her 
with her options.  Emotionally labile, Alice disclosed that her grandmother died of breast cancer, 
and that she has two friends who had undergone personal cancer scares, one of which resulted in 
a radical mastectomy, while the other was benign.  She notes that her friend who underwent the 
mastectomy described her recovery as painful, awkward, and socially uncomfortable for her and 
her husband. 
Condition and Prognosis 
 Alice currently has a stage IIB malignancy.  Upon biopsy, the malignancy was 
determined to be 5.5cm in size, but had not reached the lymph nodes.  Her treating physician has 
given her a five-year survival chance of 65% with treatment.  Her hepatitis flared again 
following her relapse, but her physician believes it should respond to interferon therapy. 
Case Treatment 
 An ethics consult has yet to be called; being aware of the possibility of comorbid 
depression, the treating clinician contacted the psychiatric consult liaison.  The consult liaison 
noted Alice’s anhedonia, an understandable reaction to an acute hepatitis flare and cancer 
diagnosis.  Suspicious that there might be more to the case, the consult liaison asked for formal 
testing by the hospital’s clinical psychologist, who administered the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale and the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. 
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Test Results 
The HADS indicated that Alice likely carried a comorbid depressive disorder.  She 
endorsed a number of items indicating anhedonia and feelings of worthlessness and helplessness.  
She could not complete the ATQ, as she burst into tears when she began reading the self-
statements, saying that she was thinking “all of them, all of the time.” 
Dialogic Content 
 Alice was willing to talk with the clinical psychologist – in the course of her interviews, 
she disclosed significant feelings of being controlled – the negative events in her life made her 
feel “helpless against fate.”  She stated that even when she tried to do right, she couldn’t win – 
just when she thought her life was back on track, something else went wrong.  She noted that she 
frequently thought of her friend who underwent the mastectomy.  The pain of treatment weighed 
especially heavy on her – she didn’t want to suffer, especially if she wasn’t sure that it would do 
any good.  When she heard that she had a 65% chance of living another 5 years, she stated that 
she only heard that she had a 35% chance of dying, even if she underwent treatment.  She stated 
that she normally was a happy person, and that before her diagnosis, she thought that she would 
have a happier life.  Now, she stated, “life doesn’t mean much to me anymore, and it probably 
never will.” 
Heuristics and Biases 
 Several key issues are apparent in this case, all of which should give pause in the decision 
to support Alice’s choice to forego medical treatment.  The first issue are the test results – both 
of which indicate that she is presently depressed, which as noted in previous chapters, can exert 
significant influence over cognition.  The second concern is elements disclosed during the 
dialogue with the clinical psychologist.  Alice notes three key heuristics which ought to raise 
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flags concerning potentially compromised autonomy.  The first is the disclosure of the impact of 
her friend’s bout with cancer on her present cognition.  Alice is demonstrating the availability 
heuristic – the information that came to her mind most readily, and as a result, the information 
which exerted significant influence on her decision-making process was that cancer recovery was 
a painful process.  By focusing on this information, Alice believes, rightly or wrongly, that her 
own recovery from cancer must be similarly painful and socially awkward.  Alice also 
demonstrates the durability bias by believing that her emotional and physical state will continue 
unabated into the foreseeable future.  In employing both availability and affective forecasting, 
Alice is ignoring key elements that can affect her recovery, specifically her support network of 
friends and children.  While Alice possesses insight into her life that is unavailable to others, her 
proximity also blinds her to salient aspects of her situation.  While she faces major hurdles, she 
has major support in overcoming them.  A third heuristic bias exhibited is that of anchoring – 
Alice stated that she only heard “35% chance of death,” a clear instance of latching on to one 
particular outcome, and ignoring the 65% chance of five-year survivability.  Her endorsement of 
most of the items on the ATQ offers further indication that she is experiencing ‘inside 
interference’ – uncontrollable negative thoughts. 
Authenticity 
 In addition to the heuristics and biases discussed above, Alice gives key indications as to 
her value structure and the congruence of her actions with it.  Two specific issues deserve 
attention.  First, Alice is concerned about pain and social awkwardness, a legitimate concern.  
Self-image exercises considerable influence on self-worth and goal-structuring – it is very 
difficult to attain goals when one believes one cannot.  Even when one is successful at achieving 
one’s goals, depression can cause one to attribute the success to outside elements or actors.  A 
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second clue is that Alice notes that she normally isn’t so morbid – she described herself as a 
happy person with goals for the future.  Deciding to forgo medical treatment and passively 
accept death seems radically incongruent with her stated values.  Both of these disclosures 
suggest that her cognition runs counter to her authentic self – the actions, it would seem, stem 
from her malignancy, not her identity. 
Accuracy of Self-Perception 
Alice does not believe that her cognition is compromised.  Instead, she states that she 
“just wants to be left alone” and that “I am seeing things clearly for the first time.”  Both of these 
suggestions, however, are questionable.  Isolation itself is a sign of depression, and it can further 
increase the malignancy by allowing the sufferer to ruminate upon their current condition.  
Isolation prevents recovery – as noted earlier, while we possess insights into our selves that are 
inaccessible to others, we can also become blinded to our state.  We experience a kind of 
agnosognosia – we are unaware that we are unaware of our dysfunctional cognition.  This 
agnosognosia is evidenced in her statement on her clarity – she is unaware that the stressors in 
her life have changed her perception from her authentic self, and have altered the cognitive 
processes upon which she based her choice to forgo treatment. 
Resolution 
 A variety of red flags were raised by Alice’s disclosures, each of which would suggest a 
higher evidentiary standard for endorsing her decision to forgo treatment.  The clinical 
psychologist, consult liaison, and treating clinician approached Alice with their concerns, and 
suggested a course of anti-depressants and brief cognitive-behavioral therapy sessions with the 
clinical psychologist over a two-week period, at which point the decision to refuse treatment 
would be revisited.  This course of treatment would be initiated during Alice’s in-patient stay, 
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and would be maintained on an out-patient basis following her discharge.  Alice was open to the 
suggestion, and used the therapy sessions to discuss her fears, social and physical, as well as 
exploring her support network and developing coping skills for automatic thoughts.  When the 
three clinicians met with Alice again, she consented to the mastectomy and adjuvant therapy. 
Variations 
 Alice’s case offers challenges in itself, but there are other potential complicating factors.  
She is presently a middle-aged woman; would her case be considered differently if she were 
older?  In light of the discussion presented in the previous chapters, there would likely be factors 
affecting the analysis.  Age carries with it complicating factors: frequently, older adults have 
more somatic complaints than younger adults.  An absence of chronic medical conditions seems 
to be the exception, rather than the rule.  As such, her assessment of the quality of her life may 
change as a result.  Further, as she gets older, her body may no longer have the same physical 
resources as it did when she was younger, and as such, physically taxing treatments and recovery 
periods may become very difficult to endure.  Her prognosis remains very favorable, but she may 
quite reasonably determine that the treatment would be too burdensome for her.  If this 
assessment were shown to be consistent with her values (which may also change from her initial 
case study presentation, since she is now older and may have had change-inducing experiences), 
there may be significant reason to endorse her decision to forgo burdensome, and hence morally 
extraordinary, treatment.60 
 Similar difficulties arise were Alice to elect a different treatment option.  For instance, if 
Alice were to maintain her same value structure and life experience, but elect prophylactic 
bilateral mastectomy.  This decision should raise concerns for a variety of reasons.  Although the 
                                                 
60 Morally ordinary treatments are distinguished in ethics from morally extraordinary treatments.  Morally ordinary 
treatments tend to be seen as obligatory, while morally extraordinary treatments tend to be seen as non-obligatory. 
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procedure would certainly remove the lump in question and would prevent a recurrence of that 
particular form of cancer, it still fundamentally conflicts with her desire to live “as a whole 
woman.”  Unilateral mastectomies tend to produce significant long-term psychological sequelae, 
and many women require counseling to restore a sense of self and self-confidence.  Bilateral 
mastectomy carries similar consequences, and as such, represents a decision that ought not to be 
treated lightly or chosen without thorough introspection and support.  If Alice were to elect this 
opposite extreme, especially in light of the immediate conflict with her authentic values, 
clinicians should suspect compromised autonomy. 
 A third complicating factor is her likelihood of five-year survivability.  In the case study, 
Alice was given a 65% chance of living another five years; if this percentage were changed, then 
it would be reasonable to expect a change in Alice’s valuation of her condition and potentially 
change her decision.  If the percentage were increased (from roughly 7 in 10 to 9 in 10, for 
instance), we might expect her to be more optimistic about her outcome.  If it were lowered, 
however, to 40%, the decision to forgo treatment may seem more reasonable.  The 25% shift 
between survivability percentages can have significant impact, especially as one moves towards 
the lower range of percentages (e.g., a 95% to 70% shift would likely have less of a decisional 
impact than a shift of 50% to 25% or 40% to 15%).  If the likelihood of five-year survivability 
drops significantly, her decision to forgo medical treatment may seem more reasonable and 
objectively accurate. 
Case #2: Bill 
 The second case under consideration is Bill, a 57-year-old African-American with colon 
cancer and coronary artery disease (CAD).  Like Alice, Bill’s cancer has not yet metastasized, 
and, in fact, was detected upon colonoscopy quite early.  Bill appears upset at times during 
 422
interviews, and has a hard time maintaining eye contact.  He has a tendency to speak to the floor, 
instead of the person asking him questions.  Bill is less concerned with the colon cancer than he 
is with his CAD – he is not happy with the dietary changes his physician is recommending, and 
he argues that at this point in his life, he has earned the right to eat badly.  He argues that if he 
has cancer, it “shouldn’t matter what I eat, since I am going to die anyway.”  Because of his 
predicament, Bill is refusing to continue his CAD treatment, and is refusing any sort of 
intervention for his colon cancer.  He has stated that since “the cards are stacking up against me, 
I might as well enjoy myself.”  After all, he argues, what is the point of living if you can’t enjoy 
it? 
Demographics, Personal and Family History 
 Bill is a bus driver, and has been for 30 years.  Prior to his hospitalization for chest pain, 
he had been considering retiring and moving across town to be closer to his family (his wife had 
died two years previously in an auto accident).  He has two children, a lawyer and an architect, 
who visit him regularly.  Bill has a fairly sedentary life – when he is not working, he enjoys 
sitting on his porch and barbecuing with his neighbors. 
 Bill’s life has been interesting.  He graduated from high school with honors, but had no 
college aspirations.  He was drafted, and spent a rotation in Vietnam in the infantry.  Wounded 
twice in combat, he was a decorated soldier before returning home.  He wanted to stay in his 
hometown, and took on a variety of jobs in the years following his discharge.  During this time 
he met Janine, whom he fell in love with and married.  As a budding photographer, her career 
required her to move away from Bill’s hometown, and in his devotion, he followed her.  He 
found a job as a bus driver, and settled into a comfortable married life.  Bill and Janine had two 
sons, of whom they were very proud; the entire family was shaken by Janine’s death.  Bill’s 
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experience in Vietnam taught him to enjoy life while he could – because he was unsure what 
each day would bring, he was determined to enjoy it.  He maintained this philosophy when he 
returned home, but didn’t maintain the same activity level.  As a result, his waistline grew as his 
hair receded, bringing with it coronary artery disease.   
In the course of a routine physical, Bill disclosed to his PCP that he occasionally had 
hemo-positive stool, which he attributed to hemorrhoids, the consequence of sitting and driving 
for hours on end.  When his doctor found no hemorrhoids, he recommended colonoscopy as a 
routine precaution.  The colonoscopy discovered polyps, which were later determined to be 
malignant.  Bill’s father had died from lung cancer, after smoking unfiltered cigarettes for twenty 
years.  It was later determined that in addition to the pleural malignancies, his father’s heart was 
atherosclerotic; in fact, if he had not died from cancer, it was quite likely that a massive heart 
attack would have killed him within a year.  When Bill heard that he himself had both colon 
cancer and CAD, he figured his time was up, and that he was going to die just like his father.  
“Why fight it?” he asked. 
Bill’s chest began to bother him several weeks before his admission.  He stated that it felt 
as if his left chest and shoulder were cramping, and he would get occasional tingling sensations 
in his hands and feet.  He didn’t think much about it in the first few days; he thought he “must 
have been sleeping on his side a little funny.”  After a week, he began to worry, but thought that 
as he had a physical coming up soon, he could just wait it out.  Doctors were expensive, he 
reasoned, so it would be better to kill two birds with one stone.  He noticed the blood in his stool 
the following week, ten days before his annual physical. 
Condition and Prognosis 
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 Bill was diagnosed with Stage A (T1N0M0) colorectal cancer and 40% occlusion of the 
coronary arteries.  His PCP and consulting oncologist gave him better than 90% five-year 
survivability, presuming that he simultaneously reduced his fat intake and engaged in moderate 
exercise.   
Case Treatment 
 Bill’s reluctance to treat the eminently correctable and survivable morbidities caused his 
treating physician significant concern.  The clinician noted that it seemed as if Bill was “giving 
up far too easily,” especially in light of the moderate nature of the illness and his strong social 
support network.  Like Alice’s clinician, he contacted the consult liaison psychiatrist, who noted 
the poor eye contact, apathy and resignation when conversing with Bill.  He called for testing by 
the clinical psychologist, who administered the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale and the 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale. 
Test Results 
 Bill scored highly on both the anxiety and depression subscales of the HADS.  While Bill 
did not manifest many outward signs of anxiety, he disclosed that his father was on his mind a 
lot, in light of the similarities of their diagnoses.  The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale similarly 
noted the likelihood of a depressive comorbidity. 
Dialogic Content 
 Although hesitant initially, Bill was willing to talk to the clinical psychologist following 
the administration of the diagnostic instruments.  When asked about his disclosure of his 
preoccupation with his father, Bill described how he couldn’t help but see the parallels between 
their two cases.  They both had heart problems and they both had cancer, so why shouldn’t he 
expect the same kind of outcome?  Why shouldn’t he expect the cancer to kill him, or, barring 
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that, the massive heart attack?  “With any luck,” he added, “it’ll get me in my sleep.”  
Concerning Bill’s attitude towards his life, he said that he was comfortable with it, and that he 
liked being able to eat what he wanted, do what he wanted, and that anything which changed that 
routine he didn’t like.  “I am who I am, and I like what I like,” he stated.  Bill showed some 
insight into his heart condition, noting that it was possible that his choice of poor diet and lack of 
exercise were exacerbating his condition, but he said that he didn’t see any way around that, 
because he didn’t like to exercise.  “Some people like to smoke; I like to eat,” he added, “and 
there ain’t nothing gonna change that.  It may kill me, but I’ll go out happy.” 
Heuristics and Biases 
 As with Alice, there are several areas of concern.  First, Bill is demonstrating the 
availability heuristic – he is drawing direct conclusions about his own condition based on his 
father’s experience of cancer and heart disease.  While this is reasonable to an extent, Bill has 
taken it beyond a reasonable level – his condition is eminently treatable, and his path is not 
intrinsically as damaging or delineated.  Bill’s prediction about the cause of his death may only 
be true if he does nothing to change it – it is essentially a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Bill has 
adopted an overly fatalistic attitude, and based it upon connections which are loose, at best.  Bill 
also demonstrates a durability bias, predicting that living a life with dietary restrictions will be 
too unpleasant for him.  This assumption may be unfounded – he will not necessarily know how 
he feels about a situation until he has experienced it.  As such, it seems as if there are reasons to 
question whether Bill’s decision to refuse therapeutic interventions for his cancer ought to be 
endorsed. 
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Authenticity 
 Bill’s case raises difficult questions about authenticity – specifically, what should we as 
clinicians do about authentic values which are dysfunctional or self-destructive?  Our bodies 
contain feedback mechanisms which can build dependencies – we have built in reward 
mechanisms for eating fatty foods, sweet foods, smoking, abusing drugs, etc., among a litany of 
directly and indirectly self-destructive behaviors.  If a patient’s authentic self is self-destructive, 
it seems to present a Catch-22 situation for the clinician.  Attempting to change the behavior 
invites accusations of paternalism, while doing nothing invites accusations of abandonment and 
disregard.  Bill’s authentic self likes to eat fatty foods and maintain a sedentary lifestyle; he 
wants to enjoy the time he has left.  It would be both unrealistic and unreasonable to expect him 
to begin training for a marathon.  One approach to this situation would be to stress the other 
elements of his life which are personally meaningful – his relationship to his surviving family.  
Bill is close to his sons, and he was considering moving closer to them after retiring.  Clearly he 
wants to be near his family, to enjoy his life with them as he wants to enjoy his vices.  One could 
explore which of these two motivations is stronger – it is not uncommon to find oneself faced 
with two competing drives.  Choosing medical intervention and changing his diet could be less 
of an imposition if he views them as means of enjoying his family more; authenticity can thus be 
saved by exploring the complex motivating elements of his decision-making process.  The choice 
to forgo treatment, in this case, would seem to be incongruous with his desire to be near his 
family. 
Accuracy of Self-Perception 
 Bill exhibits some insight into the controllability of his situation in that he recognizes that 
his behavior is linked with his health.  However, it seems as if Bill does not see how his long-
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term and short-term goals conflict.  His devotion to his family is confounded by his desire for 
short-term gratification, found in maintaining his lifestyle.  He views his alternatives as all-or-
none; either he can enjoy himself and live a shorter life, or he can deny himself and live a longer, 
miserable life.  This dichotomy is as powerful as it is false; Bill is not entertaining any notions 
that a middle-ground is possible.  Dietary changes would not necessarily require him to become 
an ascetic; instead, it would simply require more responsible monitoring of what he was eating.  
He would not have to train for the marathon, but instead could take a walk around the block – an 
activity he could combine with visiting his neighbors.  Bill’s lack of insight into his cognition 
and dichotomous thinking demonstrate likely influence of a depressive disorder, and as such, 
raise cautionary flags about his choice to forgo treatment. 
Resolution 
 Bill initially did not agree with the recommendations of the treatment team, but was more 
open to discussion when his sons visited him.  They offered to help him move, to eat and walk 
with him, providing him with a means of both improving his lifestyle and maintaining contact 
with his family, at which point he consented to immediate treatment for his CAD, and said he 
would think about treating his colon cancer.  He agreed to follow-up with the clinical 
psychologist as an outpatient.  After several weeks of talking about his father’s experience of 
illness, in addition to strengthening his social support network and learning about warning signs 
of depression, he consented to treatment for his colon cancer. 
Variations 
 Bill’s case becomes more complicated when focus is shifted to his CAD by removing his 
cancer.  At this point, the only clinically significant condition is his cardiac disease; the treatment 
for his condition is quite simple: dietary changes and exercise.  As noted in the case a significant 
 428
concern for Bill was the perception that he was experiencing a significant amount of medical 
comorbidity (the CAD on top of the cancer), which he argued rationalized and justified his 
dietary choices.  Absent that rationalization, the choice to forgo treatment based on dietary 
impact would seem to lose both objective weight and subjective appeal.  Bill may still choose to 
forgo treatment based upon this rationalization, but it should at this point raise significant 
concern for the clinician, and would suggest that there may be compromised decision-making 
ability.  This is not to suggest that clinicians can overturn a decision based upon objectively poor 
lifestyle choices; a number of reputable institutions and organizations have amassed a wealth of 
evidence supporting the link between smoking and multiple health problems, but it does not 
therefore stand to reason that a clinician can undermine a patient’s choice simply because he 
chooses to continue to live in an unhealthy manner.  While clinicians cannot control lifestyles, 
they can at least raise challenges to decision-making processes that are compromised by lifestyle 
choices. 
 A second complication takes Bill to the opposite extreme – in this case, his cancer has 
advanced, and poses a serious threat to his health.  Depending upon the severity of the cancer, 
Bill’s gastronomy may be the only enjoyable part of his life, and as such, requiring him to refrain 
from the one activity which brings him pleasure may genuinely constitute overly burdensome 
treatment.  Were this the case, refusing to consent to treatment he views as overly burdensome 
would seem to be a reasonable response, instead of an indication of potentially compromised 
autonomy.61 
                                                 
61 I admit that I am concerned about this statement, in that what is burdensome has a significant subjective element, 
and as such, it is quite possible for objectively questionable (even unreasonable) judgments to appear to be justified 
by this argument.  I wish to stress that this idea exists upon a continuum between clearly reasonable and 
unreasonable extremes, and as such, I would examine the internal consistency of the choice with the patient’s value 
structure (and potential value conflicts) before attempting to generate generalized rules as to what is reasonable 
versus unreasonable.  In the event that a clinician encounters a patient with a value structure which appears at odds 
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 A third possibility is that Bill may disagree with the treatment team’s treatment 
recommendations.  As has been noted earlier, simple disagreement with the treatment team does 
not in itself constitute compromised autonomy.  In the case presented above, the resolution notes 
that Bill ultimately consents to treatment for both his CAD and his colon cancer.  Quite 
obviously this is not the only potential outcome.  The case is meant to raise potential concerns 
about compromised autonomy, but it does not require that he consent to both or either treatment.  
Patients are free to make bad mistakes; what is incumbent upon us as clinicians is to challenge 
them, and not simply to overrule those choices with which we disagree.  Bill may have chosen to 
make the dietary changes but not address the colon cancer, or vice versa.  Consent to one 
treatment does not carry with it consent for the other, and each would need to be addressed 
separately.  It does make sense to approach them as part and parcel of the same overall treatment 
package, but patients may disagree, just as they may divorce consent to CPR from consent to 
specific follow-up interventions (e.g., any resulting intubation), or divorcing consent to 
exploratory surgery from consent to remove any malignancies found.  Disagreement does not 
necessarily produce inability to make treatment decisions, but it certainly produces a greater 
necessity of common language and understanding between clinician and patient, as it may stem 
from simple miscommunication or obfuscation. 
Case #3: Catherine 
 The third patient under consideration is Catherine, a 70-year-old Hispanic woman 
presenting with congestive heart failure, diabetes mellitus, and peripheral vascular disease 
(PVD).  Prior to her admission, Catherine noted that her legs were beginning to swell severely, 
and that her feet, already puffy and weepy, were also discolored.  Catherine has been living with 
                                                                                                                                                             
with common sense, the necessity of dialogic interaction becomes evident – the ‘method to the madness’ may 
become evident to the clinician, and/or the source of the error may become evident to the patient. 
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congestive heart failure for many years, and is used to being short of breath and experiencing 
edema.  She is concerned about the discoloration, but didn’t want to make a fuss when she 
visited her doctor.  Testing determined that while the edema could be treated by increasing her 
Lasix, the discoloration in her feet was being caused by occlusions in the blood vessels near her 
ankles, which was starving her feet of oxygen.  In fact, tissue on the toes of both of her feet were 
necrotic; she had not noticed because she was unable to see or feel the damage due to her 
diabetes and poor flexibility.  Catherine is unsure how she wants to proceed; her physician is 
recommending removing the dead tissue, but has not ruled out the possibility of amputation.  
Catherine has poor mobility as it is, and is sure that any intervention at this point would restrict 
her mobility too much, as she is convinced that the doctors want to take her feet. 
Demographics, Personal and Family History 
 Catherine is a high-school graduate, and was the first in her family to go beyond eighth 
grade.  Her activity level has dropped off with age and the progression of her illnesses, but she 
still does her own housework, cooking, and socializing with her neighbors.  Her daughter lives a 
few miles away, and visits her frequently. 
Her life has been tumultuous at times; at a young age she lost her first husband in the 
Korean War, leaving her with a young child and minimal income.  She worked a series of jobs 
from receptionist to retail, always provided for her and her child, and had enough saved to send 
her daughter to college.  Because of her experiences as a young adult, she has developed 
significant self-reliance and a drive for independence.  She had been diabetic since childhood, 
and had assiduously attended to her blood sugar levels.  While she has some retinopathy in 
addition to the PVD, she has made a conscious effort to minimize the impact of the illness on her 
life.  She was, therefore, quite surprised to hear about the necrotic tissue on her feet. 
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 Prior to her admission, Catherine had noticed that her feet and ankles were swelling up 
during the day, which she simply attributed to her frequent walks in the house.  In the times 
when she would sit down, she would put her feet up to reduce the swelling, advice she took to 
heart from her gerontologist.  She was able to recognize the signs of edema, and reduced her 
activity level as a result, allowing her daughter to do some of the cooking and cleaning for a few 
days.  When the edema did not go down and the discoloration appeared, she became concerned 
and approached her gerontologist, who referred her for treatment. 
 Catherine maintained strong community ties, and several of her neighbors have visited 
her during her hospitalization.  She remains feisty, and the staff occasionally reprimands her for 
pacing in her room instead of elevating her feet.  “I want to stay active,” she tells them, “it makes 
me feel good to be up and about and doing something.”  Catherine tells them further that she 
doubts she’ll be able to be active once the doctor takes her feet – she is afraid that she will 
become entirely dependent on other people, and that she will lose control of her life. 
Condition and Prognosis 
 Catherine’s diabetes is currently being managed – she is quite compliant with dietary 
restrictions, and is faster checking her blood sugar than are the nurses treating her.  Catherine’s 
principle ailment is the necrotic tissue, which is threatening to lead to sepsis.  Her treating 
physician has her on several antibiotics while they discuss her treatment options. 
Case Treatment 
The treatment physician is concerned about her apparent ambivalence regarding her 
outcome.  She does not seem to appreciate the severity of sepsis, nor does she seem to appreciate 
the precariousness of her health.  This seems to be a significant change from her previous state of 
mind, which was very health minded.  While she keeps tabs on her diabetes, her physician is 
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concerned that this may be due simply to routine, rather than maintained concern.  Recognizing 
that personality changes can be a hallmark of depression, he contacts the psychiatric consult 
liaison.  The psychiatric consult notes that she does display a variety of somatic symptoms 
typically associated with depression, but wants to make sure that a psychopathology is present.  
The consult liaison contacts the clinical psychologist, who administers the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale, along with the Geriatric Depression Scale. 
Test Results 
 Both the HADS and the GDS indicate borderline depressive symptoms.  Although neither 
test indicates clear psychopathology, her scores were very close to the threshold, and as such, the 
clinician elects to pursue a dialogue with Catherine, in an effort to find more evidence supporting 
or refuting a depressive disorder. 
Dialogic Content 
 Catherine is a little reluctant to discuss her case with the clinical psychologist, but speaks 
more freely after a visit from her daughter.  The psychologist notes that her affect brightened 
considerably following the visit as well.  Catherine relates to the psychologist her life and need 
for independence.  She stresses how tough it was being a single mother, but that she raised her 
daughter to be self-reliant.  She relates how difficult it was for her to sit around while her 
daughter cooked and cleaned; she confides that she would occasionally fold laundry when she 
was supposed to be sitting down.  Her voice gets stronger as she describes the shock of being 
widowed and the satisfaction of being able to do well by herself when everyone else thought that 
she couldn’t.  She describes her fear of becoming dependent if amputation becomes necessary, 
and wonders if it might not be better for her just to enjoy the time she has left.  She loves her 
daughter, and does not want to think that she would be a burden on her.  She has known several 
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individuals who were less rigorous in their diabetic management, and she doesn’t want to end up 
like them. 
Heuristics and Biases 
 Like Alice and Bill, Catherine is exhibiting the availability heuristic – she is drawing a 
parallel between other individuals experience with diabetes and her own, which may not 
necessarily be accurate.  While there is a possibility that removing the necrotic tissue may 
require amputation, it does not necessarily follow that this must lead to greatly restricted 
mobility.  She further notes that she may become burdensome upon her daughter, which may 
also be an unfounded application of the availability heuristic.  Like Bill, she is exhibiting some 
durability bias – she is forecasting her emotional response into the future, and ignoring possible 
coping mechanisms which could restore some equilibrium between dependence and autonomy.  
Further, Catherine has anchored, rightly or wrongly, on the word ‘amputation’, which carries 
significant meaning for her.  As such, it is clear that it is influencing her cognitive processing and 
decision-making. 
Authenticity 
 Clearly independence is an important part of Catherine’s life – it has been a guiding 
principle for her since she was a young woman.  Any answer to the current dilemma must 
include an appreciation and understanding of this basic tenet of her existence.  It would seem that 
the best possible recourse would be a treatment that minimizes the impact on this facet of her 
self-understanding.  Removing the dead tissue without amputation would be the clearest step in 
this direction.  Further, discussion of the diagnosis and prognosis with her daughter would clarify 
any needed assistance Catherine may require, and may in fact assuage Catherine’s fears of being 
burdensome.  If a resolution is found which maximizes Catherine’s independence, she may be 
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more amenable to therapeutic intervention.  One of the biggest issues that seems to plague 
consultations is poor communication – ensuring that the relevant parties are on the same page 
regarding motivations and outcomes can go a long way to overcoming apparent boundaries. 
Accuracy of Self-Perception 
 Catherine’s self-perception is demonstrably more accurate than Alice’s or Bill’s, but 
there are still areas of concern.  Catherine’s fear of dependence has caused her to focus on the 
possibility of amputation and potential restriction, almost to the point of ignoring other possible 
outcomes and benefits.  She has selectively maximized the likelihood of complete dependence 
and minimized the possibility of diminished, but significantly maintained independence – after 
all, there are many individuals who have undergone amputations who still maintain active lives.  
As such, it appears that her decision-making is unduly influenced by this attention to select 
details, and it is simultaneously preventing her from recognizing both her cognitive barriers as 
well as other prognoses. 
Resolution 
 After talking with her treating clinician and her daughter, Catherine decided to allow the 
removal of the dead tissue.  She insisted, however, that if further interventions such as 
amputation were deemed medically necessary, that she would refuse them, and her daughter 
voiced her understanding of her mother’s wishes.  Catherine stressed again her desire to live 
independently; her daughter replied that she would be happy to check in on her mother, but 
would happily do so as a guest, rather than a housekeeper. 
Variations 
Catherine’s case can be complicated by strengthening her fears of losing her feet to 
amputation.  In this variation, she adamantly refuses both debridement of the necrotic tissue and 
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amputation of her feet, but demonstrates clearly compromised autonomy.  The compromise 
results, however not from a medical condition, but from her fears of disfigurement.  This raises 
an issue of significant concern – her fears have a legitimate basis.  This is not to say that she is 
automatically autonomous or non-autonomous; rather, we see that there is evidence on both sides 
of Grisso and Appelbaum’s scale.  On the one hand, Catherine was approached about the 
possible medical need to amputate.62  This directly conflicts with her desire to remain active; 
amputation will not necessarily reduce her to a moribund state, but it will certainly impact her 
mobility.  Even the use of prostheses would require an acclimation period.  This shifts the 
discussion of the removal of the necrotic tissue away from morally ordinary care and towards 
morally extraordinary care.  In doing so, it suggests that Catherine may be justified in choosing 
to forgo the treatment.  On the other hand, there is significant analysis demonstrating the 
availability heuristic and the durability bias, both of which suggest sources of cognitive error.  
This then leads to an uncomfortable dilemma, with compelling evidence on both sides of the 
evaluative scale.  As a means of approaching this situation, part of the original analysis still holds 
true – any avenue of treatment must necessarily address her concerns of independence, but it 
must be made clear that any source of cognitive error be identified and corrected as much as 
possible for the action to be autonomous; as noted above, the underlying motive for the refusal is 
fear.  While fear can be a powerful motivator, it can also be addressed and overcome. 
A second complication arises if the psychometrics did not indicate the likelihood of 
depression influencing cognition.  This is not to say that an affective disorder is the only possible 
                                                 
62 I willfully shift from ‘medical necessity’ to ‘medical need’, precisely because necessity may be too strong of a 
word in this case.  While her medical best interests may be served from the removal of the necrotic tissue and 
potentially of her feet, that is not the only potential outcome.  For instance, the amputation may be presented as 
medically favorable, or the intervention which produces a higher long-term gain; this does not therefore translate 
into the only potentially beneficial course of action.  Medical best interests could also be served by removing the 
dead tissue without amputating the feet, or by providing palliative care and pain management, were sepsis or other 
secondary medical issues to arise. 
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compromising factor – as was argued in the last chapter, there are may requisite characteristics of 
an autonomous action.  Rather, a lack of psychometric evidence does undermine arguments that 
her decision is cognitively compromised.  There is still recourse in the heuristical analysis, and 
dialogic interaction may succeed in bringing out any sources of error.  These are not guaranteed 
results, however, and clinicians may be forced to accept that the only objections they can raise to 
a decision is their own intuition or impression from interaction with their patients, which may not 
be enough to justify overturning an endorsement of their patient’s autonomy.  An absence of 
quantifiable data does not immediately make a compromised patient uncompromised; all it does 
is shift the emphasis in patient interaction from psychometrics to dialogic interaction.  No 
psychometric enjoys perfect sensitivity or specificity; as such, clinicians must make a dialogical 
exploration of personal values a part of the decision-making process. 
A third complication can be raised if Catherine refuses to make a choice.  Many patients 
prefer to have decisions made for them.  Several authors have noted a willful surrender of 
authority to treating clinicians on the part of patients; while this may make the decision-making 
process longer, it does not necessarily make it morally ambiguous.  If Catherine were to refuse to 
make a choice, several avenues remain open possibilities.  The refusal may stem from her 
interactions with the clinical staff – a friend or family member may be able to make inroads 
towards a decision.  This friend or family member would not necessarily make the choice for her, 
but may make it easier for Catherine to express her wishes.  The friend or family member may be 
a facilitator, rather than a proxy decision-maker.  Alternatively, the friend or family member 
make explicitly take on the role of proxy, and provided that no conflicts of interest occurred or 
clear differences between the proxy’s and patient’s wishes were present, the friend or family 
member may be able to shoulder the burden of responsibility for Catherine.  The requirements 
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for proxy decision-making vary from state to state, so adequate research and/or legal 
understanding may be required to employ this avenue of decision-making. 
Case #4: David 
 Our fourth patient is David, a 64-year-old Asian-American male presenting with 
Parkinson’s disease, peripheral neuropathy and congestive heart failure (CHF).  David’s dosage 
of L-dopa has steadily increased over the years as his Parkinson’s has gotten worse.  His 
therapeutic dosage is approaching toxic levels, and he is experiencing auditory and visual 
hallucinations with increasing frequency as a result.  These auditory and visual hallucinations are 
causing him significant distress, compounded by his increasing difficulty moving.  He spends 
most of his time sitting in his chair at home, “trying to decide what’s real and what isn’t, and 
trying not to feel my feet tingling.”  David isn’t quite sure what to do with his life – he finds it 
difficult to move his hands, which makes it hard to enjoy the puzzles and games his 
grandchildren want to play.  His impaired mobility makes it hard for him to stay active – before 
his diagnosis, he used to enjoy walking in the park and feeding the pigeons.  His family visits 
him at least once a week, but he feels very lonely when they are not around.  Recently his CHF 
began to act up, and when his family found him struggling to breathe on their last visit, they 
brought him to the ER.  His treating physician has increased his Lasix and his CHF is responding 
moderately well to the treatment.  David, however, is not sure that he wants to continue 
treatment – although he might breathe better, he is not sure that his life is worth continuing. 
Demographics, Personal and Family History 
 David is a college-educated retired high school history teacher.  He is twice divorced, and 
has children from both marriages who visit him frequently.  He was athletic throughout his life, 
regularly bicycling and running, until he began having some difficulty coordinating his 
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movements.  What he initially attributed to clumsiness was later diagnosed as 80% destruction of 
his substantia nigra, the onset of Parkinson’s disease. 
 David always did well in school, met his first wife in college, and had two children 
before his thirtieth birthday.  His wife and he grew apart, culminating in a divorce in their early 
thirties.  At thirty-six, he remarried a woman five years younger than he, and had two more 
children before his fortieth birthday.  His wife began an affair a year after the birth of their 
second child, which eventually spoiled the marriage.  He decided that he would try living single 
for a while before looking again, but he never really felt the drive to become involved in a long-
term relationship, the product of two failed marriages.  His children harbored no resentments, 
and they remain closely knit, despite lingering animosity between their parents. 
 David’s life became much more solitary after his Parkinson’s diagnosis – he felt that it 
was a huge change in his life, and that it would prevent him from being the man he was before.  
He remained active as long as he could, but his lifestyle was further affected by a diagnosis of 
congestive heart failure – he could no longer exercise as easily as he once did.  Frequent walks 
and free weights gave way to his recliner and porch chair.  As his motor skills slid away, he 
found it more difficult to read, and his thick books and reading glasses gave way to audio books 
and the television.  He isn’t happy with his lifestyle, and continues to wish that he could be more 
active.  The visits from his family restore his spirits, but he feels his illness closing in on him 
when they are not there. 
 When he woke one morning and found it hard to breathe, he was unsure what to do.  On 
the one hand, he didn’t want to leave his family – he loved them dearly and wanted to see his 
grandchildren grow up.  On the other hand, his life was no longer what it used to be, and he was 
finding it harder and harder to manage to cook, clean, and take care of himself.  He knows his 
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family is considering nursing homes – the family harbors no illusions that the Parkinson’s will 
ultimately prevent David from caring for himself, and as such, he would need skilled care.  He is 
ambivalent about living in a nursing home – he recognizes that his needs will increase, but he 
doesn’t want to depend on others, or leave the house he has lived in for several decades. 
Condition and Prognosis 
 David currently has moderately advanced Parkinson’s disease, his neurologist predicts 
that he will be completely chair-bound within three years.  His congestive heart failure is 
advanced, but responds to treatment; his treatment team believes that it will respond to the Lasix 
and are recommending that a home care nurse begin visiting him following discharge. 
Case Treatment 
 The treating physician recognizes that David has legitimate concerns about his long-term 
prognosis.  They have discussed the likely outcomes of his conditions, and both are aware of 
what he can expect within the next five years.  Both are cognizant of the significant changes that 
have occurred in David’s life, and they recognize that he has been forced to give up personally 
meaningful activities.  David’s physician is concerned that he may be conflicted about his 
treatment – his consideration of giving up treatment seems to conflict with his desire to be with 
his family.  His clinician contacts the consult liaison psychiatrist, who after a formal evaluation 
consults the clinical psychologist, who administers the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
and the Geriatric Depression Scale. 
Test Results 
 Both the HADS and the GDS indicate borderline depressive symptoms.  The clinical 
psychologist expresses some concerns that the Parkinson’s and CHF may confound the somatic 
items on the GDS, and decides to pursue the issue further through a formal interview. 
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Dialogic Content 
 In the course of the dialogue, David expands upon his conflicting desires.  His family is 
very important to him, and he gets a lot of pleasure from visiting them.  At the same time, he 
does not believe that he can impose upon them, or require them to visit him daily.  They are busy 
with their lives and children, and he noticed the strain the more frequent visits had on them.  He 
is deathly afraid of becoming moribund, and the prospect of sitting in a chair and being unable to 
move greatly alarms the previously energetic and active man.  He does not want to die, but he is 
not sure whether his life is worth living – he feels that he has become simply a shell of the man 
he was before.  He says “it’s hard to find a purpose when you can do next to nothing to 
accomplish it.”  He notes that he has been having these kinds of thoughts quite frequently, ever 
since he had been forced to reduce his activity level. 
Heuristics and Biases 
 David has legitimate concerns, and his thought process rightly reflects his conflict.  One 
can note that he is engaging in affective forecasting – he is attempting to predict how he will feel 
about his situation far in advance, which as has been discussed earlier, is easily mistaken.  This is 
not to say that David might not experience these emotions or that his perception is necessarily 
inaccurate – however, he is mistaken in conflating questions of probability with questions of 
necessity.  In light of the finality of his decision, it would make more sense to discuss the 
probabilities of different outcomes, and to attempt to address any misconceptions and 
uncertainties as possible.  In short, while David shows significantly less cognitive biases than 
Alice, Bill, or Catherine, there are still reasons to explore his cognition further, instead of simply 
endorsing the decision to forgo treatment, especially in light of his evident ambivalence. 
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Authenticity 
 As should be evident, David has two essential personal values that are in conflict.  On the 
one hand, he has his drive and desire to be with his family.  It is clear that they are important to 
him, and that he has long-term goals involving them (i.e., the desire to see his grandchildren 
grow up).  On the other hand, he has a profound desire to avoid a moribund state – he greatly 
fears the end-stage of his illness, in which he is completely dependent upon others.  As such, he 
wants to avoid this as much as possible.  The choice he faces – whether to continue treatment for 
his congestive heart failure – clearly hinges upon which of these two conflicting ideas has 
precedence.  Any recommendation made must include sensitivity to this fundamental conflict.  In 
this particular case, further clarification of his expectations of his illness may offer insight into a 
resolution.  The clinician may note that while a moribund state is likely, it is not immediate, and 
as such, it is a decision he can always return to, should his condition worsen.  In the meantime, 
he would still be able to see his family and watch his grandchildren grow.  This would allow him 
to maintain both driving forces in his motivation, and retain the ultimate control which clearly is 
important to him. 
Accuracy of Self-Perception 
 The only significant challenge to accurate self-perception in David’s case is the degree 
and immediacy of the incapacitation he expects.  At present, it appears that his concerns about 
long-term dependency are making it difficult for him to identify and appreciate the likely short-
term gains to be had.  As such, it appears that he has some inaccuracies in his self-perception, 
which would seem to raise potential compromising factors to his autonomy.  This does not 
translate to an outright refusal to honor his wishes, but stresses the need for further discussion to 
 442
ensure that he identifies, understands, and appreciates both the short-term and long-term options 
available to him. 
Resolution 
 Ultimately the treatment team and clinical psychologist convinced David to continue 
treatment, with the knowledge that he always had the ability to refuse treatment in the future – 
with the assistance of the hospital ethicist, he and his family discussed his wishes regarding 
future treatment, clarifying what he viewed as acceptable versus burdensome interventions.  The 
psychiatrist recommended starting David on a mild dose of antidepressants, in light of his scores 
on the HADS and GDS, which produced an affective improvement following his discharge.  The 
family and social worker arranged a home care nurse to check in with David on the days when 
the family could not, ensuring that he had daily company. 
Variations 
 David’s case can be complicated by advancing his Parkinson’s disease.  At present, he 
has a moderate stage of the illness, but is expected to be completely dependent in three years 
time.  Consider for a moment the impact his disease may have were it to be at an advanced stage 
now, rendering him moribund.  If David were still able to voice his treatment preferences, and 
elected to forgo treatment, that decision would not be made simply upon the prognosis of his 
CHF, but upon how he viewed his baseline functioning.  It might not be unreasonable for him to 
decide that while he was breathing more easily, his life had gotten to the point where he felt it to 
be overly burdensome.  Per his disclosure in dialogic interaction, it is clear that he feels it hard to 
find a purpose in his life; restoring his breathing to baseline may not address this concern – the 
medical treatment may not provide a cure for the existential questions that remain.  Treatment 
might make him physically better, but one could legitimately raise the question as to whether 
 443
well-being is defined solely by oxygen saturation – psychological considerations and subjective 
assessments of burden are requisite elements of the desirability of a particular state of being.  
This would seem to avoid accusations of succumbing to the availability heuristic, and the present 
irreversibility of Parkinson’s disease weakens arguments that David is experiencing the 
durability bias; his movement will not get better, and entertaining illusions to the contrary seems 
more unreasonable than reasonable.  Were David to find himself in this state, the question of 
compromised autonomy is less clear, and the treatment team’s proposed therapeutic interventions 
may legitimately be interpreted as either morally ordinary or morally extraordinary. 
 Alternatively, the case can be complicated by exacerbating David’s CHF.  If it is 
sufficiently advanced that David will never again draw an unlabored breath, one can raise 
questions about the appropriateness of the intervention.  While David would remain alive, he 
may find that he cannot adjust or adapt to such breathing difficulties, which may increase both 
his physical and psychological discomfort.  David may therefore judge interventions which 
simply preserve his current level of functioning instead of improving it to be morally 
burdensome, and hence, may reasonably forgo such interventions.  Alternatively, medical 
management with morphine may decrease his sensation of smothering or drowning, which may 
increase his subjective quality of life.63 
 A third complication is what to do if David actively wants to die.  In phrasing the 
variation in this manner, it is not meant that David is seeking a more comfortable life, or a life 
unburdened with unpleasant medical interventions, or that David is actively suicidal.  Instead, the 
                                                 
63 Morphine can reduce the sensation of oxygen starvation, so patients may not experience the discomfort associated 
with breathing problems.  Morphine is contraindicated in patients with breathing difficulties, quite understandably, 
and at sufficiently high doses it can produce respiratory arrest.  This is obviously a significant concern, and finding 
the balance between keeping a patient comfortable and potentially administering a lethal dose of medication requires 
significant clinical attention.  The option is raised not as a means of euthanizing the patient, but rather as a means of 
trading a longer but less comfortable survival for a potentially shorter but more comfortable survival period.  Clearly 
the patient must be involved in this kind of decision as much as possible, and in as much of an autonomous capacity 
as is possible in light of his or her condition. 
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question is asked, what ought a clinician do when faced with a patient actively looking to die?  
This is a difficult issue – there are many reasons why a patient may express a desire for death.64  
Clinicians must be sensitive to feelings of hopelessness and helplessness producing these 
statements – they are hallmarks of affective disorder, and as such, ought to be explored with the 
patient.  There are times when recognizing and validating a patient’s sensation of alienation and 
fear can produce significant changes in how they view the world.  By taking such statements at 
face value, a clinician may be overlooking the underlying problem.,   By simply dismissing them 
as meaningless, a clinician runs the risk of converting a borderline depression to a fulminant 
depression, which demonstrably affects morbidity and mortality of the underlying medical 
illness.  Cases like this underscore the necessity of open and honest dialogue between clinician 
and patient; the insights offered through such a process will influence assessments of 
compromised versus uncompromised autonomy significantly. 
Case #5: Eugenia 
 Our fifth patient is Eugenia, a 68-year-old African-American female presenting post-
stroke with comorbid coronary artery disease.  Eugenia’s stroke affected her left motor cortex 
and Broca’s area, resulting in right-side hemiparesis and significant language impairment.  Her 
case is further complicated by a 75% occlusion of her coronary arteries.  While her ability to 
produce meaningful speech has been compromised, she is still able to communicate in writing.  
She indicates that is afraid of further debilitation, and that she doesn’t want to be kept alive by 
anything “unnatural,” but has a hard time explaining what she means by the term.  She is clear 
                                                 
64 Aside from motivations encountered in cases in the literature, I have talked with numerous patients of varying 
demographics who have expressed a desire to die.  Some do so out of fatigue (i.e., illness has worn them down), 
some do so to escape intractable pain, some do so for attention, some do so to remain hospitalized.  Exploration of 
the desire for death will therefore be a critical part of dialogic interaction – we certainly ought not to accede to the 
‘autonomous wish to stop treatment’ of a patient who voices a desire for death because she feels lonely and wants 
attention. 
 445
that she doesn’t want to be intubated, nor does she want “to be hooked up to a bunch of 
machines.”  She is uncomfortable with cardiopulmonary resuscitation, especially when she hears 
that it might require breaking her ribs, and doesn’t like needles.  She expresses some 
ambivalence about death, indicating that there are times when she feels ready to die, especially 
when she gets chest pains.  Her treating physician has recommended two coronary artery bypass 
grafts (CABGs), but she isn’t sure if it is worth it, as she feels very physically compromised. 
Demographics, Personal and Family History 
 Eugenia is a high-school educated, former restaurant manager.  She found time to start a 
family, has two sons and a daughter, all of whom live out of state, and her husband is a retired 
police officer.  They have flown in to be with her during her hospitalization, and one of her sons 
has offered to move back to take care of her.  She is moderately overweight, and never really 
maintained an active lifestyle outside of work. 
 Throughout her life, Eugenia has been dependent upon others for motivation.  Although 
she ended up in positions of responsibility as a wife, mother, and manager, she has always been 
indecisive, and usually has required someone else to be her impetus in deciding major issues.  
After graduating high school, she went straight to work, but didn’t really find anything which 
captured her interest.  After ten years of shifting from job to job, she settled in as a waitress at a 
growing chain of restaurants.  With prodding from her husband and family, she rose from 
waitress to shift leader, to assistant manager, to manager, and was happy in that position until her 
retirement.  She was unsure about having children; her feelings shifted significantly from month 
to month until she discovered that she was pregnant with her first child.  Following the birth of 
her first son, she and her husband settled into a routine, until her second pregnancy, which 
produced twins, her daughter and second son.  Following a brief maternity leave, she returned to 
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the restaurant.  Between her earnings and those of her husband, they were able to provide a 
comfortable home.  Her parents helped out watching their grandchildren when Eugenia and her 
husband were at work. 
 Following their retirements, Eugenia and her husband enjoyed a fairly quiet life.  He had 
occasional poker games with his former coworkers, while she puttered around the house and 
garden.  One Sunday, while washing up the lunch dishes, a plate fell from her hand, breaking on 
the floor.  She noticed that she started to feel very weak on her right side, and found it very 
difficult to talk and balance, preventing her from calling to her husband.  Fortunately he had 
heard the broken plate, and came into the kitchen in time to prevent her from falling to the floor.  
He called an ambulance and rushed her to the ER, where a left side ischemic cerebrovascular 
accident was diagnosed.  Following her admission to the hospital, further testing revealed the 
extent of her coronary artery disease.  Her clinician approached her about CABG, but she is 
feeling a little overwhelmed by everything going on.  The motor deficits she is experiencing have 
shaken her, and being hampered in getting her frustrations out has made her feel helpless and 
hopeless. 
Condition and Prognosis 
 Eugenia experienced a left side stroke of the middle cerebral artery.  Because it was 
caught and treated relatively quickly, her neurologist is confident that her deficits will be 
manageable with physical and speech therapy, but stresses that this is not guaranteed.  There is 
significant concern that her coronary artery disease may lead to another ischemic attack, which 
may be fatal, but this is an unknown.  Overall, her clinician rates her likelihood of significant 
partial recovery at 60%, but believes that vestiges of her neurological deficits will remain for the 
rest of her life, however long that may be. 
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Case Treatment 
 Eugenia’s treating physician notes that Eugenia is emotionally labile, which makes him 
suspect that her stroke is affecting her psychologically as well as physiologically.  He consults 
the psychiatric consult liaison, who after interviewing her concludes that there is a psychiatric 
comorbidity.  He recommends further testing by the clinical psychologist, who administers the 
Mini-Mental Status Exam, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, and the Geriatric 
Depression Scale, offering assistance when needed due to Eugenia’s impairments. 
Test Results 
 The Mini-Mental Status Exam indicates good cognitive functioning of the major 
executive areas.  Both the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale and Geriatric Depression Scale 
yield borderline scores, suggesting the need for further interviewing to offer further evidence or 
absence of an affective disorder. 
Dialogic Content 
 Eugenia finds it difficult at times to express her feelings – aside from her language 
deficits, she finds it difficult finding words which can capture fears and worries, of which she has 
many.  She worries about her heart, about her children, about her husband, about another stroke.  
She worries about being bed-ridden or confined to a wheelchair.  She worries about never being 
able to tell her children that she loves them.  She worries about rehabilitation, and whether she 
will ever regain her ability to function.  She finds writing to be frustrating, doubly so when she 
tries to speak and cannot.  She feels trapped within her body, a feeling she had never had before 
in nearly 70 years.  She hates having to live this way, and is not sure whether she is willing to go 
on or attempt to restore her health.  She writes that these thoughts whirl around her head every 
time she tries to move or speak and fails.  She writes that even when she tries to calm herself 
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down, she can never escape these worries.  They always linger, waiting for a trigger to spring 
back to the forefront of her thoughts. 
Heuristics and Biases 
 While Eugenia notes a variety of distressing cognitions, she does not explicitly 
demonstrate any particular heuristic or bias.  Instead, what is presented is significant backstage 
cognition – she notes that the thoughts are always there, but she isn’t always aware of them.  
Their ability to spring quickly to mind suggests that they are a significant part of her underlying 
cognitive mechanisms, which invites speculation as to the extent to which they are influencing 
the mental constructs she produces.  As such, one cannot state definitively that her autonomy is 
compromised on these grounds – one would need to discuss these further with her, and perhaps 
administer the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire to attempt to quantify her processing.  
Therefore, one ought to conclude that there is possible influence in her thought process, but not 
definite influence. 
Authenticity 
 Clearly Eugenia is conflicted – she demonstrates significant ambivalence in her 
motivations and concerns.  As such, it would be mistaken to simply fiat one guiding principle.  
Some patterns do emerge, however – her worries fall into concerns about her physical 
functioning and her relationship with her family.  Any proposed solution, therefore, should 
approach the issue with sensitivity to these important and influential elements.  In light of 
Eugenia’s difficulty in making decisions in her life, one could approach her and ask if she felt 
more comfortable making this choice with her husband and/or children.  It is recognized that this 
may confound the issue – it is not uncommon for family members to disagree.  However, as 
Eugenia is capable of expressing her wishes, she would retain ultimate authority in the decision.  
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Further, it should be noted that she has been given a favorable probability of recovery to a point 
where she would not be as hindered as she presently is.  It would be important to note that 
treatment and rehabilitation would allow her to maintain more control over her life, and to 
engage with others in ways that she finds more meaningful than written notes.  This would 
simultaneously address both her concerns about familial interaction as well as physical 
impairment.  It is not a cure-all, but it is a significant improvement over her current condition, 
and therefore worthy of consideration. 
Accuracy of Self-Perception 
 Eugenia demonstrates an accurate assessment of her present state, and has legitimate 
concerns about her recovery.  She does not seem to harbor misconceptions about her illness, but 
does seem overly pessimistic about the likelihood of recovery.  This is a far cry from Alice’s 
agnosognosia; Eugenia is aware of that her concerns are potentially influencing her cognition.  In 
light of these, there seems to be little ground on which to challenge any resultant decision to 
forgo treatment based on self-perception. 
Resolution 
 Eugenia opted to make her decision with input from her husband and children.  They 
favored her attempting rehabilitation and treatment for her CAD, recognizing that both may 
amount to only temporary fixes.  Bolstered by her family and sure of their support, Eugenia 
elected to try rehabilitation and treatment.  Eugenia and her husband used the current crisis to tell 
their children what they would want done if something else happened to them. 
Variations 
 Eugenia’s case can be complicated by changing her underlying motivations – instead of 
Eugenia seeking to avoid being kept alive via mechanical interventions, she now is concerned 
 450
about remaining alive at all costs.  She seeks every possible intervention, mechanical, chemical, 
electrical, surgical, etc.  During dialogic interaction, she discloses that her motivations for doing 
so stem from a dear of death; she doesn’t want to die, and believes that by using all of the 
avenues of medical science available to her, she will be able to postpone her death indefinitely, 
or at least of pushing off her death for the foreseeable future.  This is a significant shift away 
from the values she disclosed in the initial case study, and at this point, her medical wishes are 
bordering on unreasonable expectations.  This is not to say that medicine cannot stall mortality, 
but it certainly cannot prolong life indefinitely, nor can it overcome profound insults and 
injuries.65  As such, a significant concern in Eugenia’s medical management will be establishing 
reasonable versus unreasonable expectations, and helping her to clarify what, if any, point she 
would wish to forgo treatment.  Issues to consider would include whether she could find her life 
to be meaningful without consciousness, or without cortical function, or whether she would want 
her ribs broken repeatedly as CPR becomes more necessary, or whether she would want to be 
machine-dependent for respiration, hemodialysis, nutrition, hydration, excretion, etc.  These are 
fundamental issues, and some patients are unaware just how much can be done when they say 
“Do everything.”  Setting reasonable treatment expectations and treatment boundaries would be 
necessary in this case. 
 Her case can also be complicated by eliminating the sequelae from her stroke, reducing 
her immediate medical concerns to her cardiac problem.  In the initial case presentation, Eugenia 
disclosed that a significant source of her frustration was the impairments she incurred following 
her stroke, which led to her ambivalence about treatment/non-treatment of her cardiac condition, 
                                                 
65 Some of the terms employed here require clarification – the kinds of insults and injuries considered here are 
systemic, e.g., massive trauma, drug-resistant infections, progressive illnesses like AIDS, etc.  Interventions exist 
which can alleviate significant pain and suffering, and can prolong lives significantly, but cannot render death 
optional. 
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as well as her sense of helplessness and hopelessness.  If these sequelae were removed, but her 
ambivalence, helplessness, and hopelessness persisted, then there would be significant reasons to 
suspect cognitive distortion and potentially compromised autonomy.  This is not to detract from 
the seriousness of her cardiac condition – as has been discussed earlier, depression frequently 
occurs when heart pathologies are diagnosed.  Many patients have disclosed significant distress 
when hearing the diagnosis, and find it difficult to adjust both to the news and to any changes 
that their heart condition may require.  As such, Eugenia’s treating clinician should be alert for 
psychological sequelae to the coronary artery disease, and should be especially vigilant in light 
of any resultant disclosures of helplessness, hopelessness, or ambivalence regarding treatment. 
 If Eugenia’s prognosis were worse, we would expect her ambivalence regarding 
treatment as well as her affective state to become more pronounced (i.e., mild to moderate 
depression giving way to more severe forms).  If the likelihood of significant recovery were 
decreased to 25%, we would expect several possible reactions.  It is possible that she would be 
further overwhelmed by her condition, and may demonstrate even greater inability to decide 
upon a course of action.  It is possible that she may develop a more severe depressive episode, or 
that she may demonstrate depressive cognition (i.e., interpreting a 25% chance of significant 
recovery as 0% chance of significant recovery).  This latter avenue would open up her judgment 
to more significant challenges – at the point where she begins to equate 25% with 0%, there is 
reason to suspect that she is evidencing cognitive distortion, and as such, the clinician should 
treat the decision to forgo treatment as more suspect.  It is not unreasonable to become 
pessimistic when one hears a low probability of success – but it is unreasonable to become 
fatalistic or irrational.  Treating clinicians, therefore, should pay greater attention to underlying 
cognition in situations like this. 
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Case #6: Frank 
 Our sixth patient is Frank, a 75-year-old white male presenting post-stroke with comorbid 
congestive heart failure (CHF) and emphysema.  Frank was struck blind by a cerebrovascular 
accident (CVA) affecting his posterior temporal artery, compressing his visual cortex.  In a way, 
he was fortunate – he was in the emergency room being treated for labored breathing when he 
stated that he could no longer see.  He was rapidly scanned, and the bleed was found and treated.  
Frank initially was less concerned about his sight than he was his breathing – he told the 
emergency department staff that when he woke up it felt like he was breathing through a wet 
towel, and that things got worse over the course of the day.  With the intracranial bleed 
addressed, Frank faced two difficult issues – he might not ever see again, and his breathing was 
not going to get any better.  This is not what he imagined his life would be like as a young man, 
and he is unsure whether he wants to continue with the breathing treatments.  After speaking 
with pastoral care, Frank is weighing his options, aware that he has the ability to elect palliative 
care in place of further treatment. 
Demographics, Personal and Family History 
 Frank is a retired construction worker, who spends his time watching sports on television 
and reading detective novels.  He has a few friends at his nursing home, but he has lost contact 
with his long-time friends.  He has two children by different mothers, but has never been 
married.  He is close to neither woman nor to his children, and it has been nearly two years since 
he last heard from any of them.  He putters around his room at the home, but tends towards 
inactivity. 
His world is essentially the games he watches and the noir novels of Micheal Connolly, 
Dennis LeHane and Keith Ablow.  Despite the other health concerns he developed over the 
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years, his eyes have been fairly reliable.  He was a two-pack a day smoker for twenty years 
before being diagnosed with emphysema, at which point he cut back, but was never able to quit 
completely.  As a result, his breathing has gotten worse over the years, eventually requiring him 
to use oxygen at night.  When his breathing problems were exacerbated by the CHF, he was put 
on Lasix and again cautioned to stop smoking completely.  Frank was able to quit for a month, 
but found himself reaching for his cigarettes whenever he turned on ESPN. 
On the day of his admission and CVA, Frank woke at his usual time.  He had had bad 
mornings before, and brought his oxygen cylinder with him to breakfast.  After his usual coffee 
and low sodium breakfast, he returned to his room, showered, and turned on his television.  
Sitting in his favorite chair, he noticed that his chest was getting very heavy and it was harder to 
breathe.  Hitting the call button, he expressed his alarm and was in an ambulance shortly 
thereafter.  Upon presentation to the emergency department, he was given 100% oxygen while 
his medication list was faxed over.  Halfway through his physical exam, the world turned to 
black.  Panicking, he informed his physician, who took him for his scan. 
 When the CVA was managed and Frank was admitted to the hospital for monitoring, his 
visual deficits remained.  The attending pulmonologist and neurologist informed him of the 
extent of his medical problems, and his treating physician proposed continuation of the breathing 
treatment and the initiation of rehabilitation with the aim of minimizing his visual deficit.  Frank, 
however, was not convinced that this really was the best course of action for him – he decided it 
might simply be better to be comfortable, instead of simply waiting while his combined illnesses 
worsened.  
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Condition and Prognosis 
Frank’s neurologist places his recovery of partial vision at 50%, due to the speed with 
which his CVA was addressed.  His pulmonologist is less optimistic about Frank’s breathing – 
he believes that Frank was at a plateau for a long time, and now his condition is likely, but not 
guaranteed, to worsen.  He expects Frank to be on continuous oxygen upon discharge, and even 
then to experience some difficulties. 
Case Treatment 
 Frank’s treating clinician is aware of the profound impact a stroke can have on a patient’s 
mood and recovery, and contacts the psychiatric consult liaison.  After interviewing Frank, the 
consult liaison believes that there may be a psychiatric comorbidity, but Frank exhibited only a 
handful of symptoms consistent with a depressive disorder (principally somatic).  In light of this, 
the consult liaison requests psychological testing.  The clinical psychologist administers the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, as well as the Geriatric Depression Scale and Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire, reading the questions out loud to assist Frank in completing the items. 
Test Results 
 The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale indicated subthreshold endorsement of 
depressive symptoms.  The Geriatric Depression Scale endorsed depression, but the clinical 
psychologist believed this to be due to confounding physical symptoms of the CVA and CHF.  
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire indicated that Frank is experiencing some ego-dystonic 
automatic thoughts. 
Dialogic Content 
 Because the testing results indicated no clear depressive disorder, the clinical 
psychologist desired clarification of the results through dialogue.  While Frank expressed some 
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frustration with his present condition, he understood that the breathing therapy and rehabilitation 
may allow him to enjoy watching sports and reading again.  Frank stressed, however, that “if my 
vision isn’t good enough to wear glasses, it really does me very little good, as I could hold my 
books, but couldn’t read them.”  He noted that his vision was the last thing that he could depend 
on, prior to his CVA; he stressed that “while I can handle a lot of things, not being able to see 
really messes up my world.”  Frank related his concerns about what the neurologist told him 
were reasonable versus unreasonable expectations, and stated that “50/50 is worth a shot, but if it 
doesn’t work out, I don’t want to try anything else.”  He was disappointed by what the 
pulmonologist told him, but stated “that so long as I can see, I’ll strap the mask on.”  He 
understands that he might not be thinking clearly at the moment, as his world has been changed 
so radically and so quickly. 
Heuristics and Biases 
 Frank exhibits very little bias in his thought – he appears to have incorporated the 
information from the pulmonologist and neurologist have told him with minimal misconception 
and misunderstanding.  If any critique can be made of his thought process, one might consider 
discussion about his reliance on sight, or raise concerns about durability bias. 
Authenticity 
 Frank’s visual orientation is quite clear, and as such, any approach to his condition must 
be sensitive to this motivating factor.  Frank acknowledges that the return of his vision is not 
necessarily guaranteed, which may offer an avenue of approach – after all, one does not 
necessarily have to see a game to enjoy it, and many books are available in large print or audio 
format.  While these responses may not be convincing to him, they do serve to acknowledge the 
things that are important to him, as well as opening up discussion of means by which he could 
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still enjoy his life in the presence of impairment.  If, however, Frank is not swayed by the 
argument, one ought to propose a trial period of therapeutic intervention – this will combat the 
durability bias by seeing how he reacts and behaves in the presence of his deficit. 
Accuracy of Self-Perception 
 Frank appears to have an accurate picture of both his condition and avenues of care 
available to him.  He recognizes that his deficits may cause him to approach problems in a way 
that may not be advantageous, indicating that he is aware of potential influences on his 
cognition.  There seems to be little ground to challenge his resultant decision to forgo treatment 
based on poor self-perception. 
Resolution 
 Frank elected treatment, but only on a provisional basis.  If his discomfort continued 
despite the rehabilitation and Lasix, he would stop further treatment, electing palliation instead.  
His treatment team endorsed his position, and initiated treatment.  After two weeks of rehab, 
Frank demonstrated minimal improvement, and his difficulty breathing continued.  He elected to 
forgo further treatment, and was referred to hospice care. 
Variations 
 The first variation on Frank’s case to be considered improves his chances of recovering 
his vision.  As the case was initially presented, Frank had an equal chance of partially recovering 
his vision as he had of never recovering his vision.  He made his choice to continue breathing 
treatments contingent upon his visual improvement, and elected not to continue the treatments 
when he had minimal recovery.  If, however, he did experience improved vision, to the point 
where he was able to read large-print books, and still elected to forgo his breathing treatment, 
questions could be raised about the autonomy of his decision.  The values that he disclosed 
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during dialogic interaction demonstrated the primacy of his vision; he stated that if he were able 
to see, then he would put up with visual deficits (“So long as I can see, I’ll strap the mask on.”).  
As such, the choice to forgo treatment would then apparently conflict with his stated preferences, 
and such conflicts raise the possibility of compromised autonomy.  Clinicians must be cognizant 
of value conflicts in their patients – a requisite element of an autonomous action is harmony with 
one’s authentic values and a knowledge of one’s preferences; the choice to forgo treatment in 
this case is inauthentic, and therefore ought to be challenged. 
 The second variation on Frank’s case involves a significant improvement in his breathing 
and a decreased likelihood of partial visual recovery.  As the case was initially presented, 
Frank’s pulmonologist does not anticipate Frank’s breathing to improve to the point where he 
will not require oxygen, and partial recovery of vision was estimated at 50/50.  In this variant, 
Frank’s pulmonary baseline is higher, and he is expected to make a full recovery, but his chance 
of partial visual recovery is only 25%.  He is expected to experience little to no discomfort when 
breathing, but it is probable that he will not see again.  Frank already voiced his priorities 
concerning improved breathing and recovery of vision, and a similar analysis can be applied in 
this case.  The decreased chance of visual improvement ought to be weighed more heavily than 
the improved breathing when considering any expression of a desire to forgo treatment.  There is 
still some ground for questioning his choice based on the durability bias, and clinicians 
encountering this choice to forgo treatment must make sure that their patients are not equating a 
diminished chance (25%) with no chance (0%).  As noted in previous case variations, an 
inability to recognize the difference between possible and impossible raises concerns about 
compromised cognitive processing.66 
                                                 
66 I would argue, however, that this becomes less of an issue as the probability of recovery approaches 0.  Clearly 
there is more distortion present when a patient equates a 95% chance of recovery with 0% chance of recovery than 
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 A final variation raises the possibility of Frank being unable to make a decision about 
whether or not to continue his treatments.  As in previous cases, his decision-making ability may 
be improved with help from a family member or friend – this is challenging, however, in light of 
his few current social attachments.  One might question whether his ambivalence may be a 
product of his alienation and isolation, and this might be a fecund avenue of inquiry.  If no such 
facilitator can be found, Frank may benefit from longer and more introspective discussion with 
someone less close to him, but willing to engage in dialogic interaction (e.g., pastoral care, 
therapist, etc.).  The key to resolving this case hinges upon finding the source of his ambivalence, 
the values or preferences which are conflicting, and exploring the area of contention between the 
two.  Frank may benefit from having the opportunity to discuss this conflict, which may give one 
option greater decisional weight, allowing him to voice a preference.  This is not a guaranteed 
outcome, however, and an inability to make a choice may demonstrate compromised autonomy.  
Indecision alone is not enough to demonstrate an inability to make medical decisions, and as 
such, it would be inappropriate to pursue guardianship, which would compromise Frank’s 
autonomy further.  The most justifiable course of action would be to continue his breathing 
treatments while engaging in dialogic interaction, attempting to facilitate a decision, as it always 
remains an option to discontinue them and explore palliative care in their stead. 
Case #7: Georgette 
 The seventh patient is Georgette, an 82-year-old African American female presenting 
with stomach cancer.  What she thought was cramps and gas has proven to be much more severe.  
She has received the news stoically, which surprised her clinician, who expected a more 
emotional reaction.  Georgette explains that “we’re all going to die from something” and that she 
                                                                                                                                                             
there is when a patient equates a 5% chance of recovery with 0% chance of recovery.  In the case of Frank, 25% is 
still a meaningful chance, even if it is unlikely. 
 459
is surprised that she hasn’t gotten it sooner, in light of her family history.  She admits to being 
afraid at times to die, but says that she knows she can’t avoid it, and that she’s had a good life.  
She states that if she “can live a few more months to see the birth of my first great-
granddaughter, I will be able to die a happy woman.”  Her clinician has discussed the possibility 
of surgery to remove the cancerous tumor, indicating that that could help improve her chances of 
seeing her granddaughter born.  After discussion with the oncologist, she was told that surgery 
itself posed a significant risk in someone of her age.  Georgette faces a difficult choice –  
because of the risks of anesthesia and potential complications from the procedure, she may live 
longer without the surgery.  At present she is leaning towards forgoing treatment, as she views it 
as invasive, and “a hard thing on these old bones.” 
Demographics, Personal and Family History 
 Georgette is a lower-middle class nanny to the young children in her neighborhood.  She 
is a frail woman, who prior to her diagnosis maintained a somewhat active life, if only by 
keeping up with the children in her care.  She is widowed, with four children, two of whom live 
in the same town. 
Georgette has lived a long life; she was born in Georgia shortly after the first World War.  
Her father transplanted the family north when his factory moved.  The youngest of six children, 
she attended school through the eighth grade, at which point she found a job as a waitress.  While 
working, she met her first husband, a mechanic in the Navy.  She and her husband moved to 
Hawaii, where he was killed in the attack on Pearl Harbor.  She returned to her family full of 
shock and grief, and stayed with them for two years before moving out.  She met the man who 
would become her second husband a year later.  He was also a military mechanic, and would go 
on to serve in Korea.  He was fortunate enough to return home, where they started a family.  She 
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had four children, two boys and two girls.  Her husband provided for the family as a mechanic 
and working construction part-time, allowing Georgette to remain at home with the children. 
 Georgette’s mother was diagnosed with breast cancer shortly after Georgette’s second 
son was born.  Not knowing that the lump was malignant, Georgette’s mother did not believe 
anything was amiss until she began to experience headaches, dizziness, and difficulty breathing.  
When she checked with her family doctor, there was nothing that could be done for her – she 
would drop dead walking back from the market shortly thereafter, and an autopsy revealed 
metastasis of her cancer to her brain and lymph nodes.  Her father, a long-time smoker, 
succumbed to undiagnosed lung cancer two years later. 
 Georgette herself was no stranger to medical problems – following the birth of her fourth 
child, she had to have an emergency hysterectomy when she hemorrhaged.  Her recovery took a 
long time, and strained her family, both monetarily and mentally.  Her husband was working two 
full-time jobs to pay for her hospital stay and provide for the children’s schooling.  Five years 
after her recovery, he died from a heart attack in his sleep.  Georgette’s medical life was 
relatively uneventful after her husband’s death.  She received her husband’s pension, and all four 
of her children graduated from college, two with the help of scholarships.  Georgette spent her 
time walking in the neighborhood, going to the library, and listening to the radio. 
 Georgette’s stomach began to bother her after a neighborhood pot luck dinner to thank 
her for her selfless care of the neighborhood children.  She initially attributed it to her neighbors’ 
salted brisket, and it went away after a few days.  It would return a few days following that, 
following  an on-again, off-again cycle.  She attributed it to unhealthy food, and began treating 
herself with antacids and Pepto-Bismol.  She woke one morning with a strong pain in her 
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stomach, at which point she presented at the emergency department.  Endoscopy revealed 
multiple tumor sites, which proved to be malignant upon biopsy.  
Condition and Prognosis 
 Georgette has been diagnosed with a stage IIIA (T2N2M0) cancer.  Her oncologist 
predicts that with surgery to excise the tumor she has approximately a 15% chance of five-year 
survival, although she is doubtful as to whether surgery would be an option for a patient of 
Georgette’s age. 
Case Treatment 
 Georgette’s clinician is concerned about the near apathy with which Georgette greeted 
the news, and believes that a depressive comorbidity may be present.  She contacts the 
psychiatric consult liaison, who finds Georgette difficult to read.  In order to get a clearer picture, 
the liaison requests a consult from the clinical psychologist, who administers the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale and the Geriatric Depression Scale. 
Test Results 
 The Geriatric Depression Scale indicates some depressive symptomatology, but the 
clinical psychologist believes it may be confounded by the somatic symptoms of cancer.  The 
depression subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale reveals a subthreshold number 
of depressive symptoms that are not confounded by somatic issues.  Both the clinical 
psychologist and consult liaison believe that if a depressive disorder is present, it is mild at 
worst. 
Dialogic Content 
 In discussion with her treating physician, Georgette relates how her family has always 
dealt with death.  Her first husband, her parents, and three of her elder siblings have all died, and 
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while the family grieves for them, they are all aware that death is not optional, and there is a 
strong belief in their family that it is just a natural part of life, in both philosophical and 
theological terms.  They miss their dead relatives, but celebrate their lives.  Georgette is 
comfortable talking about death, and states that she understands that forgoing surgery now will 
likely remove it as an option in the future.  She smiles when she thinks about her family, and 
says she is “looking forward to seeing them again once I move on.”  She states that if she can do 
something about the pain in her stomach, she will be happy just to make do as she is.  She states 
that she will “be able to cook for my children and grandchildren, to see them smile and laugh for 
a little longer,” and “maybe see that happy little girl come into the world.”  She states that while 
the surgery may help this happen, it is just as likely to prevent it from happening, and “that’s a 
risk I’m not sure I want to take.” 
Heuristics and Biases 
 While Georgette is focusing on her family’s experience with death, she appears not to be 
employing any unrealistic heuristics.  The conclusions she is reaching are consistent with the 
available data, and while one might raise questions about some of her predictions of how she will 
feel in the future, she appears to be exhibiting little bias in her thoughts.  Her conclusions seem 
to be quite reasonable, and offer little ground for suspecting diminished autonomy. 
Authenticity 
 There is little question that Georgette sees her choice as consistent with her attitude 
towards life and death.  Family is clearly an important motivator for her, and her choice appears 
consistent with what probabilistically will give her the most time with them.  There are always 
some uncertainties in making probabilistic statements, but the available evidence makes her 
statements and judgments reasonable and authentic.  Like the analysis concerning heuristics and 
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biases, there is little ground for suspecting diminished autonomy from the perspective of 
authenticity.  The only potential concern lies in the nature of probabilities – one should be clear 
on the reasonably foreseeable and most likely outcomes before making these kinds of judgments. 
Accuracy of Self-Perception 
 Georgette demonstrates a good understanding of her situation and prognosis.  She is clear 
in her priorities and the likelihood of attaining them in light of her condition.  There is little 
ground on the basis of self-perception for suspecting diminished autonomy. 
Resolution 
 Georgette ultimately elects to forgo surgery; she was referred to hospice care and died 
three months later, just shy of the birth of her first great-granddaughter. 
Variations 
The first variation on Georgette’s case focuses on her age.  The case as initially presented 
detailed the life of an octogenarian, but the analysis and outcomes can shift dependent upon her 
age.  Clearly a woman half her age likely would not have had her experiences (e.g., losing a 
husband in Pearl Harbor or awaiting the birth of a great-grandchild), but a younger woman could 
have similar family histories and personal experiences with illness.  As such, the authenticity of 
the decisions may be comparable.  There are some important differences, however.  For instance, 
the physical resources of a forty-year-old woman would likely be greater than those of an eighty-
year-old woman.  This could affect the issue of recovery; Georgette stated in the initial case 
study that she feels the surgery would be difficult on her, as she is significantly older.  While this 
may hold true for an older person, the same line of reasoning becomes suspect in younger and 
ostensibly healthier people.  The clinician treating Georgette in this case variant should be 
suspect of the claim that the surgery and recovery will be too difficult.  This is not to suggest that 
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it is impossible for the recovery from surgery to be too taxing for a younger person or that this 
has never happened clinically; however, it does stand to reason that such instances are the 
exception, rather than the rule, and as such, should raise cautionary flags in the evaluation of 
autonomous action.  On the other hand, however, the five-year survival rate for this type of 
cancer does remain low, so it is not unreasonable for a younger patient to question whether an 
invasive procedure and painful recovery process are off-set by a small survival rate.  In these 
cases, therefore, it would seem prudent to engage the patient in dialogue to explore her important 
values and goals, and to see whether the risks and potential benefits of treatment are harmonious 
with these subjective assessments. 
 A second variation maintains Georgette’s age at eighty-two, but increases her five-year 
survival to 40%.  This is a significant increase (+25%), and exerts am important influence on the 
assessment of her case.  As noted in previous cases, it is important for clinicians to be cognizant 
of the patient’s assessment of probabilities.  A patient who cannot appreciate the difference 
between 15% and 40% chance of five-year survival demonstrates potential impairment.67  As the 
case was initially presented, Georgette opted to forgo further treatment in favor of hospice care.  
This decision is still reasonable in light of her other concerns (i.e., difficulty of recovery at her 
age), but the risk/benefit assessment has changed, and as such, her clinician ought to approach 
her to ensure that this information is understood and appreciated.  As in the first variation, an 
increase in her probability of five-year survival of this degree warrants exploration of her values 
and goals.  She may decide that the increased likelihood of five-year survival increases the 
change of seeing both the birth of her first great-grandchild as well as her first birthday and first 
                                                 
67  Just as in earlier cases, the indication of impairment will be dependent upon the amount of change.  Not 
appreciating a 5% increase demonstrates significantly less potential impairment than failure to appreciate a 50% 
increase. 
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words.  As her family is clearly an important motivator, these concerns are quite germane, and as 
such, warrant careful consideration. 
 A third variation would reexamine her case in light of potential availability bias.  Cancer 
has been part of her family throughout her life, and as such, it is something with which she has 
great familiarity.  However, there is a legitimate question raised as to whether her thinking has 
become fatalistic – because her parents both died from cancer, and she disclosed that she was 
surprised that she didn’t get it earlier, could she simply be working under the impression that she 
must die from cancer, too?  To be sure, cancer has a genetic etiology, and that first-degree 
relatives of individuals with cancer have higher risks.  However, like many illnesses, cancer 
appears to follow a diathesis-stress model, in that while she may carry the latent susceptibility to 
cancer, it requires an impetus before developing into a clinical condition.  She may have taken it 
for granted that she would develop cancer at some point, and may have resigned herself to her 
illness, instead of approaching the illness more objectively.  In short, her thinking may have been 
“This is going to happen; why fight it?”  Such thinking does not automatically produce 
compromised autonomy, but it certainly opens an avenue for exploration and discussion.  It 
would seem that Georgette has focused on the examples of cancer in her life (her parents), both 
of whom had progressed too far in their illness to effectively treat it, which has led her to believe 
that she is necessarily in the same boat (hence, availability bias).  Her clinician should challenge 
this preconception, if only to note that there are qualitative differences between her parents’ 
experiences with the disease and her own, and any subsequent differences in prognosis.  The 
outcome for this variation may be the same as the initial case presentation, but at least a source 
of potential error would have been raised and addressed. 
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Case #8: Harry 
 The eighth patient in our case metric is Harry, a 68-year-old Asian-American male 
presenting with pancreatitis, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), diabetes mellitus (which 
resulted in bilateral amputations below his knees), and congestive heart failure (CHF).  Harry 
presented to the emergency department with flare-ups of pancreatitis and congestive heart 
failure; his breathing had been labored all day, but towards dinner it had become markedly worse 
and he was diaphoretic, causing his care team to transfer him to the hospital.  While his CHF is 
responding to Lasix, it is very slow going, and Harry appears to have hit a plateau – he is neither 
improving nor getting worse.  The concern at this point is pain control – his pancreatitis is 
relentless, and is causing him significant discomfort.  Despite the analgesia, there is worsening 
breakthrough pain; his treating clinician is concerned that if he provides any more pain 
medication, he may end up suppressing Harry’s breathing, a significant concern in light of his 
current CHF difficulties.  The team has reached an impasse – do they give priority to Harry’s 
breathing or his pain management?  Harry stresses that his primary concern is pain, but he is 
inconsistent.  There are times when he confides a fear of not being able to breathe.  He hates the 
sensation of being smothered, and had a fear of drowning all of his life.  The team, as a result, is 
unclear as to what to do for him. 
Demographics, Personal and Family History 
 Harry is a college-educated retired engineer.  He has two younger brothers, but has not 
maintained a close relationship with either of them.  He has never married or had children, and 
has few close friends.  His amputations and physical frailty have led to his housing in a skilled 
care facility for the past several years, but while he is friendly with the staff, he has not attempted 
to develop friendships with them. 
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 Harry’s life has been, in his words, “uneventful.”  He was born in Chicago, studied 
physical engineering and literature at college, and took a job with an architectural firm after 
graduating.  His social life brought him many casual acquaintances and social contacts, but he 
“never really found anyone who clicked.”  As such, while he spent many nights out on the town, 
he frequently went home alone.  He never felt strongly about marrying or raising a family, he 
always said that it might be nice, but it didn’t really cross his mind much. 
 Harry has had significant medical problems – his diabetes has hit him hard, causing 
bilateral amputations below the knees, as well as advancing retinopathy.  His socialization 
dropped off significantly after the first amputation, but it occurred relatively late in his life – he 
spent most of his time on the internet, a habit he was able to continue after diabetes took his 
other leg and he moved into the skilled care facility.  His retinopathy made it difficult to see the 
screen, but he made do.  It wasn’t until his pancreatitis and CHF started giving him difficulties 
that he began thinking about the quality of his life. 
 On the day of his admission, Harry awoke as normal.  He was wheezing slightly in the 
morning, but he attributed it to the air conditioning, and not having a lot of fresh air.  His appetite 
diminished after breakfast as he began to experience abdominal pain, which wasn’t relieved by 
his usual PRN medication.  As evening approached, both his pain and his breathing worsened.  
An aide found him in his room heaving his chest for air when they were gathering their residents 
for dinner.  At that point, he was transported to the emergency department. 
 Harry hates pain, and has said so on numerous occasions.  At his skilled care facility, he 
has repeatedly asked for increases in his PRN pain medication, but did not demonstrate any signs 
of addiction or dependency – for him, it was genuinely a pain management issue.  In the hospital, 
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he has generally maintained this attitude, stating that if he had to choose between difficult 
breathing and abdominal pain, he would choose the difficult breathing. 
Condition and Prognosis 
 Harry’s pulmonologist believes that Harry will be dependent upon continuous oxygen 
following discharge, which would offer further difficulties for his mobility.  He is not confident 
that even with Lasix and oxygen Harry will be able to draw an unlabored breath.  Harry’s 
pancreatitis is chronic and debilitating – his attacks are becoming more frequent and more 
severe. 
Case Treatment 
 Harry is quite lucid, despite his compromised condition.  In discussion with his clinician, 
he admits to fears of smothering and of pain, but he more often than not says that he would 
prefer to be pain-free than to worry about his breathing.  He states that he would prefer to be 
healthy, but he would settle for being comfortable; his pain causes him more discomfort than his 
CHF.  His apparent resignation raises some concerns in his treating physician, who suspects that 
there may be a psychiatric comorbidity.  He contacts the psychiatric consult liaison, who is 
concerned about pain masking depression.  Focusing on the somatic diagnostic criteria, the 
consult liaison notes recurrent anhedonic elements in Harry’s statements, and recommends that 
the clinical psychologist evaluate him formally.  The clinical psychologist administers the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale along with the Geriatric Depression Scale and the 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale. 
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Test Results 
 Both the GDS and DAS note the possibility of depression, but the clinical psychologist 
suspects that there may be confounding due to the somatic content of Harry’s primary illnesses.  
The HADS subscale for depression indicates subthreshold depressive elements. 
Dialogic Content 
 The clinical psychologist opens a dialogue with Harry about his preferences in treatment.  
Harry discloses that he would prefer that his pain be managed over his breathing, although it 
would be nice if both could be resolved.  Since he knows that won’t happen, he would at least 
like to be able to sleep, which he finds next to impossible with his breakthrough pain.  He 
discloses that he’s relatively happy with the life he led, and that he doesn’t really worry about 
death – at his age, he is becoming more used to the idea, and it doesn’t make him afraid.  “After 
all,” he reasons “I’m not going to know when it happens.”  Instead, he is more afraid of pain and 
suffering.  Death may not be unpleasant, he adds with a small smile, since he “doubts his 
pancreatitis will bother him much at that point.”  He states that he is aware that his current 
condition may make him “feel a little down,” but “it’s nothing I haven’t dealt with before, and I 
haven’t changed my mind when it’s happened then.”  Harry even noted that he didn’t want CPR 
if something happened, because it would be too rough on him if it worked – the added pain of 
cracked ribs would simply be too much for him. 
Heuristics and Biases 
 If Harry is demonstrating any particular bias in his cognition, it is a durability bias about 
his pain.  This, however, is questionable, as he has significant experience with his pancreatitis, 
and has no reason to suspect that it will abate in the future.  Further, his conclusions are 
reasonable, and he is basing them upon conditions of which he has significant confirmatory 
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experience.  His pain may be an influential element of his cognition, but it is not unreasonably 
so, and as such, there is little ground for claims of compromised autonomy. 
Authenticity 
 Harry has affirmed and reaffirmed his basic principle: avoidance of pain and suffering, 
not necessarily avoidance of death.  One might raise challenges to this, but it appears to be a 
consistent pattern in his life, and appears to be a genuine constituent of his self-identity – it is 
something he endorses repeatedly, outside of his current medical crisis.  As such, it would seem 
reasonable to endorse decisions based upon this guiding principle as autonomous.  One might 
challenge this based on his statements about a fear of smothering, but there are also 
contemporaneous statements placing fear of pain as a higher concern than fear of smothering.  
Thus, there is some uncertainty in this case, but not enough to ground conclusions of 
compromised autonomy based on authenticity. 
Accuracy of Self-Perception 
 Harry seems to possess an understanding of his condition based upon his experience with 
chronic illness.  He does not seem to be harboring any unreasonable expectations concerning his 
prognosis with and without treatment, and he seems to be aware of the likely outcomes of 
favoring pain management over respiratory control.  As such, there seems to be little grounds 
upon which to base claims of diminished autonomy. 
Resolution 
 Harry ultimately elected increased attention to pain management over interventions 
designed to improve his breathing.  Four days after making this decision, he went into cardiac 
and respiratory arrest.  Per his instructions to staff, CPR was not performed, and he was declared 
dead shortly thereafter. 
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Variations 
 The first variation on Harry’s case involves his diabetes; the bilateral amputations 
profoundly affected his mobility and his retinopathy has affected his socialization.  This disease 
has put him in a place where he is very dependent upon others, and has little to focus on save his 
own physical state.  If diabetes were removed from the equation, he would still have significant 
medical issues (the pancreatitis, GERD, and CHF), but he would not necessarily be as dependent 
upon others, and may have other aspects of his life upon which he could focus his attention.  
Harry may find this quite relevant to his long-term preferences in medical care.  Restoring his 
ability to be active and socialize may cause him to place more emphasis on one treatment versus 
the other, as he may elect to tolerate some pain and avoid compromising his breathing, in order 
to be more active and social.  This is not guaranteed, to be sure, but it would likely facilitate the 
decision-making process; allowing for some novelty in an otherwise routinized situation can 
make otherwise intolerable conditions tolerable.  To wit, Harry’s day involves little more than 
focusing on his somatic concerns; increasing his mobility and ability to socialize may decrease 
the attention he pays to his pancreatitis.  Further, the case as presented noted the possibility of 
Harry demonstrating a durability bias; by introducing an avenue by which he can change his 
surroundings and experiences (since removing the diabetes from the case presentation has 
restored his mobility and vision), it is possible that he may not exhibit the same affective 
forecasting.  
 The second variation on Harry’s case restores his diabetes and its comorbidities, but 
involves a complete absence of pancreatitis and it’s corresponding abdominal pain.  This can 
exert a significant influence over his ultimate treatment preferences – pain is a significant 
motivator in electing to forego medical treatment.  Harry still faces a dependent existence; his 
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daily routine is tied to the schedule and availability of his care staff, and his breathing is likely 
only to worsen.  He may be unsatisfied with the quality of his life, a topic that is addressed in he 
psychometrics discussed earlier in the chapter, and certainly fecund ground for discussion in 
dialogic interaction.  As his health worsens, he may view breathing therapies to be burdensome, 
which then raises the question as to whether he ought to continue with the treatments, or shift his 
attention towards palliative care.  If Harry were to elect to forgo treatment at this point, there is a 
significant amount of evidence suggesting that this is reasonable, and not necessarily the product 
of cognitive distortion.  The clinician should approach him and discuss the values and goals that 
are meaningful to him, and then to offer treatment modalities congruent with those preferences, 
whether potentially curative or palliative.  Alternatively, Harry may elect to continue to receive 
breathing treatments when they are no longer of any real medical or psychological benefit – at 
this point, it would be appropriate to discuss with him reasonable versus unreasonable 
expectations of therapy, and why he may feel that continued ‘treatment’, if that is even the 
appropriate term, is warranted. 
 The third variation removes all of his medical comorbidities except his pancreatitis.  He 
maintains his mobility, no longer has his breathing difficulties, but still experiences severe 
abdominal pains.  The question at this point becomes pain management, and a variety of 
treatment options exist, whether in the form of medications, analgesic patches, nerve blocks, etc.  
The standard of care would require an examination of his lifestyle choices to see whether there 
are any exacerbating elements (e.g., alcohol abuse), but pancreatitis is a manageable condition.  
If he were to elect to forgo treatment at this point (say for an acute illness), it is reasonable to 
suspect that his cognition is being influenced unduly, and therefore the decision to forgo 
treatment ought to be challenged.  Pain can be a powerful motivator, and in some cases, can 
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require dosages of analgesic medication in the toxic and lethal ranges to manage it; it is not the 
purpose of this case variation to suggest that pain alone is insufficient grounds to forgo medical 
interventions, but it certainly should raise cautionary flags and suggest avenues of dialogue about 
treatment. 
Case #9: Irene 
 The last case in the metric is Irene, a 70-year-old Hispanic female who presents with 
pancreatic cancer.  Irene is no stranger to cancer, having gone though skin and colorectal cancer 
earlier in life.  She has endured several surgeries and rounds of chemotherapy and radiation in 
the process.  The pancreatic mass was discovered quit recently, but it was discovered to have 
metastasized to her lymphatic system.  Irene has made it quite clear that she does not want 
further medical interventions beyond palliative care – she states that she is “too old and frail to 
have to go through all that nonsense again.”  Her treating clinician felt that it was his 
responsibility to discuss potential therapeutic interventions, as well as palliative measures. 
Demographics, Personal and Family History 
 Irene is a middle class former schoolteacher.  Aside from her multiple cancer scares, she 
is in quite good health.  She walks frequently, and socializes with other cancer survivors.  She 
has two younger sisters, along with numerous nieces and nephews.  A hysterectomy early in life 
prevented her from having children of her own.  Her husband died the previous year from 
pneumonia. 
 Irene has been very vocal and opinionated throughout her life.  She developed a 
reputation for voluminous research and meticulous attention to detail in topics that interested her.  
This drove her to academic success, where she earned Master’s Degrees in both Education and 
Biology.  She taught science classes in many grade levels, and was quite resourceful for her 
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honor’s students.  She retired late, arguing successfully that while her body might be slowing 
down, her mind was as sharp as ever, a point demonstrated unequivocally by questioning by the 
school board. 
 After her skin cancer diagnosis in her mid-thirties, she focused her considerable faculties 
on understanding the disease.  She read information generally available, as well as delving into 
some of the trade publications for research articles.  She maintained a library on cancer in her 
home that would rival that of some clinicians.  She felt that by understanding the disease, she 
could exert some mastery over it – “know thy enemy” as she related to her treatment staff.  She 
experienced remission and recurrence of the skin cancer over the following decade, but it seemed 
to go into a permanent remission in her mid-forties.   
As she approached fifty, she noticed that she was experiencing recurrent hemo-positive 
stool.  She became alarmed, knowing that it was potentially symptomatic of colorectal cancer, 
and promptly underwent examination and biopsy.  When it was confirmed to be malignant, she 
underwent several rounds of treatment which left her tired, weak, emotionally and physically 
exhausted, but victorious and in remission.  She would experience a recurrence five years later, 
and underwent further rounds of chemotherapy. 
Her diagnosis shook her at first – her interest in understanding cancer had not waned as 
she grew older, and she recognized the significant mortality rate present in the pancreatic form.  
She had taken stock of her situation, and decided that at this point in her life, it was more 
important to her to feel comfortable than to survive – although she was still active, her age was 
wearing at her spirit.  She tired easily, and felt that while she might be able to give a good fight, 
she no longer possessed the physical and emotional resources she had in her youth. 
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Condition and Prognosis 
 Irene was diagnosed with stage II pancreatic cancer.  Her oncologist predicts that her 
chances of five-year survival are approximately 1%. 
Case Treatment 
 Irene’s clinician is concerned with Irene’s adamant refusal of potential medical 
intervention; he suspects that there may be a psychological comorbidity affecting her decision.  
He contacts the psychiatric consult liaison, who evaluates Irene.  Noting little obvious depressive 
symptomatology, the consult liaison elects to cover all the bases and asks the clinical 
psychologist to evaluate her.  The clinical psychologist administers the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale, as well as the Geriatric Depression Scale and the Dysfunctional Attitudes 
Scale. 
Test Results 
 All three scales indicate subthreshold depressive symptoms.  The GDS and DAS scores 
are higher, but the clinical psychologist suspects that these may be false positives due to the 
somatic content of the some of the scale items. 
Dialogic Content 
Irene notes that while she understands that her clinician is concerned with promoting the 
well-being of his patients, he may be ignoring her experience and knowledge of cancer.  She 
reiterates that she has gone through medical interventions for the disease in the past, and found 
them to be quite taxing on her mind and body.  She notes that she doesn’t have the same 
resources and strengths once available to her – she is a lot older now, which has affected her 
strength and resiliency.  She had a difficult time bouncing back from her previous illnesses, and 
believes that were she to attempt it again, that those difficulties would be compounded. 
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Heuristics and Biases 
 The only potential sources of bias that seems apparent are potential applications of the 
availability heuristic (drawing upon the most salient information) as well as potentially 
misremembering her previous experiences with illness.  Neither of these, however, seems 
particularly likely – a recurrent theme in Irene’s case is her efforts to understand both the illness 
and her experience of it.  This suggests that any information which may exert influence would 
likely be objectively accurate and relatively free from personal bias.  As such, there appears to be 
little heuristic ground for suggesting diminished personal autonomy. 
Authenticity 
 A key component of Irene’s value structure is her evident understanding of herself and 
her illness.  Throughout her life, she has made an effort to research and explore her areas of 
interest, amassing information and organizing in a manner that makes it highly relevant to her.  It 
is clearly important to her that her analysis of her situation be respected – aside from the abstract 
knowledge provided by years of reading and research, she has personal experience which are 
quite salient.  She defines herself through her understanding; any recommendation, therefore, 
must take this into consideration.  Her voiced preference to forgo further interventions is based 
upon a thorough understanding, not only of the disease in question, but of her own abilities and 
resources.  Her choice to forgo treatment reflects this understanding and assessment, and as such, 
is congruent with fundamental aspects of her self-identity.  As a result, there is little ground for 
suggestions of diminished autonomy based on authenticity. 
Accuracy of Self-Perception 
It seems quite evident that Irene is aware of her condition, her quite likely prognosis, and 
her self.  She seems quite aware of the effect age has had on her ability to recoup – she 
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understands that who she is now is not who she was the last time she fought the battle.  She 
knows what the fight requires, and knows that she will come up lacking.  While one may raise 
the question as to the objective accuracy of this self-knowledge, it is congruent with the available 
evidence, making her self-judgments quite reasonable and defensible.  As such, there is little 
reason to suggest that her autonomy has been compromised due to lack of accurate self-
perception. 
Resolution 
 Irene elected to refuse medical intervention for her pancreatic cancer, and was referred to 
hospice care.  Her growing pain was managed with morphine, and five months after her 
diagnosis, she died peacefully in her sleep. 
Variations 
The first variation on Irene’s case shifts her pancreatic cancer to an earlier stage.  This 
carries with it an increased chance of five-year survivability, and may make treatment less taxing 
on her physically and emotionally.  This is not to suggest that it will be easy, however, it does 
raise the possibility that her risk/benefit analysis of treatment may change, which is an important 
consideration.  If her survivability were increased to 40%, she would be remiss to dismiss a 
therapeutic intervention out of hand.  This is not to say that she would be incompetent or that her 
autonomy has necessarily been compromised, but dismissal of that significant of an 
improvement ought to raise cautionary flags in the assessment of her autonomy.  As has been 
noted in earlier cases, an inability to recognize significant differences in probable treatment 
outcomes suggests a compromised cognitive process. 
 The second variation provides a bit of a twist – instead of electing to forgo treatment, 
Irene now insists upon it, despite the risks and very low five-year probability of survival.  This 
 478
suggests several different avenues of approach.  On the one hand, there may be a meaningful 
future event in her life that she wants to witness, and as such, is willing to take risks that have 
small chances of success.  For instance, she may desire to witness the birth of a relative, a 
wedding, a graduation, etc.68  This is reasonable, and has occurred frequently in clinical practice.  
As such, it would be remiss of a clinician to dismiss out of hand a patient’s desire to pursue 
treatments with diminishing probabilities of success.  On the other hand, a clinician must be 
cognizant that sometimes patients seek out treatments because of irrational expectations – they 
are ‘hoping for a miracle.’  These cases are difficult, in that hope can be a powerful motivator, 
and can help to ward off psychological comorbidities (e.g., depression), which has been 
demonstrated to affect morbidity and mortality.  However, it is important that a patient have 
reasonable expectations in treatment outcomes – entertaining impossible outcomes as serious 
possibilities ought to raise a cautionary flag in assessing autonomy.  If a patient maintains an 
unreasonable expectation in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary, the clinician should 
suspect that some element of the patient’s autonomy has been compromised, and engage in the 
necessary dialogic interaction to explore the patient’s thought process.  As has been argued 
earlier, it is important to address as many identifiable sources of error as possible in light of the 
decisions being made. 
The third variation on Irene’s case changes little of her case except her source of 
information.  It is entirely possible that Irene has found incomplete or inaccurate information 
regarding cancer, and is using that information in making her choice.69  She is highly intelligent, 
                                                 
68 This is not an uncommon desire – I have both worked with patients and have followed patients in the literature 
who have found personally meaningful events in the future which they desired to experience.  A case local to 
Pittsburgh involved a man with advanced illness who wanted to remain alive long enough to see his son graduate 
from high school.  He was able to witness the ceremony, and died shortly thereafter. 
69 This is a significant concern in the contemporary “Information Age” .  The World Wide Web allows individuals 
to access an extraordinary amount of information, but does not use uniform standards of peer review or critical 
appraisal of the information provided (if the website in question does any fact-checking at all).  I have worked with 
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but may be led astray.  There is a clear external source of error which has translated into 
systematic internal errors in her cognition.  As was discussed in Chapter Two, backstage 
cognitive processes build new cognitive schemata from existing data.  If the data is questionable 
to begin with, the resultant constructs (which become reinforced and automatic over time) are 
equally questionable.  Any decision to be made, therefore, must make clear what is accurate 
versus inaccurate, and as a result, what constitutes reasonable versus unreasonable expectations.  
Her decision to forgo medical treatment in this scenario may be made for the inaccurate reasons, 
and as such, ought to be questioned, even if the outcome ends up being identical.  While the end 
result is the same, it makes a significant amount of difference how one reaches it. 
Conclusion 
 What emerges from these cases is a sliding scale of influence and potential of 
compromised autonomy.  The cases have been summarized and scaled below, in an effort to 
indicate quickly and clearly the conditions in which treating clinical staff should suspect that a 
patient’s autonomy has been compromised.   
 
CASE METRIC OF INFLUENCE ON AUTONOMY 
SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCES MODERATE/ MINIMAL INFLUENCES LITTLE/ NO INFLUENCES 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Alice Bill Catherine David Eugenia Frank Georgette Hal Irene 
Autonomy Compromised Autonomy Possibly Compromised Autonomy Not Compromised 
 
This scale is not meant to serve as the sum total of evaluation – i.e., it is not meant to supplant 
the role of the consult liaison or clinical psychologist.  It is meant, however, to note those 
instances in which clinicians should raise the evidentiary standard of autonomous choice when a 
                                                                                                                                                             
patients who have entertained ideas gleaned from questionable sources in both print and electronic formats which 
have defied what we know about anatomy, physiology, and biochemistry. 
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patient elects to forgo potentially beneficial treatment.  Personal autonomy is a relevant and 
meaningful concept in medical ethics for many compelling reasons; however, it is a very 
complex phenomenon, and requires great attention to detail for it to be genuine.  Autonomy can 
be a mask, an attractive veneer placed over incomplete and unrealistic cognitive models, an 
ethical ‘out’ when situations require more analysis than the dominant philosophical model can 
muster.  If we genuinely want our patients to make autonomous decisions, we must attend to as 
many relevant details of that decision as we possibly can – the opportunity for error and the 
finality of the decision warrants nothing less. 
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CONCLUSION 
 A significant amount of ground has been covered in the preceding chapters in a number 
of fields.  It has been demonstrated that consciousness, our day-to-day perception, our sense of 
self and identity, judgment, emotions, and intuitions are all predicated upon a number of causal 
cognitive elements that are outside our awareness – the bulk of our cognition is deterministic and 
preconscious.  This determinism opens up avenues of undue influence into processes we 
normally assume to be under our control – it should be clear that this assumption is mistaken at 
best, inhuman and pernicious at worst.  We should not abandon ourselves to blind determinism, 
however – we possess the ability to reflect upon our motivations, and to engage in dialogic 
interaction with others, who may bring aspects of ourselves to the fore which would remain 
otherwise inaccessible.  As a result, we can take back a measure of control, but only if we engage 
in honest dialectic and dialogue with others. 
 In the context of patient autonomy and decision-making, the necessity of this dialogical 
process is especially evident – patients are already physically compromised, potentially in ways 
that can exert conscious and unconscious influence over their decision-making processes, above 
and beyond the normal potential sources of error found in heuristics and biases.  Any clinician 
who genuinely cares for the welfare of her patient will be alert for such influences, recognizing 
that a medical illness can easily mask a deeper psychopathology.  Affective disorders are very 
common, occur more in patients than in the general population, and tend to go unrecognized or 
dismissed as a normal reaction to their illness.  The effect of these disorders, however, is quite 
pernicious.  They fundamentally affect the efficacy of therapeutic interventions, morbidity and 
mortality, and rate of recovery – ignoring, dismissing, or failing to identify a comorbidity 
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compromises the treatment of the obvious illness.  By only treating the surface pathology, we 
potentially ignore the deeper wound. 
 Many contemporary models of autonomy suffer from similar shortcomings – while ethics 
seeks to inform itself of philosophical, legal, theological, and medical constructs, it all too easily 
ignores the psychological, an unfortunate irony in light of the fundamental connection between 
cognitive and clinical psychology and ethical ideals of autonomous choice.  Ethical theories that 
dismiss or fail to address psychological constructs are simply so much story-telling; models 
derived from inhuman absolutes are so much fancy and fiction.  What good is it to describe 
models of cognition that have little resemblance to how we actually think? 
 The present autonomy model suggests that decision-making is a complex construct 
necessarily containing rational and emotional elements, intuitive judgments, and, as a result, 
potential sources of error.  This seems to gel with day-to-day experience – many decisions are 
made by gut instinct and intuition, instead of a Cartesian rational process methodically and 
algorithmically exploring all possible influences, outcomes, and variables.  This deterministic 
model gels with the phenomenon of basing day-to-day decisions upon distal causes – early 
education and environment, role models, learned behaviors, etc.  This model suggests that as the 
severity of the outcomes increases to terminal, increasing reflection upon the causes and 
motivations of the decision is required – that a genuinely autonomous choice will explore the 
agent’s motivations, identifying and judging the appropriateness of each influence, determining 
if it is congruent with the value system adopted by the agent as a whole.  Decisions stemming 
from inauthentic elements of the self fundamentally are not expressions of autonomy; if a patient 
is forgoing treatment, whether to avoid suffering or actively to choose death, we would be remiss 
not to ensure that it is her, and not her pathology making the choice.  Anything less would 
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surrender autonomy to expediency, would surrender authenticity to apathy, and would surrender 
insight to obfuscation.  The capacity for self-reflection appears to be a defining characteristic of 
being human – we would do well to use it when we face terminal choices. 
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APPENDIX: PSYCHOMETRIC SCALES 
 
 
HOSPITAL ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION SCALE This metric can be found in: 
“The Hospital Anxiety And Depression Scale.”
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica. 
1983; Volume 67, pages 361–70
 
AUTOMATIC THOUGHTS QUESTIONNAIRE 
DYSFUNCTIONAL ATTITUDES SCALE 
GERIATRIC DEPRESSION SCALE 
These metrics can be found in: 
Measures for Clinical Practice: A Sourcebook 
(3rd Edition)
Joel Fischer and Kevin Corcoran 
New York: The Free Press, 2000
 
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY Harcourt Assessment, Inc.
19500 Bulverde Road
San Antonio, Texas 78259-3701
1-800-211-8378 Customer Service
1-800-228-0752 Administration
 
HAMILTON RATING SCALE OF DEPRESSION This metric can be found in: 
Sourcebook of Adult Assessment Strategies
Nicola S. Schutte, and John M. Malouff
New York:  Plenum Press, 1995.
 
 485
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Ackermann, Ruby, and Robert J. DeRubeis. "Is Depressive Realism Real?" Clinical Psychology 
Review 11 (1991): 565-84. 
Adler, Alfred. The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler. Edited by Heinz L. Ansbacher and 
Rowena R. Ansbacher. New York: Harper Perennial, 1956. 
Agich, George J. "Seeking the Everyday Meaning of Autonomy in Neurologic Disorders." 
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11, no. 4 (December 2004): 295-98. 
Agid, O. et al. "Environment and Vulnerability to Major Psychiatric Illness: A Case Control 
Study of Early Parental Loss in Major Depression, Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia." 
Molecular Psychiatry 4, no. 2 (March 1999): 163-72. 
Ainsworth, Patricia. Understanding Depression. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000. 
Akechi, Tatsuo et al. "Why Do Some Cancer Patients With Depression Desire an Early Death 
and Others Do Not?" Psychosomatics 42, no. 2 (March/April 2001): 141-45. 
Al-Khalili, Jim. Quantum: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003. 
Albright, Jeanne S., and Margit C. Henderson. "How Real is Depressive Realism? A Question of 
Scales and Standards." Cognitive Therapy and Research 19, no. 5 (October 1995): 589-
609. 
Alexopoulos, George S. et al. "Clinical Presentation of the "Depression-Executive Dysfunction 
Syndrome" of Late Life." The American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 10, no. 1 
(January/February 2002): 98-106. 
Alloy, L.B., and L.Y. Abramson. "Depressive Realism: Four Theoretical Perspectives." In 
Cognitive Processes in Depression, edited by L.B. Alloy. New York: Guilford Press, 
1988. 
American Medical Association. Essential Guide to Depression. New York: Pocket Books, 1998. 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 
Fourth Edition, Text Revision. Edited by Michael B. First. Fourth. Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000. 
Anderson, Joel, and Warren Lux. "Knowing Your Own Strength: Accurate Self-Assessment as a 
Requirement for Personal Autonomy." Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11, no. 4 
(December 2004): 279-94. 
Annas, George J. "In Re: Quinlan: Legal Comfort for Doctors." Hastings Center Report June 
1976: 29-31. 
Anonymous. "Impaired Autonomy and Rejection of Treatment." Journal of Medical Ethics 9 
(1983): 131-32. 
Anscombe, G.E.M. Intention. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. 
Anton, Corey. Selfhood and Authenticity. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 
Arborelius, L. et al. "The Role of Corticotropin-Releasing Factor in Depression and Anxiety 
Disorders." Journal of Endocrinology 160, no. 1 (January 1999): 1-12. 
Arnason, Vilhjalmur. "Towards Authentic Conversations: Authenticity in the Patient-
Professional Relationship." Theoretical Medicine 15, no. 3 (1994): 227-42. 
Ashcraft, Mark H. Human Memory and Cognition. New York: HarperCollins College 
Publishers, 1994. 
Atkins, Kim. "Autonomy and the Subjective Character of Experience." Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2000): 71-79. 
 486
Aydin, Gül. "The Relationship Between Negative Automatic Thoughts and Illness." 
International Journal of Mental Health 25, no. 4 (1997): 69-74. 
Baergen, Ralph. "Revising the Substituted Judgment Standard." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 6, 
no. 1 (Spring 1995): 30-38. 
Bagby, R.M., R. Rogers, and T. Buis. "Detecting Malingered and Defensive Responding on the 
MMPI-2 in a Forensic Inpatient Sample." Journal of Personality Assessment 62, no. 2 
(April 1994): 191-203. 
Baldessarini, Ross J. "A Summary of Biomedical Aspects of Mood Disorders." In Essential 
Papers on Depression, edited by James C. Coyne, 459-92. New York: New York 
University Press, 1986. 
Bargh, John. "Conditional Automaticity: Varities of Automatic Influence in Social Perception 
and Cognition." In Unintended Thought, edited by James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh, 
3-51. New York: Guilford Press, 1989. 
Bargh, John A. "The Automaticity of Everyday Life." In The Automaticity of Everyday Life, 
edited by Robert S. Wyer, 1-61. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997. 
———. "Reply to the Commentaries." In The Automaticity of Everyday Life, edited by Robert S. 
Wyer, 231-46. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997. 
Bargh, John A., and Tanya L. Chartrand. "The Unbearable Automaticity of Being." American 
Psychologist 54, no. 7 (July 1999): 462-79. 
Bargh, John A., and Melissa J. Ferguson. "Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automaticity of Higher 
Mental Processes." Psychological Bulletin 126, no. 6 (2000): 925-45. 
Barnes, Barry, and David Bloor. "Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge." In 
Rationality and Relativism, edited by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 21-47. Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1994. 
Baron, Miron. "Behavior Genetics." In Human Behavior: An Introduction for Medical Students, 
edited by Alan Stoudemire, 473-94. New York: Lippincott-Raven Publishers, 1998. 
Barondes, Samuel H. Molecules and Mental Illness. New York: Scientific American Library, 
1993. 
Baum, Andrew, David S. Krantz, and Robert J. Gatchel. An Introduction to Health Psychology. 
Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1997. 
Baumeister, Roy E., and Kristin L. Sommer. "Consciousness, Free Choice, and Automaticity." In 
The Automaticity of Everyday Life, edited by Robert S. Wyer, 75-81. Mahwah: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1997. 
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Fifth. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Beck, Aaron T. Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders. New York: Meridian, 1976. 
———. Depression: Causes and Treatment. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1967. 
Beck, Aaron T. et al. Cognitive Therapy of Depression. Edited by Michael J. Mahoney. The 
Guilford Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy Series. New York: The Guilford Press, 
1979. 
Belkin, Gary S. "Moving Beyond Bioethics: History and the Search for Medical Humanism." 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 47, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 372-85. 
Benazzi, Franco. "A 10-Item Hamilton Depression Rating Scale to Measure Major Depressive 
Episode Severity in Outpatients." International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 13 
(1998): 570-71. 
 487
Berard, R.M.F., F. Boermeester, and G. Viljoen. "Depressive Disorders in an Out-Patient 
Oncology Setting: Prevalence, Assessment, and Management." Psycho-Oncology 7 
(1998): 112-20. 
Berkowitz, Leonard. "Some Thoughts Extending Bargh's Argument." In The Automaticity of 
Everyday Life, edited by Robert S. Wyer, 83-94. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1997. 
Binswanger, Harry. "Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation." Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 50 (1991): 154-78. 
Bird, Thomas D. "Alzheimer's Disease and Other Primary Dementias." In Harrison's Principles 
of Internal Medicine (15th Edition), edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 2391-98. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Birks, Yvonne, Alun Roebuck, and David R. Thompson. "A Validation Study of the Cardiac 
Depression Scale (CDS) in a UK Population." British Journal of Health Psychology 9 
(2004): 15-24. 
Bishop, Robert. "Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions." In Between Chance and 
Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by Harald Atmanspacher 
and Robert Bishop, 5-31. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2002. 
Bjelland, Ingvar et al. "The Validity of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale: An Updated 
Literature Review." Journal of Psychosomatic Research 52 (2002): 69-77. 
Black, Ira. Information in the Brain: A Molecular Perspective. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991. 
Blair, R. James. "A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the 
Psychopath." In The Maladapted Mind: Classic Readings in Evolutionary 
Psychopathology, edited by Simon Baron-Cohen, 85-114. East Sussex: Psychology Press, 
1997. 
Bolton, Derek. "Problems in the Definition of 'Mental Disorder'." The Philosophical Quarterly 
51, no. 203 (April 2001): 182-99. 
Boss, Medard. Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology. Northvale: Jason Aronson 
Inc., 1994. 
Bowers, Len. The Social Nature of Mental Illness. New York: Routledge, 1998. 
Boyd-Wilson, Belinda M., Frank H. Walkey, and John McClure. "Present and Correct: We Kid 
Ourselves Less When We Live in the Moment." Personality and Individual Differences 
33, no. 5 (October 2002): 691-702. 
Boyer, P. "Do Anxiety and Depression Have a Common Pathophysiological Mechanism?" Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandanavica Supplementum 406 (2000): 24-29. 
Branson, Roy, and Kenneth Casebeer. "Obscuring the Role of the Physician." Hastings Center 
Report February 1976: 8-11. 
Brawley, Otis W., and Barnett S. Kramer. "Prevention and Early Detection of Cancer." In 
Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine (15th Edition), edited by Eugene Braunwald 
et al., 497-503. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Breggin, Peter R. Talking Back to Prozac. New York: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1994. 
———. Toxic Psychiatry. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 
Brennan, James. "Adjustment to Cancer - Coping or Personal Transition?" Psycho-Oncology 10 
(2001): 1-18. 
Bricklin, Jonathon. "A Variety of Religious Experience: William James and the Non-Reality of 
Free Will." In The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, edited by 
 488
Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland, 77-98. Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 1999. 
Brown, Alison Leigh. On Foucault. Belmont: Thompson Learning, 2000. 
Brown, E. Sherwood, A. John Rush, and Bruce S. McEwen. "Hippocampal Remodeling and 
Damage by Corticosteroids: Implications for Mood Disorders." 
Neuropsychopharmacology 21, no. 4 (1999): 474-84. 
Brown, Gary P. et al. "Dimensions of Dysfunctional Attitudes as Vulnerabilities to Depressive 
Symptoms." Journal of Abnormal Psychology 104, no. 3 (1995): 431-35. 
Brown, George W. "A Three-Factor Causal Model of Depression." In Essential Papers on 
Depression, edited by James C. Coyne, 390-402. New York: New York University Press, 
1986. 
Bryant, Fred B., and W. Jeff Baxter. "The Structure of Positive and Negative Automatic 
Cognition." Cognition and Emotion 11, no. 3 (1997): 225-58. 
Buchanan, Allan E., and Dan W. Brock. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision 
Making. Studies in Philosophy and Health Policy. Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Butler, Robert N., Myrna I. Lewis, and Trey Sunderland. Aging and Mental Health: Positive 
Psychosocial and Biomedical Approaches. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1998. 
Butters, Meryl A. et al. "The Nature and Determinants of Neuropsychological Functioning in 
Late-Life Depression." Archives of General Psychiatry 61 (June 2004): 587-95. 
Byer, Virginia L., Evan G. DeRenzo, and Edward J. Matricardi. "Rational Suicide or Involuntary 
Commitment of a Patient Who Is Terminally Ill." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 4 
(Winter 1993): 327-28. 
Byerly, Floyd C., and William A. Carlson. "Comparison Among Inpatients, Outpatients, and 
Normals on Three Self-Report Depression Inventories." Journal of Clinical Psychology 
38, no. 4 (1982): 797-804. 
Bynum, Jerry, and Forrest Scogin. "The Impact of Dysfunctional Attitudes on Depressive 
Realism." Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 15, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 305-17. 
Caci, Hervé et al. "How Does the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale Measure Anxiety and 
Depression in Healthy Subjects?" Psychiatry Research 118 (2003): 89-99. 
Calhoon, Sharon K. "Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale in a 
Student Sample." Cognitive Therapy and Research 20, no. 1 (1996): 81-91. 
Callahan, Daniel. "Autonomy: A Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession." Hastings Center Report 
October 1984: 40-42. 
Callen, Michael L. "Commentary: "If I Have AIDS, Then Let Me Die Now!"." Hastings Center 
Report February 1984: 26. 
Campbell, A.G.M. "The Right to Be Allowed to Die." Journal of Medical Ethics 9 (1983): 136-
40. 
Campbell, Jennifer D., and Beverley Fehr. "Self-Esteem and Perceptions of Conveyed 
Impressions: Is Negative Affectivity Associated with Greater Realism?" Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 58, no. 1 (January 1990): 122-33. 
Camus, Albert. The Fall. New York: Vintage Books, 1984. 
———. The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays. New York: Vintage Press, 1991. 
———. The Stranger. 1946. Translated by Matthew Ward. New York: Vintage Books, 1988. 
Capron, Alexander Morgan. "Shifting the Burden of Decision Making." Hastings Center Report 
February 1976: 17-19. 
 489
Carmody, Dennis P. "Psychometric Characteristics of the Beck Depression Inventory-II with 
College Students of Diverse Ethnicity." International Journal of Psychiatry in Clinical 
Practice 9, no. 1 (2005): 22-28. 
Carpenter, Linda L. et al. "Cerebrospinal Fluid Corticotropin-Releasing Factor and Perceived 
Early-Life Stress in Depressed Patients and Healthy Control Subjects." 
Neuropsychopharmacology 29 (2004): 777-84. 
Carver, Charles S. "Associations to Automaticity." In The Automaticity of Everyday Life, edited 
by Robert S. Wyer, 95-103. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997. 
Casacalenda, Nicola, J. Christopher Perry, and Karl Looper. "Remission in Major Depressive 
Disorder: A Comparison of Pharmacotherapy, Psychotherapy, and Control Conditions." 
American Journal of Psychiatry 159, no. 8 (August 2002): 1354-60. 
Chadwick, Paul, Peter Trower, and David Dagnan. "Measuring Negative Person Evaluations: 
The Evaluative Beliefs Scale." Cognitive Therapy and Research 23, no. 5 (1999): 549-59. 
Chapman, Gretchen B., and Eric J. Johnson. "Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments 
of Belief and Virtue." In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, 
edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, 120-38. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Chase, Valerie M., Ralph Hertwig, and Gerd Gigerenzer. "Visions of Rationality." Trends in 
Cognitive Science 2, no. 6 (June 1998): 206-14. 
Chow, T., and J.L. Cummings. "Depression in Parkinson's Disease: Pharmacological 
Characteristics and Treatment." In Depression Associated with Medical Illness, edited by 
Katherine Palmer, 31-52. Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000. 
Christensen, Richard C., and S. Van McCrary. "Decisions to Refuse Medical Treatment by 
Depressed, Medically Ill Patients." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 
335-37. 
Christidis, Theodoros. "Probabilistic Causality and Irreversibility: Heraclitus and Prigogine." In 
Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by 
Harald Atmanspacher and Robert Bishop, 165-87. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 
2002. 
Churchland, Patricia Smith. Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2002. 
———. Neurophilosophy. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998. 
Churchland, Paul M. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1995. 
Chwastiak, Lydia et al. "Depressive Symptoms and Severity of Illness in Multiple Sclerosis: 
Epidemiologic Study of a Large Community Sample." The American Journal of 
Psychiatry 159, no. 11 (November 2002): 1862-68. 
Ciaramella, Antonella, and Paolo Poli. "Assessment of Depression Among Cancer Patients: The 
Role of Pain, Cancer Type and Treatment." Psycho-Oncology 10 (2001): 156-65. 
Cicirelli, Victor G., A. Peter MacLean, and Lisa S. Cox. "Hastening Death: A Comparison of 
Two End-Of-Life Decisions." Death Studies 24 (2000): 401-19. 
Clark, David A. "The Validity of Measures of Cognition: A Review of the Literature." Cognitive 
Therapy and Research 12, no. 1 (1988): 1-20. 
Clark, David A., Allan Cook, and Dean Snow. "Depressive Symptom Differences in 
Hospitalized, Medically Ill, Depressed Psychiatric Inpatients and Nonmedical Controls." 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology 107, no. 1 (1998): 38-48. 
 490
Clark, David A., and Robert A. Steer. "Use of Nonsomatic Symptoms to Differentiate Clinically 
Depressed and Nondepressed Hospitalized Patients with Chronic Medical Illnesses." 
Psychological Reports 75 (1994): 1089-90. 
Clarke, David M., Graeme C. Smith, and Helen E. Herrman. "A Comparative Study of Screening 
Instruments for Mental Disorders in General Hospital Patients." International Journal of 
Psychiatry in Medicine 23, no. 4 (1993): 323-37. 
Class, C.A., L. Schneider, and M.R. Farlow. "Optimal Management of Behavioural Disorders 
Associated with Dementia." In Depression Associated with Medical Illness, edited by 
Katherine Palmer, 17-29. Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000. 
Claxton, Guy. "Whodunnit?  Unpicking the 'Seems' of Free Will." In The Volitional Brain: 
Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, edited by Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and 
Keith Sutherland, 99-114. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 1999. 
Clement, Y., E. Lepicard, and G. Chapouthier. "An Animal Model for the Study of the Genetic 
Bases of Behaviour in Men: The Multiple Marker Strains (MMS)." European Psychiatry 
16 (2001): 246-54. 
Cleophas, T.J.M. "Depression and Myocardial Infarction: Implications for Medical Prognosis 
and Options for Treatment." In Depression Associated with Medical Illness, edited by 
Katherine Palmer, 77-85. Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000. 
Clore, Gerald, and Timothy Ketelaar. "Minding Our Emotions: On the Role of Automatic, 
Unconscious Affect." In The Automaticity of Everyday Life, edited by Robert S. Wyer, 
105-20. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997. 
Cockerham, William C. Sociology of a Mental Disorder. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1989. 
Cohen, Dov. "Ifs and Thens in Cultural Psychology." In The Automaticity of Everyday Life, 
edited by Robert S. Wyer, 121-31. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997. 
Cohen, Lorenzo et al. "Endocrine Levels at the Start of Treatment Are Associated With 
Subsequent Psychological Adjustment in Cancer Patients with Metastatic Disease." 
Psychosomatic Medicine 63 (2001): 951-58. 
Cohen, Mabel Blake et al. "An Intensive Study of Twelve Cases of Manic-Depressive 
Psychosis." In Essential Papers on Depression, edited by James C. Coyne, 82-139. New 
York: New York University Press, 1986. 
Cole, James C. et al. "Multimethod Validation of the Beck Depression Inventory-II and 
Grossman-Cole Depression Inventory with an Inpatient Sample." Psychological Reports 
93 (2003): 1115-29. 
Cole, Martin G. et al. "Feasibility and Effectiveness of Treatments for Post-Stroke Depression in 
Elderly Inpatients: Systematic Review." Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry and Neurology 
14, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 37-41. 
Collins, Francis S., and Jeffrey M. Trent. "Cancer Genetics." In Harrison's Principles of Internal 
Medicine (15th Edition), edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 503-09. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Columbia University, and  New York State Psychiatric Institute. DSM-IV-TR Case Book: A 
Learning Companion to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fourth Edition, Text Revision. Edited by Robert L. Spitzer et al. Fourth. Washington, 
D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, Inc., 2002. 
Combined Treatments for Mental Disorders. Edited by Morgan T. Sammons and Norman B. 
Schmidt. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2001. 
 491
Corey, Gerald. Case Approach to Counseling and Psychotherapy. Belmont: Brooks/Cole 
Counseling, 2001. 
———. Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy. Sixth. Belmont: Brooks/Cole, 
2001. 
Cramer, Kristie, Holly Tuokko, and David Evans. "Extending Autonomy for Health Care 
Preferences in Late Life." Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition 8, no. 3 (2001): 213-
24. 
Cummings, J.L. Clinical Neuropsychiatry. Orlando: Grune & Stratton, 1985. 
Custance, John. "The Universe of Bliss and the Universe of Horror: A Description of a Manic-
Depressive Psychosis." In The Inner World of Mental Illness, edited by Bert Kaplan, 43-
62. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 
Damasio, Antonio R. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: 
HarperCollins, 1994. 
Dawson, Neal V., and Hal R. Arkes. "Systematic Errors in Medical Decision Making: Judgment 
Limitations." Journal of General Internal Medicine 2 (1987): 183-87. 
Dawson, Valina L., and Ted M. Dawson. "Parkinson's Disease." In Fundamental Neuroscience, 
edited by Larry R. Squire et al., 830. New York: Academic Press, 2003. 
Deardorff, Paul A., Lisa R. Hopkins, and A.J. Finch. "Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire: A 
Reliability and Validity Study." Psychological Reports 55 (1984): 708-10. 
Deardorff, Paul A. et al. "Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire: A Study of Concurrent Validity." 
Psychological Reports 57 (1985): 831-34. 
Deimling, Gary T. et al. "Cancer Survivorship and Psychosocial Distress in Later Life." Psycho-
Oncology 11 (2002): 479-94. 
DeLong, Mahlon R. "The Basal Ganglia." In Principles of Neural Science, edited by Eric R. 
Kandel, James H. Schwartz, and Thomas M. Jessell. Fourth, 853-67. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Health Professions Division, 2000. 
Denner, Bruce. "To Be Moral, Must Psychology Have a Moral Face?" American Psychologist 
49, no. 2 (February 1994): 143. 
Dennett, Daniel C. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1978. 
DePaulo, J. Raymond, and Leslie Alan Horvitz. Understanding Depression: What We Know and 
What You Can Do About It. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002. 
Dewan, E. M. "Consciousness as an Emergent Causal Agent in the Context of Control System 
Theory." In Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry, edited 
by Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irwin Savodnik, 181-98. New York: Plenum 
Press, 1976. 
The Dictionary of Psychology. Edited by Ray Corsini. New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2002. 
Dieks, Dennis. "Does Chance Make a Difference?  The Philosophical Significance of 
Indeterminism." In Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
Determinism, edited by Harald Atmanspacher and Robert Bishop, 209-36. 
Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2002. 
Dienstag, Jules L., and Kurt J. Isselbacher. "Tumors of the Liver and Biliary Tract." In 
Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine (15th Edition), edited by Eugene Braunwald 
et al., 588-91. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Dixon, Keith. The Sociology of Belief: Fallacy and Foundation. Boston: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1980. 
 492
Dobson, Keith S., and Dennis Pusch. "A Test of the Depressive Realism Hypothesis in Clinically 
Depressed Subjects." Cognitive Therapy and Research 19, no. 2 (April 1995): 179-94. 
Dobson, Keith, and Hans J. Breiter. "Cognitive Assessment of Depression: Reliability and 
Validity of Three Measures." Journal of Abnormal Psychology 92, no. 1 (1983): 107-09. 
Dobson, Keith, and Renee Louise Franche. "A Conceptual and Empirical Review of the 
Depressive Realism Hypothesis." Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 21, no. 4 
(October 1989): 419-33. 
Donchin, Anne. "Understanding Autonomy Relationally: Toward a Reconfiguration of 
Bioethical Principles." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26, no. 4 (2001): 365-86. 
Dorato, Mauro. "Determinism, Chance, and Freedom." In Between Chance and Choice: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by Harald Atmanspacher and 
Robert Bishop, 339-69. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2002. 
Double, Richard. "Four Naturalist Accounts of Moral Responsibility." Behavior and Philosophy 
24, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 137-43. 
Dowe, Phil. "What is Determinism?" In Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on Determinism, edited by Harald Atmanspacher and Robert Bishop, 309-
19. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2002. 
Draper, Heather, and Tom Sorell. "Patients' Responsibilities in Medical Ethics." Bioethics 16, no. 
4 (2002): 335-52. 
Dreikurs, Rudolf. Fundamentals of Adlerian Psychology. Chicago: Adler School of Professional 
Psychology, 1989. 
Drislane, Frank W. et al. Blueprints in Neurology. Williston: Blackwell Publishing, 2002. 
Dunner, David L. "Recent Genetic Studies of Bipolar and Unipolar Depression." In Essential 
Papers on Depression, edited by James C. Coyne, 449-58. New York: New York 
University Press, 1986. 
Dunning, David, and Amber L. Story. "Depression, Realism, and the Overconfidence Effect: Are 
the Sadder Wiser When Predicting Future Actions and Events?" Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 61, no. 4 (October 1991): 521-32. 
Dupre, John. "Against Reductionist Explanations of Human Behavior." Aristotelian Society 
Supplement (72) (1998): 153-71. 
———. The Disorder of Things. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
Duvoisin, Roger C. Parkinson's Disease: A Guide for Patient and Family. New York: Raven 
Press, 1991. 
Dworkin, Gerald. "Autonomy and Behavior Control." Hastings Center Report February 1976: 
23-28. 
———. "Can You Trust Autonomy?" Hastings Center Report March-April 2003: 42-44. 
Eccles, John C. "Brain and Free Will." In Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and 
Philosophical Inquiry, edited by Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irwin 
Savodnik, 101-21. New York: Plenum Press, 1976. 
———. "How Dogmatic Can Materialism Be?" In Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific 
and Philosophical Inquiry, edited by Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irwin 
Savodnik, 155-60. New York: Plenum Press, 1976. 
Eddy, David M. "Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: Problems and Opportunities." In 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
Slovic, and Amos Tversky, 249-67. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
 493
Edwards, Virginia. Depression and Bipolar Disorders: Everything You Need to Know. Buffalo: 
Firefly Books, 2002. 
Einhorn, Hillel J. "Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making." In 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
Slovic, and Amos Tversky, 268-83. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Eisenberg, Leon. "Is Biology Destiny? Is It All in Our Genes?" Journal of Psychiatric Practice 
8, no. 6 (November 2002): 337-43. 
Elliott, Carl. "Meaning What You Say." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 
61-63. 
———. "Pursued by Happiness and Beaten Senseless: Prozac and the American Dream." 
Hastings Center Report 30, no. 2 (March-April 2000): 7-12. 
Elliott, Rebecca. "The Neuropsychological Profile in Primary Depression." In Cognitive Deficits 
in Brain Disorders, edited by John E. Harrison and Adrian M. Owen, 273-94. London: 
Martin Dunitz, 2002. 
Elliott, Timothy R. et al. "Negotiating Reality After Physical Loss: Hope, Depression, and 
Disability." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61, no. 4 (1991): 608-13. 
Enç, Berent. How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. 
Erion, Gerald J. "Finding the Faults of No-Fault Naturalism." Behavior and Philosophy 25, no. 1 
(Spring 1997): 29-41. 
Evans, Mark D., and Steven D. Hollon. "Patterns of Personal and Causal Inference: Implications 
for the Cognitive Therapy of Depression." In Cognitive Processes in Depression, edited 
by Lauren B. Alloy, 344-77. New York: Guilford Press, 1988. 
The Faber Book of Madness. Edited by Ray Porter. Boston: Faber and Faber, 1991. 
Faden, Ruth R., and Tom L. Beauchamp. A History and Theory of Informed Consent. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Fagerlin, Angela et al. "The Use of Advance Directives in End-of-Life Decision Making: 
Problems and Possibilities." American Behavioral Scientist 46 (2002): 268-83. 
Fahim, S. et al. "A Study of Familial Aggregation of Depression, Dementia and Parkinson's 
Disease." European Journal of Epidemiology 14, no. 3 (April 1998): 233-38. 
Fauconnier, Gilles. Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Fauconnier, Gilles, and Mark Turner. The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's 
Hidden Complexities. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 
Fava, G.A., and N. Sonino. "Diagnostic and Therapeutic Aspects of Depression Associated with 
Medical Illness." In Depression Associated with Medical Illness, edited by Katherine 
Palmer, 1-16. Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000. 
Fenton, Robert G., and Dan L. Longo. "Cell Biology of Cancer." In Harrison's Principles of 
Internal Medicine, edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 509-17. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Ferrara, Allessandro. "Authenticity as a Normative Category." Philosophy & Social Criticism 23, 
no. 3 (May 1997): 77-92. 
Fink, Paul Jay, and Allan Tasman. Stigma and Mental Illness. Washington: American Psychiatric 
Press, 1992. 
Finucane, Thomas E. et al. "Establishing Advance Medical Directives with Demented Patients: 
A Pilot Study." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 51-54. 
 494
Fischer, Edward H., and John W. Goethe. "Measurement of Depression and Anxiety for 
Hospitalized Depressed Patients." Psychiatric Services 48, no. 5 (May 1997): 705-07. 
Fischoff, Baruch. "Judgment and Decision Making." In The Psychology of Human Thought, 
edited by Robert J. Sternberg and Edward E. Smith, 153-87. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988. 
Fitzsimmons, D. et al. "Differences in Perception of Quality of Life Issues Between Health 
Professionals and Patients with Pancreatic Cancer." Psycho-Oncology 8 (1999): 135-43. 
Folkman, Judah. "Angiogenesis." In Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine (15th Edition), 
edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 517-30. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing 
Division, 2001. 
Fossa, S.D., and A.A. Dahl. "Short Form 36 and Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale: A 
Comparison Based on Patients with Testicular Cancer." Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research 52 (2002): 79-87. 
Foucault, Michel. The Birth of the Clinic. New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 
———. Madness and Civilization. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Vintage Books, 
1965. 
———. Mental Illness and Psychology. Translated by Alan Sheridan. Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1962. 
———. The Order of Things. New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 
Frederick, Shane. "Automated Choice Heuristics." In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of 
Intuitive Judgment, edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, 
548-58. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Freeman, Mark, and Charles Locurto. "In Skinner's Wake: Behaviorism, Poststructuralism, and 
the Ironies of Intellectual Discourse." New Ideas in Psychology 12, no. 1 (1994): 39-56. 
Freer, Jack P. "Decision Making in an Incapacitated Patient." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, 
no. 1 (Spring 1993): 55-58. 
Freud, Sigmund. "Mourning and Melancholia." In Essential Papers on Depression, edited by 
James C. Coyne, 48-63. New York: New York University Press, 1986. 
Friedel, Robert O. "Dopamine Dysfunction in Borderline Personality Disorder: A Hypothesis." 
Neuropsychopharmacology 29 (2004): 1029-39. 
Frith, Chris. "Commentary on 'Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry'." Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, and Psychology 3, no. 2 (June 1996): 91-94. 
Frith, Christopher D., and Karl J. Friston. "Studying Brain Function with Neuroimaging." In 
Cognitive Neuroscience, edited by Michael D. Rugg, 169-95. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1996. 
Frodl, Thomas et al. "Hippocampal Changes in Patients With a First Episode of Major 
Depression." American Journal of Psychiatry 159, no. 7 (July 2002): 1112-18. 
Furlanetto, Leticia M., Mauro V. Mendlowicz, and J. Romildo Bueno. "The Validity of the Beck 
Depression Inventory-Short Form as a Screening and Diagnostic Instrument for Moderate 
and Severe Depression in Medical Inpatients." Journal of Affective Disorders 86 (2005): 
87-91. 
Furrow, Barry R. et al. Health Law. Second Edition. St. Paul: West Group, 2000. 
Gacano, C.B. et al. "A Clinical Investigation of Malingering and Psychopathy in Hospitalized 
Insanity Acquittees." Bulleting of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 23, 
no. 3 (1995): 387-97. 
 495
Gantt, Edwin. "Agency, Embodiment, and the Ethical: On Saving Psychology from Biology." In 
Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by 
Harald Atmanspacher and Robert Bishop, 447-67. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 
2002. 
Ganzini, Linda, and Melinda A. Lee. "Authenticity, Autonomy, and Mental Disorders." The 
Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 58-61. 
Ganzini, Linda et al. "Depression, Suicide, and the Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment." 
The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 337-40. 
———. "Is the Patient Self-Determination Act Appropriate for Elderly Persons Hospitalized for 
Depression?" The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 46-50. 
Garson, James W. "Chaos and Free Will." Philosophical Psychology 8, no. 4 (1995): 365-74. 
Gawande, Atul. Complications: A Surgeon's Notes on an Imperfect Science. New York: Picador, 
2002. 
George, Mark S. et al. "Vagus Nerve Stimulation: A New Tool for Brain Research and Therapy." 
Biological Psychiatry 47 (2000): 287-95. 
Georgopoulos, Apostolos P. "Voluntary Movement: Computational Principles and Neural 
Mechanisms." In Cognitive Neuroscience, edited by Michael D. Rugg, 131-68. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996. 
Ghaemi, S. Nassir. "Depression: Insight, Illusion, and Psychopharmacological Calvinism." 
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6, no. 4 (December 1999): 287-94. 
Gigerenzer, Gerd. "On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and 
Tversky." Psychological Review 103, no. 3 (1996): 592-96. 
Gigerenzer, Gerd, Jean Czerlinski, and Laura Martignon. "How Good Are Fast and Frugal 
Heuristics?" In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by 
Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, 559-81. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
Gilbert, Daniel T. et al. "Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting." In Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel 
Kahneman, 292-312. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Gilovich, Thomas, and Dale Griffin. "Introduction - Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now." In 
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by Thomas 
Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, 1-18. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002. 
Glass, Carol R., and Diane B. Arnkoff. "Questionnaire Methods of Cognitive Self-Statement 
Assessment." Journal of Counsulting and Clinical Psychology 65, no. 6 (1997): 911-27. 
Gold, P.W. et al. "Abnormal ACTH and Cortisol Responses to Ovine Corticotropin Releasing 
Factor in Patients with Primary Affective Disorder." Progress in 
Neuropsychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry 10, no. 1 (1986): 57-65. 
Gold, Phillip W., and Dennis S. Charney. "Diseases of the Mind and Brain: Depression: A 
Disease of the Mind, Brain, and Body." The American Journal of Psychiatry 159, no. 11 
(November 2002): 1826. 
Goldberg, Stephen. Clinical Neuroanatomy Made Ridiculously Simple. Miami: MedMaster, Inc., 
2000. 
Golden, Robert N. et al. "A Longitudinal Study of Serotonergic Function in Depression." 
Neuropsychopharmacology 26, no. 5 (2002): 653-59. 
 496
Golden-Kreutz, Deanna M., and Barbara L. Andersen. "Depressive Symptoms After Breast 
Cancer Surgery: Relationships with Global, Cancer-Related, and Life Event Stress." 
Psycho-Oncology In Press (In press). 
Gomes, Gilberto. "Volition and the Readiness Potential." In The Volitional Brain: Towards a 
Neuroscience of Free Will, edited by Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith 
Sutherland, 59-76. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 1999. 
Goodman, Geoff. "Kleinian Guilt, Determinism, and Free Will: Implications for Clinical Theory 
and Treatment." Journal of The American Academy of Psychoanalysis 26, no. 1 (1998): 
137-63. 
Goodwin, Frederick K., and Kay Redfield Jamison. Manic-Depressive Illness. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Gotay, Carolyn Cook, Joan L. Holup, and Ian Pagano. "Ethnic Differences in Quality of Life 
Among Early Breast and Prostate Cancer Survivors." Psycho-Oncology 11 (2002): 103-
13. 
Gotlib, Ian H. et al. "Negative Cognitions and Attributional Style in Depressed Adolescents: An 
Examination of Stability and Specificity." Journal of Abnormal Psychology 102, no. 4 
(1993): 607-15. 
Graham, George. "Melancholic Epistemology." Synthese 82 (1990): 399-422. 
———. "Sociobiology in the Age of Melancholy." Biology & Philosophy 4, no. 2 (April 1989): 
162-67. 
Green, Stephen A. "Supportive Psychological Care of the Medically Ill: A Synthesis of the 
Biopsychosocial Approach in Medical Care." In Human Behavior: An Introduction for 
Medical Students, edited by Alan Stoudemire, 495-514. New York: Lippincott-Raven 
Publishers, 1998. 
Greenberg, Michael S., Carmelo V. Vazquez, and Lauren B. Alloy. "Depression Versus Anxiety: 
Differences in Self- and Other-Schemata." In Cognitive Processes in Depression, edited 
by Lauren B. Alloy, 109-42. New York: Guilford Press, 1988. 
Greenspan, Francis S., and David G. Gardner. Basic and Clinical Endocrinology. New York: 
Lange Medical Books, 2004. 
Griffin, Dale, and Amos Tversky. "The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of 
Confidence." In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by 
Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, 230-49. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
Grisso, Thomas, and Paul S. Appelbaum. Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment: A 
Guide for Physicians and Other Health Professionals. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998. 
Groom, Madeleine J. et al. "Assessing Mood in Patients with Multiple Sclerosis." Clinical 
Rehabilitation 17 (2003): 847-57. 
Grothe, Karen B. et al. "Validation of the Beck Depression Inventory-II in a Low-Income 
African American Sample of Medical Outpatients." Psychological Assessment 17, no. 1 
(2005): 110-14. 
Gruba-McCallister, Frank P. "Behaviorism and Existentialism Revisited: Further Reflections." 
Journal of Humanistic Psychology 31, no. 1 (1991): 75-85. 
Guignon, Charles. "Ontological Presuppositions of the Determinism-Free Will Debate." In 
Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by 
 497
Harald Atmanspacher and Robert Bishop, 321-37. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 
2002. 
Gustafson, Y. et al. "Post-Stroke Depression." In Depression Associated with Medical Illness, 
edited by Katherine Palmer, 63-75. Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000. 
Gutheil, Thomas G. "Commentary on "Impairments and Impediments in Patients' Decision-
Making" (Editorial)." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 340-41. 
Gutheil, Thomas G., and Paul S. Appelbaum. Clinical Handbook of Psychiatry and the Law. 
Third. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Williams, & Wilkins, 2000. 
Haaga, David A.F., and Aaron T. Beck. "Perspectives on Depressive Realism: Implications for 
Cognitive Theory of Depression." Behaviour Research and Therapy 33, no. 1 (January 
1995): 41-48. 
Haaga, David A.F. et al. "Social Problem-Solving Deficits, Dependency, and Depressive 
Symptoms." Cognitive Therapy and Research 19, no. 2 (1995): 147-58. 
Hachinski, Vladimir. "Post-Stroke Depression, not to Be Underestimated." The Lancet 353 (May 
22 1999): 1728. 
Hamamci, Zeynep, and Sener Büyüköztürk. "The Interpersonal Cognitive Distortions Scale: 
Development and Psychometric Characteristics." Psychological Reports 95 (2004): 291-
303. 
Hamer, D. et al. "Using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale to Screen for Psychiatric 
Disorders in People Presenting with Deliberate Self-Harm." British Journal of Psychiatry 
158 (1991): 782-84. 
Hamilton, Max. "A Rating Scale for Depression." Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and 
Psychiatry 23 (1960): 56-62. 
Hammen, Constance. "Depression and Cognitions About Personal Stressful Life Events." In 
Cognitive Processes in Depression, edited by Lauren B. Alloy, 77-108. New York: 
Guilford Press, 1988. 
Hancock, J.A., A.P.R. Moffoot, and R.E. O'Carroll. ""Depressive Realism" Assessed Via 
Confidence in Decision-Making." Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 1, no. 3 (1996): 213-20. 
Hansenne, Michel, and Marc Ansseau. "Contingent Negative Variation and Personality in 
Depression." Neuropsychobiology 44 (2001): 7-12. 
Harcum, E. Rae. "The Relative Utility of Complementary Disparate Views on Voluntarism and 
Determinism." The Journal of Psychology 125, no. 2 (1990): 217-28. 
Hardin, Curtis D., and Alexander J. Rothman. "Rendering Accessible Information Relevant: The 
Applicability of Everyday Life." In The Automaticity of Everyday Life, edited by Robert 
S. Wyer, 143-56. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997. 
Harrell, Thomas H., and Nancy B. Ryon. "Cognitive-Behavioral Assessment of Depression: 
Clinical Validation of the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire." Journal of Counseling 
and Clinical Psychology 51, no. 5 (1983): 721-25. 
Harrison, John E., Isabel Stow, and Adrian M. Owen. "Parkinson's Disease." In Cognitive 
Deficits in Brain Disorders, edited by John E. Harrison and Adrian M. Owen, 197-215. 
London: Martin Dunitz, 2002. 
Hatzinger, M. "Neuropeptides and the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenocortical (HPA) System: 
Review of Recent Research Strategies in Depression." World Journal of Biological 
Psychiatry 1, no. 2 (April 2000): 105-11. 
 498
Härter, Martin et al. "Screening for Anxiety, Depressive and Somatoform Disorders in 
Rehabilitation - Validity of HADS and GHQ-12 in Patients with Musculoskeletal 
Disease." Disability and Rehabilitation 23, no. 16 (2001): 737-44. 
Hellerstein, David J. et al. "Rating Dysthymia: An Assessment of the Construct and Content 
Validity of the Cornell Dysthymia Rating Scale." Journal of Affective Disorders 71 
(2002): 85-96. 
Henriques, Gregg, and Harold Leitenberg. "An Experimental Analysis of the Role of Cognitive 
Errors in the Development of Depressed Mood Following Negative Social Feedback." 
Cognitive Therapy and Research 26, no. 2 (April 2002): 245-60. 
Herrero, M.J. et al. "A Validation Study of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
in a Spanish Population." General Hospital Psychiatry 25 (2003): 277-83. 
Hierholzer, R. "Psychopharmacologic Calvinism." American Journal of Psychiatry 156, no. 7 
(July 1999): 1121-2. 
Higgins, E. Tory. "Knowledge Accessibility and Activation: Subjectivity and Suffering from 
Unconscious Sources." In Unintended Thought, edited by James S. Uleman and John A. 
Bargh, 75-123. New York: Guilford Press, 1989. 
Hjerl, Karen et al. "Depression as a Prognostic Factor for Breast Cancer Mortality." 
Psychosomatics 44, no. 1 (January-February 2003): 24-30. 
Hollis, Martin. "The Social Destruction of Reality." In Rationality and Relativism, edited by 
Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 67-86. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994. 
Hollon, Steven D., and Philip C. Kendall. "Cognitive Self-Statements in Depression: 
Development of an Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire." Cognitive Therapy and 
Research 4, no. 4 (1980): 383-95. 
Holmstrom, Nancy. "Firming Up Soft Determinism (Selection)." In Fifty Readings in 
Philosophy, edited by Donald C. Abel, 319-32. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004. 
Holsboer, Florian. "The Corticosteroid Receptor Hypothesis of Depression." 
Neuropsychopharmacology 23, no. 5 (2000): 477-501. 
Holyoak, Keith J., and Richard E. Nisbett. "Induction." In The Psychology of Human Thought, 
edited by Robert J. Sternberg, 50-91. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
Homan, Richard W. "Autonomy Reconfigured: Incorporating the Role of the Unconscious." 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 96-108. 
Hoose, Bernard. Proportionalism: The American Debate and Its European Roots. Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987. 
Horan, Barbara L. "Functional Explanations in Sociobiology." Biology & Philosophy 4, no. 2 
(April 1989): 131-58. 
Houts, Renate M. et al. "Predicting Elderly Outpatients' Life-Sustaining Treatment Preferences 
Over Time: The Majority Rules." Medical Decision Making 22 (Jan-Feb 2002): 39-52. 
Hugin-Flores, M.E. et al. "Chronic Corticotropin-Releasing Hormone and Vasopressin Regulate 
Corticosteroid Receptors in the Hippocampus and Anterior Pituitary." Brain Research 
976, no. 2 (June 2003): 159-70. 
Hunt, Morton. The Story of Psychology. New York: Random House, 1993. 
Huprich, Steven K. et al. "The Depressive Personality Disorder Inventory: An Initial 
Examination of Its Psychometric Properties." Journal of Clinical Psychology 52, no. 2 
(March 1996): 153-59. 
Husain, Mustafa M. et al. "Safety of Vagus Nerve Stimulation with ECT." American Journal of 
Psychiatry 159, no. 7 (July 2002): 1243. 
 499
Hyman, Arnold. "Comment on Williams." American Psychologist 49, no. 2 (February 1994): 
143. 
Hyman, Steven E., and Eric J. Nestler. The Molecular Foundations of Psychiatry. Washington: 
American Psychiatric Press, Inc., 1993. 
Hyun, Insoo. "Authentic Values and Individual Autonomy." Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2001): 
195-208. 
Ingvar, David H. "On Volition: A Neurophysiologically Oriented Essay." In The Volitional 
Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, edited by Benjamin Libet, Anthony 
Freeman, and Keith Sutherland, 1-10. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 1999. 
Isen, Alice M., and Gregory Andrade Diamond. "Affect and Automaticity." In Unintended 
Thought, edited by James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh, 124-52. New York: Guilford 
Press, 1989. 
Iverson, G.L., and L.M. Binder. "Detecting Exaggertion and Malingering in Neuropsychological 
Assessment." Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation 15, no. 2 (April 2000): 829-58. 
James, William. The Principles of Psychology (Vols. 1 & 2). New York: Dover Publishers, Inc., 
1950. 
Jamison, Kay Redfield. Night Falls Fast. New York: Vintage Books, 1999. 
———. An Unquiet Mind. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. 
Jennings, Bruce. "Autonomy and Difference: The Travails of Liberalism in Bioethics." In 
Bioethics and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise, edited by Raymond DeVries 
and Janardan Subedi, 258-69. Prentice Hall, 1998. 
Jensen, Robert T. "Endocrine Tumors of the Gastrointestinal Tract and Pancreas." In Harrison's 
Principles of Internal Medicine, edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 593-604. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Johnson, G. et al. "Screening Instruments for Depression and Anxiety Following Stroke: 
Experience in the Perth Community Stroke Study." Acta Psychiatrica Scandanavica 91 
(1995): 252-57. 
Johnson, Thomas J., and Thomas M. DiLorenzo. "Social Information Processing Biases in 
Depressed and Nondepressed College Students." Journal of Social Behavior and 
Personality 13, no. 3 (September 1998): 517-30. 
Johnsrude, Ingrid S. "The Neuropsychological Consequences of Temporal Lobe Lesions." In 
Cognitive Deficits in Brain Disorders, edited by John E. Harrison and Adrian M. Owen, 
37-58. London: Martin Dunitz, 2002. 
Johnston, Marie, Beth Pollard, and Peter Hennessey. "Construct Validation of the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale with Clinical Populations." Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research 48 (2000): 579-84. 
Joiner et al. "Hopelessness Depression as a Distinct Dimension of Depressive Symptoms Among 
Clinical and Non-Clinical Samples." Behaviour Research and Therapy 39 (2001): 523-
36. 
Jonides, John, and Edward E. Smith. "The Architecture of Working Memory." In Cognitive 
Neuroscience, edited by Michael D. Rugg, 243-76. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996. 
Joseph, R. "Frontal Lobe Psychopathology: Mania, Depression, Confabulation, Catatonia, 
Perseveration, Obsessive Compulsions, and Schizophrenia." Psychiatry 62, no. 2 
(Summer 1999): 138-72. 
 500
Joseph, Stephen et al. "Rapid Assessment of Well-Being: The Short Depression-Happiness Scale 
(SDHS)." Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice 77 (2004): 
463-78. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions." Psychological 
Review 103, no. 3 (1996): 582-91. 
Kandel, Eric R. "Disorders of Mood: Depression, Mania, and Anxiety Disorders." In Principles 
of Neural Science, edited by Eric R. Kandel, James H. Schwartz, and Thomas M. Jessell, 
1209-26. New York: McGraw-Hill Health Professions Division, 2000. 
Kane, Robert. "Free Will, Determinism, and Indeterminism." In Between Chance and Choice: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by Harald Atmanspacher and 
Robert Bishop, 371-406. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2002. 
Kapci, Emine G, and Duncan Cramer. "The Accuracy of Dysphoric and Nondepressed Groups' 
Predictions of Life Events." Journal of Psychology 132, no. 6 (November 1998): 659-70. 
———. "Judgement of Control Revisited: Are the Depressed Realistic or Pessimistic?" 
Counselling Psychology Quarterly 12, no. 1 (March 1999): 95-105. 
Kaplan, Harold I., and Benjamin J. Sadock. Synopsis of Psychiatry, Eighth Edition. Baltimore: 
Lippincott, Williams, & Wilkins, 1998. 
Karp, David A. Speaking of Sadness. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Kasckow, J.W., D. Baker, and T.D. Jr. Geracioti. "Corticotropin-Releasing Hormone in 
Depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder." Peptides 22, no. 5 (May 2001): 845-51. 
Katz, Jay. The Silent World of Doctor and Patient. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2002. 
Katz, Mark et al. "Screening for Depression in Head and Neck Cancer." Psycho-Oncology In 
press (2003). 
Keilp, John G. et al. "Neuropsychological Dysfunction in Depressed Suicide Attempters." 
American Journal of Psychiatry 158, no. 5 (May 2001): 735-41. 
Keller, Punam Anand, Isaac M Lipkus, and Barbara K Rimer. "Depressive Realism and Health 
Risk Accuracy: The Negative Consequences of Positive Mood." Journal of Consumer 
Research 29, no. 1 (June 2002): 57-69. 
Keltner, Normal L., and David G. Folks. Psychotropic Drugs, Third Edition. Philadelphia: 
Mosby, 2001. 
Kendler, K.S. et al. "Genetic Risk Factors for Major Depression in Men and Women: Similar or 
Different Heritabilities and Same or Partly Distinct Genes?" Psychological Medicine 31, 
no. 4 (May 2001): 605-16. 
Kendler, K.S., and L. Karkowski-Shuman. "Stressful Life Events and Genetic Liability to Major 
Depression: Genetic Control of Exposure to the Environment?" Psychological Medicine 
27, no. 3 (May 1997): 539-47. 
Kendler, K.S. et al. "A Longitudinal Twin Study of 1-Year Prevalence of Major Depression in 
Women." Archives of General Psychiatry 50, no. 11 (November 1993): 843-52. 
Kendler, K.S., and C.A. Prescott. "A Population-Based Twin Study of Lifetime Major 
Depression in Men and Women." Archives of General Psychiatry 56, no. 1 (January 
1999): 39-44. 
Kenn, Chris et al. "Validation of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Rating Scale (HADS) in 
an Elderly Psychiatric Population." International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 2 
(1987): 189-93. 
 501
Kistner, Janet, and Michael Balthazor. "Adolescents' Perceptions of Peer Acceptance: Is 
Dysphoria Associated with Greater Realism?" Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 
20, no. 1 (March 2001): 66-81. 
Kleespies, Phillip M., Douglas H. Hughes, and Fiona P. Gallacher. "Suicide in the Medically and 
Terminally Ill: Psychological and Ethical Considerations." Journal of Clinical 
Psychology 56, no. 9 (2000): 1153-71. 
Klerman, G. "Psychotropic Hedonism Vs. Pharmacological Calvinism." Hastings Center Report 
2 (1972): 1-3. 
Klimek, Violetta et al. "Brain Noradrenergic Receptors in Major Depression and Schizophrenia." 
Neuropsychopharmacology 21, no. 1 (1999): 69-81. 
Knapp, Peter K. "The Mysterious 'Split': A Clinical Inquiry in Problems of Consciousness and 
Brain." In Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry, edited by 
Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irwin Savodnik, 37-69. New York: Plenum 
Press, 1976. 
Kneebone, Ian I., and Emma Dunmore. "Psychological Management of Post-Stroke Depression." 
The British Journal of Clinical Psychology 39 (March 2000): 53-65. 
Koehler, Stefan, and Morris Moscovitch. "Unconscious Visual Processing in Neurophysiological 
Syndromes: A Survey of the Literature and Evaluation of Models of Consciousness." In 
Cognitive Neuroscience, edited by Michael Rugg, 305-73. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1996. 
Koenig, Harold G. et al. "Screening for Depression in Hospitalized Elderly Medical Patients: 
Taking a Closer Look." Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 40 (1992): 1013-17. 
Koenig, Linda J., Ann B. Ragin, and Martin Harrow. "Accuracy and Bias in Depressive's 
Judgments for Self and Other." Cognitive Therapy and Research 19, no. 5 (1995): 505-
17. 
Koike, Alan K., Jurgen Unutzer, and Kenneth Wells. "Improving the Care for Depression in 
Patients with Comorbid Medical Illness." American Journal of Psychiatry 159, no. 10 
(October 2002): 1738-45. 
Kovacs, Maria, and Aaron T. Beck. "Maladaptive Cognitive Structures in Depression." In 
Essential Papers on Depression, edited by James C. Coyne, 240-58. New York: New 
York University Press, 1986. 
Kramer, Peter. Listening to Prozac. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. 
Kreisman, Jerold J., and Hal Straus. I Hate You, Don't Leave Me: Understanding the Borderline 
Personality. New York: Avon, 1991. 
Kuczewski, Mark G. "Physician-Assisted Death: Can Philosophical Bioethics Aid Social 
Policy?" Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 7 (1998): 339-47. 
Kuenzel, H.E. et al. "Pharmacological and Nonpharmacological Factors Influencing 
Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenocortical Axis Reactivity in Acutely Depressed Psychiatric 
In-Patients, Measured by the Dex-CRH Test." Neuropsychopharmacology 28 (2003): 
2169-78. 
Kugaya, Akira et al. "Prevalence, Predictive Factors, and Screening for Psychologic Distress in 
Patients with Newly Diagnosed Head and Neck Cancer." Cancer 88, no. 12 (June 15 
2000): 2817-23. 
Kukla, Rebecca. "Conscientious Autonomy: Displacing Decisions in Health Care." Hastings 
Center Report 35, no. 2 (2005): 34-44. 
 502
Kurtz, M.E. et al. "Predictors of Depressive Symptomatology of Geriatric Patients with Lung 
Cancer - A Longitudinal Analysis." Psycho-Oncology 11 (2002): 12-22. 
Laing, R.D. The Divided Self. New York: Penguin Books, 1969. 
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its 
Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books, 1999. 
Lane, Robert E. "Moral Blame and Causal Explanation." Journal of Applied Philosophy 17, no. 1 
(2000): 45-58. 
Lang, Undine E., Rainer Hellweg, and Juergen Gallinat. "BDNF Serum Concentrations in 
Healthy Volunteers Are Associated with Depression-Related Personality Traits." 
Neuropsychopharmacology 29 (2004): 795-98. 
Langer, Ellen J. "The Illusion of Control." In Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, edited by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, 231-38. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Lavretsky, Helen, and Anand Kumar. "Clinically Significant Nonmajor Geriatric Depression." 
Psychiatric Services 54, no. 3 (March 2003): 297-99. 
Lennon, Kathleen. Explaining Human Action. La Salle: Open Court, 1990. 
Levine, Melvin D. "Disconnection: The Clinician's View." Hastings Center Report February 
1976: 11-12. 
Levinson, A-J Rock. "Commentary: "If I Have AIDS, Then Let Me Die Now!"." Hastings 
Center Report February 1984: 25. 
Lewinson, Peter M. "A Behavioral Approach to Depression." In Essential Papers on Depression, 
edited by James C. Coyne, 150-80. New York: New York University Press, 1986. 
Lewis, J.L., A.M. Simcox, and D.T. Berry. "Screening for Feigned Psychiatric Symptoms in a 
Forensic Sample by Using the MMPI-2 and the Structured Inventory of Malingered 
Symptomatology." Psychological Assessment 14, no. 2 (June 2002): 170-76. 
Libet, Benjamin. "Commentary on 'Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry'." Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, and Psychology 3, no. 2 (June 1996): 95-96. 
———. "Do We Have A Free Will?" In The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free 
Will, edited by Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland, 47-58. Exeter: 
Imprint Academic, 1999. 
Libet, Benjamin, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland. "Editor's Introduction: The Volitional 
Brain." In The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, edited by 
Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland, ix-xxii. Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 1999. 
Light, Donald W., and Glenn McGee. "On the Social Embeddedness of Bioethics." In Bioethics 
and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise, edited by Raymond DeVries and 
Janardan Subedi, 1-15. Prentice Hall, 1998. 
Lippman, Marc E. "Breast Cancer." In Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine (15th Edition), 
edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 571-78. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing 
Division, 2001. 
Lishman, William Alwyn. Organic Psychiatry. Boston: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1987. 
Little, Craig B. Deviance and Control. Itasca: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1989. 
Lockwood, Kathryn A., George S. Alexopoulos, and Wilfred G. van Gorp. "Executive 
Dysfunction in Geriatric Depression." American Journal of Psychiatry 159, no. 7 (July 
2002): 1119-26. 
 503
Logan, Gordon D. "Automaticity and Cognitive Control." In Unintended Thought, edited by 
James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh, 52-74. New York: Guilford Press, 1989. 
Lombardi, Olimpia. "Determinism, Interalism, and Objectivity." In Between Chance and Choice: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by Harald Atmanspacher and 
Robert Bishop, 75-87. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2002. 
London, Perry. The Modes and Morals of Psychotherapy. New York: Hemisphere Publishing 
Corporation, 1986. 
Longo, Dan. L. "Approach to the Patient with Cancer." In Harrison's Principles of Internal 
Medicine (15th Edition), edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 491-97. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Lowe, E.J. "Self, Agency and Mental Causation." In The Volitional Brain: Towards a 
Neuroscience of Free Will, edited by Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith 
Sutherland, 225-40. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 1999. 
Löwe, Bernd et al. "Diagnosing ICD-10 Depressive Episodes: Superior Criterion Validity of the 
Patient Health Questionnaire." Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics 73 (2004): 386-90. 
Löwe, Bernd et al. "Comparative Validity of Three Screening Questionnaires for DSM-IV 
Depressive Disorders and Physicians' Diagnoses." Journal of Affective Disorders 78 
(2004): 131-40. 
Luciano, Juan V. et al. "Development and Validation of the Thought Control Ability 
Questionnaire." Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005): 997-1008. 
Lupia, Arthur, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin. "Constructing a Theory of 
Reasoning: Choice, Constraints, and Context." In Elements of Reason: Cognition, 
Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality, edited by Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, 
and Samuel L. Popkin, 287-89. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Lustman, Patrick J. et al. "Screening for Depression in Diabetes Using the Beck Depression 
Inventory." Psychosomatic Medicine 59, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 24-31. 
Lyketsos, Constantine G. et al. "Does Stroke Cause Depression?" The Journal of 
Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 10, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 103-07. 
Lykouras, Lefteris et al. "Beck Depression Inventory in the Detection of Depression Among 
Neurological Inpatients." Psychopathology 31 (1998): 213-19. 
MacGillivray, Richard G., and Pierre Baron. "The Influence of Cognitive Processing Style on 
Cognitive Distortion in Clinical Depression." Social Behavior and Personality 22, no. 2 
(1994): 145-56. 
Macklin, Ruth. Man, Mind, and Morality: The Ethics of Behavioral Control. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982. 
MacQuarrie, John. Existentialism. New York: Penguin Books, 1986. 
Mann, John J. et al. "Blunted Serotonergic Responsivity in Depressed Inpatients." 
Neuropsychopharmacology 13, no. 1 (1995): 53-64. 
Margo, Geoffrey M. et al. "A Direct Comparison of the Defense Mechanisms of Nondepressed 
People and Depressed Psychiatric Inpatients." Comprehensive Psychiatry 34, no. 1 
(January-February 1993): 65-69. 
Martin, Jack, and Jeff Sugarman. "Agency and Soft-Determinism in Psychology." In Between 
Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by Harald 
Atmanspacher and Robert Bishop, 407-24. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2002. 
Martin, Jack, Jeff Sugarman, and Janice Thompson. Psychology and the Question of Agency. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. 
 504
Martin, Mike W. "Depression and Moral Health: A Reponse to the Commentary." Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, and Psychology 6, no. 4 (December 1999): 295-98. 
———. "Depression: Illness, Insight, and Identity." Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6, 
no. 4 (December 1999): 271-86. 
Mathiasen, Patrick, and Suzanne Levert. Late Life Depression. New York: Dell Publishing, 
1998. 
Matthews, Eric. "Autonomy and the Psychiatric Patient." Journal of Applied Philosophy 17, no. 
1 (2000): 59-70. 
———. "Moral Vision and the Idea of Mental Illness." Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 
6, no. 4 (December 1999): 299-310. 
Mayer, Robert J. "Gastrointestinal Tract Cancer." In Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 
edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 578-88. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing 
Division, 2001. 
———. "Pancreatic Cancer." In Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine (15th Edition), 
edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 591-93. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing 
Division, 2001. 
Mayo Clinic. Mayo Clinic on Depression. Edited by Keith Kramlinger. First. Rochester: Mayo 
Clinic, 2001. 
Mayo, David J. "The Case of Ms. A and Her Nurse-Therapist." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, 
no. 4 (Winter 1993): 329-31. 
McCrone, John. "A Bifold Model of Free Will." In The Volitional Brain: Towards a 
Neuroscience of Free Will, edited by Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith 
Sutherland, 241-60. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 1999. 
McCue, P. et al. "An Investigation Into the Psychometric Properties of the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale in Individuals with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome." Psychology, Health & 
Medicine 8, no. 4 (2003): 425-39. 
McGrath, P.J., E.V. Nunes, and F.M. Quitkin. "Treatment of Depression in Alcohol-Dependent 
Patients: Current Concepts." In Depression Associated with Medical Illness, edited by 
Katherine Palmer, 93-104. Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000. 
McGuffin, P. et al. "A Hospital-Based Twin Register of the Heritability of DSM-IV Unipolar 
Depression." Archives of General Psychiatry 53, no. 2 (February 1996): 129-36. 
McGuire, Michael et al. "Evolutionary Biology: A Basic Science for Psychiatry?" In The 
Maladapted Mind: Classic Readings in Evolutionary Psychopathology, edited by Simon 
Baron-Cohen, 23-38. East Sussex: Psychology Press, 1997. 
McGuire, Michael, Alphonso Troisi, and Michael Raleigh. "Depression in Evolutionary 
Context." In The Maladapted Mind: Classic Readings in Evolutionary Psychopathology, 
edited by Simon Baron-Cohen, 255-82. East Sussex: Psychology Press, 1997. 
McKendree-Smith, Nancy, and Forrest Scogin. "Depressive Realism: Effects of Depression 
Severity and Interpretation Time." Journal of Clinical Psychology 56, no. 12 (2000): 
1601-08. 
McQuellon, Richard P. et al. "Reducing Distress in Cancer Patients with an Orientation 
Program." Psycho-Oncology 7 (1998): 207-17. 
Mealey, Linda. "The Sociobiology of Sociopathy: An Integrated Evolutionary Model." In The 
Maladapted Mind: Classic Readings in Evolutionary Psychopathology, edited by Simon 
Baron-Cohen, 133-88. East Sussex: Psychology Press, 1997. 
 505
Mechanic, David. "Some Factors in Identifying and Defining Mental Illness." In The Making of 
a Mental Patient, edited by Richard H. Price and Bruce Denner, 19-30. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973. 
Meyer, John S., Y.-S. Li, and John Thornby. "Validating Mini-Mental Status, Cognitive 
Capacity Screening and Hamilton Depression Scales Utilizing Subjects with Vascular 
Headaches." International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 16 (2001): 430-35. 
Miller, Bruce L. "Autonomy & the Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment - Four Cases, Four Senses of 
Autonomy." Hastings Center Report 11, no. 4 (August 1981): 22-28. 
Miller, Dale T., and Marlene M. Moretti. "The Causal Attributions of Depressives: Self-Serving 
or Self-Disserving?" In Cognitive Processes in Depression, edited by Lauren B. Alloy, 
266-88. New York: Guilford Press, 1988. 
Miller, William R., Robert A. Rosellini, and Martin E.P. Seligman. "Learned Helplessness and 
Depression." In Essential Papers on Depression, edited by James C. Coyne, 181-219. 
New York: New York University Press, 1986. 
Mills, Jon. "Five Dangers of Materialism." In Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial 
Issues in Cognitive Science, edited by Marion Mason, 10-19. Dubuque: McGraw-
Hill/Dushkin, 2005. 
Minna, John D. "Neoplasms of the Lung." In Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, edited 
by Eugene Braunwald et al., 562-71. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing 
Division, 2001. 
Mirowsky, John, and Catherine E. Ross. Social Causes of Psychological Distress. New York: 
Aldine de Gruyter, 1989. 
Mischel, Walter. "Was the Cognitive Revolution Just a Detour on the Road to Behaviorism?  On 
the Need to Reconcile Situational Control and Personal Control." In The Automaticity of 
Everyday Life, edited by Robert S. Wyer, 181-86. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1997. 
Mitchell, A.J. "The Role of Corticotropin Releasing Factor in Depressive Illness: A Critical 
Review." Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 22, no. 5 (September 1998): 635-51. 
Mitchell, S., and E. A. Campbell. "Cognitions Associated with Anxiety and Depression." 
Personality and Individual Differences 9, no. 4 (1988): 837-8. 
Mombereau, Cedric et al. "Genetic and Pharmacological Evidence of a Role for GABA B 
Receptors in the Modulation of Anxiety- and Antidepressant-Like Behavior." 
Neuropsychopharmacology 29 (2004): 1050-62. 
Mondimore, Francis Mark. Bipolar Disorder: A Guide for Patients and Families. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
Moran, Patricia J., and David C. Mohr. "The Validity of Beck Depression Inventory and 
Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression Items in the Assessment of Depression Among 
Patients with Multiple Sclerosis." Journal of Behavioral Medicine 28, no. 1 (February 
2005): 35-41. 
Moretti, Marlene M., and Brian F. Shaw. "Automatic and Dysfunctional Cognitive Processes in 
Depression." In Unintended Thought, edited by James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh, 
383-421. New York: Guilford Press, 1989. 
Morison, Robert S. "The Biological Limits on Autonomy." Hastings Center Report October 
1984: 43-49. 
Morreim, E. Haavi. "Impairments and Impediments in Patients' Decision Making: Reframing the 
Competence Question." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 294-307. 
 506
Moxley, Roy A. "The Import of Skinner's Three-Term Contingency." Behavior and Philosophy 
24, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 145-67. 
———. "Skinner: From Determinism to Random Variation." Behavior and Philosophy 25, no. 1 
(Spring 1997): 3-28. 
Mullan, Bob. Mad to Be Normal: Conversations with R.D. Laing. London: Free Association 
Books, 1995. 
Mumma, Gregory H. "Validation of Idiosyncratic Cognitive Schema in Cognitive Case 
Formulations: An Intraindividual Idiographic Approach." Psychological Assessment 16, 
no. 3 (2004): 211-30. 
Murray, John B. "Depression in Parkinson's Disease." The Journal of Psychology 130, no. 6 
(November 1996): 659-67. 
Murray, John B., and Alan D. Lopez. Global Health Statistics: A Compendium of Incidence, 
Prevalence and Mortality Estimates for Over 200 Conditions. Global Burden of Disease 
and Injury Series, vol. 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
Musson, Robert F., and Lauren B. Alloy. "Depression and Self-Directed Attention." In Cognitive 
Processes in Depression, edited by Lauren B. Alloy, 193-222. New York: Guilford Press, 
1988. 
Narushima, K., J.T. Kosier, and R.G. Robinson. "A Reappraisal of Poststroke Depression, Intra- 
and Inter-Hemispheric Lesion Location Using Meta-Analysis." The Journal of 
Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 15, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 422-30. 
National Institute of Mental Health. The Invisible Disease: Depression. Washington, D.C.: 
National Institute of Mental Health, 2001. 
Naumann, Vicki J., and Gerard J.A. Byrne. "WHOQOL-BREF as a Measure of Quality of Life 
in Older Patients with Depression." International Psychogeriatrics 16, no. 2 (2004): 159-
73. 
Nelson, Linda D., Stephen L. Stern, and Dominic V. Cicchetti. "The Dysfunctional Attitude 
Scale: How Well Can It Measure Depressive Thinking?" Journal of Psychopathology and 
Behavioral Assessment 14, no. 3 (1992): 217-23. 
Nemeroff, C.B. et al. "Reduced Corticotropin Releasing Factor Binding Sites in the Frontal 
Cortex of Suicide Victims." Archives of General Psychiatry 45, no. 6 (June 1988): 577-
79. 
Nemeroff, Charles B. "The Neurobiology of Depression." In The Scientific American Book of the 
Brain, 263-75. Guilford: The Lyons Press, 1999. 
Nerozzi, D. et al. "Corticotropin-Releasing Factor and Adrenal Function in Major Depression." 
Journal of Endocrinological Investigation 11, no. 10 (November 1988): 697-701. 
Nesse, Randolph, and George Williams. "Are Mental Disorders Diseases?" In The Maladapted 
Mind: Classic Readings in Evolutionary Psychopathology, edited by Simon Baron-
Cohen, 1-22. East Sussex: Psychology Press, 1997. 
Netemeyer, Richard G., Donald A. Williamson, and Scot Burton. "Psychometric Properties of 
Shortened Versions of the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire." Educational and 
Psychological Measurement 62, no. 1 (2002): 111-29. 
"Neurologic Disorders." In Diseases, edited by Joanne M. Bartelmo et al., 716-81. Springhouse: 
Springhouse Corporation, 2001. 
Newport D.J. et al. "Cerebrospinal Fluid Corticotropin-Releasing Factor (CRF) and Vasopressin 
Concentrations Predict Pituitary Response in the CRF Stimulation Test: A Multiple 
Regression Analysis." Neuropsychopharmacology 28, no. 3 (March 2003): 569-76. 
 507
Newton, Michael J. "Precedent Autonomy: Life-Sustaining Intervention and the Demented 
Patient." Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 8 (1999): 189-99. 
Nicholl, Catherine R. et al. "Cognitions and Post-Stroke Depression." The British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology 41 (September 2002): 221-31. 
Nisbett, Richard E. et al. "Popular Induction: Information is not Necessarily Informative." In 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
Slovic, and Amos Tversky, 101-16. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Norris, Jack T. et al. "Assessment of Depression in Geriatric Medical Outpatients: The Validity 
of Two Screening Measures." Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 35 (1987): 989-
95. 
Oden, Thomas C. "Beyond an Ethic of Immediate Sympathy." Hastings Center Report February 
1976: 12-14. 
Ohayon, Maurice M., and Alan F. Schatzberg. "Prevalence of Depressive Episodes with 
Psychotic Features in the General Population." The American Journal of Psychiatry 159, 
no. 11 (November 2002): 1855-61. 
Ohrt, Torbjorn, Ingemar Sjodin, and Lars-Hakan Thorell. "Cognitive Distortions in Panic 
Disorder and Major Depression: Specificity for Depressed Mood." Nordic Journal of 
Psychiatry 53, no. 6 (1999): 459-64. 
Ohrt, Torbjorn, and Lars-Hakan Thorell. "Ratings of Cognitive Distortion in Major Depression: 
Changes During Treatment and Prediction of Outcome." Nordic Journal of Psychiatry 
52, no. 3 (1998): 239-44. 
Older Adults' Decision-Making and the Law. Edited by Michael Smyer, K. Warner Schaie, and 
Marshall B. Kapp. Springer Series on Ethics, Law and Aging. New York: Springer 
Publishing Company, 1996. 
Oliver, J.M., and Elayne P. Baumgart. "The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale: Psychometric 
Properties and Relation to Depression in an Unselected Adult Population." Cognitive 
Therapy and Research 9, no. 2 (1985): 161-67. 
Orme, J.E. Abnormal and Clinical Psychology: An Introductory Text. Dover: Croom Helm, 
1984. 
Ostow, Mortimer. The Psychology of Melancholy. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 
Owen, Adrien M. "The Neuropsychological Sequelae of Frontal Lobe Damage." In Cognitive 
Deficits in Brain Disorders, edited by John E. Harrison and Adrian M. Owen, 79-98. 
London: Martin Dunitz, 2002. 
Owens, M.J., and C.B. Nemeroff. "The Role of Corticotropin-Releasing Factor in the 
Pathophysiology of Affective and Anxiety Disorders: Laboratory and Clinical Studies." 
Ciba Foundation Symposium 172 (1993): 296-308. 
The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Edited by Richard L. Gregory and O.L. Zangwill. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
O'Brien, D. et al. "Are CRF Receptor Antagonists Potential Antidepressants?" Human 
Psychopharmacology 16, no. 1 (January 2001): 81-87. 
Palazidou, Eleni, and Emma Tiffin. Depression. Rapid Reference. London: Elsevier Science 
Limited, 2002. 
Paradiso, Sergio, and Robert G. Robinson. "Gender Differences in Poststroke Depression." The 
Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 10, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 41-47. 
———. "Minor Depression After Stroke: An Initial Validation of the DSM-IV Construct." The 
American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 7, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 244-51. 
 508
Parascandola, Mark, Jennifer Hawkins, and Marion Danis. "Patient Autonomy and the Challenge 
of Clinical Uncertainty." Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12, no. 3 (2002): 245-64. 
Park, Denise C. "Acts of Will?" American Psychologist 54, no. 7 (July 1999): 461. 
Parker, Gordon et al. "Atypical Depression: A Reappraisal." American Journal of Psychiatry 
159, no. 9 (September 2002): 1470-79. 
Parks, Jennifer. "A Contextualized Approach to Patient Autonomy Within the Therapeutic 
Relationship." Journal of Medical Humanities 19, no. 4 (1998): 299-311. 
Passingham, Richard. The Frontal Lobes and Voluntary Action. Oxford Psychology Series, vol. 
21. Nicholas J. Mackintosh et al., gen. ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Pearlman, Robert A. et al. "Insights Pertaining to Patient Assessments of States Worse Than 
Death." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 33-41. 
Pederson, Cord A. et al. "Neurobiological Aspects of Behavior." In Human Behavior: An 
Introduction for Medical Students, edited by Alan Stoudemire, 403-72. New York: 
Lippincott-Raven Publishers, 1998. 
Pelham, Brett W. "On The Benefits of Misery: Self-Serving Biases in the Depressive Self-
Concept." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61, no. 4 (1991): 670-81. 
Perry, Michael C., and Dan L. Longo. "Late Consequences of Cancer and Its Treatment." In 
Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine (15th Edition), edited by Eugene Braunwald 
et al., 650-53. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Persons, Jacqueline B. et al. "Relationships Between Symptoms of Depression and Anxiety and 
Dysfunctional Beliefs About Achievement and Attachment." Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology 102, no. 4 (1993): 518-24. 
Peruzzi, Nico, Andrew Canapary, and Bruce Bongar. "Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Role of 
Mental Health Professionals." Ethics & Behavior 6, no. 4 (1996): 353-66. 
Phillips, William A. "Theories of Cortical Computation." In Cognitive Neuroscience, edited by 
Michael D. Rugg, 11-46. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996. 
Pilgrim, David, and Anne Rogers. A Sociology of Mental Health and Illness. Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1999. 
Pliszka, Steven R. Neuroscience for the Mental Health Clinician. New York: Guilford Press, 
2003. 
Plomin, Robert, J.C. DeFries, and G.E. McClearn. Behavioral Genetics. New York: W. H. 
Freeman and Company, 1990. 
Powell, Tia, and Donald B. Kornfeld. "On Promoting Rational Treatment, Not Rational Suicide." 
The Journal of Clinical Ethics 4, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 334-35. 
Prater, John F. "Recurrent Depression with Vagus Nerve Stimulation." American Journal of 
Psychiatry 158, no. 5 (May 2001): 816-17. 
Presson, Paul K., and Victor A. Benassi. "Are Depressive Symptoms Positively or Negatively 
Asociated with the Illusion of Control?" Social Behavior and Personality 31, no. 5 
(2003): 483-95. 
Price, David M. "Forgoing Treatment in an Adult with No Apparent Treatment Preferences: A 
Case Report." Theoretical Medicine 15 (1994): 53-60. 
Price, Donald L. "Aging of the Brain and Dementia of the Alzheimer Type." In Principles of 
Neural Science, edited by Eric R. Kandel, James H. Schwartz, and Thomas M. Jessell, 
1149-61. New York: McGraw-Hill Health Professions Division, 2000. 
 509
Price, John et al. "The Social Competition Hypothesis of Depression." In The Maladapted Mind: 
Classic Readings in Evolutionary Psychopathology, edited by Simon Baron-Cohen, 241-
54. East Sussex: Psychology Press, 1997. 
Purselle, David C., and Charles B. Nemeroff. "Serotonin Transporter: A Potential Substrate in 
the Biology of Suicide." Neuropsychopharmacology 28 (2003): 613-19. 
Pusch, Dennis et al. "The Relationships Between Sociotropic and Autonomous Personality Styles 
and Depressive Realism in Dysphoric and Nondysphoric University Students." Canadian 
Journal of Behavioral Science 30, no. 4 (1998): 253-65. 
Quality of Life: The New Medical Dilemma. Edited by James J. Walter and Thomas A. Shannon. 
Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1990. 
Radloff, Lenore Sawyer. "Risk Factors for Depression: What Do We Learn from Them?" In 
Essential Papers on Depression, edited by James C. Coyne, 403-20. New York: New 
York University Press, 1986. 
Ramachandran, V.S., and Sandra Blakeslee. Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the 
Human Mind. New York: Quill, 1998. 
Ramasubbu, Rajamannar et al. "Functional Impairment Associated with Acute Poststroke 
Depression: The Stroke Data Bank Study." The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical 
Neurosciences 10, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 26-33. 
Ramsey, Paul. "Prolonged Dying: Not Medically Indicated." Hastings Center Report February 
1976: 14-17. 
Rapaport, David. "Edward Bibring's Theory of Depression." In Essential Papers on Depression, 
edited by James C. Coyne, 64-81. New York: New York University Press, 1986. 
Rapaport, Mark Hyman et al. "A Descriptive Analysis of Minor Depression." American Journal 
of Psychiatry 159, no. 4 (April 2002): 637-43. 
Rapp, Peter R., and Jocelyne Bachevalier. "Cognitive Development and Aging." In Fundamental 
Neuroscience, edited by Larry R. Squire et al., 1167-200. Boston: Academic Press, 2003. 
Razavi, Darius et al. "Screening for Adjustment Disorders and Major Depressive Disorders in 
Cancer In-Patients." British Journal of Psychiatry 156 (1990): 79-83. 
Redelmeier, Donald A., Paul Rozin, and Daniel Kahneman. "Understanding Patients' Decision: 
Cognitive and Emotional Perspectives." Journal of the American Medical Association 
270, no. 1 (July 7 1993): 72-76. 
Rehm, Lynn P. "Self-Management and Cognitive Processes in Depression." In Cognitive 
Processes in Depression, edited by Lauren B. Alloy, 143-76. New York: Guilford Press, 
1988. 
Reidy, John, and Edmund Keogh. "Testing the Discriminant and Convergent Validity of the 
Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire Using a British Sample." Personality and 
Individual Differences 23, no. 2 (1997): 337-44. 
A Research Agenda for DSM-V. Edited by David J. Kupfer, Michael B. First, and Darrel A. 
Regier. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 2002. 
Richardson, Frank, and Robert Bishop. "Rethinking Determinism in Social Science." In Between 
Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by Harald 
Atmanspacher and Robert Bishop, 425-45. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2002. 
Richter, Paul et al. "Measuring Treatment Outcome by the Beck Depression Inventory." 
Psychopathology 30 (1997): 234-40. 
 510
Riley, William T., and Edward W. McCraine. "The Depressive Experiences Questionnaire: 
Validity and Psychological Correlates in a Clinical Sample." Journal of Personality 
Assessment 54, no. 3&4 (1990): 523-33. 
Roberts, John Russell. "Mental Illness, Motivation and Moral Commitment." The Philosophical 
Quarterly 51, no. 202 (January 2001): 41-59. 
Robinson, Leslie A., Jeffrey S. Berman, and Robert A. Neimeyer. "Psychotherapy for the 
Treatment of Depression: A Comprehensive Review of Controlled Outcome Research." 
Psychological Bulletin 108, no. 1 (1990): 30-49. 
Robinson, Robert G. "Diagnosis of Depression in Neurologic Disease." In Depression in 
Neurologic Disease, edited by Sergio E. Starkstein, , and Robert G. Robinson, 1-12. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 
———. "Neuropsychiatric Consequences of Stroke." Annual Review of Medicine 48 (1997): 
217-29. 
Rockwell, W. Teed. "Beyond Determinism and Indignity: A Reinterpretation of Operant 
Conditioning." Behavior and Philosophy 22, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1994): 53-66. 
Roessler, Beate. "Problems with Autonomy." Hypatia 17, no. 4 (2002): 143-62. 
Rogers, Daniel. "Functional Depression Viewed as Neurologic Disease." In Depression in 
Neurologic Disease, edited by Sergio E. Starkstein and Robert G. Robinson, 13-27. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 
Rogers, Robert D. et al. "Tryptophan Depletion Alters the Decision-Making of Healthy 
Volunteers Through Altered Processing of Reward Cues." Neuropsychopharmacology 28 
(2003): 153-62. 
Rohling, Martin L. et al. "Depressive Symptoms and Neurocognitive Test Scores in Patients 
Passing Symptom Validity Tests." Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology 17 (2002): 202-
22. 
Ronson, A., and D. Razavi. "Affective and Anxiety Disorders in Patients with Cancer: Optimal 
Management." In Depression Associated with Medical Illness, edited by Katherine 
Palmer, 113-28. Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000. 
Roose, S.P., and E. Spatz. "Treating Depression in Patients with Ischaemic Heart Disease: Which 
Agents Are Best to Use and to Avoid?" In Depression Associated with Medical Illness, 
edited by Katherine Palmer, 87-92. Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000. 
Rosenbaum, Alan S. Coercion and Autonomy: Philosophical Foundations, Issues, and Practices. 
New York: Greenwood Press, 1986. 
Rosenfarb, Irwin S., and Eileen J. Burker. "Effects of Changing Contingencies on the Behavior 
of Depressed and Nondepressed Individuals." Journal of Abnormal Psychology 102, no. 
4 (November 1993): 642-46. 
Rosenfeld, Barry et al. "Measuring Desire for Death Among Patients with HIV/AIDS: The 
Schedule of Attitudes Toward Hastened Death." American Journal of Psychiatry 156, no. 
1 (January 1999): 94-100. 
Rowe, Dorothy. The Experience of Depression. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978. 
Rugg, Michael D. "Introduction." In Cognitive Neuroscience, edited by Michael D. Rugg, 1-9. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996. 
Rush, A. John et al. "Vagus Nerve Stimulation (VNS) for Treatment-Resistant Depressions: A 
Multicenter Study." Biological Psychiatry 47 (2000): 276-86. 
Rychlak, Joseph F. "Four Kinds of 'Determinism' and Free Will: A Response to Viney and 
Crosby." New Ideas in Psychology 12, no. 2 (1994): 143-46. 
 511
Rychlak, Joseph F., and Ronald J. Rychlak. "The Insanity Defense and the Question of Human 
Agency." New Ideas in Psychology 8, no. 1 (1990): 3-24. 
Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
Salomon, Ronald M. et al. "Association of a Critical CSF Tryptophan Threshold Level with 
Depressive Relapse." Neuropsychopharmacology 28 (2003): 956-60. 
Sappington, A.A. "Free Will and Agency." American Psychologist 49, no. 2 (February 1994): 
143-44. 
———. "Recent Psychological Approaches to the Free Will Versus Determinism Issue." 
Psychological Bulletin 108, no. 1 (1990): 19-29. 
Sarkar, Sahotra. Molecular Models of Life: Philosophical Papers on Molecular Biology. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005. 
Sausville, Edward A., and Dan L. Longo. "Principles of Cancer Treatment." In Harrison's 
Principles of Internal Medicine (15th Edition), edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 530-
47. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Sauvayre, Pascal, and Carl Auerbach. "Free Will, Identity, and Primary Creativity." New Ideas in 
Psychology 8, no. 2 (1990): 221-30. 
Savage, C. Wade. "An Old Ghost in a New Body." In Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific 
and Philosophical Inquiry, edited by Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irwin 
Savodnik, 125-53. New York: Plenum Press, 1976. 
Savard, Josee et al. "Evaluating Anxiety and Depression in HIV-Infected Patients." Journal of 
Personality Assessment 71, no. 3 (1998): 349-67. 
Schatzberg, Alan F. "Major Depression: Causes or Effects?" American Journal of Psychiatry 
159, no. 7 (July 2002): 1077-79. 
Scheff, Thomas J. Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 
1999. 
Schotte, C.K.W. et al. "Construct Validity of the Beck Depression Inventory in a Depressive 
Population." Journal of Affective Disorders 46 (1997): 115-25. 
Schulkin, Jay. Neuroendocrine Regulation of Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999. 
Schultz, Wolfram. "The Primate Basal Ganglia and the Voluntary Control of Behaviour." In The 
Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, edited by Benjamin Libet, 
Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland, 31-46. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 1999. 
Schwartz, Steven. "Heuristics and Biases in Medical Judgment and Decision Making." In 
Applications of Heuristics and Biases to Social Issues, edited by Linda Heath et al., 45-
72. New York: Plenum Press, 1994. 
Schwarz, Norbert. "Feelings as Information: Moods Influence Judgments and Processing 
Strategies." In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by 
Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, 534-47. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
Schwarz, Norbert, and Leigh Ann Vaughn. "The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall 
and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information." In Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel 
Kahneman, 103-19. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Schweitzer, Paul. "Realization, Reduction, and Psychological Autonomy." Synthese 126 (2001): 
383-405. 
 512
Scott, T.F., and C. Chieffe. "Treatment of Affective Disorders in Patients with Multiple 
Sclerosis." In Depression Associated with Medical Illness, edited by Katherine Palmer, 
105-11. Hong Kong: Adis International, 2000. 
Searle, John. Minds, Brains, and Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. 
Selkoe, Dennis J. "Amyloid Protein and Alzheimer's Disease." In The Scientific American Book 
of the Brain, 251-62. Guilford: The Lyons Press, 1999. 
Sellick, Scott M., and Dauna L. Crooks. "Depression and Cancer: An Appraisal of the Literature 
for Prevalence, Detection, and Practice Guideline Development for Psychological 
Interventions." Psycho-Oncology 8 (1999): 315-33. 
Shapiro, David. Autonomy and Rigid Character. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1981. 
Shrauger, J. Sidney, and Eric Mariano. "Depressive Symptoms and Accuracy in the Prediction of 
Future Events." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24, no. 8 (August 1998): 
880-92. 
Shreyaskumar, R. Patel, and Robert S. Benjamin. "Soft Tissue and Bone Sarcomas and Bone 
Metastases." In Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine (15th Edition), edited by 
Eugene Braunwald et al., 625-28. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 
2001. 
Sibille, Etienne et al. "Gene Expression Profiling of Depression and Suicide in Human Prefrontal 
Cortex." Neuropsychopharmacology 29 (2004): 351-61. 
Simon, Herbert A. "Alternative Visions of Rationality." In Rationality in Action: Contemporary 
Approaches, edited by Paul K. Moser, 189-204. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990. 
Simons, Anne D. et al. "Cognition and Life Stress in Depression: Cognitive Factors and the 
Definition, Rating, and Generation of Negative Life Events." Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology 102, no. 4 (1993): 584-91. 
Skinner, B.F. About Behaviorism. New York: Vintage Books, 1976. 
———. Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971. 
———. Science and Human Behavior. New York: The Free Press, 1965. 
Slater, Lauren. Prozac Diary. New York: Penguin Books, 1998. 
Slife, Brent. "Time, Information, and Determinism in Psychology." In Between Chance and 
Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by Harald Atmanspacher 
and Robert Bishop, 469-83. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2002. 
Slife, Brent D., and Amy M. Fisher. "Modern and Postmodern Approaches to the Free 
Will/Determinism Dilemma in Psychotherapy." Journal of Humanistic Psychology 40, 
no. 1 (2000): 80-107. 
Sloan, Tod Stratton. "Understanding Major Life Decisions: A Life History Approach." New 
Ideas in Psychology 10, no. 1 (1992): 63-77. 
Sloman, Steven A. "Two Systems of Reasoning." In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of 
Intuitive Judgment, edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, 
379-96. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Slovic, Paul et al. "The Affect Heuristic." In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive 
Judgment, edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, 395-420. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Smith, Eliot R. "Preconscious Automaticity in a Modular Connectionist System." In The 
Automaticity of Everyday Life, edited by Robert S. Wyer, 187-202. Mahwah: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1997. 
 513
Smith, L. Scott. "Freud and Adler on Agency and Determinism in the Shaping of the 
Personality." The Journal of Individual Psychology 59, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 263-80. 
Smith, Timothy W., Jennifer L. O'Keeffe, and Alan J. Christensen. "Cognitive Distortion and 
Depression in Chronic Pain: Association with Diagnosed Disorders." Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 62, no. 1 (1994): 195-98. 
Smith, Wade S., Stephen L. Hauser, and J. Donald Easton. "Cerebrovascular Diseases." In 
Harrison's Principle's of Internal Medicine, edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 2370-91. 
New York: McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Snyder, C. R. et al. "Assessing Hostile Automatic Thoughts: Development and Validation of the 
HAT Scale." Cognitive Therapy and Research 21, no. 4 (1997): 477-92. 
Solomon, Andrew. The Noonday Demon: An Atlas of Depression. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2001. 
Spalletta, Gianfranco, Alessandra Ripa, and Carlo Caltagirone. "Symptom Profile of DSM-IV 
Major and Minor Depressive Disorders in First-Ever Stroke Patients." American Journal 
of Geriatric Psychiatry 13, no. 2 (February 2005): 108-15. 
Spence, Sean A. "Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry." Philosophy, Psychiatry, and 
Psychology 3, no. 2 (June 1996): 75-90. 
———. "Response to the Commentaries." Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3, no. 2 
(June 1996): 99-100. 
Spence, Sean A., and Chris D. Frith. "Towards a Functional Neuroanatomy of Volition." In The 
Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, edited by Benjamin Libet, 
Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland, 11-30. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 1999. 
Sperber, Dan. "Apparently Irrational Beliefs." In Rationality and Relativism, edited by Martin 
Hollis and Steven Lukes, 149-80. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994. 
Sperry, R.W. "Mental Phenomena as Causal Determinants in Brain Function." In Consciousness 
and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry, edited by Gordon G. Globus, 
Grover Maxwell, and Irwin Savodnik, 163-77. New York: Plenum Press, 1976. 
Stace, W.T. "The Problem of Morals (Selection)." In Fifty Readings in Philosophy, edited by 
Donald C. Abel, 312-19. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004. 
Stanovich, Keith E., and Richard West. "Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for 
the Rationality Debate." In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, 
edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, 421-40. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Starkstein, Sergio E., and Robert G. Robinson. "Depression in Cerebrovascular Disease." In 
Depression in Neurologic Disease, edited by Sergio E. Starkstein and Robert G. 
Robinson, 28-49. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 
Staub, Fabienne, and Julien Bogousslavsky. "Post-Stroke Depression or Fatigue?" European 
Neurology 45 (January 2001): 3-5. 
Steer, Robert A. et al. "Common and Specific Dimensions of Self-Reported Anxiety and 
Depression: The BDI-II Versus the BDI-IA." Behaviour Research and Therapy 37 
(1998): 183-90. 
Stephens, G. Lynn. "Commentary on 'Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry'." Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, and Psychology 3, no. 2 (June 1996): 97-98. 
Stommel, Manfred, Barbara A. Given, and Charles W. Given. "Depression and Functional Status 
as Predictors of Death Among Cancer Patients." Cancer 94, no. 10 (May 15 2002): 2719-
27. 
 514
Stone, Eric A. et al. "Emerging Evidence for a Central Epinephrine-Innervated Alpha-1 
Adrenergic System That Regulates Behavioral Activation and is Impaired in Depression." 
Neuropsychopharmacology 28 (2003): 1387-99. 
Stone, Eric, Carrie L. Dodrill, and Natasha Johnson. "Depressive Cognition: A Test of 
Depressive Realism Versus Negativity Using General Knowledge Questions." Journal of 
Psychology 135, no. 6 (November 2001): 583-602. 
Stone, Richard M. "Metastatic Cancer of Unknown Primary Site." In Harrison's Principles of 
Internal Medicine (15th Edition), edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 628-32. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Stout, S.C., M.J. Owens, and C.B. Nemeroff. "Regulation of Corticotropin-Releasing Factor 
Neuronal Systems and Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis Activity by Stress and 
Chronic Antidepressant Treatment." Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental 
Therapeutics 300, no. 3 (March 2002): 1085-92. 
Street, Helen. "The Psychosocial Impact of Cancer: Exploring Relationships Between 
Conditional Goal Setting and Depression." Psycho-Oncology 12 (2003): 580-89. 
Stroud, Walter L. "A Cognitive-Behavioral View of Agency and Freedom." American 
Psychologist 49, no. 2 (February 1994): 142-43. 
Styron, William. Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. 
Sullivan, Phillip R. "The Natural Ought." Behavior and Philosophy 23, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 1-
12. 
Szasz, Thomas S. Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry. New York: Collier Books, 1963. 
———. The Manufacture of Madness. New York: Dell Publishing, 1970. 
———. The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (Revised). 
New York: Harper & Row, 1974. 
———. "Noncoercive Psychiatry: An Oxymoron - Reflections on Law, Liberty and Psychiatry." 
Journal of Humanistic Psychology 31, no. 2 (1991): 117-25. 
Tait, Rosemay, and Rozane Cohen Silver. "Coming to Terms with Major Negative Life Events." 
In Unintended Thought, edited by James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh, 351-82. New 
York: Guilford Press, 1989. 
Tang, Paul C. L. "A Review Essay: Recent Literature on Cognitive Science." In Taking Sides: 
Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in Cognitive Science, edited by Marion Mason, 
4-9. Dubuque: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2005. 
Tateno, Amane, Yuichi Murata, and Robert G. Robinson. "Comparison of Cognitive Impairment 
Associated With Major Depression Following Stroke Versus Traumatic Brain Injury." 
Psychosomatics 43, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 295-301. 
Tauber, Alfred I. "Sick Autonomy." Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46, no. 4 (2003): 484-
95. 
Taylor, Charles. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
The National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, and  The National Institute of 
Mental Health. "The Brain and Nervous System." In The Johns Hopkins Medical 
Handbook: The 100 Major Medical Disorders of People Over the Age of 50, edited by 
Simeon Margolis and Hamilton Moses, 96-160. New York: Rebus, Inc., 1992. 
Thiebaut, Carlos. "The Logic of Autonomy and the Logic of Authenticity: A Two-Tiered 
Conception of Moral Subjectivity." Philosophy & Social Criticism 23, no. 3 (May 1997): 
93-108. 
 515
Thiry, Paul Henri. "Of the System of Man's Free Agency." In Fifty Readings in Philosophy, 
edited by Donald C. Abel, 278-85. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004. 
Thompson, Tracy. The Beast: A Reckoning with Depression. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 
1995. 
Todd, Peter M. "The Ecological Rationality of Mechanisms Evolved to Make Up Minds." 
American Behavioral Scientist 43, no. 6 (2000): 940-56. 
Torrey, E. Fuller. Out of the Shadows. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997. 
Trask, Peter C. et al. "Longitudinal Course of Depression, Fatigue, and Quality of Life in 
Patients with High Risk Melanoma Receiving Adjuvant Interferon." Psycho-Oncology In 
press (2003). 
Tripathy, Debasish, and James Rubenstein. "Neoplasia." In Pathophysiology of Disease, edited 
by Stephen J. McPhee, Vishwanath R. Lingappa, and William F. Ganong, 91-112. New 
York: Lange Medical Books, 2003. 
Turner, Jonathon H., and Alexandra Maryanski. Functionalism. Menlo Park: 
Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, 1979. 
Turner, Mark. "Backstage Cognition in Reason and Choice." In Elements of Reason: Cognition, 
Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality, edited by Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, 
and Samuel L. Popkin, 264-86. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. "Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability." In Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, 163-78. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982. 
———. "Evidential Impact of Base Rates." In Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, edited by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, 153-60. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
———. "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." In Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, edited by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, 3-
20. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Tzelgov, Joseph. "Automatic but Conscious: That is How We Act Most of the Time." In The 
Automaticity of Everyday Life, edited by Robert S. Wyer, 217-30. Mahwah: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1997. 
Uchitomi, Yosuke et al. "Depression After Successful Treatment for Nonsmall Cell Lung 
Carcinoma." Cancer 89, no. 5 (Sept. 1 2000): 1172-79. 
van de Wag, FB, DJ Kulk, and GJ Lankhorst. "Post-Stroke Depression and Functional Outcome: 
A Cohort Study Investigating the Influence of Depression on Functional Recovery from 
Stroke." Clinical Rehabilitation 13 (1999): 268-72. 
van Londen, Liesbeth et al. "Plasma Levels of Arginine Vasopressin Elevated in Patients with 
Major Depression." Neuropsychopharmacology 17, no. 4 (1997): 284-92. 
Veatch, Robert M. "Is Autonomy an Outmoded Value?" Hastings Center Report October 1984: 
38-40. 
———. A Theory of Medical Ethics. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1981. 
Victor, Maurice, and Allan H. Ropper. Principles of Neurology. Seventh. New York: McGraw-
Hill Medical Publishing Division, 2001. 
Viinamaki, Heimo et al. "Is the Beck Depression Inventory Suitable for Screening Major 
Depression in Different Phases of the Disease?" Nordic Journal of Psychiatry 58, no. 1 
(2004): 49-53. 
 516
Viney, Donald Wayne, and Donald A. Crosby. "Free Will in Process Perspective." New Ideas in 
Psychology 12, no. 2 (1994): 129-41. 
———. "A Necessary and an Unnecessary Condition of Free Will: A Reply to Rychlak and 
Westcott." New Ideas in Psychology 12, no. 2 (1994): 151-52. 
Vinogradov, Sophia, and Joe E. Thornton. "Commentary: "If I Have AIDS, Then Let Me Die 
Now!"." Hastings Center Report February 1984: 24-25. 
Vittengl, Jeffrey R. et al. "Multiple Measures, Methods, and Moments: A Factor-Analytic 
Investigation of Change in Depressive Symptoms During Acute Phase Cognitive Therapy 
for Depression." Psychological Medicine 35 (2005): 693-704. 
Vokes, Everett E. "Head and Neck Cancer." In Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine (15th 
Edition), edited by Eugene Braunwald et al., 559-62. New York: McGraw-Hill Medical 
Publishing Division, 2001. 
Vuorilehto, Maria, Tarja Melartin, and Erkki Isometsä. "Depressive Disorders in Primary Care: 
Recurrent, Chronic, and Co-Morbid." Psychological Medicine 35 (2005): 673-82. 
Vythilingam, Meena et al. "Psychotic Depression and Mortality." American Journal of 
Psychiatry 160, no. 3 (March 2003): 574-76. 
Walker, Edward A., and Wayne J. Katon. "Psychological Factors Affecting Medical Conditions 
and Stress Responses." In Human Behavior: An Introduction for Medical Students, edited 
by Alan Stoudemire, 85-108. New York: Lippincott-Raven Publishers, 1998. 
Waller, Bruce N. "Authenticity Naturalized." Behavior and Philosophy 23, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 
21-28. 
———. "Natural Autonomy and Alternative Possibilities." American Philosophical Quarterly 
30, no. 1 (January 1993): 73-81. 
Wang, JianLi, Donald B. Langille, and Scott B. Patten. "Mental Health Services Received by 
Depressed Persons Who Visited General Practitioners and Family Doctors." Psychiatric 
Services 54, no. 6 (June 2003): 878-83. 
Watkins, C. Edward et al. "Contemporary Practice of Psychological Assessment by Clinical 
Psychologists." Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 26, no. 1 (1995): 54-60. 
Watson, John B. Behaviorism. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003. 
Waxman, Stephen G., and Jack deGroot. Correlative Neuroanatomy. Norwalk: Appleton & 
Lange, 1995. 
Wegner, Daniel M. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge: Bradford Books, 2002. 
Weinstein, Neil D. "Exploring the Links Between Risk Perceptions and Preventive Health 
Behavior." In Social Psychological Foundations of Health and Illness, edited by J. Suls 
and K.A. Wallston, 22-53. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. 
Welie, Jos V.M., and Urban Wiesling. "Authenticity as a Foundational Principle of Medical 
Ethics." Theoretical Medicine 15, no. 3 (1994): 211-25. 
Westcott, Malcolm R. "The Purposeful Choice of a Perspective: A Response to Viney and 
Crosby." New Ideas in Psychology 12, no. 2 (1994): 147-50. 
Willenberg, H.S. et al. "Effects of a Novel Corticotropin-Releasing-Hormone Receptor Type I 
Antagonist on Human Adrenal Function." Molecular Psychiatry 5, no. 2 (March 2000): 
137-41. 
Williams, Richard N. "The Human Context of Agency." American Psychologist June 1992: 752-
60. 
 517
Wilson, Daniel. "Evolutionary Epidemiology: Darwinian Theory in the Service of Medicine and 
Psychiatry." In The Maladapted Mind: Classic Readins in Evolutionary 
Psychopathology, edited by Simon Baron-Cohen. East Sussex: Psychology Press, 1997. 
Wimsatt, William C. "Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem." In 
Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry, edited by Gordon 
G. Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irwin Savodnik, 205-67. New York: Plenum Press, 
1976. 
Wing, John Kenneth. Reasoning About Madness. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 
Winokur, George. "Controversies in Depression, or Do Clinicians Know Something After All?" 
In Essential Papers on Depression, edited by James C. Coyne, 428-48. New York: New 
York University Press, 1986. 
Winstanley, Catharine A. et al. "Fractioning Impulsivity: Contrasting Effects of Central 5-HT 
Depletion on Different Measures of Impulsive Behavior." Neuropsychopharmacology 29 
(2004): 1331-43. 
Wise, E.A. "Relationships of Personality Disorders with MMPI-2 Malingering, Defensiveness, 
and Inconsistent Response Scales Among Forensic Examinees." Psychological Report 
90, no. 3 pt 1 (June 2002): 760-66. 
Wise, Thomas N., Daniel J. Levine, and Robert W. Johnson. "The Decision to Discontinue 
Hemodialysis." General Hospital Psychiatry 7 (1985): 377-84. 
Wolpe, Paul Root. "The Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A Sociological View." In 
Bioethics and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise, edited by Raymond DeVries 
and Janardan Subedi, 38-59. Prentice Hall, 1998. 
Wood, J., A.P.R. Moffoot, and Ronan E. O'Carroll. ""Depressive Realism" Revisited: Depressed 
Patients Are Realistic When They Are Wrong but Are Unrealistic When They Are 
Right." Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 3, no. 2 (May 1998): 119-26. 
World Health Organization. The Global Burden of Disease: A Comprehensive Assessment of 
Mortality and Disability from Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors in 1990 and Projected 
to 2020. Edited by Christopher J.L. Murray and Alan D. Lopez. Global Burden of 
Disease and Injury, vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
———. International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems. Tenth. 
Geneva: World Health Organization, 1992. 
Wurtzel, Elizabeth. Prozac Nation: Young and Depressed in America - A Memoir. New York: 
Riverhead Books, 1994. 
Youngner, Stuart J. "A Model System Works: Looking Deeper Than Suicide." The Journal of 
Clinical Ethics 4, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 332-33. 
Zhuang, Xiaoxi et al. "Altered Emotional States in Knockout Mice Lacking 5-HT1A or 5-HT1B 
Receptors." Neuropsychopharmacology 21, no. 25 (1999): 52S-60S. 
Zigmond, A.S., and R.P. Snaith. "The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale." Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandanavica 67 (1983): 361-70. 
Zimmerman, Mark, Thomas Sheeran, and Diane Young. "The Diagnostic Inventory for 
Depression: A Self-Report Scale to Diagnose DSM-IV Major Depressive Disorder." 
Journal of Clinical Psychology 60, no. 1 (2004): 87-110. 
Zittoun, Robert, Sophie Achard, and Martine Ruszniewski. "Assessment of Quality of Life 
During Intensive Chemotherapy or Bone Marrow Transplantation." Psycho-Oncology 8 
(1999): 64-73. 
 518
Zonderman, Alan B. et al. "Depressive Symptoms as a Nonspecific, Graded Risk for Psychiatric 
Diagnosis." Journal of Abnormal Psychology 102, no. 4 (1993): 544-52. 
Zubenko, G.S. et al. "Malignancy of Recurrent, Early-Onset Major Depression: A Family 
Study." American Journal of Medical Genetics 105, no. 8 (December 8 2001): 690-99. 
Zubenko, George S. et al. "A Collaborative Study of the Emergence and Clinical Features of the 
Major Depressive Syndrome of Alzheimer's Disease." American Journal of Psychiatry 
160, no. 5 (May 2003): 857-66. 
 
